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Abstract I 
Abstract 
Society‟s concern over the negative impact of business activities on the natural 
environment has significantly increased and, as a result, environmental regulations 
have grown considerably both in number and scope. As these policies affect 
businesses and their competitive environment, firms are interested in shaping the 
nature of such legislation through corporate political activities (CPAs).  
This thesis investigates the CPAs of MNEs in the automotive industry that are 
directed towards environmental regulations in the EU. Using the resource-based view 
as its theoretical framework, it investigates six research questions that address the 
characteristics, determinants and consequences of these CPAs in relation to three 
regulatory areas (pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and end-of-life vehicles). Case 
study analysis is based on 71 interviews with stakeholders from the automotive 
industry (the entire population of 11 MNEs from the Triad regions that are politically 
active in Brussels) and related industries, EU institutions and civil society 
organisations, representing the societal triangle (market, state, civil society). 
The thesis finds that the 11 automotive firms engage in CPAs to inform policy-
makers, and because of the impact that regulations have on their businesses. Whilst 
the firms attempt a cooperative approach, in reality this is not always the case: 
whereas individual company and association activities should lead to a united voice, 
this does not occur when it comes to important company-specific technologies and 
particular environmental policies. These regulations are viewed by companies as 
both a costly burden and as opportunities, though non-corporate respondents 
perceive that MNEs see them only as costs. The main (political) resources and 
competences used in CPAs are found to be human resources (including the related 
resources of expertise, contacts, trust and reputation, i.e. social capital), and 
technological resources. Regulations and the technological resources influencing 
CPAs are directly and uniquely linked to the product portfolios of MNEs. These 
differences in technological resources and product ranges account for most of the 
variance in MNEs‟ CPAs rather than the respective countries of origin within the 
Triad.  
 
KEYWORDS: Corporate Political Activities, Business-Government Relations, 
Lobbying, Multinational Enterprises, Triad Regions, Automotive Industry, 
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Introduction 1 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This research investigates those corporate political activities (CPAs) of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in the automotive industry that are directed towards 
environmental regulations in the European Union (EU). In this introductory chapter, 
the motivation and justification behind the choice of topic, the research questions 
investigated, the methods used and the structure of the thesis are explained. 
Why Business and Politics? The research combines these two areas and brings 
together theoretically and academically separate areas that are inextricably linked in 
practice – government policies and decisions affect businesses and their competitive 
environment, and vice versa (Keim and Hillman 2008). So far, the necessity for 
combining these two areas seems to have been rather neglected academically: 
Vogel (1996) argues strongly for an approach to the study of CPAs (business-
government relations) that incorporates both Political Science and management 
perspectives. This study is therefore exploratory in nature.  
Why Environmental Regulations? This area has been chosen as a context for CPAs 
as these regulations for companies have grown immensely in number (Lenschow 
and Sprungk 2010) and complexity in recent years due to society‟s concern over the 
impact that business activities have on the environment (Rugman and Verbeke 
1998a), and as these policies are of vital importance to the future of both the planet 
and of humankind. For firms, this matter demonstrates a crucial corporate dilemma 
between competitive advantage and social and environmental legitimacy.  
Why MNEs and Environmental Regulations? Environmental pollution and protection 
are essentially cross-border issues and thus companies crossing national borders 
and operating across them, i.e. MNEs, are an important part of the solution to 
environmental problems, whether these are process- or product-based. MNEs as 
larger firms also have more resources to engage in CPAs (Levy 1995). It was 
therefore decided to analyse MNE political behaviour rather than smaller firms‟ 
political activities. 
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Why the EU? The EU is the most advanced regional trading bloc, integrating both 
economically and politically, and it is considered a leader in environmental 
regulations (Kelemen and Vogel 2010). With policy-making and therefore pre-
regulatory CPAs based in the political centre of the EU, Brussels, it is possible to 
compare MNEs from the Triad regions (EU, Japan, US) in one location. Many 
environmental issues are inherently supranational (Dunning and Lundan 2008) and it 
is thus advisable to examine the issue of MNEs and environmental regulations in a 
supranational context such as the EU instead of a purely national context. 
Why the Automotive Industry? The motor vehicles industry was chosen as all the 
major global car companies operate within the European single market and are also 
politically represented in a single location. Accordingly, this makes it possible to 
compare, in Brussels, the CPAs of European firms with those of US and Japanese 
subsidiaries. The industry is politically active and has been the subject of lobbying 
studies in the Political Science literature (McLaughlin and Maloney 1999), which 
makes it possible to compare findings. It is also regarded as a polluting industry in 
terms of its processes and products, and hence faces significant (post-regulatory) 
challenges by environmental regulations and is strongly influenced by these 
regulations (Levy and Egan 2003, Wagner 2009). The chosen focus of this thesis, 
therefore, on the selected regulatory areas of pollutant emissions, carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions, and end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), is important, and these three areas 
– which can pose conflicting requirements on the industry – have not been studied 
together in this pre-regulatory context. 
Why pre-regulatory CPAs of the automotive industry in the EU? Crotty and Smith 
(2006) have come close to the unit of analysis of this thesis as they investigated the 
post-regulatory response of business activities of the UK car industry regarding ELVs 
by using Rugman and Verbeke (1998a)‟s framework. This thesis acknowledges this 
direction of research but tries to find out whether, ex ante, CPAs can lead to new 
insights regarding political activities, resources and relationships between the private, 
public and third sector. 
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives 
The research on CPAs tends to draw independently on the disciplines of International 
Business (IB), Strategic Management and Political Science. This literature stresses, 
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however, a need for inter- and multidisciplinary research into business-government 
relations and for the investigation of the EU as a supranational institution. These 
three disciplines share an underlying resource assumption, and therefore a resource-
based view (RBV) is used in this thesis as its main theoretical framework. 
While CPAs are discussed and defined in these three strands of literature as any 
intended firm action with the purpose of influencing governmental policy, they have 
so far not provided clear and consistent answers as to why firms pursue CPAs and 
whether government policies are exogenous or endogenous to companies 
(Boddewyn 1988 and 2003, Salorio et al. 2005). This thesis will therefore address the 
following six research questions:  
 Research question 1: Why do firms1 engage in CPAs? 
Business-government relations are complex and within the mentioned strands of 
research there has not been a clear answer as to whether these relations are of 
confrontational or cooperative nature, or how they are organised (Rugman and 
Verbeke 1998b, McLaughlin and Maloney 1999). Therefore, another research 
question is posed: 
Research question 2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
This question of organisation also embraces firms‟ decisions whether to pursue 
activities individually or collectively through an industry association (Bouwen 2002). 
The focus of this thesis is mainly on individual CPAs; however, since joint political 
(unlike market) activities are permitted, the following question also needs to be 
asked: 
Research question 3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities 
and industry association activities in interest representation? 
The importance of researching environmental regulations is emphasised in the three 
strands of literature used (Windsor 2007), and the RBV, too, discusses corporate 
environmental policies (Russo and Fouts 1997), leading to the next question: 
Research question 4: How do corporations view environmental regulations? 
Investigating this sheds light on the perspective companies adopt in relation to 
environmental regulations, whether they regard these as costs, opportunities or both 
                                              
1
 By firms, we mean companies and corporations in general and MNEs in particular. These terms are 
used interchangeably in order to avoid repetition. 
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(see also Smith and Crotty 2008 for automotive companies‟ attitudes towards 
environmental regulations, albeit within a purely UK context). 
The three areas of environmental regulations (pollutant and CO2 emissions, ELVs) 
have been reported in media and academia as being full of tensions and differences. 
Furthermore, the automotive industry is unique in that it has companies with 
headquarters in all Triad regions operating competitively and politically in the EU. 
The thesis therefore investigates what these tensions and differences are and why 
they arose. In other words: 
Research question 5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of 
environmental regulations and between MNEs from the Triad regions2? 
This research question was prompted by the RBV and a call for papers for a special 
issue of the Journal of International Business Studies3. Therefore, this question of 
international differences is an important contribution to the IB literature, which has 
often focused on similarities between IB institutions, e.g. MNEs (Toyne and Nigh 
1997a: 14). It is also the case that the literature on business-government relations 
has not investigated differences between companies across different countries of 
origins (Meznar 2001, Coen 2007). As the RBV is traditionally used as a framework 
for explaining differences between firms (Gibbert 2006a), it serves as useful 
underpinning for the study to provide answers to this question. Faced with the same 
regulatory and institutional environment, MNEs might be expected to respond 
similarly to this environment. However, due to differences in their resource 
endowments, it is expected that MNEs may be heterogeneous in their responses, 
based on the RBV. The RBV also helps to address the following, last, research 
question: 
Research question 6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do 
firms use in their CPAs? 
The RBV only looks at the economic and organisational competences of firms 
(Boddewyn and Brewer 19994) and, therefore, investigating this question should 
                                              
2
 In this thesis, EU member states in general are considered as home countries for companies from 
the EU area and as host countries for US and Japanese subsidiaries (see e.g. Wilkins 2007). All 
companies are faced with the same regulatory environment. Location decisions are already made 
and therefore “traditional” IB location and entry considerations are not discussed. 
3
 This call was published in 2005 for a focused issue on “Three lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: 
Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility” and the research questions included 
amongst others “How do MNE political strategies vary across nations?”. 
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extend this literature and shed light on how MNEs engage in CPAs and on the 
specific political resources employed by them in order to gain political advantages. 
In investigating these six research questions this study addresses various gaps in the 
three strands of CPA literature (IB, Strategic Management, and Political Science) and 
the theoretical framework (RBV), and therefore contributes in several ways to the 
academic development of research in these areas. The next three chapters discuss 
these contributions and identify research gaps in more detail. Furthermore, the 
investigation of these six research questions leads to recommendations for 
researchers and practitioners, discussed in the concluding chapter.  
1.3 Research Methods and Sources 
As research design, a case study approach using qualitative methods was chosen, 
although initially quantitative methods were also considered. The complex and 
potentially sensitive nature of the subject of business-government relations, the small 
number of companies involved, and the exploratory nature of the research influenced 
this choice of qualitative instruments.  
The chosen research methodology comprised semi-structured interviews, supported 
by primary and secondary sources such as reports, policy and legal documents from 
the companies and industry associations involved, and from the EU institutions. Data 
sources as well as interview sources were triangulated: all three corners of the so-
called societal triangle (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006) were included in the 
investigation, i.e. state, market and civil society, to give a holistic representation of 
the complex reality involved in CPAs. The state (or government) provides the legal 
framework which structures society while the market sector creates benefits for 
society by transforming inputs into outputs within the boundaries of the legal 
framework (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006). Civil society represents social 
relations among citizens that structure society outside business and politics. The 
most important representatives of civil society are non-governmental organisations, 
NGOs (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006: 61). All three sides of the societal 
triangle are involved in the environmental policy-making process and therefore all 
sides needed to be taken into account for this research.  
In total, 71 interviews were conducted, most of them face-to-face in Brussels, with 
representatives from the EU institutions (European Commission and Parliament) 
representing the state, companies and associations from the automotive industries 
and other stakeholders (related industries) representing the market, as well as 
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environmental and consumer NGOs representing civil society. There are 11 cases of 
automotive companies politically active in Brussels of which 10 were directly 
interviewed and 1 indirectly through other sources, and therefore this research 
covers the whole population of automotive MNEs engaging in CPAs at European 
level.  
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The next three chapters (2 to 4) present the literature background, the study context, 
and the theoretical framework, and chapter 5 synthesises the research questions for 
which chapter 6 proposes a methodology. Together they provide the basis for the 
following two chapters 7 and 8, which analyse and discuss the findings. Chapter 9 
concludes the thesis. 
The literature review in chapter 2 covers the three perspectives on CPAs. The IB 
literature focuses on MNE-host government relations with an international 
perspective, while the Strategic Management literature discusses CPAs with a US 
emphasis. The Political Science literature revolves around interest representation 
and lobbying with a focus on the EU and a European perspective. The latter also 
includes a discussion on social capital. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the 
three CPA perspectives and the definition of CPAs used throughout the thesis4. 
In chapter 3, CPAs are applied to the automotive industry and EU environmental 
legislation, introducing the three chosen regulatory areas in more detail – pollutant 
emissions, CO2 emissions and ELVs. The thesis does not aim to explain the 
economics of environmental regulations but takes these as a given to which 
companies then respond with pre-regulatory political activities in order to shape the 
details of regulation on the European level5. Environmental regulations are discussed 
as well as the EU – as a context for these – and CPAs with regard to environmental 
policies. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is discussed in chapter 4. The first part 
reviews the RBV in general, including the concepts of competitive advantage, 
resources, heterogeneity and immobility as well as the so-called VRIN framework 
(value, rareness, inimitability, and non-substitutability of resources) and limitations of 
                                              
4
 For ease of exposition, CPAs will be the unifying term. 
5
 For further discussions of environmental regulations see e.g. Grubb et al. 1999 and Helm 2003. 
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the RBV6. In the second part, the concepts of the RBV are applied to the context of 
this thesis, i.e. MNEs, CPAs and environmental regulations. The main assumption of 
the thesis follows from the RBV, which states that companies differ in their 
competitive strategies due to heterogeneous distributions of resources across firms 
and due to the immobile nature of resources (that is, they cannot be transferred 
between firms without costs). The assumption of the thesis transfers this into the field 
of political strategies: firms differ in their CPAs due to different competitive strategies 
and resource endowments. As the RBV is a theoretical framework that is used to 
explain differences between companies in a competitive environment (Hoopes et al. 
2003: 897), it is extended in this thesis to provide a framework to investigate 
differences between firms in a political environment and the (political) resources and 
competences employed by MNEs in their CPAs. 
Chapter 5 synthesises the research questions on the basis of the three previous 
chapters. The methodology for this research is then proposed in chapter 6, i.e. the 
case study and qualitative methods as research tool, and the instruments and 
sources used. Data collection is described in detail, tools for analysis are introduced, 
and validity and reliability concerns are considered. 
The analysis chapters (7 and 8) are structured around the research questions and 
include cross-case as well as within-case analysis; in chapter 7 the following 
research questions (RQs), which are of a general nature, are discussed across the 3 
regulatory areas: 
 Why do firms engage in CPAs? (RQ1) 
 How do companies organise and approach CPAs? (RQ2) 
 What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? (RQ3) 
 What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in CPAs? 
(RQ6) 
Chapter 8 entails analysis of the three environmental regulatory areas, and findings 
specific to the individual companies according to their country and region of origin. It 
addresses the remaining two research questions: 
 How do enterprises view environmental regulations? (RQ4) 
                                              
6
 The term resource-based view (RBV) is used throughout this thesis, thus adhering to conventional 
use of the term. 
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 How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations and between MNEs from the Triad regions? (RQ5) 
Chapter 8 also discusses (political) resources and competences with respect to the 
environmental areas and individual MNEs (RQ6). Chapter 9 revisits the six research 
questions and summarises the findings. In doing so, it also revisits the foundational 
chapters in light of the analysis in chapters 7 and 8 in order to point out contributions 
and reflections. At this stage, the limitations of the study are discussed, including an 
acknowledgment of the changing environment of the industry, and further research is 
suggested before the chapter ends with recommendations to the constituents of this 
research – state, market and civil society – and concluding remarks. 
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2 The Corporate Political Activities (CPAs) of 
MNEs 
As the nature of the thesis favours an interdisciplinary approach, this chapter draws 
on three different fields of knowledge to study business-government relations: the IB 
literature focuses on MNE-host government relations; the Strategic Management 
literature related to CPAs focuses mostly on US corporations, whereas the Political 
Science literature focuses on the EU perspective and interest groups in general. The 
following sections discuss these three areas, which all contribute to a better 
understanding of the specific context of this thesis: automotive MNEs‟ political 
activities directed towards environmental regulations in the EU. A synthesis of the 
three perspectives, summarising the gaps and consequent research questions, 
concludes the chapter. 
2.1 Three Perspectives on the CPAs of MNEs and their Political 
Environment  
2.1.1 Setting the Scene: Public Policy Processes and Business 
The function of the political process is to organize collective effort to 
achieve certain goals or objectives that individuals or private groups 
find difficult, if not impossible, to achieve by themselves. (Gale and 
Buchholz 1987: 35) 
The justification for CPAs lies in the influences and effects that government decisions 
and policies may have on business enterprises and their competitive environment 
(Keim and Hillman 2008, Wagner 2009). These effects vary according to the issue 
area and the type of policy. 
Gale and Buchholz (1987) point out that government action can have three general 
effects: on the size of markets, the structure of markets and the cost structure of an 
industry. Regulatory requirements can change the cost structures of companies; for 
example, among environmental regulations, pollution control requirements can alter 
the input costs of an industry (Gale and Buchholz 1987). Energy costs are a critical 
uncertainty in the corporate environment and the government‟s influence on this 
environment is a reason for companies to engage politically (Yoffie 1987). 
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Public policies are created through the political process or through mutual agreement 
by interested parties (Keim and Hillman 2008). The development of these policies 
does not take place in a vacuum but is rather the result of “power plays” by interested 
parties (Boddewyn 1988: 344). Power and influence of a variety of actors pursuing 
distinct interests make the public policy process a political process – unlike the 
market place, where a procedure of exchange is prevalent (cf. Gale and Buchholz 
1987). 
Gale and Buchholz (1987) make a distinction between two goals of corporate 
involvement in the political process: legitimacy and competitive advantage7, which 
may or may not be in conflict. The authors use Wilson‟s (1980) argument that 
participating in the public policy process for either goal requires that the objectives 
are stated in terms of collective or societal goods, not the market‟s self-interest (Gale 
and Buchholz 1987). This is in accordance with Marcus et al. (1987b: 15) who argue 
that it is the  
ability of the firm to merge its interests with broader social concerns 
that is of utmost importance in business strategy and public policy. 
There is a range of terms used for business-government relations and the company 
function for it, as can be seen in the following table. 
Table 2.1: Terms used for business-government relations 
Business-government relations  
 (corporate) public affairs 
 (corporate/business) political 
activities/action,  
 political behaviour  
 (corporate) political strategies  
 (international) business-government 
interaction 
 external affairs 
 corporate affairs 
 external relations 
 public relations 
 government relations 
 lobbying 
 MNE-host government relations  
(Sources: Baysinger 1984, Mahon 1989, Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Griffin et al. 2001a, Blumentritt 
and Nigh 2002, Hillman et al. 2004, Luo 2004a) 
The study of CPAs (or public affairs) is naturally an interdisciplinary subject and 
draws from the literatures in political science, economics, and management. Getz 
(1997) mentions the following theories from these literatures in the context of CPAs: 
interest group, collective action, public choice, transaction cost, resource 
dependency, exchange, institutional, behavioural and agency theories. Griffin et al. 
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 Marcus et al. (1987a) call these two goals business dilemmas. See also Meznar and Nigh (1993) and 
Holtbrügge and Berg (2004) for legitimacy as a goal of public affairs management. Boddewyn and 
Brewer (1994) point out that legitimacy is rather an instrumental goal than an end in itself. 
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(2001a) make finer distinctions in their wide-ranging bibliography of corporate public 
affairs and mention the following literatures: corporate public affairs, political strategy, 
issues management, international public affairs, community relations, and political 
involvement activities. The terms mentioned in the table above vary slightly in their 
definitions, but they all have in common that they refer to the function of  
enlisting the support and/or negating the opposition of non-market 
and non-economic players in a firm‟s environment. (Griffin et al. 
2001a: 11) 
The next sections discuss definitions and functions in the light of three different areas 
– IB, Strategic Management and Political Science. 
2.1.2 International Business: MNE-Host Government Relations 
The IB literature on MNEs can be traced to two inter-related strands of literature in 
three main time periods, according to Dunning (2001): the three time periods are the 
1960s to the mid 1970s, the mid 1970s to the late 1980s, and the late 1980s to the 
turn of the century. The first strand of literature has examined determinants of 
ownership, sectoral pattern and geographical scope of MNE activity (Dunning 20018). 
The second strand of literature is concerned with changes in the external 
technological, economic and political environment (Dunning 2001).  
According to Boddewyn and Brewer (1994: 137), political behaviour is intrinsic to 
international business as the crossing of borders means introducing companies into 
other sovereignties. The authors assert that IB research is much more concerned 
with political factors than research in domestic business9. Governmental policies 
differ from country to country and thus distinguish international from domestic 
business10 (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994: 123-125, see also Grosse and Behrman 
1992: 119, as well as Toyne and Nigh 1998). Boddewyn (1988) anticipates this 
notion in claiming that the distinction between international and domestic business is 
                                              
8
 See e.g. Hymer 1976, Vernon (1966) (Product cycle and international investment), Buckley and 
Casson (1976), Hennart (1982), and Dunning (1981) (OLI paradigm of ownership, location, 
internalisation). For overviews on the theoretical foundations in IB see also Buckley (1990), Grosse 
and Behrman (1992) and Dunning and Lundan (2008). 
9
 Their argument of distinguishing domestic from international business is as follows: nations are 
typified by physical, economic, social, and cultural characteristics whereas states are typified by 
political characteristics. Technically, this would mean that international business is in fact “inter-
state” business. However, to be consistent with other writings, this thesis will use the established 
term “international” business. 
10
 Pitelis (2001) points out that in the absence of states no FDI (foreign direct investment) can exist 
and neither can transnational companies. 
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fundamentally political (see also Boddewyn 1997 and Grosse 2005a). Grosse 
(2005a) implicitly defines international business-government relations as the relations 
between national governments and multinational firms. Moon and Lado (2000) 
confirm that an important issue in IB is the interaction between multinationals and 
host governments, among which strategic interdependence often exists (Ring et al. 
1990). Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) argue for more integration between MNE 
literature and literature on international business-government interactions.  
Dunning (2002) also stresses the need for a reappraisal of the significance of 
governments for MNE activities. Dunning established the so-called OLI paradigm as 
a model of the MNE, which is a widely referenced model (Fladmoe-Lindquist and 
Tallman 1994)11. Other empirical models to analyse multinational strategies and 
structures include Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s (1989) transnational model and Porter‟s 
(1990) competitive diamond of an industry‟s home country advantage (Fladmoe-
Lindquist and Tallman 1994, see also Buckley 2002).  
In order to bring political aspects into MNE Theory, Boddewyn (1988) expands 
Dunning‟s eclectic OLI paradigm of Ownership, Location and Internalisation 
advantages to include political dimensions, which were missing from the framework 
until then. The environment of a firm can, thus, be dichotomised into market and non-
market components12. Enriching Dunning‟s paradigm requires that non-market 
factors like the government should be endogenised instead of being taken as 
exogenous “givens” (Boddewyn 1988: 357), which involves interdisciplinary 
borrowings. One borrowing this author would like to stress is the notion that “public 
policy (…) is not developed in a vacuum but is usually the outcome of power plays by 
interested parties” (Boddewyn 1988: 344). Political activities of MNEs (and other 
corporations) thus take part in shaping legislation. Boddewyn (1988) criticises 
previous work for an economic bias, taking government policies as givens, which 
may not be internalised by MNEs. He furthermore emphasises that even though 
MNEs‟ goals might still be economic, they can use political means to achieve 
                                              
11
 It presents a paradigm of empirically based models of the multinational firm. Two other major 
theoretical perspectives on MNEs are based on industrial economics and transaction cost 
economics (Fladmoe-Lindquist and Tallman 1994). 
12
 Like Boddewyn (1988), Baron (1995) uses the dichotomy non-market and market, which form the 
corporate environment. The non-market environment includes interactions that are “intermediated by 
the public, stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions” (Baron 1995: 47). For an 
extensive discussion and overarching definition of the concept of non-market see Boddewyn (2003).  
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economic ends13. Markusen (1995) also urges further research to consider making 
the relationship between policy and foreign ownership, that is, between governments 
and MNEs, endogenous.  
Boddewyn (1988) enriches Dunning‟s OLI paradigm by adding political knowledge or 
expertise to O advantages, by assuming that an L advantage can be of a political 
nature, and that I involves political intermediate products, too. Political knowledge 
and expertise are political resources (Dahan 2005a, b) that are investigated as well 
for their role in CPAs (see chapter 4). The OLI framework can incorporate MNE-host 
government relations as a result of Boddewyn‟s work. 
Boddewyn (1997) terms MNE-host government relations as International Business-
Government Relations and puts them in the context of less developed countries. 
MNE-host government relations literature often focuses on developing or emerging 
markets (e.g. Luo 2004a), especially in the context of technology transfer and foreign 
direct investment (FDI, see e.g. Fagre and Wells 1982, Dunning 1993, Dunning and 
Lundan 2008), and seems to take government relations in industrialised home and 
host countries for granted14. Hillman and Wan (2005) note that most IB literature 
focuses on initial entry into a country whereas little research is directed towards 
political strategies post-entry (see also Rodriguez et al. 2006). The study at hand 
addresses this gap by focusing on environmental regulations, which do not regard 
initial entries, but focus on post-entry production and products. 
As research has tended to be on emerging markets (Caves 1998, Dunning 1998), 
industrialised countries have not been adequately researched. Luo (2004a) 
encourages the investigation of MNE-host government relations in developed 
countries and points out that these often provide national treatment to foreign MNEs. 
Nigh (1997) emphasises that most MNEs are indeed headquartered in (and hosted 
by) developed countries in the Triad15 (US, Japan, EU), and that the trend towards 
increased supranational economic integration does weaken the national identity of 
                                              
13
 Wilkins (1997) argues similarly, and advocates against the separation of the political from the 
economic in providing analytical frameworks. 
14
 The general MNE-host government relations literature does seem to focus between MNEs from the 
Northern hemisphere and host governments in developing countries from the Southern hemisphere, 
whereas government relations also played a big role for Western MNEs investing in and trading with 
industrialised Eastern European economies through industrial co-operation agreements during the 
Cold War (Hill and Hay 1993). 
15
 See Ohmae (1985, 1987) for Triad regions, as well as Van den Bulcke (1995) and Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004). 
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MNEs16. National governments are also facing regulatory competition from 
organisations such as the EU (Grosse 2005a) which has complicated the monitoring 
of the political environment for MNEs (Brewer and Young 2001). This thesis 
investigates this increasingly important and complex context by looking at MNE-
government relations in the EU.  
In addition, it needs to be stressed that the bulk of sales for MNEs is still in the Triad 
(Rugman and Verbeke 2004) and there is 
plenty of room for further analysis from different perspectives and with 
greater emphasis on the current geographic focus of MNE activities, 
which clearly is in the Triad countries. (Grosse 2005a: 21) 
This thesis therefore makes an empirical contribution with its focus on the EU as a 
region of developed countries, which is both home and host region to MNEs in the 
automotive industry, and thus enables the simultaneous comparison of host and 
home government relations of MNEs: MNE-host government relations for Japanese 
and American subsidiaries and MNE-home government relations for European 
companies (EU institutions are regarded as the European government)17.  
The Triad regions are of interest in the context of MNE typologies, of which Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1989) provide the most extensive one (Harzing 2000)18. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1989) typify MNEs according to key capabilities in responding to pressures 
for national responsiveness and global integration, as multinational (or 
multidomestic19 in Harzing‟s terms, 2000), global and international.  
The multinational type is mainly found in European MNEs, the global enterprise in 
Japanese MNEs and the international one in US MNEs; therefore the MNE typology 
matches the Triad regions mentioned above. The ideal prescribed type is an 
integration of all three which Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) call “transnational 
                                              
16
 Dunning and Robson (1987) draw an interesting link between regional economic integration and the 
international integration of activities by and within MNEs which they call corporate integration, both 
of which are based on a perception that net gains can be attained by integration. 
17
 Toyne and Nigh (1997a) underline that MNEs influence governmental decisions and business 
processes of both their home and host countries. See also Wilkins (2007) for a discussion of Europe 
as home and host to MNEs. 
18
 See also Perlmutter (1969) for an early classification of MNEs. 
19
 Bartlett et al. (2008) assign specific meanings to the terms multinational, international, and global. In 
order to avoid confusion, this thesis will use Harzing‟s term multidomestic, although Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1989) use the term multinational. MNE as abbreviation is used in a general sense to refer 
to all enterprises whose operations extend across national borders (Bartlett et al. 2008). Peng 
(2009) uses the terms home replication, localisation, global standardisation and transnational in his 
discussion of MNE types. 
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enterprise” that encompasses efficiency, responsiveness and learning as key 
capabilities for success20. Although Harzing (2000) criticises Bartlett and Ghoshal for 
their small number of large in-depth cases, she confirms their typology through 
empirical work in a large-scale survey of more than 160 MNE subsidiaries. Baron 
(1995) uses the Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) typology of MNE market strategies 
(multidomestic, international and global) to classify non-market strategies of MNEs21, 
and shows that Bartlett and Ghoshal‟s framework can therefore incorporate MNE-
host government relations. His conclusion is that, although there can be international 
and global non-market strategies in some areas, the most likely strategy to be used 
will be multidomestic as the issues and institutions to be targeted are country-specific 
rather than common throughout countries22. This is the most likely case even when 
the market strategy is international or global (Baron 1995).  
It should, thus, be investigated whether the Bartlett and Ghoshal typology holds true 
for activities on a political as well as on a market level. Rodriguez et al. (2006) 
encourage research into multinational political strategy according to MNE typology. 
This thesis examines whether differences are limited to the strategic level of MNEs 
as discussed by the authors (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989) or whether these 
differences extend to and exist in MNE-government relations.  
In the context of firm-state interaction in IB, Kobrin (1997) alludes to the political risk23 
and bargaining power literatures (see e.g. Vernon 1971, Poynter 1982, Kobrin 1987, 
Grosse and Behrman 1992, Brewer 1992). These two streams of research have 
dominated the IB scholarship dealing with MNE host government relations (Dahan et 
al. 2005). The bargaining model, the dominant MNE-government relations 
                                              
20
 The administrative heritage, that is, the influence of the historical context, is both an asset and an 
impediment in the process to change into a transnational organisation (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). 
Whereas the transnational enterprise is an integrated network of interdependent subsidiaries, the 
first three are „hub-and-spoke‟ models with the home country as the hub (Westney and Zaheer 
2001). 
21
 Ring et al. (1990) use the strategic predispositions ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric in their 
discussion of political imperatives in International Business. 
22
 Even in the EU with its supranational institutions, national governments from the member states 
play a role: “In the European Community, lobbying focuses on the Commission and the Directorate 
Generals as well as on national institutions as a means of influencing the Council of Ministers” 
(Baron 1995: 63). 
23
 Boddewyn (1988: 347) criticises that non-market factors have been perceived as risks rather than 
opportunities, “as if there were not also „political opportunities‟”. Political risk is generally defined as 
“home or host government intervention in international business activities” (Ring et al. 1990: 143). 
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paradigm24 (Ramamurti 2001), has been predominantly conflictual (Luo 2001, 2004a 
and b, Lecraw 1984). Dunning (1993) discusses bargaining with respect to the OLI 
paradigm and points out that home country-MNE bargaining relationships have been 
given less attention than relationships with host countries (Dunning and Lundan 
2008; see also Ramamurti 2001 on MNEs targeting home and host countries). As 
pointed out above, the research undertaken here addresses this gap. 
The resources of a firm and its O advantages have an effect on its overall bargaining 
power vis-à-vis its host government (Fagre and Wells 1982, see also Luo 2001, 
Moon and Lado 2000 as well as Capron and Chatain 2008). Similarly, Boddewyn and 
Brewer (1994) propose that the intensity of political behaviour is greater when a 
firm‟s political competences are more developed – enterprises in a stronger market, 
or financial, position will be in a better position to engage in political activities (Keillor 
and Hult 2004, Gladwin and Walter 1980). Eden et al. (2005) also discuss the 
influence of resources on bargaining power and use insights of the RBV in their 
elaboration. They furthermore point out that bargaining negotiations can also include 
lobbying (see section 2.1.4 in the context of Political Science). Chapter 4 takes a 
more detailed look at resources in general (RBV) and in relation to CPAs.  
Blumentritt and Nigh (2002: 57) point out that “business-government interactions are 
a complex function for multinational corporations”. The nature of these interactions 
and relations ranges from collaborative to divergent. In Mahon‟s terms (1989), these 
settings and relationships vary between being adversarial and non-adversarial.  
Brewer (1997) notes that emphasis has mostly been placed on conflicts between 
governments and MNEs instead of on cooperation (see e.g. Behrman 1969 for an 
early view of conflicts). Dunning (1998) notes that the traditionally uneasy relations 
have shifted from confrontational to non-adversarial and cooperative (see also 
Dunning 199325 and Grosse 2005a). Luo (2001) likewise argues for a more 
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 Luo (2001) furthermore mentions transaction cost theories as underpinning conflict-based views of 
MNE-host government relations. See Gomes-Casseres (1990) for an attempt to integrate both 
bargaining and transaction cost approaches. Grosse‟s edited book (2005b) gives an overview of the 
history and theories in the analysis of international business-government relations. 
25
 Dunning (1993) identifies three phases of MNE-host government interaction: the honeymoon (1950s 
and 1960s), the confrontation (1960s and 1970s) and the reconciliation stage (1970s until early 
1990s). Stopford (1994) also argues for a reconsideration of a zero-sum game to a positive-sum 
game. 
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cooperative view of MNE-host government relations26. Part of the more cooperative 
stance of governments is the significant knowledge MNEs possess in terms of 
technologies as an input to the regulatory process (Dunning and Lundan 2008). 
Furthermore, leading firms might have competitive reasons to provide inputs into the 
regulatory process by promoting their own standards as regulatory standards to give 
them competitive advantage over rivals (Dunning and Lundan 2008). 
Luo (2004a) points out environment protection as one area where there are still 
substantial differences between MNEs and governments. Grosse (2005a) confirms 
that this issue is an increasingly important element in relations between governments 
and companies, which has potential for serious conflict. Brewer (2005: 167) 
emphasises that especially global warming has “emerged as one of the most 
challenging and contentious problems facing multinational firms and governments“.  
Furthermore, international environmental regulations are growing rapidly, especially 
on a regional level as part of regional policy integration such as in the EU, and MNEs 
have stronger incentives than domestic firms to interact with public policy makers in 
this area in striving for potential scope economies (Rugman and Verbeke 2001). This 
thesis therefore investigates how business-government relations manifest 
themselves in the case of the automotive industry and the EU (conflictual or 
cooperative), especially with regard to environmental regulations.  
Gladwin and Walter (1980) point out that positive relationships in general serve to 
cultivate mutual trust and willingness to respond helpfully. This is underlined by Luo‟s 
(2001) assertion that personal relations between MNE executives and government 
officials are a force in creating trust and stability. Relational resources are pointed out 
by Dahan (2005a, b) as political resources used in business-government relations 
and are further investigated in this study. 
As the nature of MNE-(host) government relations varies, so do for example 
empirical findings of studies on MNE bargaining power (Moon and Lado 2000). Moon 
and Lado (2000: 99) furthermore show that most of the research on MNE bargaining 
power has been skewed towards MNEs from the US and demand more systematic 
analysis of country-level sources of MNE bargaining power, that is, a “nation-of-
origin” effect (see also Keillor and Hult 2004 as well as Sethi and Elango 1999). This 
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 Similarly to Dunning (1993), Luo (2001) attributes the conflictual view to the early (entry) stage of 
MNE-host government relations and the cooperative view to after-entry or operational stages. It is 
no surprise that the focus of most of the literature in this area has been on time before entry 
(Dunning and Lundan 2008), that is, conflictual.  
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is what the present thesis is aiming for, by analysing and comparing CPAs of MNEs 
from all Triad regions (Japan, US, EU) in one location27.  
With respect to regional economic integration as is the case for the EU, Dunning and 
Lundan (2008) point out that, as MNEs become more prominent as political actors, 
they might seek regional rather than multilateral fora to use and build their influence 
(see also Scherer et al. 2009). This strengthens the case for the research at hand 
with its focus on the EU. Dahan et al. (2005) also underline that research in IB on 
MNEs and their international political environment has overlooked the rise of 
international organisations such as the EU. 
Sullivan and Daniels (2008) challenge IB research by pointing out that the 
environment of MNEs includes multiple stakeholders that need to be taken into 
account. The research undertaken here takes up this research challenge by not only 
interviewing MNE representatives from the automotive industry but also 
representatives from EU institutions, related industries and civil society organisations 
like environmental NGOs28 (see also Dunning and Lundan 2008 for multiple 
stakeholders in MNE environments as well as Vernon 2001, Ramamurti 2001, Doh 
and Teegen 2002). The study is in line with the ongoing endeavour to “understand 
how firms formulate and implement political strategies” (Blumentritt and Nigh 2002:  
58). 
Toyne and Nigh (1997a) criticise the concern of IB research with similarities of IB 
phenomena such as MNEs, and encourage questions about differences. This 
supports the research question how and why do MNEs differ in their CPAs29? 
Sullivan (1998a, 1998b) remarks on the multidisciplinary nature of IB research, but 
notes that it is not interdisciplinary. Toyne and Nigh (1998) also encourage the 
investigation of IB phenomena from other disciplinary backgrounds for increased 
understanding. Behrman (1997) underlines this, and specifically states the growing 
global concern for the natural environment as an area where cooperation is needed 
between MNEs and states, and as an area where IB can benefit from Political 
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 Fagre and Wells (1982) also encourage the investigation of non-US MNEs in the context of MNE-
host government relations. See also Buckley and Chapman (1996) for encouraging comparative 
research. 
28
 Rugman and Verbeke (1998c) point towards the role of NGOs as especially important in areas such 
as environment issues. See also Holtbrügge and Berg (2004). 
29
 See also Whitley (2001) on how and why questions with regard to international firms and 
differences. 
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Science perspectives30. Boddewyn (1993) also argues for the studies of IB and 
business political behaviour (CPAs) to be more integrated. Interdisciplinarity also 
provides the possibility for cross-disciplinary validation of findings (Toyne and Nigh 
1997b). The next two sections provide an interdisciplinary grounding for the thesis by 
looking at business-government relations from a Strategic Management point of view 
(literature on CPAs) and a Political Science perspective (literature on lobbying and 
interest representation). 
2.1.3 Strategic Management: Corporate Political Activities 
Few researchers have taken up the task of examining and analyzing 
firm-specific political behaviour. (Sadrich and Annavarjulia 2003: 489) 
Until the mid 1980s political decision-making had received little attention in the 
management literature dealing with the political environment of the enterprise (Keim 
and Zeithaml 1986, Epstein 1980). Gale and Buchholz (1987) point out that, since 
the 1960s, public policy has become an influential determinant of firm behaviour, and 
Mahon (1989) stresses that corporations expanded their political-action activity 
immensely in the 1980s. Epstein‟s contributions (1969, 1980) paved the way for the 
further development of the research area in the 1980s and 1990s, when Baysinger‟s 
article (1984) was influential. In Griffin et al.‟s (2001a, b) extensive bibliography of the 
area it can be seen how the field developed and grew from only some individual 
contributions in the 1960s and start of the 1970s to a whole host of publications in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the last decade, studies have become more systematically 
theoretical as opposed to prior decades when research in the area was conducted in 
a more ad hoc manner (Griffin et al. 2001a)31. Baysinger (1984) identifies CPAs as 
corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm. Getz 
(1997: 32f) defines CPAs as “any deliberate firm action intended to influence 
governmental policy or process”. Getz (1997) differentiates between CPAs and 
corporate political strategies. She uses Mahon‟s (1989) definition of corporate 
political strategies which means using 
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 See also Grosse and Behrman 1992 on the usefulness of Political Science in explaining 
IB/government interactions. See Griffith et al. (2008) for public policy issues, especially 
environmental issues as future research themes in IB.  
31
 The growing importance of the business-government interface can also be seen in the addition of 
new journals such as Business and Politics (Vol. 1 in 1999) and Journal of Public Affairs (Vol. 1 in 
2001) to the established Business and Society (Vol. 1 in 1960) journal and the topic‟s treatment in 
other management mainstream journals (Windsor 2001). 
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the organisation‟s resources to integrate objectives and to undertake 
coherent actions directed toward the political, social, and legal 
environment in order to secure either permanent or temporary 
advantage and influence over other actors in the process (Mahon 
1989: 51-52). 
CPAs as a term is narrower in its focus, according to Getz (1997), which is contested 
by Windsor (2007): political strategy deals with governments and other stakeholders 
that are governmentally relevant and CPAs are not restricted to political strategy as 
they also involve corporate social responsibility and corruption strategy32. The term is 
also more specific than the related concept “political behaviour” which Boddewyn 
(1988: 342, Getz 1997) defines as “particular ways of relating to targets located in the 
non-market environment of firms”.  
The location of CPAs in individual companies is often the public affairs departments 
or offices, where government affairs are one of their important activities33 (Marcus et 
al. 1987b, see also Post et al. 1983). Public affairs can thus be seen as more than 
only government affairs: it is the management of the interface between an 
organisation and its socio-political environment (Meznar and Nigh 1995, see also 
Post et al. 1983).  
CPAs are often quite limited in time, for example when votes over legislation take 
place, and thus timing is critical to political action34 (Mahon 1989). Bonardi and Keim 
(2005) also assert that timing is key for corporate political strategies, which will differ 
according to where an issue stands in its political life cycle35 (Keim 2001a). 
Firms have incentives to influence politics and legislation as there is a great degree 
of interdependence between a company‟s market environment and government 
policy (Hillman and Hitt 1999, Baron 1995). Since governments have significant 
influence on the legal and regulatory framework within which corporations conduct 
business, it is critical for firms to have political strategies that form an integral part of 
their overall strategy (Baron 1995, see also Post et al. 1983 and Keim 2001a). As 
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 In an earlier contribution, the author acknowledges a narrow and a broad connotation of political 
strategy (Windsor 2001). 
33
 Other activities being issues management, public relations, community affairs (Marcus et al. 1987b). 
34
 Mahon (1989) introduces the concept of the public issues-life-cycle, which consists of five stages, 
which in turn influence corporate political strategies.  
35
 In the context of timing, it may also be pointed out, that although the CPA literature is couched in 
strategic management, which would imply a long-term perspective (strategy), CPAs are often short-
term measures and rather tactics than strategies due to the nature of legislation. As the CPA 
literature focuses mostly on American companies, this is consistent with American cultural short-
termist perspectives (see e.g. Voss and Blackmon 1998). 
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such, political behaviour is complementary to economic behaviour as the former is a 
means to achieve strategic goals rather than an end in itself (Boddewyn and Brewer 
1994). Boddewyn (1988) also argues there need not be a specific objective in CPAs 
other than firms‟ traditional economic goals of survival, profitability and/or growth. 
Government policies are not necessarily exogenous policies that f irms must take as 
given constraints, but firms can take an active role in shaping these public policies as 
is accepted and expected in democratic societies36 (Keim and Hillman 2008, Keim 
2001a).  
Like Boddewyn (1988), Baron (1995) uses the dichotomy of non-market and market 
components, which together form the corporate environment. For a business strategy 
to be effective it needs to integrate both areas, especially considering the non-market 
environment as endogenous to corporate strategy rather than exogenous. Only 
through such a perspective can the purpose of non-market strategies be pursued, 
which is to shape the firm‟s market environment (Baron 1995, Keim 2001a). Despite 
Baron‟s call for integrating market and non-market strategies, this area remains 
understudied, as Rodriguez et al. (2006) state (see also Keim 2001a). 
For Windsor (2007) and Hillman et al. (2004), CPAs broadly include any intentional 
business effort to influence public or quasi-public policies. As such, CPA is not 
synonymous with non-market strategy, but rather a subset of it37 (Windsor 2007). 
The target of CPAs is the non-market environment of the firm, which is made up of 
social, political, and legal arrangements. Schuler et al. (2002: 669) state that: 
Understanding corporate political strategy is indispensable for making 
sense of competitive strategy. 
Shaffer (1995) argues that the effects of government on the competitive position of 
firms are important determinants of profitability. Keim and Hillman (2008) emphasise 
how government decisions shape the competitive environment of firms and 
specifically point out automotive companies Honda and Toyota for having positioned 
themselves to be leaders in fuel economy in the US market while General Motors 
(GM) and Ford are following behind. The authors underline the increasing importance 
of issues such as sustainability and climate change as reasons for business 
                                              
36
 Salorio et al. (2005: 46) remark that business political behaviour creates qualms about its potential 
for “nefarious impact” on nonmarket institutions. This negative connotation of CPA is more 
pronounced in the discussion of lobbying and interest representation (see next section). 
37
 Other subsets of non-market strategies include stakeholder management, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) strategy, community relations, and anticorruption posture (Windsor 2007). 
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managers to interface with political decision-makers. These areas are investigated in 
three areas of environmental regulations in the EU for the automotive industry.  
As Getz (2001) points out, the literature on political strategy and public affairs 
provides inconsistent explanations of why firms become politically engaged. To fill 
this gap and to establish what the objectives and motivational factors of CPAs are, 
the study at hand asks why firms engage in business-government relations. CPAs (or 
non-market strategies) take many forms and names, and are classified by different 
means by different authors. In the table below an indicative list is displayed. 
Table 2.2: Methods and objectives of CPAs 
 Methods and approaches Objectives and strategies 
Baysinger 
1984 
Methods 
 Political Action Committee (PAC) 
contributions 
 In-kind support 
 Lobbying,  
 Trade associations,  
 Washington office (in Europe: 
Brussels office) 
 Agency hearings 
 Grass roots efforts 
 Public relations 
Objectives 
 Domain Management  
 Domain Defence 
 Domain Maintenance 
Keim and 
Zeithaml 
1986 
 
Strategies 
 Constituency building,  
 PAC contributions  
 Advocacy advertising,  
 Lobbying 
 Coalition building 
Yoffie 1987  Strategies 
 Passive strategies 
 Activist strategies  
Boddewyn 
and Brewer 
1994 
Forms 
 Bargaining vs. non-bargaining 
 Non-bargaining: Compliance, 
avoidance, circumvention 
 Bargaining: Conflict vs. Partnership 
Strategic Objectives 
 Efficiency 
 Market power 
 Legitimacy 
Baron 1995 Tools 
 Nonmarket assets/competencies 
Outcome 
 Firm performance improved 
Hillman and 
Hitt 1999 
Approaches 
 Transactional vs. Relational 
 Collective vs. Individual 
Tactics 
 Lobbying 
 position papers or technical reports 
 Contributions 
 Grassroots mobilization 
 Advocacy advertising 
 Public relations 
 Press conferences 
Strategies 
 Information strategy 
 Financial incentive strategy. 
 Constituency-building strategy. 
Hillman et 
al. 2004 
Types of CPA 
 Proactive CPA 
 Reactive CPA 
Outcomes of CPA 
 Public policy  
 Firm performance 
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Hillman and Hitt (1999) classify political strategies into three forms: information, 
financial incentives, and constituency building. Each strategy consists of various 
tactics. Information and financial incentives involve more direct interactions with 
political decision-makers through knowledge and money, whilst constituency building 
is a rather indirect means of influence through votes and voters (Hillman and Wan 
2005). In the light of the targeted area in this thesis, financial incentives and 
constituency building might not play a big role, as opposed to the US-American 
context38, while information strategies are expected to be more prevalent.  
Keim (2001a) distinguishes between strategies that simply react as regulations and 
laws are changed, strategies that look to anticipate these changes and incorporate 
them into strategy formulation, and strategies that actively seek changes in formal 
arrangements. 
The level of CPAs varies across and even within industries (Keim and Zeithaml 
1986). This is due to the two-level effect of non-market issues, that is, on firms and 
on industries (Baron 1995). The difference between non-market strategies (CPAs) 
and market strategies is that collective action is legitimate in the non-market 
environment whereas collusion/cartel activities in the market environment are not 
permitted by law under antitrust legislation (cf. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Baron 
1995, Gale and Buchholz 1987).  
Keim and Hillman (2008) point out that it is mostly larger firms that are more 
international in scope that are most active in the political arena39 (see also Lenway 
and Rehbein 1991). Keim and Hillman (2008) also point to the likely results of 
inaction (e.g. potential costs, competitors‟ actions) determining how active 
businesses are in the public policy process.  
Rehbein and Schuler (1995) state that the structures, routines, resources, issue 
salience, and stakeholder dependencies determine why and how a firm responds to 
its external environment. In line with Yoffie (1987), Hillman et al (2004) argue that the 
level of CPAs is dependent on resources. This is an important commonality the CPA 
literature shares with the previous IB section. The authors furthermore point out that 
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 There, both financial incentives and constituency building play a role (see e.g. Oberman 1993, 
Brasher and Lowery 2006 and De Figueiredo and Tiller 2001, also McGrath 2005). In the EU, 
constituency building is aggravated due to the number of countries and languages involved, which is 
very different to the unilingual US context. 
39
 See also Bonardi et al. 2005 who mention firms in highly concentrated industries as more likely to 
engage in explicit political activities. This is the case of the automotive industry where the ten largest 
companies account for 70-80% of world production (McLaughlin and Maloney 1999, Wells 2010). 
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research into firm political resources can be greatly aided by the RBV, which is 
echoed by Bonardi et al. (2005). Keim (2001b) also points to the importance of 
resources that need to be valuable, rare, inimitable and not readily substitutable in 
order to be sources of competitive advantage for firms‟ CPAs. These resource 
characteristics are further discussed in chapter 4. Schuler et al. (2002) relate 
resources used in CPAs to the size of the firm, with larger firms possessing more 
clout to influence public policy according to their complex needs. 
Epstein (1969) used the term “corporate political resources or assets” as early as 
1969, but not within the context of the RBV (chapter 4) (see also Mitnick 1993). 
Corporate resources yield corporate political power, according to Schuler (2008); 
scarce resources are deployed to politically relevant activities in order to influence 
public policy (Windsor 2007). Political resources can be defined as those “assets and 
skills utilised in the implementation of corporate political strategies” (Jacomet 2005: 
83). Both Jacomet (2005) and Dahan (2005a, b) point out that these political 
resources are traditionally of individual corporate nature but can also be of collective 
nature (genuine collective resources or pooled individual resources)40. Chapter 4 
discusses the RBV and political resources in detail. 
Table 2.3: Choices in Managing Business-Government Issues (Marcus et al. 1987b: 7) 
 Nature of Issues 
Non-specific Specific 
In
te
r-
a
c
ti
o
n
s
 
Frequent Trade Association Public Affairs Office 
Infrequent Trade Association 
Retains Consultant 
Firm Retains 
Consultant 
Marcus et al. (1987b) set up the above table for choosing between different forms for 
managing relations with governments. The nature of issues refers to their specificity 
in terms of interests‟ conversion or diversion between the firm and the industry, 
whereby interests converge for non-specific issues and diverge for specific issues41. 
This thesis investigates where interests converge and diverge for three specific areas 
of environmental regulations (pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions, ELVs), thus 
asking how individual CPAs and trade association activities in the automotive 
industry compete with or complement each other. 
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 See also Oberman (1993) and Salorio et al. (2005) for political resources. 
41
 Mahon (1989) uses Cobb and Elder‟s definition of an issue which is “(…) a conflict between two or 
more identifiable groups or organizations over procedural or substantive matters relating to the 
distribution of positions or resources” (Cobb and Elder 1972: 35, cited in Mahon 1989: 53). 
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Furthermore, with respect to whether trade associations and individual CPAs are in 
conflict with each other, bargaining behaviour and conflictual relations was brought 
up in the first section as an important constituent in IB and MNE-host government 
relations. Salorio et al. (2005) discuss bargaining behaviour in CPAs, which is split 
into conflict and partnership. Dahan (2005a) also points out that corporate political 
strategy has two generic modes, cooperative versus adversarial. The IB literature is 
thus echoed and raises the question again whether CPAs are conflictual or 
cooperative. Bagby et al. (1987) point out that: 
Rather than a strict dichotomy separating strong adversarial from 
close partnership, most business-government relations fall on a 
continuum between these extremes. (Bagby et al. 1987: 285) 
Getz (1997) also distinguishes between information-oriented and pressure-oriented 
CPAs, that is, cooperative versus more conflictual approaches. This thesis 
investigates this issue by asking what kind of approach MNEs from the automotive 
industry are taking in their CPAs in the EU. 
Jacomet (2005) emphasises that individual CPAs are not exclusive of collective 
action – large companies often have their own lobbying capacities while participating 
in trade associations at the same time. Keim and Hillman (2008) consider three 
strategies of business responses to public policy that depend on the issue: 1) passive 
reaction, 2) positive anticipation, and 3) proactive public policy shaping (see also 
Weidenbaum 1980). Whereas the first two strategies can be followed as members of 
industry associations, it is the latter strategy where companies get most active in 
individual CPA to shape public policy42. Keim (2001b) brings to light that firms that 
pursue passive options perceive the public policy-making process as a given, 
whereas firms following a proactive option try to shape policy before it is finalised.  
Hillman et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive overview and review of CPAs, but 
their focus is mainly on US CPAs; the EU is only treated in passing. This is a general 
tendency in the literature (see e.g. Barron 2010), reflected in the following quote: 
Business lobbying is an American tradition (Windsor 2001: 395). 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) also lament that the traditional scope of such research 
rarely goes beyond US borders which is confirmed by Windsor (2007, also Keillor et 
al. 2005). Furthermore, Rodriguez et al. (2006) point out that research on corporate 
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 See Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985) for a discussion on disadvantages of working within established 
interest groups for corporate political entrepreneurs, that is, proactive individual CPAs.  
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political strategies lacks MNE and IB perspectives. In order to address this gap, this 
thesis contributes to such research by focusing on MNEs‟ CPAs. 
In the context of firm-specific political resources Frynas et al. (2006) point out that 
research has mostly been conducted on the domestic political process in the US 
without a regard for the international dimension. This is where this thesis contributes 
to research in CPAs and political resources. 
Hillman and Keim (1995) are two of the American authors who do address 
international variations in business-government relations, although it is in comparison 
to the US system. Meznar (2001) asks to what extent (if any) the nationality of firms 
may affect their political strategies. As this research investigates CPAs by MNEs from 
the Triad regions, it can be asked whether different countries of origin translate into 
different approaches to CPAs. This is done by Hansen and Mitchell (2001) who 
examine whether national practices persist in the political activities of large 
corporations with mixed results, thus warranting further research, which is confirmed 
by Barron (2010). Windsor (2001) also encourages comparative, international 
research into CPAs where research has been weak so far43. Furthermore, the author 
(Windsor 2001) points out firm and industry cases as research opportunities, which 
this thesis takes up by focusing on the automotive industry and the individual firms 
represented in Brussels as so-called capital of the EU. 
Skippari et al. (2005) emphasise the North American dominance in their bibliometric 
analysis of CPA research in respect to journals and authors, which Meznar (2001: 
330) even calls “ethnocentrism”. Skippari and his colleagues (2005) emphasise that 
the international perspective has been generally ignored in the field, which is missing 
a non-American perspective (see also Barron 2010). This is a gap this thesis 
attempts to fill by providing a European perspective of CPAs in the EU. The EU is a 
supranational institution with an increasing role in policy-making that leads to 
supranational CPAs (Windsor 2007). Windsor also emphasises international 
environmental protection as an emerging phenomenon within IB and CPAs that 
should be tackled by research, which is the policy area this thesis investigates44.  
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 See Brasher and Lowery (2006) for variation and differences in domestic political activities. 
44
 With respect to environmental protection, Cho et al. (2006) link CPAs to environmental issues and 
assert that firms with poorer environmental performance are likely to spend more on political 
activities than their better-performing counterparts. 
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Schuler and Rehbein (1997) point out that in the study of political activities of firms 
and industries, various academic disciplines like Political Science and management 
ignore each other‟s perspectives. Shaffer and Hillman (2000) use both Political 
Science and Strategic Management in their investigation of CPA, whereas this thesis 
attempts to take in three different perspectives on MNE CPAs: IB, Strategic 
Management and Political Science. 
2.1.4 Political Science: Lobbying and Interest Representation 
It has been suggested that lobbying as a term originates from the hotel lobby where 
US president Ulysses Grant (1869-77) met waiting interest representatives (Köppl 
2005), although Mack (2005) points to the lobby of the Palace of Westminster in  
London as origin of the term, and Buholzer (1997) states that lobbying is as old as 
politics itself. Lobbying as a term is firmly rooted in the Anglo-Saxon political world 
while regarded as suspicious in other languages and cultures (McGrath 2005, 
Gardner 1991). 
McGrath (2005) highlights that professions generally have a commonly-agreed notion 
of what they involve. This consensus is missing in the case of lobbyists whose 
activities have been described by a host of terms such as government relations, 
lobbying, public affairs, and advocacy; terms which mean different things to different 
people. One of the most frequently used definitions of lobbying is the one offered by 
Milbraith (McGrath 2005, see also Van Schendelen 1993):  
Lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by 
someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a 
governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his 
decision. (Milbraith 1963: 8, as quoted by McGrath 2005: 17) 
For Köppl (2005), lobbying is the intended influence of political decision-making 
processes by persons that are not involved in these decisions, which include laws, 
regulations, amendments and directives. 
Boddewyn (1982: 12-3) defines public affairs as being 
concerned with enlisting the support and negating the opposition of 
significant nonmarket units (public institutions and private 
organizations, looser collectivities, and individuals) in the firm‟s 
environment. 
Pedler, in his book on lobbying in the EU (Pedler 2002a) defines public affairs as the 
“management skill that internalizes the effects of the environment in which an 
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organisation operates and externalizes actions to influence that environment” (Pedler 
2002b: 4).  
Due to the negative connotation lobbying has, Mahoney (2007) and Baumgartner 
(2007) use the term advocacy to mean the attempt to push public policy in one 
direction or another. McGrath (2005: 3) points to the term‟s negative association and 
the perception of lobbying being somehow “illegitimate or unsavoury”45. These 
negative connotations imply that this is a sensitive area for firms, which may impact 
on their willingness to disclose information (Hadjikhani and Ghauri 2001).  
Lobbying has been the more commonly used term in Political Science, while public 
affairs seems to become more common as it is more encompassing, appropriate and 
perhaps not as negatively associated as lobbying. Lobbying is widely acknowledged 
within the Anglo-Saxon world, but not necessarily outside of it (McGrath 2005). 
As the communication of information and positions to policy-makers by 
representatives of societal or corporate interests, lobbying constitutes three basic 
citizen rights in democracies and is therefore a legitimate activity: the freedom of 
expression and information, the freedom of assembly and of association as well as 
the right to petition (see for example Althaus, undated; Rieksmaier 2007). McGrath 
(2005) and Grande (1996) also draw attention to the legitimate and even important 
role lobbyists play for public policy-making in a democracy.  
Here, the terms lobbying and interest representation are used as these are the most 
common ones within the Political Science field. 
The EU lobbying context 
The EU presents a unique context for lobbying which is very different from any 
national policy-making context46 (Greenwood 2007). Within this context, most authors 
stress the importance of the arrival of the Single European Market and its 
consequences for interest representation in the EU. The Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1986 made way for the completion of the internal market. The Treaty on European 
Union in 1992 brought changes for lobbying as member states lost veto power in 
some economic areas and the European Parliament (EP) gained a greater role in 
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 Michalowitz (2004) points out this is specifically in relation to political consultants that firms hire.  
46
 It is not the intent of this thesis to explain these different contexts; they will be taken as given and 
the reader is referred to other publications to understand the specificities of the EU as a political 
entity. See for example Grande (1996), Peterson and Bomberg (1999), Young and Wallace (2000).  
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decision-making vis-à-vis the European Commission and the Council of Ministers 
(Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998, see also Coen 1997a).  
In the wake of the SEA and the single market, individual firm lobbying increased – 
Coen (1997b) states the figure of over 200 large firms setting up direct lobbying 
capabilities in Brussels47 between 1985 and 199348. Broscheid and Coen (2003: 166) 
call this a “lobbying boom”. Before the SEA, interest representation was in the form of 
European-wide federations of national associations, so-called Euro-groups, 
especially in sectors such as agriculture, coal and steel where the European 
communities had policy-making responsibilities early on through the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 (Mazey and Richardson 1993a). As European law takes precedence over 
national law in many areas (Van Schendelen 1993), firms have needed to move their 
interest representation from a national to a European level. 
Importantly in the thesis context, the EU was given new competencies in the area of 
environmental policy, where it is considered a world leader (e.g. Michaelowa 2000, 
Kelemen and Vogel 2010). These new competencies have led to a growth in EU-
level interest representation on this issue (Van Schendelen 1993), which Coen 
(2007) terms the Europeanisation of interest groups, and therefore presents a 
relevant context to be studied here. Pedler (2002b and c) also points to 
environmental issues as a growing field of studies on lobbying. Furthermore, civil 
society – in the form of NGOs – has gained influence in policy-making (see e.g. 
Michaelowa 1998) and therefore contributes perspectives on corporate lobbying in 
this thesis through interviews.  
The environment poses one of the many challenges in the 21st century where a 
supranational approach might be required to find solutions such as environmental 
regulations (Dunning and Lundan 2008, see also Wagner 2009). Therefore, the EU 
as a supranational entity is an appropriate institution to choose for the context of 
environmental regulations. Furthermore, Calingaert (1993) points out the 
environment as one key area where the Commission49 has historically been less 
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 Although not all EU institutions are located in Brussels all the time, the EP and the Commission 
have their main base there and therefore „Brussels‟ is used here as shorthand for the capital of 
Europe (see also Mack 2005). 
48
 Coen (1997b) does not give a baseline number but the number of individual firms represented in 
Brussels before 1986 can be assumed to be very low. 
49
 The terms European Commission and the Commission are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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receptive to business views. It is therefore appropriate to study these policies as an 
area that business tries to influence.  
McLaughlin and Maloney (1999: 13) use the term “antagonistic cooperation” to 
describe the resolution of policy issues within policy communities who work on 
particular issues. This reflects the previous two sections on whether the relationship 
between policy-makers and firms and industries is cooperative or conflictual. Wilks 
and Wright (1987) point out that relations between governments and industries are 
complex, can be controversial as well as trivial, and are characterised by tension as 
well as compromise. This thesis asks how the relationship between the automotive 
industry and the European institutions is characterised. 
While Coen (2007) points to the growing Europeanisation of interest groups in the 
“political game” in Brussels, he also recognises that distinct “national interest models” 
remain. In order to verify Coen‟s statement, this thesis asks whether there are 
differences in the lobbying of companies from different home countries. McGrath 
(2005) also encourages comparative research on lobbying. 
In the context of national differences50, a word on the Council of Ministers is needed. 
It is an important institution in the policy-making of the EU: however, as it consists of 
the national governments of the member states, businesses and industries do not 
lobby the Council in Brussels, but in their respective countries (Calingaert 1993). As 
the focus of this thesis is to compare CPAs from different home countries and 
regions in one location (Brussels), the Council is not taken into account in order to 
keep the location variable constant51. Grande (1996) also points out that the 
European system of interest intermediation has its own specific features, which differ 
from the national level, and therefore this thesis only investigates lobbying of the 
genuine European institutions, such as the Commission and the EP. 
Skippari (2002) highlights that lobbying studies in Political Science are often 
conducted from a governmental point of view, which is echoed by Hadjikhani and 
Ghauri (2001) who note the state perspective of Political Science literature when 
examining lobbying. Therefore this thesis contributes to this literature by taking a firm 
perspective to lobbying and interest representation. Political action and economic 
action in the market place are directed by fundamentally different principles and 
strategic imperatives (Schmitter and Streeck 1999) and thus point to the differences 
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 For example corporatism versus pluralism (see Coen 1997b). 
51
John and Schwarzer (2006) highlight that the Council is the least accessible institution for lobbyists. 
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of market and non-market strategies as elaborated in the previous two sections. This 
thesis therefore investigates whether differences in corporate action in the market 
place translate into differences in the political environment. 
In contrast to associations, large enterprises are direct actors in the market and are, 
as a result, better equipped to provide expert knowledge that is needed by European 
institutions for policy-making (Bouwen 2003). McLaughlin et al. (1993) pointed out 
that the traditional view of European lobbying has overlooked two important features 
– so-called Euro-groups dominated by firms, and direct interest representation by 
corporations themselves. The authors pointed out a danger of a group focus in 
studying policy-making in the EU, which tends to ignore the primacy of corporate 
interests. A decade later, Bouwen (2002) continued to point out that individual 
political action on the part of companies was understudied. Michalowitz (2004: 105) 
also emphasises that research on in-house lobbyists for companies is “far less 
extensive” than that on Euro-groups. This thesis contributes to closing this gap by 
focusing on direct, individual interest representation by MNEs.  
Why? and How? 
Interest group theory argues that the democratic public policy process is an attempt 
to reach a compromise between the competing objectives of a number of interest 
groups (Getz 2001). Interests consist of values, attitudes, goals or preferences and 
the anticipated effects of government action on these interests make them politically 
relevant. Companies enter the political environment because other groups with 
different views are politically active (Getz 2001). Grant (1993: 32) terms the reasons 
for joining an association as „logic of influence‟: when an industry is heavily affected 
by Community policies, corporations have an interest in influencing those policies to 
their favour. Van Schendelen (1993) points to insufficient information of politicians or 
civil servants for the lobbyist‟s need to inform and to the fear of wrong decisions by 
public authorities for the lobbyist‟s need to influence.  
Bennett (1999) explains the direct lobbying of large companies in supplementing 
collective action of associations by pointing to corporate wishes of interests not being 
diluted by an association and of gaining specific information, which can be used to 
influence the association. Vining et al. (2005) underline that to the extent that 
government actions are exogenous, they are strategically unimportant from a firm 
perspective, but that this is rarely the case. This is in line with the suggestion of the 
previous sections to question the exogenous nature of government policies. 
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As the policy areas in which the EU has competences have grown in number, its 
institutions have become a focus for interest groups. Brussels is where the agenda is 
being shaped (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). As interests want to affect the 
outcome of the agenda, they trade information needed by the institutions against 
influence (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998). Calingaert (1993) points to the lack of 
expertise in the Commission, which makes it rely on outside information such as from 
lobbyists. 
An indicator of the increased importance of the EU for pressure groups is the number 
of MNEs that have set up permanent government affairs representatives in Brussels 
(Grant 1993). Nevertheless, the Political Science literature has focused on collective 
action by business while overlooking the independent activities of large firms  
(McLaughlin and Maloney 1999, based on Grant et al. 1989). In order to study the 
“art of lobbying”, Van Schendelen (2002: 11) suggests bringing two streams of 
knowledge together, Political Science and Management Science, and calls the 
combination EU Public Affairs Management. This thesis attempts to use the two 
literatures, aided by the IB perspective on MNEs.  
Commenting on the state of knowledge in EU lobbying, Van Schendelen (1993: 15) 
indicates that prescriptive studies outbalance descriptive ones, which, together with 
empirical studies, are “extremely scarce”. He encourages research in five categories: 
network studies, policy studies, case studies, sectoral studies and country studies. 
The research undertaken here is carried out through empirical case studies in one 
sector, the automotive industry, and, thus, attempts to fill some of these gaps. 
The first and initially most important target when it comes to lobbying (in) the EU is 
the European Commission, as this is the European institution that has the right to 
propose legislation (Donnelly 1993, Hull 1993). In addition to the Commission as 
prime target, the EP has also increased in power in recent years and thus in 
importance for lobbyists (John and Schwarzer 2006). 
Of course, interest organizations are not so naïve as to rely solely on 
one channel of access (Grant 1993: 29).  
The channels used are the national governments, European federations and direct 
contacts in Brussels, that is, the Commission (Grant 1993). Collie (1993: 226) calls it 
a “multi-faceted strategy” where direct representation, national and European-level 
associations, as well as ad hoc organisations all form part of a lobbying strategy.  
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Business interests 
European business federations are organised according to sector, subsector or 
product lines, but cross-sectoral (or non-sector specific) associations exist as well 
(Calingaert 1993). A distinction is made between direct membership associations, 
where individual companies are allowed membership, and so-called Umbrella groups 
of national trade associations. Direct membership associations are more likely to 
emerge when firms are rather big in size but small in number, where the industry is 
internationally oriented, and where activities are influenced by EU decisions (Grant 
1993: 36). Greenwood and Ronit (1994) encourage sector-based studies of interest 
representation in the EU, which is followed in this thesis. 
Donnelly emphasises that lobbying is not a one-way process as  
The Commission also needs external allies if it is to ensure that the 
policy proposals agreed through its complex internal co-ordination 
process are to be successfully translated into Community law. 
(Donnelly 1993: 81) 
Business groups predominate in the EU, accounting for nearly two thirds of interest 
groups (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998, Greenwood 2007), but are not the only 
interests represented in the EU52. It can be pointed out, though, that business is one 
of the more powerful lobbies, although it does not always get what it wants (Grant 
1993: 44)53. Business is indeed recognised as a “special” interest group because of 
its key role in organising the economy and the considerable amount of resources that 
business interests possess54 (Lindeque 2007: 564, John 2002). This resource 
perspective is a commonality all three perspectives share and therefore, the RBV is 
discussed in chapter 4 to provide a theoretical framework for this thesis. The amount 
of resources a firm possesses can be linked to its size, and the size of a firm 
influences whether businesses lobby individually in Brussels55 (Bennett 1999). Woll 
(2007) indicates financial resources, social capital, legal or technical expertise as well 
as other information as resources that are used by lobbyists.  
 
                                              
52
 Other interests include agriculture, organised labour, consumer interests and environmentalists. 
53
 Or as Mahon (1989) puts it: “Conflicts in the political system are not always resolved by those 
organizations or individuals with the most money or, in the case of organizations, the largest 
membership.“ 
54
 Newell and Paterson (1998) specifically point to financial resources as explanation for corporate 
influence. 
55
 See Dür and de Bièvre (2007) for a similar argument for group versus individual activities.  
The Corporate Political Activities (CPAs) of MNEs 34 
 
Social capital 
Social capital as a resource (Bourdieu 1986) deserves more detailed attention as a 
major resource used by companies for lobbying. Social capital is a key organising 
concept in the social sciences (Coleman 1988, Putnam 1995, 2000, Fukuyama 1995, 
and Bourdieu 1986)56. A widely-accepted definition of the term is proposed by 
Serageldin and Grootaert (1999: 45): 
In the literature of political science, sociology, and anthropology, 
social capital generally refers to the set of norms, networks, and 
organizations through which people gain access to power and 
resources that are instrumental in enabling decision-making and 
policy formulation. 
Social capital plays a role in policy-making as it can be used by lobbyists and 
decision-makers alike. The OECD (2001) in its publication on the role of human and 
social capital is less political and includes the “networks, norms, values and 
understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”, and thus reflects 
the role of social capital in terms of bonding and bridging (see below). Coleman 
(1988, p. S98) includes firms when he defines social capital through its function: 
It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two 
elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social 
structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether 
persons or corporate actors – within the structure. 
In the context of this thesis, social capital enables corporate actors, that is, 
representatives of firms in Brussels to interact with policy-makers and with other 
representatives in the same industry or other (related) industries. Of particular 
importance in this context is information-flow capability which Coleman (1988) points 
out as an important form of social capital that facilitates action57, and trust 
(Bachmann and Nielsen 2009). 
Whilst interaction among industry representatives constitutes bonding social capital, 
interaction of corporate actors with policy-makers constitutes bridging capital (Grix 
2002 calls these „within group‟ and „between group‟ social capital58). Bonding (or 
                                              
56
 For a thorough historical overview of the term and its usage, see Halpern (2005). See also 
Dasgupta and Serageldin (1999), and Serageldin and Grootaert (1999). 
57
 For an example of the use of the social capital concepts regarding civil society and environmental 
issues, see Crotty (2006a). 
58
 Here Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006: 28) warn that spillovers of social capital formation might 
not necessarily be positive as it can create entry barriers or exclude communities altogether. 
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exclusive) social capital is inward looking while bridging social capital is outward 
looking (Putnam 2000), or as Putnam (2000: 23) puts it: 
Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, 
whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40. 
This dichotomy of bonding versus bridging social capital has been brought about by 
the networks view of the social capital literature, encompassing relationships 
between and within horizontal and vertical associations (Grootaert and Van Bastelaar 
2002: 6, Ch. 1)59. Portes (1998: 7) also underlines the relational and intangible 
aspect of social capital, which “inheres in the structure of (…) relationships”. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) emphasise the network of relationships from 
which social capital is derived as an actual and potential resource. 
Lin (2001: 6) stresses the facilitation of flow of information and exertion of influence 
as aspects of social capital, which the author defines as “investment in social 
relations with expected returns”. Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002, Ch. 1) 
emphasise the critical role of trust (see also Fukuyama 1995), social interaction, and 
reciprocity as elements of social capital which they define more broadly as the  
institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern 
interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 
development (Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002: 2).  
Coleman (1988) also underlines obligations and expectations as reciprocal elements 
of social capital. Esser (2008), too, stresses the relational aspect of social capital 
which he divides into relational and system capital and defines it as the value of all 
the “resources and benefits that an actor can obtain and control through his 
embeddedness in relationships to other actors” (Esser 2008: 41, see also 
Granovetter 1985 for issues of embeddedness)60.  
Although Woll (2007) does not use a resource-based concept, the resources 
indicated by her – including social capital – relate to the typology of political 
resources by Dahan (2005a, b). Similarly, Van Schendelen (2002) lists expertise, 
                                              
59
 Other views within the literature include the communitarian perspective, the institutional view and 
the synergy view (Grootaert and Van Bastelaar 2002). 
60
 See also the discussion on political resources in Ch. 4 (section 4.3.2), especially relational 
resources, which relate to social capital. 
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networks, positions and financial means as the most frequently resources, but does 
not relate them to any theoretical concept61. This is done in chapter 4. 
Greenwood and Webster (2000) point to formal EU level business associations and 
firms with an established government relations office in Brussels as the most visible 
business actors with an interest to target the EU level. Important business lobbying 
actors there include (Collie 1993, Eberlie 1993, Coen 1997a, Greenwood 2007):  
 BUSINESSEUROPE, formerly UNICE - The Union of Industrial and Employers‟ 
Confederations of Europe 
 ERT: The European Roundtable of Industrialists 
 Eurochambres: The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry 
 AmCham EU - American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union 
 Sectoral organisations (e.g. CEFIC - European Chemical Industry Council) 
 National federations (e.g. CBI - Confederation of British Industry).  
The products and activities of business are the object of regulations, and therefore 
business necessarily plays an essential role in the policy process (Young and 
Wallace 2000): producers hold information that policy makers need to make informed 
decisions about the market situation and the proposals‟ consequences. 
Cowles (1996) notes interestingly that the EU Committee of AmCham, created in 
1978, was the first organisation that large MNEs formed. The traditional characteristic 
of business interest representation in the EU is the European federation of national 
federations (Cowles 1996). This has also been the traditional focus for studies of EU 
interest representation. Coen‟s (1997a) contribution is one of the first and few to 
study large firms as political actors in the EU as Bouwen (2002) points out62. In 
recent years, European interest representations have seen a rise in mixed 
membership organisations where both national federations and companies directly 
are represented. Prominent examples include CEFIC and ACEA, the European 
                                              
61
 Beyers (2004) even uses the familiar term “resource-based” of the resource-based view but does 
not provide any discussion of literature or theory. 
62
 See Scherer et al. (2009) for a call for more research into business firms as political actors.  
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Automobile Manufacturers' Association. This could be seen as a consequence of the 
weaknesses of European-level associations63, as Greenwood (2007) points out.  
Mixed membership is an important aspect to keep in mind, as the research looks at 
individual companies‟ activities and strategies. Collective action as such is therefore 
not the focus of the thesis. However, it is considered because individual action can 
complement association activities or compete with them and as those play an 
important part of an individual company‟s explicit strategy and activities. With respect 
to the relationship between individual companies and associations Calingaert (1993) 
draws attention to the fact that there is no distinct pattern between these two types of 
actors, and this thesis therefore investigates what the relationship between individual 
firm activities and industry association activities in interest representation is and 
whether these activities complement or compete with each other. The research 
specifically investigates companies where the make-or-buy decision for public affairs 
and lobbying has been made in favour of “make”64 and hence in-house activities. The 
research is therefore not concerned with external resources for lobbying, i.e. buying-
in consultancies or agencies.  
2.2 Synthesis and Conclusion 
What we do not know is vaster than what we have discovered to date. 
At present, scholars of PA/IM/CPA have discovered the part of the 
iceberg above water but lack an understanding of how far it is 
submerged. (Schuler 2001: 351)65 
 (…) political behavior belongs necessarily to the study of 
international strategy management. (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994: 
137) 
Ultimately, what is needed is an analysis that links both perspectives, 
one that shows the interrelationship between the role of politics in 
shaping management decision-making and the role of business in 
influencing governmental decision-making. (Vogel 1996) 
The above quotes all illustrate the need to engage in interdisciplinary research in the 
area of business-government interaction, since there is still much to discover as 
                                              
63
 These weaknesses include a lack of resources, a reactive rather than proactive lobbying approach 
and diverging national interests of member associations which leads to a „lowest common 
denominator policy‟ (Grant 1993). Pijnenburg (1998) also points to the great “distance” between 
individual companies and Euro-federations. 
64
 Cf. Marcus et al. (1987a). 
65
 PA – Public Affairs, IM – issues management, CPA – corporate political activity (Schuler 2001).  
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Schuler points out. This section draws the discussed literatures together, presents an 
overview of the identified gaps, which this thesis attempts to fill, and discusses the 
terminology used. 
Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) argue strongly for better integration of IB and CPAs 
literature: according to them the latter “rarely considers the complexities” of MNEs 
whereas the former “pays little attention to the management of political imperatives” 
(Blumentritt and Nigh 2002: 59). The international CPA literature investigates the 
means by which organisations interact with global political actors (Blumentritt and 
Nigh 2002) and thus both the IB and CPA literature are suitable to address MNE 
CPAs in the EU. The authors furthermore point out that MNEs are special when 
considering political activities (Blumentritt and Nigh 2002, see also Rugman and 
Verbeke 1998c). For example, Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) see governments as 
endogenous rather than exogenous to business activities (see also Luo 2001). 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998c) emphasise that a firm‟s perspective on governments 
as either exogenous or endogenous will influence its political strategies. This thesis 
asks what motivates firms to engage in government relations, which should give an 
indication as to whether firms view public policy as exogenous or endogenous. 
As early as 1988, Boddewyn (1988) had highlighted that political behaviour of MNEs 
was ignored or only passively treated in common models of the MNE. Governments 
were taken as exogenous givens to which MNEs reacted. Although he argued for an 
integration of political aspects into MNE theories, he failed to mention the (American) 
domestic CPA literature of that period, for example authors such as Epstein, Keim, 
Baysinger, and Zeithaml.  
Wan and Hillman (2005) point out that the investigation of corporate political 
strategies is often limited to the domestic US context, thereby suggesting 
incorporating an international dimension. This thesis is attempting to fill part of this 
gap by investigating CPAs in an international, European context and thus contribute 
to the development of the CPA research area where research of MNEs‟ CPAs across 
different countries is at an early stage. With a particular focus on the Triad regions, 
this thesis presents a contribution to CPA as well as to IB at the same time. 
Blumentritt and Nigh (2002), in line with Hillman and Hitt (1999), emphasise that the 
political environment of the country where firms operate influences political activities 
– thus it is of interest whether US and Japanese subsidiaries in the EU have adapted 
their CPAs to the “specialities of Brussels” or whether they still use their “home-
grown approach” to lobbying. Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) point out that, although 
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MNEs might have global competitive strategies, host country contexts might require 
particular subsidiary activities in the political environment.  
Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) do mention the example of the EU; however, it is not 
addressed in actuality, as US MNEs are at the core of their analysis. Rugman and 
Verbeke (1998c) distinguish between benefits of integration and of national 
responsiveness as an MNE‟s desired outcome of business-government interactions 
and point out that integration benefits will be desired when dealing with supranational 
public agencies, which is the case in this research of EU environmental regulations. 
Firms with a focus on integration will prefer EU-wide regulations in an integrated 
market in order to have a consistent operating environment. 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998c) point towards the national treatment principle which 
ends discriminatory treatment of home and foreign firms by governments, thus the 
EU is truly both home and host to firms from the Triad region66. It is an “institutional 
reality” that governments do not unambiguously represent either a home or host 
country (Rugman and Verbeke 1998c: 130). 
The difference between lobbying in the US and in the EU is pointed out by Cowles 
(1996: 345): in the US there is a more “confrontational style of lobbying” while in the 
EU the approach is more subtle and discreet. This is echoed by Loewenberg (2001) 
and Calingaert (1993)67. It is a commonality these three strands of literature share: all 
point to approaches of business-government relations ranging from 
confrontational/adversarial to cooperative, and therefore this thesis investigates the 
approaches taken by automotive MNEs lobbying EU environmental regulations.  
Gardner (1991) points out the negative connotation that lobbying has in Europe and 
that it is rather not spoken about publicly there. In contrast, lobbying and lobbyist are 
value-free terms, in the US (Köppl 2005). Hillman and Hitt (1999) emphasise the 
different connotations of the term “lobbying”: in the US and other non-European 
countries lobbying implies the “provision of information to policy makers by 
individuals representing the firms interest”, whereas in European countries lobbying 
implies political action in general, and thus refers to any proactive political strategy.  
                                              
66
 See also Wilkins (2007) on this point. 
67
 Mahoney (2007) underlines less compromise and „winner-take-all‟ outcomes as more prevalent in 
the US. Loewenberg (2001) points out the differences between the US and the EU, especially in the 
area of environmental regulations from which the chosen case studies come (see next chapter). 
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What links all three areas of literature is that individual CPAs are only pursued if 
sufficient resources are available (e.g. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Keillor and Hult 
2004, based on Gladwin and Walter 1980; see also Lenway and Rehbein 1991, 
Schuler and Rehbein 1997). The size of firms serves as a proxy for resources and 
political clout, which determine benefits from pursuing CPAs (Wan and Hillman 
2005). The automotive industry, as one of the world‟s biggest industries, consists of 
large MNEs and thus a resource-based approach to its lobbying activities is 
appropriate. The following tables present summaries of all the gaps that were 
identified within the three areas of literature and how the thesis intends to address 
these.  
Table 2.4: Identified Gaps and Contribution of Thesis (dark grey shaded gaps indicate overlaps with 
gaps in other areas) 
a) International Business: MNE-government Relations 
Identified Gap Addressed in Thesis 
Government policies viewed as exogenous 
(Boddewyn 1988) 
Thesis questions exogenous nature of 
government policies by asking why do firms 
engage in CPA  
Developed countries under-researched (Luo 
2004) 
Focus on companies from Triad region in EU 
Focus on FDI/Technology transfer (Hillman and 
Wan 2005) 
Focus on environmental regulations as major 
challenge in 21
st
 century, especially with regard 
to climate change.  
Need for a multi/inter-disciplinary approach 
(Sullivan 1998a, b) (see also Political Science) 
CPA and Political Science literature  
More complicated monitoring through regulatory 
competition of national governments by EU 
(Brewer and Young 2001) 
Thesis researches this increasingly important 
and complex context by looking at MNE-
government relations in EU 
MNE typology only corporate strategy (related: 
Triad regions) (Baron 1995) 
MNE typology applicable to political strategy? 
(country-of-origin effect?) 
Multiple stakeholders not taken into account 
(Dunning and Lundan 2008) (see also Political 
Science) 
Interviewing representatives from MNEs, 
governmental institutions and civil society 
Ambiguous findings: Business-government 
Relations adversarial or cooperative? (Rugman 
& Verbeke 1998 b, c) 
What is the approach of MNEs to business-
government relations in EU? 
 
b) Strategic Management: Corporate Political Activities 
Identified Gap Addressed in Thesis 
Need to analyse non-US firms (Boddewyn and 
Brewer 1994, Keillor et al. 2005) 
Japanese and European firms in addition to US 
firms 
International perspective needed, analysis of 
non-US context (Skippari et al. 2005) 
Political resources only in US context (Frynas et 
al. 2006) 
European perspective and context investigated, 
IB  
Political resources in EU context studied 
Research on corporate political strategies lacks 
MNE and international business perspectives 
(Rodriguez et al. 2006) 
CPA of MNEs are investigated, IB perspective 
included 
Increasing importance of issues such as 
sustainability and climate change as reasons for 
business managers to interface with political 
decision-makers (Keim and Hillman 2008) 
These areas are investigated in three 
environmental areas of business-government 
relations for automotive companies. 
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International environmental protection as an 
emerging phenomenon within IB and CPA that 
should be tackled by research (Windsor 2007) 
Policy area this thesis investigates 
Inconsistent explanations of why firms become 
politically engaged (Getz 2001, Salorio et al. 
2005) 
Why do firms engage in business-government 
relations/act politically? What are the 
motivational factors? 
Association versus individual activities, role 
unclear (Marcus et al. 1987b) (see also Political 
Science) 
What kind of approach do MNEs take in their 
government relations/CPA and how their 
approach differs from/ complements the industry 
association 
To what extent (if any) does the nationality of 
firms affect their political strategies (Meznar 
2001, Hansen and Mitchell 2001) 
Do different countries of origin translate into 
different approaches to CPA? 
Various academic disciplines like Political 
Science and management ignore each other‟s 
perspectives (Schuler and Rehbein 1997) 
Interdisciplinary approach in thesis by taking 
three areas of literature 
Pressure-oriented or information-oriented (Getz 
1997) 
What kind of approach (cooperative or 
conflictual) do MNEs take in CPA? 
 
c) Political Science: Lobbying/Interest Representation 
Identified Gap Addressed in Thesis 
Association, not companies, primarily as 
lobbyists (Bouwen 2002, Salorio et al. 2005) 
(see also CPA) 
Companies as lobbyists are investigated 
Government point of view (Skippari 2002, 
Hadjikhani and Ghauri 2001) 
Firm point of view  
Contribution of civil society understudied 
(Michaelowa 1998) (see also IB) 
Civil society actors are interviewed 
Environmental regulations need supranational 
context (Pedler 2002 b and c) 
EU as chosen context for case studies of 
environmental regulations  
Europeanisation of interest groups or national 
interest representation? (Coen 2007) 
Investigates differences between companies of 
different countries of origin 
Research encouraged through case studies and 
sector studies (Van Schendelen 1993) 
Investigation by case studies within one sector 
Interdisciplinary research necessary (Van 
Schendelen 2002) 
Thesis takes interdisciplinary approach 
Complex relations between governments and 
industries (Wilks & Wright 1987, McLaughlin & 
Maloney 1999) 
What approach is taken by MNEs in the EU? 
The following table summarises the gaps common to all three strands of literatures. 
Table 2.5: Joint research gaps 
Summary of joint research gaps 
 Interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary approach needed (Sullivan 1998a, b, Rodriguez et al. 
2006, Van Schendelen 2002)  
 Importance of researching environmental regulations (Behrman 1997, Windsor 2007, Pedler 
2002b/c) 
 EU as supranational research context (Brewer & Young 2001, Blumentritt & Nigh 2002, 
Greenwood 2007) 
 Business-government relations confrontational or cooperative? (Rugman & Verbeke 
1998b/c, Getz 1997, McLaughlin & Maloney 1999) 
 Country-of-origin effect? (Moon & Lado 2000, Meznar 2001, Coen 2007) 
Regarding the terminology, corporate political activities (CPAs) is the main term 
used, while government relations or interest representation and lobbying are also 
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used. Corporate Political Activities is an academic term specific to a certain type of 
literature that could be misunderstood by laymen because of the “political” 
connotation, while lobbying is used by practitioners and in everyday language, 
despite its negative connotations. Government relations and interest representation 
seem to have more neutral connotations than the other two terms.  
Drawing the discussed areas together, all of these terms are here understood to:  
 Include any intended firm action with the purpose of influencing governmental 
policy or processes (based on discussions of the term CPAs) 
 Include an aspect of communication (based on the definition of lobbying) 
 Include activities that are specifically influencing governmental policies but 
also activities that keep relations with governments on an ongoing basis as a 
pre-condition for influence (based on the relational aspect of business-
government relations). 
This is the basis upon which this thesis proceeds from hereon to answer the following 
research questions that have emerged from the discussion so far: 
 Why do firms engage in CPAs? (RQ1) 
 How do companies organise and approach CPAs? (RQ2) 
 What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? (RQ3) 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4) 
 How and why do CPAs differ between MNEs from the Triad regions? (RQ5) 
The literature review in the chapter showed that CPAs have been researched in the 
areas of IB, Strategic Management and Political Science. It demonstrated that there 
are various gaps (outlined above) that can only be addressed by an interdisciplinary 
approach. Accordingly, such an approach is taken in this thesis to fill those gaps. An 
underlying assumption of all three strands of literature is that only firms with a 
sufficient amount of resources (e.g. financial resources, expertise, social capital) can 
engage in business-government relations. The RBV, therefore, underpins the 
investigation of this thesis and chapter 4 discusses these in general and in 
application to CPAs. Before that, environmental regulations in the EU and their 
impact on the automotive industry are discussed. 
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3 Environmental Regulations in the EU and their 
Impact on the Automotive Industry  
3.1 Environmental Regulations  
Environmental pollution, and in particular climate change, are issues that inherently 
have a moral as well as a scientific dimension. Science provides the necessary 
understanding of the issues whereas moral philosophy concerns the “duty to ensure 
that future generations are treated at least as well as our own on grounds of inter-
generational equity” (Helm 2003: 350). This chapter looks at environmental 
regulations generally, and then considers the EU and the CPA perspective to the 
matter, before it moves on to the automotive industry and the three chosen regulatory 
areas – pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and ELVs. 
Between the previous chapter on the background in the literature regarding CPAs of 
MNEs and the following chapter on the RBV as chosen theoretical lens, this chapter 
serves to put the thesis in a practical, industrial context: firstly, in the context of 
environmental regulations – particularly in the EU – which have grown in importance 
due to concern over environmental pollution, and secondly, in the context of the 
automotive manufacturing as an industry that is particularly confronted with 
challenges posed by environmental regulations. Different environmental standards 
that the industry has to meet are often of a contradictory nature in their technical 
requirements. This leads to the research questions of how companies view 
environmental regulations (RQ4) and how and why their CPAs differ across different 
environmental regulatory areas (RQ5). 
3.1.1 General Aspects of Environmental Regulations68 
The increase in environmental regulations has been attributed to society‟s concern 
over negative environmental impacts of business activities (Rugman and Verbeke 
1998a). Conventional wisdom claims that economic growth and rigorous pollution 
abatement measures are mutually exclusive, as environmental measures will 
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increase costs and lower profits (Wurzel 2002: 14, Simpson and Bradford 1996). 
Society‟s desire for higher environmental standards has therefore been met with 
opposition from industrial groups (Farzin 2003). Traditionally, the relationship 
between businesses‟ competitiveness and environmental objectives has been 
conceived as a trade-off between private costs and social benefits, and thus as a 
kind of “arm-wrestling match” (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a: 97). Researchers 
have argued that increased environmental regulations could possibly have 
unproductive investments, higher costs and possible losses of competitive advantage 
as a consequence (Walley and Whitehead 1994, Aragón-Correa and Sharma 2003). 
This assertion is contested by Porter and van der Linde (1995a) through the so-
called Porter Hypothesis which states that tougher environmental standards – if 
properly designed – can lead to more innovation and thus to more economic benefits 
for corporate environmental leaders (“first-mover advantage”). This is particularly the 
case for companies in a triad-based economy, as Rugman and Verbeke (1998b) 
point out, since companies from smaller economies sell more abroad than in their 
respective home countries. The thesis investigates the research question how 
companies in the automotive industry view environmental regulations – as costs or 
as opportunities for innovation (RQ4). 
The general principles of environmental regulations comprise the precautionary 
principle, the prevention principle, rectification of damage at source, and the polluter-
pays principle (Krämer 2000; see also Papadakis 1996). There are different 
“standard-setting philosophies” concerning principles of environmental regulations 
which differ in the EU member states, so that Germany for example has favoured the 
precautionary principle and Best Available Technology while Britain has favoured 
environmental quality objectives and Best Practicable Means (Wurzel 2002: 19f).  
3.1.2 Environmental Regulations in the EU 
Environmental regulations in the EU have grown immensely in number over the past 
two decades and pose new challenges for policy-makers and industry (Wagner 2009, 
see also figure below). Areas generally covered under environmental legislation 
include waste, noise, air, soil, nature, water, and chemicals (DG Environment 2007; 
Krämer 1997). The EU is considered an international environmental leader – its 
environmental regulations are among the world‟s strictest and most ambitious ones 
(Kelemen and Vogel 2010). 
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Figure 3.1: EU Environmental Legislation in Force 1959-2005, directives only (Lenschow and Sprungk 
2010: 138) 
 
Environmental policy on the European level was not mentioned in community 
legislation until the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which came into force in 
1987 (Wurzel 2002: 75). It was then that environmental measures were given a 
separate legal basis (Collier 1996, Young and Wallace 2000). The SEA enforced a 
high level of protection in proposals concerning environmental protection and 
contains the principles mentioned above (Young and Wallace 2000). 
The Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) of 1992 (in force in 1993) 
introduced qualified majority voting (QMV) to environmental policy, and thus 
strengthened the area further (Collier 1996). The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 (in  
force in 1999) moved the protection of the environment from being a minor policy 
goal to one of the main goals of the EU, even stating it in its preamble (Roth-
Behrendt and Detken 2002).  
Wettestad (2005: 11) points out that environmental policy on a European level is 
often the result of one or more “green” member states who initiate the levelling of the 
“European regulatory playing field” which also reduces the institutional mismatch 
between domestic and EU policy. There are three main legal instruments in EU 
environmental policy: directives, regulations, and decisions (Wurzel 2002: 75). 
Regulations and decisions are directly applicable, whereas directives – which form 
the majority of EU environmental legislation – have to be translated into national law 
before their implementation. 
So-called environmental action programmes played a role at a European level as 
early as the 1970s, long before they received legal foundations in the 1980s. The first 
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of these programmes took place from 1973 to 197669 (Roth-Behrendt and Detken 
2002). During the 5th environmental action programme, in 1996, the European 
Commission issued a communication on Environmental agreements, which paved 
the way for voluntary agreements (VAs). Legal direct regulation is rather a „command 
and control‟ type of regulation whereas VAs are better characterised by a „carrot and 
stick‟ approach (Skjærseth 2000). The Commission communication thus marked a 
switch from a prescriptive „thou shalt not‟ to a „let‟s work together‟ approach and 
enhanced the mix of policy instruments, although the tool is regarded as a 
supplement to and not a replacement for other tools (European Commission 1996a, 
b). Skjærseth (2000) points out that there is a clear advantage of environmental VAs, 
namely their capacity to develop constructive co-operation between authorities and 
target groups. Other advantages include their cost-effectiveness and quicker goal 
achievement. The disadvantages include the possibility of more lenient objectives, 
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and potential free-rider problems. The 
EU guidelines were developed in line with these benefits and risks, and include 
criteria such as clearly defined goals, a limited number of contracting parties, 
monitoring of progress, and enforcement mechanisms in case of failure to ensure 
their viability (European Commission 1996a, b). VAs are of relevance in this thesis 
for CO2 (see below). 
3.1.3 CPAs with Regard to Environmental Regulations 
According to Rugman and Verbeke (1998a), research on MNE environmental 
strategies is vital as MNEs dominate in pollution-intensive industries such as 
petroleum and chemicals (see also Levy 1995). Environmental legislation in the EU is 
most costly for manufacturing and energy production industries (EEA 2003); their 
political involvement thus takes place for obvious reasons as Markussen and 
Svendsen (2005) illustrate. Boyd (2002) as well as Pedler (2002c) point out, 
however, that industries often do not speak with one voice, which reflects scientific 
and policy controversies over the issue. 
Stigson (1997) emphasises that industry is part of the solution for environmental and 
climate change issues. Fierce resistance to the issues by business in the early 1990s 
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 The latest is the 6
th
 environmental action programme which started in 2001 and which forms the 
basis for European environmental policy over the following decade (2002-2012). Its key word is the 
concept of sustainable development and the integration of social progress, economic growth and 
environmental protection (Roth-Behrendt and Detken 2002). 
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changed to a less opposing stance towards the mid and late 1990s. Whereas fossil 
fuel as well as most manufacturing and processing industries opposed climate 
change regulation, it was insurance companies that sounded the bell for support, 
threatened by weather-related losses (Grubb et al. 1999: 257). 
Levy (1995) argues that MNEs are faced with regulations that vary from country to 
country which force them to make choices between differentiated or standardised 
responses. For this research this argument could be translated into an expectation 
that MNEs in the EU would work (or would have worked) towards single European 
environmental standards, which would make their operations “easier” and more 
consistent across this bloc of regional economic integration.  
MNEs as larger firms also have more resources to utilise CPAs (Levy 1995, Lenway 
and Rehbein 1991). Thus, it is more advisable to analyse MNEs‟ political behaviour 
rather than smaller firms‟ political activities70. Wurzel (2002) points out that the 
involvement of corporate actors in environmental policy-making in the EU varies from 
sector to sector71. They do play a very important role in EU policy-making. Industry, 
however, is not a homogenous actor: there are „corporate environmental leaders‟ as 
well as „corporate environmental laggards‟ (Wurzel 2002). It is therefore asked how 
companies view environmental regulations (RQ4). According to Wurzel (2002: 261), 
“the power and knowledge resources of corporate actors are considerable”. The kind 
of resources the corporate actors in the automotive industry use in their attempts to 
influence environmental policy in the EU is examined in this thesis (RQ6). 
3.2 Application of CPAs and Environmental Regulations in the 
EU to the Automotive Industry  
Of all the areas of public policy, it is the environment where the 
European Union has probably the greatest daily impact on the way 
companies go about their business. (FT 2002) 
The regulatory environment is one of the major determinants of competitiveness of 
the automotive industry as it affects almost all aspects of doing business (European 
Commission 2004). This section gives an overview of the industry and how it is 
affected by environmental regulations in the EU. This forms the basis of the 
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 See for example Michaelowa (2000) for a comparison of sectors regarding EU climate policies. See 
also Polk and Schmutzler (2005) and Gullberg (2008) for lobbying in the EU regarding 
environmental and climate policies. 
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investigation into the ways in which companies respond to such policies through pre-
regulatory CPAs (RQ5). 
3.2.1 The Automotive Industry 
Over a period of more than 100 years the automotive industry has developed into 
one of the most global industries, and has become the world‟s largest manufacturing 
industry (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003). The automotive value chain is made up of 
vehicle manufacturers – the most important players and focus of this thesis – 
material and component suppliers, distribution and retailing and after-sales services. 
In general the industry is characterised by high fixed costs in factories and product 
development as well as by high levels of over-capacity (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 
2003, FT 2011a).  
It was selected for this thesis for several reasons: 
 The industry is not only the world‟s largest manufacturing industry, but a motor 
vehicle also represents the most complex consumer decision for buyers72.  
 The industry is the biggest industry in terms of R&D (research and 
development) expenses (accounting for 24% of industrial R&D activity, ACEA 
2005, 2006) 
 It accounts for 17% of total tax revenues in the EU, for 6-7% of EU 
manufacturing output, and 7% of European manufacturing employment 
(McLaughlin and Maloney 1999, John and Schwarzer 2006) 
 It faces significant market and technological challenges on account of climate 
change (Levy and Egan 2003) and other environmental regulations both in 
voluntary and legally binding form.  
 All major global car companies operate in Europe, that is, they not only sell but 
also produce in Europe. This makes it possible to compare European MNEs 
with US and Japanese subsidiaries in one location. 
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 The automotive industry, more than most industries, illustrates the significant 
irreversible shift of decision-making power from member states to the regional 
EU level (McLaughlin and Maloney 1999). 
 The majority of the companies in the industry are represented politically in the 
EU, that is, in Brussels, as well as in several member states thus providing an 
opportunity to research their CPAs comparatively in one location. 
 The industry is a regular participant in the EU policy process (McLaughlin and 
Maloney 1999) and has been the subject of lobbying studies in Political 
Science literature, which makes it possible to compare findings and to adjust 
the approach to a business and strategy research setting.  
The focus is on the vehicle manufacturers (OEMs – Original Equipment 
Manufacturers) as they are the most important players, being more visible and less 
fragmented than the supplier side73. Fragmentation brings with it smaller sizes of 
companies which tend to be politically represented at a collective rather than 
individual level. As the focus is on individual CPAs, the major car producers as MNEs 
offer the best possibility to research this field – 11 OEMs have representative offices 
in Brussels, all of which have been interviewed directly (10 cases) or indirectly (one 
case), thus the whole population of politically active automotive MNEs has been 
covered. The following tables show the biggest producers worldwide in terms of sales 
volumes. These tables already indicate the changing nature of the competitive 
environment of the industry during the course of this study, in terms of shifts in 
alliances and changes in ownership, illustrated by Daimler‟s separation from Chrysler 
in 2007, which in turn filed for bankruptcy (as did GM) in 2009 before entering an 
alliance with Fiat in the same year. Examples of changes in ownership include Ford‟s 
sale of Jaguar/Land Rover to Tata from India in 2008 and of Volvo to Chinese 
company Geely in 2010 as well as GM‟s sale of Saab to Dutch company Spyker Cars 
in the same year (source: Just Auto). 
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(McLaughlin and Maloney 1999, Wells 2010). 
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Table 3.1: Motor vehicles producers by company, 2005 and 2008 (ILO 2006, OICA 2008, own 
calculations) 
Company Production („000) Share (%) 
General Motors 9,097 13.69 
Ford-Mazda 7,785 11.71 
Toyota 7,338 11.04 
Renault-Nissan 6,111 9.19 
Volkswagen 5,211 7.84 
DaimlerChrysler 4,815 7.25 
Honda 3,436 5.17 
Peugeot Citroen 3,375 5.08 
Hyundai-Kia 3,091 4.65 
Others 16,203 24.38 
Total in 2005 66,465 100.00 
 
Company Production 
(„000) 
Share (%) 
Toyota 9,238 13.28 
GM 8,283 11.91 
Volkswagen 6,437 9.25 
Ford 5,407 7.77 
Honda  3,913 5.63 
Nissan 3,395 4.88 
PSA 3,325 4.78 
Hyundai 2,777 3.99 
Suzuki 2,624 3.77 
Fiat 2,524 3.63 
Others 21,638 31.10 
Total in 2008 69,561 100.00 
 
In the EU the production of motor vehicles is highly concentrated, with 45% of total 
value added generated in Germany, 17% in France, 11% in the United Kingdom, 7% 
each in Italy and Spain, and 6% in Sweden (John and Schwarzer 2006). It has to be 
added that these figures do not represent the manufacturing output of solely 
indigenous producers, as for example Spain no longer has any Spanish-owned car 
firms operating in Spain. 
In the EU, where they remain of fundamental economic importance (McLaughlin and 
Maloney 1999), automobile companies are subject to a whole range of regulations – 
regulations specifically designed for the industry as well as regulations more 
generally for business and other sectors. Consequently, there is a tradition of 
automobile interest representation in the EU (see Spell 2000, McLaughlin and 
Maloney 1999, Mazey and Richardson 1993b, McLaughlin and Jordan 1993). Before 
the founding of ACEA, the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, in 
1991, the interests were represented by two different organisations: The Liaison 
Committee of the Automobile Industry of the Countries of the European Communities 
(CLCA), founded in 1958 as an offspring of the Organization of International 
Automobile Constructors (OICA); and The Committee of Common Market Automobile 
Constructors (CCMC), formed in 197274 (McLaughlin and Jordan 1993, McLaughlin 
and Maloney 1999). The first working priority of ACEA was the increasing threat of 
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 CCMC was set up out of a dissatisfaction of direct company representation in the CLCA and a 
concern of European companies that Ford Europe and GM would lobby for adopting US emissions 
regulations through their membership in national trade associations and hence CLCA (McLaughlin 
and Maloney 1999). Although the two interest groups cooperated and had their respective areas of 
strength – CCMC concentrated on technical matters while CLCA focused on legal and fiscal 
matters, relations became increasingly strained after the SEA in 1986 (ibid.) and led to the demise of 
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Japanese imports (Weber and Hallerberg 2001). Only later did the focus shift 
towards other issues, especially environmental regulations (see below). Other 
regulations facing the industry concern areas such as safety issues (driver, 
passengers, and pedestrians), transport networks, health, type approval, competition 
policies, technical harmonisation and standardisation, and employment rights. 
Environmental regulations represent trends that already have an impact on the 
automotive business and will continue to do so in the future (cf. Nieuwenhuis and 
Wells 2003: 3). They have rarely been addressed, however, in a business context, 
according to Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2003: 4), although this is becoming 
increasingly important: 
It is important because business and industry are the key to moving 
society towards more sustainable economic activity. 
As the authors demonstrate, the existing “automobility system” is not sustainable with 
two major factors determining car industry developments in the twenty-first century. 
The first question is how to overcome the chronic lack of profitable volume car 
production75; the second factor, however, which is to be researched in this thesis, is 
how to deal with the increasing environmental pressures on the trade, of which 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2003) count CO2 emissions as a main factor. One of the 
ways to deal with possibly contradictory environmental pressures is engaging with 
the political decision-makers who impose such regulations on the industry. These 
pre-regulatory CPAs are the subject of the chosen areas studied. 
The contemporary automotive industry, while a source of wealth and 
employment as well as contributing to the movement of people and 
goods, generates huge environmental and social burdens 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003: 68). 
Environmental regulations have grown immensely in number and pose new 
challenges for policy-makers and industry with the issues of pollutant emissions 
(Euro norms), global warming (CO2 emissions) and recycling (ELVs) (Wagner 2009). 
Eisenhardt (1989) advocates choosing cases such as extreme situations or polar 
types. The regulatory areas chosen for this thesis would not normally be called 
extreme or polar. However, as they represent significant trade-offs for the operations 
in the industry, they are to a certain degree polar: Reductions in CO2 and pollutant 
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emissions are in principle not compatible as reductions in pollutant emissions lead to 
increased CO2 emissions and potentially vice versa. Similarly, reductions in CO2 
require lighter vehicles, whereas increased recycling rates for ELVs require higher 
contents of steel – easier to recycle than plastics – thus resulting in heavier cars. A 
„strategy of diverse sampling‟ (Eisenhardt 1989: 537) was therefore followed to cover 
a broad range of environmental regulations for the automotive industry. Yin (1994: 
45) argues likewise that the decision for a multiple case study should not be taken 
lightly: “every case should serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of 
inquiry”. Further to the trade-offs discussed above (where the policy areas are in 
some respects complementary so that differences are better seen), it can be added 
that the ELV directive is the first regulation of its kind, the CO2 policy area serves as 
the only VA in the automotive sector, and the Euro norms on pollutant emissions 
consist of a series of directives that were successively tightened76.  
This demonstrates that the three areas impact on the automobile industry in different 
and even opposing ways. These environmental policies are thus expected to pose 
excellent areas for pre-regulatory CPAs of automobile enterprises, as there are 
different emphases of interests by the various manufacturers77. In the investigation, 
the research question is posed how and why (pre-regulatory) CPAs differ across 
these different areas of environmental regulations (RQ5). The areas are now 
introduced in turn. 
3.2.2 Area 1: Obligatory Emission Reductions – The Air Quality Agenda and 
the “Euro Norms” on Pollutant Emissions from Motor Vehicles 
EU efforts to curb exhaust emissions (also called pollutant or toxic emissions) date 
back to the 1970s (Pedler 2002c), and air quality concerns consequently led to the 
regulations of those emissions. Successive tightening of the regulations has placed 
continuing technical demands on the car industry (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003). 
Such tightening demands have not always been coordinated with other policies, 
which therefore, as a whole, have not always been coherent and consistent in terms 
of their technical implications, as will be discussed here and in the findings.  
During the early 1990s, tightened emission standards triggered the introduction of 
catalytic converters on new cars. Catalysts (two-way and three-way) can cut harmful 
emissions by around 50% (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003: 147, FOE 1997). The 
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process leading up to the introduction of catalytic converters was not uncontroversial, 
with debates about whether to follow US standards or regulations of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva. This also involved arguments 
over the catalytic converter versus the lean-burn engine (Friedrich et al. 2000). 
The so-called Euro norms were introduced in 1991 with the consolidated directive 
(91/441/EEC), which set mandatory limits (Euro 1) coming into effect in 1992/1993. 
The next directive (94/12/EC) put forward Euro 2 standards for 1996. Both directives 
allowed for the adoption of national fiscal incentives to accelerate the introduction of 
cars complying with the standards (Friedrich et al. 2000, Acid News 2004). 
Meanwhile, with the Auto-Oil Programme (AOP) in 1993 the EU took a “tripartite” 
approach to cost-effectively reducing air pollution, which involved the European 
Commission, the oil industry and automobile manufacturers (Friedrich et al. 2000). 
This meant that the focus was not only on output (exhaust emissions), but also on 
input as fuel quality affects emission levels (Pedler 2002c). The so-called Auto-Oil 
package included legislation on motor fuels for the oil industry and vehicle emission 
targets for the car industry. The most important part of the package were limit values 
for emissions from new cars for 2000 and 2005 – the Euro 3 and Euro 4 standards 
agreed in 1998 in the directive (98/69/EC)78 79. 
As part of the EU clean air strategy the Commission proposed standards for Euro 5 
in 2005 with the aim of coming into effect in 2009. These were passed in late 2006 at 
the same time as Euro 6 standards (coming into force in 2014) as follow up for Euro 
5 to create better lead times and greater legislative certainty for manufacturers. 
Pollutant emissions not only have set standards to achieve in contrast to CO2 
emissions (see below), there are also trade-offs between reductions in pollutant and 
CO2 emissions: this is due to technological issues whereby reduced pollutant 
emissions lead to increased CO2 emissions (Plotkin 2001). These trade-offs pose 
serious difficulties for the automotive industry as this means making environmental 
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 In total, the Auto-Oil I Programme was made up of the following legally binding measures: (1) car 
emission limits for 2000 and 2005; (2) petrol and diesel fuel standards for 2000 and 2005; (3) 
emission limits for vans; (4) emission limits for lorries; (5) maintenance, inspection and testing 
requirements (Friedrich et al. 2000). See also Acid News (2004). 
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 The main regulated exhaust emissions, which have to attain a standard, are carbon monoxide (CO), 
Hydrocarbons (HC), Nitrous Oxide (NOx) and particulate matter (PM). The targets differ between 
petrol and diesel cars, and particulate matter only relates to diesel cars (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 
2003). The fuel quality standards concern most importantly Sulphur for both diesel and petrol and 
Benzene for petrol. Other substances include Aromatics, Oxygen, PAHs (polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons), and Olefins (Friedrich et al. 2000, Pedler 2002b). 
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efforts on several fronts, which cannot necessarily all be achieved at the same time, 
thus creating uncertainties for companies regarding which issues to focus on. 
3.2.3 Area 2: Voluntary Emission Reductions – The Climate Change Agenda 
and CO2 from Cars 
Although a controversial issue among scientists for years, most of them now agree 
that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have caused and will continue to cause 
climate change (Grubb et al. 1999, Compston 2009). Carbon dioxide (CO2) is one of 
the major causes of climate change, which has become one of the most salient and 
daunting environmental problems (Grubb et al. 1999: xlii, Collier 1996). Already in the 
late 19th century scientists suggested that the earth‟s surface was warmed through 
an increase of CO2 in the atmosphere (Grubb et al. 1999: 3). The Kyoto Protocol – 
which was developed following the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 – was signed in 1997 and came into force in 
2005. Following up on the UNFCCC, the European Commission set out a strategy on 
climate change in 1995 which called for a stabilisation of CO2 at 1990 levels by 2000 
(European Commission 1995a). This strategy included measures on CO2 reduction 
from passenger cars as their CO2 emissions then accounted for 50% of transport 
CO2 emissions and for 12% of total CO2 emissions in the EU (European 
Commission 1995b). Among the fiscal and non-fiscal options for emission reductions, 
a three-pillar strategy was designed of which a cornerstone is the technological 
improvement of fuel efficiency through a VA between the Commission and the car 
industry. Two complementary measures concern consumer behaviour influence: fuel-
economy labelling and incentives through vehicle taxation (European Commission 
1995b). The VA between the Commission and ACEA represents a significant part of 
the EU‟s commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Skjærseth 2000). The agreement 
was to reduce CO2 emissions to 140g/km by 2008 from a late 1990s average of 
around 170g/km (Nieuwenhuis and Well 2003). It was negotiated in 1997 and 1998, 
and accepted in 1999. 
Nieuwenhuis and Wells (2003: 13) highlight CO2 as the main issue for the 
automobile industry in the 1990s and see it to continue to be a prime matter: 
The perceived need to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide in order to 
avert global warming is now the main agenda driving the car industry 
in Europe and the Far East. 
According to the authors, the CO2 agenda is starting to change the nature of the 
vehicles people drive. The VA is “the most influential force” in this agenda 
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(Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003: 13). The producers of Japan and South Korea also 
agreed to the same CO2 reductions (140g/km) until 2009, through their associations 
JAMA and KAMA.  
The CO2 agenda provides new challenges for industry as reducing CO2 emissions 
requires lighter vehicle weights, whereas the industry has been used to “Buddist80 
mass car making” where mainly steel is used (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003: 110). 
While a bigger steel proportion increases the recyclability of the vehicles, and thus 
makes compliance with the ELV directive (see below) easier, it leads to heavier cars 
that emit more CO2 emissions, which are directly linked to fuel consumption and thus 
fuel efficiency.  
The problem for the industry is that, even though individual engines are becoming 
more efficient than ever before in terms of torque and power per cubic centimetre of 
cubic capacity, these cubic capacities have increased over time and move heavier 
cars than the average vehicles in the 1970s and thus emit more CO2 (Nieuwenhuis 
and Wells 2003: 189). The industry is thus confronted with a fundamental challenge 
to its traditional paradigm of building evermore faster, larger and more efficient cars 
based on internal combustion engines as the CO2 agenda forces it to consider the 
production of lightweight vehicles not necessarily based on internal combustion 
propulsion. This could implicate a paradigm shift. 
In analyses of whether the agreement meets the guidelines and criteria developed by 
the European Commission in its Communication on Environmental Agreements 
(1996a, b) several authors criticise the ACEA-agreement for lacking enforcement 
mechanisms (Volpi and Singer 2000, Skjærseth 2000). Skjærseth (2000: 75) even 
goes as far as saying that the requirement of sanctions was “sacrificed”.  
CO2 emissions were not regulated legally until 2009 as there was no set emissions 
standard to be achieved (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003: 170). This is in contrast to 
above discussed regulations on pollutant emissions where set amounts have to be 
achieved. This situation changed in 2009 after the completion of the data collection 
for this thesis (2007), when a legally binding, regulatory solution was passed for CO2 
emissions from passenger cars (2009/443/EC). Having legally binding policies in 
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Wells 1994) – hence the term "Buddist”.  
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place for both CO2 and pollutant emissions thus intensifies the pressure on the car 
industry to balance these contradictory requirements as pointed out above. 
3.2.4 Area 3: End-of-life Vehicles – The Waste Reduction Agenda and Scrap 
Cars 
The ELV directive (2000/53/EC) forces producers to take a whole-life view of their 
products. This development was prompted by concerns in Germany in the early 
1990s about running out of landfill capacity by the year 2000 (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 
2003). This led to an increased interest in producer responsibility for ELVs or „product 
stewardship‟, where manufacturers remain responsible for their products during their 
whole useful life and beyond (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003). In the EU, 12-13 million 
vehicles are scrapped every year (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003), generating 
between 8 and 9 million tonnes of waste products, which are not easy to discard 
(European Commission 2006a). In 1997, the Commission first proposed the directive, 
which was adopted in October 2000 and took effect in 2003. These three years saw 
famous lobbying activities of automobile manufacturers and controversial 
negotiations, which are discussed and analysed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. 
The ELV directive forces the industry to move towards a product stewardship model 
(Smith and Crotty 2008) and thus has far-reaching consequences for companies 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003). It requires car manufacturers to take back scrap cars 
free of charge and sets targets for the reuse, recycling and recovery of vehicles and 
their components (European Commission 2006a). Furthermore it introduces stepwise 
bans on lead, cadmium, mercury and hexavalent chromium in car manufacture 
(ENDS Daily, 24.05.2000). 
As producers face additional costs at some future stage, there are incentives to 
minimise these costs by prolonging the life expectancy of cars and postponing the 
moments when these costs are incurred (Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2003). 
The ELV directive is part of a host of directives that deal with different „streams‟ of 
waste (EurActiv 2006, see figure below). In 2005 the Commission presented its new 
Thematic Strategy on Waste Prevention and Recycling, which aims at streamlining 
existing legislation within a single, comprehensive framework. The EU‟s approach to 
waste management is based on three principles: 1. waste prevention, 2. recycling 
and re-use, and 3. improving final disposal and monitoring (European Commission 
2006a). The sequence of waste prevention in the first place, reuse, recycling or 
composting, recovering energy and landfill disposal is also called the waste hierarchy 
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from best to worst option (European Commission, undated). The figure below 
illustrates how the ELV directive is placed within the overall waste framework of EU 
legislation. 
Motor vehicles consist of different materials, metals like iron and steel (main content), 
plastics, rubber, glass, fluids and lubricants, electric cables, insulation, paint, non-
ferrous metals and other materials (Lucas 2001, based on Kuhndt and Bilitewski 
2000). The degrees of recyclability vary from material to material, thus in itself 
creating additional challenges for the automotive industry and related industries. 
Increasingly, plastics – which are the most difficult parts to recycle – are being used 
in car manufacturing (ENDS Daily, 21.07.2000).  
Figure 3.2: EU waste legislation (source: European Commission, undated: EU Waste Policy – The 
Story behind the Strategy) 
 
The better recyclability degree of the traditional material steel makes it a preferable 
component in light of the ELV directive. However, higher steel contents lead to 
heavier vehicle weights, which in turn negatively affect fuel consumption: heavier 
cars consume more fuel, which in turn causes increased CO2 emissions (see 
above). These three areas of environmental regulations thus put conflicting 
pressures on the automotive industry which has to make efforts to achieve technical 
demands on three different fronts which do not necessarily add up to consistent 
environmental targets. 
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3.2.5 Timeline of Environmental Regulations in the EU for the Automotive 
Industry  
Following the discussion of the three areas, a timeline is provided to give an overview 
of the timeframe and therefore a chronological background and context of the 
investigated areas of environmental regulations. This table illustrates that the 
automotive industry has been confronted with challenges in these three areas in a 
parallel manner, which has not made it possible for the sector to deal with each 
individual area in isolation, thus underlining the contentious nature of these 
regulations for the industry.  
Table 3.2: Timeline of chosen environmental areas 
 Pollutant 
Emissions  
CO2 Emissions  ELVs  Other relevant 
events  
1970s 1970 First emissions 
limits 
1971-1993 
progressive 
reductions 
  First Environmental 
Action Programme 
1980s 1983 Catalytic 
converter debate  
(MVEG-motor 
vehicles emissions 
group) 
  1986 Single 
European Act - 
environmental 
measures with legal 
basis 
1989    EU2 opens office in 
Brussels  
1990     
1991 Euro 1 passed 
 
First calls to reduce 
car CO2 
 EU1 opens office in 
Brussels  
1992    Single European 
Market (Dec.)  
1993 Euro 1 in force   Treaty of Maastricht 
in force  QMV for 
environmental area 
1994 Euro 2 passed 
AOP 1 mandate 
   
1995  EU climate change 
strategy 
 Sweden enters EU 
1996 Euro 2 in force 
Euro 3 and 4 
proposed (result of 
AOP 1) 
AOP 2 mandate 
   
1997  ACEA offers CO2 
target for VA 
Proposal 
 
Kyoto Protocol 
1998 Euro 3 and Euro 4 
passed (result of 
AOP 2) 
VA targets agreed  EU3 opens office in 
Brussels  
1999  VA accepted for 
ACEA 
Change of legal basis 
(cooperation to co-
decision procedure) 
Treaty of 
Amsterdam in force 
– environment as 
main goal 
2000 Euro 3 in force 
 
VA accepted for 
JAMA/KAMA 
ELV directive 
passed 
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 Pollutant 
Emissions  
CO2 Emissions  ELVs  Other relevant 
events  
-     
2003  Review VA ACEA  ELV directive in force  
2004  Review VA 
JAMA/KAMA 
 Eastern 
enlargement of EU 
2005 Euro 4 in force 
Euro 5 proposed 
 Review of 2015 
targets for ELV, 
amendments 
 
2006 Euro 5 and Euro 6 
passed 
   
2007  Proposal for 
regulation  
  
2008  ACEA VA ends 
New legislation 
discussed 
  
2009 Euro 5 in force JAMA/KAMA VA 
ends 
New legislation 
passed 
  
-     
2012  Legislation to enter 
into force 
  
2014 Euro 6 in force    
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter environmental regulations were discussed generally and the EU as a 
supranational institution was demonstrated to be an appropriate context to study 
interest representation by MNEs in the automotive industry. The industry was then 
introduced, followed by a discussion of the three chosen areas for the study, pollutant 
emissions, CO2 emissions and ELVs. As automobile manufacturers constitute the 
world‟s largest industry and are heavily affected by environmental regulations  and by 
changes in the competitive environment, motor companies provide an adequate 
setting for studying pre-regulatory CPAs regarding these policies.  
The following research questions emerged from the discussion in this chapter, with 
the emphasis on the first two of these: 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4)  
 How and why do CPAs differ across three different areas of environmental 
regulations? (RQ5) 
 What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? (RQ6) 
Together with the previous background chapter on MNE CPAs and the next chapter 
on the RBV as a theoretical framework, this chapter provides the basis and context of 
this investigation of the CPAs of automotive MNEs regarding environmental 
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regulations in the EU, which, as shown in this chapter, pose considerable challenges 
to the industry, even to the extent of being contradictory in the technical demands 
they place on the sector. This practical and industrial context provides an appropriate 
research setting for the study of MNEs‟ CPAs as seen through the theoretical lens of 
the RBV which will be discussed in the next chapter, after which the research 
questions will be drawn together (Ch. 5) and the methodology will be presented (Ch. 
6), before the findings will be analysed (Ch. 7 and 8) and concluded (Ch. 9). 
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4 The Resource-Based View (RBV) as a 
theoretical framework 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, all three areas of literature – IB and MNE-Host 
Government Relations, Strategic Management and CPAs, and Political Science on 
interest representation – share an underlying resource-based assumption: only firms 
with sufficient resources will engage in business-government relations (e.g. 
Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Hillman and Hitt 1999, Bennett 1999, Luo 2001). The 
main theory that is used as a theoretical framework for this thesis is therefore the 
RBV. It is used to investigate the research questions regarding what kind of 
resources and competences MNEs employ in their CPAs (RQ6), and how and why 
CPAs differ between MNEs (RQ5).  
Unlike the interest representation literature from Political Science, which takes a 
government or state perspective on lobbying, the RBV enables a company 
perspective on CPAs: 
The Resource-Based View is an inside-out perspective on 
organizations that seeks to identify the characteristics of firms with 
superior performance. Unlike outside-in approaches, which begin with 
the external environment explanations of sustained superior 
performance, the Resource-Based View posits that we look inside 
organizations and more explicitly holds a place for managers and 
what they do as important to organizational outcome. (Rouse and 
Daellenbach 2002: 966) 
Capron and Chatain (2008) encourage research that links CPAs and firm resources, 
and Moon and Lado (2000) support the use of the RBV for IB research on MNE-host 
government relations. Furthermore, Hart (1995) promotes the inclusion of the 
environmental aspect in the RBV. Although the RBV has already been used in 
analyses of CPAs, this has only been in a US domestic context and therefore there is 
a need for international extension of the RBV (Frynas et al. 2006, Mc Williams et al. 
2002), especially with regard to the European (Union) setting. This thesis thus fills 
these gaps by using the RBV as a theoretical framework to investigate how MNEs 
influence environmental policies in the EU. These aspects are elaborated in the 
second part of this chapter, which discusses the application of the RBV in the context 
of the thesis, transferring the RBV from the corporate competitive, market context to 
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a political context. The chapter first starts with a general overview of the theory and 
its conceptualisation. The VRIN framework, which is central to the RBV, is then 
discussed, before concluding with an overview of its limits and critiques. 
4.2 The Resource-Based View 
4.2.1 Overview and concepts: Resources, competitive advantage, 
heterogeneity and immobility 
The emergence of the RBV of the firm has been one of the main developments in 
recent IB and Strategic Management research, with Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney 
(1991) at the forefront (Peng 2001). This strand of management theory has focused 
on internal mechanisms to explain firm performance (Sadrich and Annavarjulia 
2003). In the strategy literature it has served as the dominant explanation for firm 
differences (Hoopes et al. 2003: 897, Gibbert 2006a, see also Peteraf 1993 and 
Wernerfelt 2003). The framework is therefore appropriate for the investigation of firm 
differences in MNEs‟ CPAs and the resources and competences they employ. 
The RBV is now considered to be one of the most widely accepted theories within 
Strategic Management (Newbert 2008, Powell 2001), and concepts and terms 
important in the RBV include resources, sustainable competitive advantage, and 
heterogeneity and immobility which are now discussed in turn. 
Wernerfelt (1984: 172) uses the following definition of resource:  
By a resource is meant anything which could be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm. More formally, a firm‟s 
resources at a given time could be defined as those (tangible and 
intangible) assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm (see 
Caves, 1980).  
For Barney (1991: 101, cf. Daft, 1983), firm resources 
include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness.  
In traditional strategic analysis resources are the strengths of a firm that can be used 
to “conceive of and implement strategies” (Barney 1991: 101). Teece et al. (1997: 
516) define resources as “firm-specific assets that are difficult if not impossible to 
imitate”. Amit and Schoemaker (1993: 35) define resources as “stocks of available 
factors that are owned or controlled by the firm”. The following box lists specific 
examples of resources. 
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Box 4.1: Examples of resources 
 Brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, skilled personnel, trade contracts, 
efficient procedures, unique combination of business experience, organisational culture, 
invisible assets difficult to imitate, organisational learning, entrepreneurship, human 
resources, functionally based distinctive competencies, routines, trade secrets, 
specialized production facilities, engineering experience, tacit knowledge, social capital 
(Hoskisson et al. 1999: 439, Wernerfelt 1984: 172, Teece et al. 1997: 516, Chisholm and 
Nielsen 2009) 
 Physical resources/tangible things: “plant, equipment, land and natural resources, raw 
materials, semi-finished goods, waste products, and by-products, and even unsold 
stocks of finished goods” (Penrose 1959: 24) 
 Human resources: “unskilled and skilled labour, clerical, administrative, financial, legal, 
technical and managerial staff” (Penrose 1959: 24)  
 Specific assets: technological assets, complementary assets, financial assets, 
reputational assets, structural assets, institutional assets, market (structure) assets, 
organisational boundaries (Teece et al. 1997: 521-522) 
In addition to resources, contributors to the RBV also discuss core competencies and 
capabilities as factors leading to sustainable competitive advantage. In comparison 
with resources, capabilities involve “complex patterns of coordination and 
cooperation between people, and between people and resources” (Grant 1991). 
Capabilities are then more complex, intangible “intermediate goods” (Schulze 1994: 
130). They are what a firm can do as a result of “teams of resources working 
together” (Grant 1991: 120). Most authors do not distinguish resources and 
capabilities, in order to simplify exposition. This convention is therefore followed here, 
too, and the terms are thus used interchangeably to prevent unnecessary complexity. 
Resources in this thesis therefore mean assets, capabilities, competencies and 
factors that are tightly connected to the firm, i.e. firm-specific resources81. 
Corporate resources and capabilities can be classified into physical, human, 
organisational and financial resources82 (Moon and Lado 2000). These resources 
need the following characteristics in order to be a basis for sustainable competitive 
advantage (Moon and Lado 2000: 100, Barney 1991): valuable, rare, imperfectly 
imitable, and nonsubstitutable; or as Oliver (1997: 698) puts it: “scarce, unique, 
inimitable, durable, idiosyncratic, nontradeable, intangible and nonsubstitutable”. 
Gibbert (2006a) points out that the notion of resource idiosyncrasy is at the heart of 
the RBV. 
                                              
81
 Barney (2003a) comments that while these labels, such as resources, (dynamic) capabilities, (core) 
competencies and (invisible or knowledge) assets may be helpful, they all contribute to competitive 
advantage. While these labels have proliferated, theory has not developed accordingly, Barney 
(2003b) points out. See also Dahan (2005a), who notes the non-unified vocabulary in this area. 
82
 Other authors add technological and intangible resources to this classification (Mahoney and 
Pandian 1992), while Grant (1991) puts forward the categories of financial, physical, human, 
technological, and organisational resources, but the subdivision can go as far as is useful, as 
Penrose (1959) points out. 
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There is a long understanding in the literature that competitive advantage is 
dependent upon a match between distinctive internal (organisational) capabilities and 
changing external (environmental) circumstances83. The RBV articulates the 
relationships among firm resources, capabilities and competitive advantage (Hart 
1995: 987). 
The concepts of competitive advantage and sustained (or sustainable84) 
competitive advantage (SCA) are key elements in Strategic Management: SCA is the 
ultimate goal of strategy, and thus forms the central agenda in strategy research 
(Rouse and Daellenbach 1999). The conditions under which resources lead to SCA 
are central to the RBV. Distinctive SCA requires the possession and utilisation of 
unique, non-imitable, non-transferable, firm-specific resources (Bowen and 
Wiersema 1999). 
Hofer and Schendel (1978: 25) define competitive advantage as “the unique position 
an organisation develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource 
deployments”. Reed and DeFilippi (1990: 90) likewise see competitive advantage as 
the “end-result of strategies that are based on the firm‟s competencies”. 
According to Barney (1991: 102), a firm has a competitive advantage when it is 
“implementing a value creating strategy” which is not implemented by any current or 
potential competitor at the same time. This competitive advantage is sustained when 
in addition to the first condition (no simultaneous implementation) the other firms are 
not able to duplicate the benefits of this strategy85.  
Research on competitive advantage has focused on organisational competencies as 
main sources of advantage (Fiol 1991). Teece (1980) also points out that a firm‟s 
comparative advantage is defined in terms of capabilities, not in terms of products; 
competitive advantage thus lies in a firm‟s knowledge and asset base. 
                                              
83
 This traditional framework used for strategy formulation is the so-called SWOT framework, which 
analyses (internal) strengths and weaknesses and (external) opportunities and threats (Barney 
1991: 99, cf. Andrews 1971). 
84
 The terms sustained and sustainable are used interchangeably in this context. 
85
 It has to be mentioned that “sustained” does not refer to a period of calendar time but to the 
possibility of competitive duplication (Barney 1991). 
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Two fundamental elemental assumptions of the RBV are that (Barney 1991; Priem 
and Butler 2001a)86:  
1. resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms, and  
2. these resources cannot be transferred between firms without cost (immobile 
resources).  
Heterogeneity is a source of SCA and according to Peteraf (1993) the most basic 
condition for it. The assumption that resource bundles and capabilities as production 
inputs are heterogeneous across companies, is essential to resource-based work 
(Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993) as Godfrey and Hill underline (1995: 522):  
Central to the RBV is a conception of the firm as a collection of 
heterogeneous resources, or factors of production. 
Heterogeneity is defined by Oliver (1997: 701) as  
relatively durable differences in strategy and structure across firms in 
the same industry that tend to produce economic rents and a 
sustainable competitive advantage 
Penrose (1959: 75) points out that  
“[I]t is the heterogeneity, and not the homogeneity, of the productive 
services available or potentially available from its resources that gives 
each firm its unique character”. 
Heterogeneity of resources thus leads to resources‟ uniqueness. 
Immobility is the second important assumption in the RBV87. Resources are 
perfectly immobile if they cannot be traded (Peteraf 1993, Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
Examples are resources for which property rights are not well defined or resources 
with „bookkeeping feasibility‟ problems, for example reputation and loyalty (Dierickx 
and Cool 1989: 1505). Nontradeable assets, for which there is no market, are firm-
specific88 and have to be accumulated internally to build up strategic or critical asset 
stocks (Dierickx and Cool 1989). Resources that are imperfectly mobile are tradable 
                                              
86
 Previously, research in strategy was based on two (simplifying) assumptions: firstly, firms are 
identical in terms of strategically relevant resources; secondly, resource heterogeneity, once 
developed, is only short-lived due to high resource mobility (Barney 1991:100, Spanos and Lioukas 
2001). The RBV “can not build on these same assumptions” as it examines the link between a 
company‟s internal characteristics and performance (Barney 1991: 100f). 
87
 Both heterogeneity and immobility are phenomena that are “assumed away” in neoclassical theory 
and thus contradict or stand outside the theory (Rumelt 1984). 
88
 Peteraf (1993) points out that firm-specific could mean idiosyncratic to the extent that there is no 
other use outside the firm. 
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but are more valuable in their current rather than in other employment. This means 
that they are “somewhat specialized to firm-specific needs” (Peteraf 1993: 183). High 
switching and transaction costs make resources imperfectly mobile. 
Two fundamental arguments follow from the two assumptions of heterogeneity and 
immobility of resources (Barney 1991; Priem and Butler 2001a):  
1. resources which are rare and valuable can yield competitive advantage;  
2. if these resources are also not imitable, not substitutable and not transferable, 
then the competitive advantage may be long lived, that is, sustainable. 
Although Penrose (1959) had earlier viewed the firm as a bundle of resources, it was 
Wernerfelt‟s conceptual article of 1984 that was very significant in initiating the RBV 
as it redirected scholars towards resources as antecedents to products and ultimately 
performance89. Previously, scholars had a major focus on the opportunities and 
threats in a competitive environment (Porter 1980; Priem and Butler 2001a). 
Hoskisson et al. (1999) confirm that between the 1960s and late 1980s, the area of 
Strategic Management was dominated by the consideration of external sources of 
competitive advantage. They describe the moves from the early internal perspective 
in the 1960s90 to industrial organisation economics91 and then “back” to the internally 
focused RBV via organisational economics92 as “swings of a pendulum”. The 
renewed interest in firm resources reflected dissatisfaction with the static, equilibrium 
framework of industrial organisation economics (Grant 1991, see also Foss 1996). 
The second seminal work was Barney‟s 1991 article. Wernerfelt focused on 
resources and diversification, whereas Barney provided a “detailed and formalized 
depiction” in the organising framework – organisational resources, which are 
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable, may yield SCA (Priem and 
Butler 2001a: 23).  
The RBV has subsequently been developed by Rumelt, Barney, Dierickx and Cool, 
Conner, Peteraf and other authors and is therefore the work of many people 
                                              
89
 See Lockett et al. (2007) for Wernerfelt‟s reflections on his development of the RBV. 
90
 With the contributions of Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), and Andrews (1971). 
91
 Porter (1980, 1985) based on Bain (1956, 1968) (structure-conduct-performance paradigm). 
92
 Transaction costs economics (Williamson 1975, 1985) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Fama 1980). 
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(Wernerfelt 1995)93. The general focus in the RBV is on firm resources contributing to 
SCA (Priem and Butler 2001a). 
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Edith Penrose‟s classic 1959 book, is in some 
ways a „canonical‟ reference for literature on RBV of the firm, although authors such 
as Barney (1991) did not base their initial resource-based papers on her work (Pitelis 
2004: 523-524). In a pioneering way, Penrose viewed the firm as a bundle of 
productive resources94. Pitelis (2004: 530, footnote 7)95 points out that Penrose, 
although an economist, saw hardly any value in the formalisation of her ideas – she 
did not feel that it would be “helpful, necessary or even feasible”. 
According to Kor and Mahoney (2000), the RBV is one of four areas that together 
build the “modern resource-based theory”: 1. the resource-based view, 2. 
commitment, 3. dynamic capabilities, and 4. the knowledge-based view96. These four 
areas “naturally blend into each other” and therefore several strands together build 
the theory (Kor and Mahoney 2000: 119)97. 
A resource-based perspective was already important in early strategy research, 
albeit using a different terminology: Conner (1991) stressed that several early 
authors connected firm performance with a firm‟s special competencies, such as 
Selznick (1957), Chandler (1962), and Rumelt (1974). The core notion of strategy as 
a “fit between the internal competencies of the firm and external opportunities” also 
incorporates the resource-based perspective (Conner 1991: 122). 
4.2.2 The “VRIN-Framework” of the RBV – Value, Rareness, Inimitability, and 
Non-Substitutability of Resources  
After the assumptions of heterogeneity and immobility are met, firm resources need 
to have four attributes in order to have the potential for sustained competitive 
                                              
93
 See Barney and Arikan (2001) for an extensive overview of the origins of the RBV. 
94
 This is in contrast to the competitive strategy framework of Porter, where the firm is viewed as a 
bundle of activities (Spanos and Lioukas 2001). Resources could be seen as antecedents to 
activities in this context. See also Hult and Ketchen (2001) that resources collectively lead to 
competitive advantage, and Chisholm and Nielsen (2009). 
95
 Pitelis is editor of the Collected Papers of Edith Penrose (Pitelis 2004, see also Penrose and Pitelis 
1999 for more on Penrose as a scholar). 
96
 Kor and Mahoney (2000) mention the following authors for each of the four areas: 1. Wernerfelt 
1984, 2. Ghemawat 1991, 3. Nelson 1991, Porter 1991, Teece et al. 1997, 4. Kogut and Zander 
1992, 1996, Spender 1996. 
97
 It has to be mentioned that the term resource-based theory (RBT) is not used as often as the term 
resource-based view. The terms perspective and approach are also used (e.g. Foss 1997, Conner 
1991). This thesis adheres to convention and uses the term RBV. 
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advantage: the characteristics valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and not 
equivalently substitutable (Barney 1991)98. These characteristics will render 
resources heterogeneous and thus contribute to SCA. These pre-conditions for SCA 
are now discussed in turn, with a focus on the attribute „imperfectly imitable‟.  
Valuable Resources 
Only valuable firm resources can be a source of SCA. Barney (1991: 106) argues 
that resources are valuable when they enable a company to “conceive of or 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness”. Newbert (2008) 
concludes that the magnitude of a company‟s competitive advantage is a function of 
the value of its resources and capabilities. The value of a resource may only be 
realised when it is combined with a corresponding capability, which Newbert (2008: 
748) calls the “exploitation of a valuable resource-capability combination”, thus 
alluding to the aforementioned bundle of resources. 
Rare Resources 
If valuable firm resources are owned by many competitors they can not be sources of 
SCA. Competitive advantage occurs when a firm executes a “value-creating strategy 
not simultaneously implemented by large numbers of other firms”. If resource 
bundles are not rare, then many firms can “conceive of and implement” the same 
strategies and these strategies will and cannot be sources of competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991: 106). This is not to say that other resources are unimportant, they 
might increase survival under competitive parity in an industry (Barney 1991). As for 
valuable resources, Newbert (2008) stresses the resource-capability combination – 
the rarer these combinations, the greater the company‟s advantages. 
Imperfectly Imitable Resources  
Following Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and Rumelt (1984), a 
competitive advantage is sustained only if it continues to exist after 
efforts to duplicate that advantage have ceased. (Barney 1991: 102) 
Sustainability of a firm‟s privileged asset position hinges on how 
easily it can be replicated. (Dierickx and Cool 1989: 1507) 
As the above quotes indicate, valuable and rare firm resources only lead to SCA if 
firms not possessing them cannot obtain them either, that is, the resources are 
                                              
98
 In Barney (1986 on organisational culture as a source of SCA), the same attributes can be found, 
with the exception of non-substitutability. The framework is also called the VRIO framework where 
inimitability includes non-substitutability and the O stands for organisational aspects of resources 
(Peng 2009) and the efficient organisation of resources (Foss and Knudsen 2003). 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) as a theoretical framework 69 
 
imperfectly imitable (Barney 1991). Imitation of innovations threatens the 
sustainability of competitive advantage (Rumelt 1984, 1987). It is the resource 
characteristic that has been most widely discussed in the literature and is a 
fundamental one (Connor 1991).   
According to Teece et al. (1997: 524) “[I]mitation occurs when firms discover and 
simply copy a firm‟s organizational routines and procedures”. Barriers to imitation 
make resources imperfectly imitable. They exist when rivals cannot understand the 
competencies and capabilities on which competitive advantage is based (Fiol 1991). 
This is the case when the causal connections between actions and results are 
ambiguous (Lippman and Rumelt 1982). On the basis of the existing literature, Reed 
and DeFillippi (1990) suggest three characteristics of competencies as sources of 
ambiguity: tacitness, complexity, and specificity. Barney (1991) suggests a 
combination of three sources as well: a) unique historical conditions, b) a causally 
ambiguous link between resources and sustained competitive advantage, and c) 
socially complex resources. It seems that only different terms are used so that Reed 
and DeFillippi‟s tacitness corresponds to causal ambiguity in Barney‟s terms, 
complexity relates to socially complex resources and specificity to unique historical 
conditions. Interaction effects between tacitness, complexity and specificity increase 
ambiguity effects and barriers to imitation (Reed and DeFillippi 1990). Generating 
and replenishing causal ambiguity and barriers to imitation permits the sustainability 
of competitive advantage over rivals (Reed and DeFillippi 1990). These sources of 
barriers to imitation are now discussed in turn. 
a) Unique historical conditions and imperfectly imitable resources 
Environmental models of the firm assume that firm performance can be explained 
independently of particular history and other idiosyncratic firm attributes. The RBV 
relaxes this assumption and asserts that  
not only are firms intrinsically historical and social entities, but that 
their ability to acquire and exploit some resources depends upon their 
place in time and space. (Barney 1991: 107) 
This assumption can also be found with traditional strategy researchers who refer to 
the unique historical circumstances of a firm‟s beginnings, or the unique conditions of 
a new management team taking over as important determining factors on corporate 
performance, according to Barney (1991). Path-dependent models of economic 
performance suggest that firm performance does not only depend on industry 
structure at a particular point in time but also on the particular path a company 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) as a theoretical framework 70 
 
followed through time to arrive where it is (Barney 1991). According to Teece et al. 
(1997: 522), the opportunities a firm has in the future are a function of its current 
position and the paths ahead, in which the current position is shaped by the path the 
company has travelled, and therefore “history matters”. Since distinctive capabilities 
and competences in general cannot be acquired, but have to be built, time is an 
important factor as it can take years to build these competences (Teece et al. 1997). 
This goes hand in hand with what Ring et al. (1990) discuss as strategic 
predisposition, which is the degree to which a company demonstrates a fairly 
consistent pattern in its strategic choices over time. In their examination of political 
imperatives, they find that the strategic predisposition of a firm will influence its kind 
of response to the political environment. 
b) Causal ambiguity and imperfectly imitable resources 
Causal ambiguity is a main source of barriers to imitation and, unlike unique history, 
has been dealt with in the literature (Barney 1991). In this context,  
causal ambiguity exists when the link between the resources 
controlled by a firm and a firm‟s sustained competitive advantage is 
not understood or understood only very imperfectly (Barney 1991: 
108f).  
A lack of understanding thus makes imitation difficult, as it is not clear which 
resources should be imitated in order to create SCA. Lippman and Rumelt (1982: 
418) define causal ambiguity as the “basic ambiguity concerning the nature of the 
causal connections between actions and results”. The authors‟ notion of causal 
ambiguity suggests that sustained differences in performance can be found in 
otherwise perfectly competitive industry settings (cf. Dierickx and Cool 1989). For 
Reed and DeFillippi (1990: 91) causal ambiguity in the form of tacitness is “embodied 
within the skill component of competencies”. Essential to the value of tacitness is the 
inability of even a skilled performer to “codify the decision rules and protocols” 
underlying performance (Reed and DeFillippi 1990: 91, see also Nelson and Winter 
198299).  
c) Social complexity and imperfectly imitable resources  
According to Barney (1991: 110), firm resources may not be imitable as they can be 
very complex social phenomena, and thus “beyond the ability of firms to 
systematically manage and influence”. Among the imperfectly imitable resources that 
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are socially complex are for example the interpersonal relations among managers in 
a company, organisational culture, and corporate reputation among suppliers and 
customers. To the extent that these are not amenable to direct management, these 
resources are imperfectly imitable. This also means that physical technology – 
however complex it may be – is typically imitable by itself (Barney 1991). Reed and 
DeFillippi (1990) argue in the same line: they see complexity as a result of 
interrelationships between skills, and between skills and assets.  
Rumelt (1984) points out that unique resources, specialised assets and causal 
ambiguity are all isolating mechanisms100. These mechanisms are important in the 
area of business strategy as they make competitive positions stable and defensible 
(Rumelt 1984), that is, they lead to SCA. Teece et al. (1997) point out that isolating 
mechanisms are fundamental determinants of firm performance101. 
Non-Substitutable Resources  
Non-substitutability is the last requirement for firm resources to be a source of SCA. 
This condition states that “there must be no strategically equivalent valuable 
resources that are themselves either not rare or imitable” (Barney 1991: 111). 
Wernerfelt (1984) also points out that the availability of substitute resources will likely 
depress returns to the holders of a given resource. Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue 
likewise, that even if imitation is not a major threat, asset stocks could still be 
vulnerable to substitution by different asset stocks and thus be rendered obsolete. 
There are two forms of substitutability: similar resources enabling conception and 
implementation of the same strategies, and very different firm resources acting as 
strategic substitutes (Barney 1991). The author cautions that strategic substitutability 
of resources is always a matter of degree.  
Summary 
The relationship between resource heterogeneity and immobility; value, rareness, 
imitability, and substitutability; and SCA is summarised in the following figure of 
Barney (1991: 112): 
                                              
100
 Other isolating mechanisms Rumelt (1984) mentions are: switching and search costs, consumer 
and producer learning, team-embodied skills, special information, patents and trademarks, 
reputation and image as well as legal restrictions on entry. 
101
 The notion of isolating mechanisms at the firm level of analysis is analogous to entry barriers at the 
industry levels, and mobility barriers at the strategic group level (Mahoney 1995). 
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Figure 4.1: The relationship between resource heterogeneity and immobility, value, rareness, 
imperfect imitability, and substitutability, and sustained competitive advantage. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The framework can be applied for analysing the potential of a broad spectrum of firm 
resources as sources of SCA (Barney 1991). It suggests the sort of empirical 
questions that must be addressed in order to understand whether or not specific firm 
resources are a source of SCA:  
is that resource valuable, is it rare, is it imperfectly imitable, and are 
there substitutes for that resource? (Barney 1991: 115) 
Wernerfelt (1989) points out, that critical resources which differentiate a firm from its 
competitors have to be unique, which seems to embody the above characteristics of 
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and imperfectly substitutable. Rouse and 
Daellenbach put the different terms and concepts together as following (2002: 966, 
italics in original): 
Table 4.1: Summary of resource-based framework  
“The framework is essentially one that privileges: 
a) resources (tangible and intangible) which are bundled, linked, incorporated, converted 
and organized into 
b) sociotechnical processes (knowledge, routines, structures of relationships, cultures, etc.) 
some of which are rare, inimitable (or costly to duplicate), and non-substitutable that form 
c) capabilities and core competencies. These then become sources of competitive 
advantage which when leveraged into products and services generate 
d) value and competitive advantage which are indicated by their performance 
consequences.” 
Dierickx and Cool (1989:1510) summarise it as follows where nontradability could be 
seen as the immobility of resources in Barney‟s (1991) terms: 
In short, asset stocks are strategic to the extent that they are 
nontradeable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutable. 
Before the RBV is discussed for the application in this thesis, some limits of the RBV 
are considered. 
Value 
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Heterogeneity 
 
Firm Resource 
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4.2.3 Limits and Critiques of the RBV 
More generally, it should be noted that ultimately the RBV will stand 
or fall not on the basis if whether its key constructs can be verified, 
but upon whether its predictions correspond to reality observed for 
populations of firms. (Godfrey and Hill 1995: 530 [sic]) 
In revisiting her 1991 article ten years later102 Fiol (2001) questions one of the then 
central assumptions of sustainability in the face of an ever-changing environment. 
She argues that in a dynamic environment where dynamic capabilities are needed 
(Teece et al. 1997), core competencies – understood as a fixed set of resources and 
skills – can become a constraining set of core rigidities103. She then argues for a 
more dynamic perspective, where „sustainable‟ competitive advantage is favoured by 
„renewable‟ competitive advantage, i.e. “continuously changing temporary 
advantages” (Fiol 2001: 692) depend on the ability to destroy and rebuild specialised, 
inimitable resources or routines over time (cf. Barney et al. 2001).  
In a dialogue with Barney (2001a), Priem and Butler (2001a, b) provide a critical 
discussion and evaluation of the RBV. The title of Priem and Butler‟s first article 
(2001a) demonstrates their investigation thread – Is the resource-based “view” a 
useful perspective for strategic management research? Priem and Butler (2001a, b) 
acknowledge the works of Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) as seminal for the 
RBV stream and the RBV‟s constructive contributions to Strategic Management. 
However, the authors bemoan the relative lack of subsequent definitional work. 
According to them, subsequent works have either simply cited Barney without 
expanding his definitions or defined new terms of interest without formally specifying 
the underlying original RBV terms. Other criticisms include the issue of implicit 
simplifying assumptions and the RBV‟s limited prescriptive ability (Priem and Butler 
2001a, b). Priem and Butler (2001a) conclude that in order for the RBV to be more 
useful in strategy research it needs more formalisation, more answers to the How? 
questions, integration of the temporal components, and attention to both the internal 
and external factors (production and demand, resources and products). Barney 
(2001a) views Priem and Butler‟s main criticisms as unfounded, but appreciates their 
reminder of important tasks still to be done in the RBV-context.  
Lado et al. (2006) deal with the question of paradoxes within the RBV. Whereas 
critiques view the RBV as paradoxical, “infused with contradictions and ambiguities”, 
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 As part of a special “10 years‟ RBV” issue of the Journal of Management (e.g. also Barney 2001b). 
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 See also Leonard-Barton (1992) for a discussion of core rigidities and core capabilities. 
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Lado and his colleagues (2006: 115f) view paradoxes as useful conceptual tools to 
academic inquiry and posit that the RBV is especially attuned to address paradoxical 
challenges. Paradoxes force researchers to “think twice” about assumptions 
previously made (Lado et al. 2006: 118); resolving paradoxes can then create new 
theoretical insights. For Gibbert (2006a) the paradox lies in whether it is possible to 
generalise SCA based on unique resources, that is, the paradox is between resource 
idiosyncrasy and generalisability. Levitas and Ndofor (2006) argue that this “paradox” 
is more perceived than real and that the quest for generalisability is 
counterproductive when applied to the RBV. In a response, Gibbert (2006b) argues 
that the RBV emphasises rather than de-emphasises the need for generalisability.  
4.3 Application of the RBV to this Thesis  
The point this author wants to start from is Priem and Butler‟s (2001a: 35) postulation 
that Strategic Management requires explicit attention to both the internal and 
external. This is also emphasised by Penrose (1959: 79) in stating that external 
changes “may change the significance of resources to the firm”. The external in this 
research is taken as a broader environment than the competitive environment: it 
encompasses the political and regulatory environment that companies face. In 
previous research, this external environment has been viewed as exogenous which 
has been criticised (Boddewyn 1988, Keim 2001b) and this thesis therefore 
questions the exogenous nature of the external environment for corporations. 
In the following the RBV is discussed in the context of the areas, which are of 
relevance to the thesis at hand: MNEs, CPAs, and Environmental Issues.  
4.3.1 The RBV in the Context of MNEs 
Moon and Lado (2000) point out that resource-based academics have primarily used 
a „domestic‟ context in theorising about the links between corporate resources and 
capabilities, and competitive advantage. The authors (2000: 102) argue that a 
distinguishing feature between domestic companies and MNEs is the latter‟s “unique 
ability (or power)” to manage political requirements resulting from host government 
actions104. This thesis therefore uses concepts of the RBV to investigate how MNEs 
manage political requirements in the form of environmental regulations in the EU. 
                                              
104
 This is in line with Penrose‟s view for whom the existence of different nation states and hence 
borders between them made MNEs „different‟ from other companies (Pitelis 2004: 528). 
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Peng (2001) maps the contribution of the RBV to IB research in leading IB journals. 
As the RBV has diffused into IB, so IB has likewise contributed to the RBV (Peng 
2001). In Peng‟s (2001: 820) view, the most significant contribution of IB to the RBV 
lies in identifying international knowledge and experience as a resource which is 
valuable, unique and difficult to imitate and thus differentiates “the winners from the 
losers and mere survivors” in global competition. Pitelis (2001) and Buckley (2002) 
also emphasise that the RBV has played an important role in explaining MNEs and 
their strategy.  
Rugman and Verbeke (2002) argue that firms can only be successful abroad if they 
possess some type of advantage that makes them competitive in foreign markets. 
This resource superiority is reflected in the concept of firm-specific advantage, which 
is crucial in overcoming the costs faced by MNEs when operating abroad (Rugman 
and Verbeke 2002). The concept of firm-specific advantage ties the RBV in with 
Dunning‟s OLI paradigm on MNEs and O advantages105. Dunning (2000: 166) 
confirms that the RBV of the firm offers “some reasons „why‟ foreign owned affiliates 
may have a competitive edge over their indigenous competitors”. Not only does the 
RBV tie in with IB theories through Dunning‟s eclectic OLI paradigm on the MNE and 
firm-specific advantages, the two can also be linked to the political environment as 
political knowledge and expertise can be seen as a resource106. This link between 
the RBV and the political environment through political resources is discussed in the 
next section. 
Moon and Lado (2000: 101) point out that the RBV has been used in an IB setting to 
analyse international strategic alliances, global strategy-performance and MNE 
political behaviour107 but that IB research of the MNE-host government relationship 
has not used RBV insights. In their theoretical framework for MNE-host government 
bargaining power relationship within the RBV, they put forward the following firm-
specific resources that form an important basis for MNEs‟ bargaining power:  
managerial resources, technological know-how and reputation. As indicated in 
chapter 2, bargaining is a form of CPA. In response to the gaps pointed out by Moon 
and Lado (2000), this thesis therefore uses the RBV to investigate MNE-government 
relations in the specific context of the EU.  
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 See also Connell (2008), Pitelis and Verbeke (2007) and Pitelis (2007) who discuss the theoretical 
developments of Penrose and their implications for the RBV and the OLI paradigm. 
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 See chapter 2 for Boddewyn‟s (1988) political extension of Dunning‟s OLI paradigm. 
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 They point to Hamel (1991), Collis (1991), and Boddewyn and Brewer (1994). 
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As moderating effects on the relationship between firm-specific resources and MNE 
bargaining power, Moon and Lado (2000) place industry and country contexts and 
thus propose the following framework:  
Figure 4.2: Resource-Based Determinants of MNE-Host Government Bargaining Power Relationship 
(based on Moon and Lado 2000: 101, terminology adapted to thesis context) 
 
Under firm-specific resources Moon and Lado (2000) include managerial resources, 
technological know-how, and reputation whereas under industry and country context, 
they embrace industry concentration, appropriability regime108, level of economic 
development and cultural context109 (Moon and Lado 2000: 101). The firm-specific 
resources that the authors put forward as important for the relationship are detailed 
as follows. Managerial resources are widely accepted as a critical resource for SCA 
(e.g. Castanias and Helfat 1991/2001, Fiol 1991, Reed and DeFillippi 1990). Moon 
and Lado (2000) point to managers‟ ability to enact beneficial firm-environment 
relationships and to manage the “political imperative” (also Ring et al. 1990). 
Technological know-how leads to greater bargaining power for MNEs when it is 
embodied in persons or processes rather than in products or physical capital (Moon 
and Lado 2000). Reputation can be a source of SCA as it cannot be traded, but has 
to be developed over time, that is, it is path-dependent. 
It is proposed that this framework be amended to have a stronger link between firm 
resources and CPAs as well as added links where firm-specific resources influence 
the industry context, which in turn influences CPAs. It is expected that firm-specific 
resources are the main determinant of CPAs. Furthermore, firm-specific resources 
impact on the industry context through contributions to an industry‟s trade 
association, which in turn influence individual CPAs, which is a link Moon and Lado 
(2000) do not consider. The following framework is therefore proposed for this thesis: 
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 Level of intellectual property protection. 
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 See also Rehbein and Schuler (1999) for a discussion of industry influences on CPAs. The cultural 
context should be kept in mind as this thesis is asking how CPAs differ between MNEs from different 
Triad regions. 
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Figure 4.3 Resource-Based Determinants of MNE-Host Government Bargaining Power Relationship 
(Moon and Lado 2000: 101, modified by this author) 
 
This links the MNE perspective of the RBV with CPAs to which the discussion now 
moves. 
4.3.2 The RBV in the Context of CPAs 
The previous section has shown that the RBV can and should be applied to MNEs 
and their government relationships. This section follows this line in the area of CPAs, 
where Capron and Chatain (2008) encourage work that links CPAs and firm 
resources. Hillman and Hitt (1999) employ the RBV assuming that firms make 
choices of specific political action based on differential resources. This implies that 
firms are more likely to engage in individual CPAs if they have many resources 
(finances or experience) whereas resource-constrained corporations will rather use 
collective action (Hillman and Hitt 1999: 828). It is an underlying assumption of all 
three strands of literature discussed in chapter 2 that only firms with a sufficient 
amount of resources can engage in CPAs. Therefore the RBV provides a suitable 
framework to underpin the investigation of MNEs‟ CPAs in this thesis.  
One premise of the RBV of the firm is that “the strategic choice of organisational 
competences affects the firm‟s performance in its domestic and foreign markets” 
(Boddewyn and Brewer 1994: 135). Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) criticise the RBV 
for only looking at economic and organisational competences of firms, not at political 
capabilities. Furthermore, RBV-oriented strategists take the non-market environment 
as exogenous and neutral – as pointed out by Amit and Schoemaker (1993), Keim 
(2001b), Boddewyn (2003), and Frynas et al. (2006)110 – whereas this thesis 
questions the exogenous perspective on non-market institutions. This thesis 
therefore closes the gap as suggested above by looking at political resources and 
questioning the exogenous nature of the political environment of companies. By 
taking into account corporate actions towards its environment and questioning the 
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exogenous nature of this environment, the understanding between a firm‟s resources 
and its competitive advantage will be increased (Capron and Chatain 2008). 
(…) important institutional factors influencing product and factor 
markets (e.g., regulations) have been taken for granted by most 
researchers, and thus have faded into the background. (Peng 2001: 
821) 
The concept of political resources in CPAs has been used by authors for several 
decades, as Dahan (2005b) points out111, although not in the context of the RBV. 
Boddewyn (1993) argues that political capabilities may be important to competitive 
advantage, even though they are not commonly discussed by the RBV (Keim 2001b). 
Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman (2006: 325) point out that 
[A]ccess to a key government minister, experience in dealing with 
corrupt officials and other political resources, which result in a firm‟s 
advantageous treatment by political decision-makers, are frequently 
in scarce supply and difficult to obtain. 
As a corollary, political resources may be aligned with Barney‟s (1991) VRIN 
framework of SCA112. As political resources can be difficult for competitors to 
equalise, they may be a source of competitive advantage (Frynas et al. 2006). 
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994: 137) assert that competitive advantages do have an 
“unavoidable political dimension” that must be factored into strategy and IB research. 
Frynas et al. (2006) state that research on firm-specific political resources has been 
focused on the US domestic political process and needs to incorporate the 
international dimension. McWilliams et al. (2002) also only investigate political 
strategies on a resource-basis within the US context113 but state that research into 
political activity in IB is necessary. This thesis therefore attempts to close this gap by 
investigating MNEs‟ political resources in the EU context. These hard-to-copy firm-
specific resources are the main determinants of MNEs‟ sustainable bargaining and 
lobbying position over time (see Moon and Lado 2000). A more favourable political-
legal environment is the goal of CPAs for which political resources are used: 
The favourable application or a change in a current public policy is 
thus the final goal to be achieved through the implementation of a 
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 Dahan (2005b) refers to authors such as Fainsod (1940), Epstein (1969, 1980), Leone (1977), and 
Mahon and Murray (1981). 
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 See also Keillor and Hult 2004 on distinctive non-market competencies used for competitive 
advantage. 
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 In a different national environment, both Dahan (2001) and Attarça (2000) have investigated CPAs 
in the French domestic context only (Attarça 2002). 
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political strategy that requires specific resources, which some have 
called “political resources”. (Dahan 2005b: 11) 
Frynas et al. (2006) remark that the literature has defined the terms „political 
capital‟114, „political resources‟ or „political competences‟ variously. The authors 
(2006: 324) broadly define political resources as  
any firm attributes, assets, human resources, or any other resources 
that allow the firm to use the political process to improve its efficiency 
and profitability. 
Similarly, Dahan (2005a) restricts the use of the term „political resource‟ to the assets 
and skills that are utilised in the political arena. In terms of advantages for firms, he 
(2005a: 43) uses the term „regulatory advantage‟ to describe a “favourable state of 
public policies for a given firm”. As with other resources, political resources are not 
necessarily owned by a firm, but are under its control115 (Dahan 2005b). Other terms 
also include non-market resources or assets (Dahan 2005a, Baron 1995). 
Frynas et al. (2006) point out that political resources can fall into Barney‟s (1991) 
threefold typology of physical, human and organisational capital resources. Salorio et 
al. (2005) assert that political assets such as the ability to generate and manage 
political alliances, access to decision-makers, and the status of a company and its 
executives116 range beyond Barney‟s typology and collapse political competences 
into three types: superior intelligence, access, and exchange skills, which translate 
into asymmetrical attention and action abilities (Salorio et al. 2005, based on 
Boddewyn and Brewer 1994 as well as Bonardi et al. 2005).  
Dahan (2005a) develops a more comprehensive typology of political resources, 
which include the following: expertise, financial resource, relational resource, 
organisational resource, reputation with other non-market actors, public image, 
support of stakeholders, and recreational skill. These are discussed in turn. 
Expertise: According to Dahan (2005a) expertise can be gained in areas such as 
technical/technological, economic/managerial, social, environmental, legal and 
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 Based on Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985). 
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 Already Oberman (1993) distinguishes between actor-controlled resources that are owned by a firm 
and so-called institutional resources that can be borrowed by the firm. Dahan (2005a) points out that 
Oberman uses the term „institutional resources‟ to describe political resources.  
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 These are based on Epstein (1969) as elaborated by Mitnick (1993) (see Salorio et al. 2005). 
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political/administrative fields117. Boddewyn (1988) points out political knowledge and 
expertise as resources that can lead to firm-specific and political advantages in the 
form of better intelligence, readier access and superior influence skills (Boddewyn 
and Brewer 1994). Technological know-how is also pointed out by Moon and Lado 
(2000). Van Schendelen (2002: 177) even considers political expertise as a meta-
resource, which is the “single most important variable asset” a lobby group may 
have. 
Financial resource: This can be both a direct resource (e.g. through campaign 
contributions) and an indirect resource (financing other political resources) (Dahan 
2005a). Van Schendelen (2002) emphasises financial resources as important 
resources due to the costs of CPAs which includes the setting up of structures, 
communication campaigns, public relations, information acquisition (e.g. through 
studies), participation in coalitions and associations (Attarça 2002). Newell and 
Paterson (1998) and Woll (2007) also underline such resources while Salorio et al. 
(2005) point out that, although money is commonly listed as a “political” resource, it is 
really an economic asset118.  
Relational resource: This includes formal (e.g. membership in a committee) and 
informal relations (interpersonal contacts) (Dahan 2005a). Schuler (2008) uses the 
terms political connections and networks (Van Schendelen 2002). Li and Zhang 
(2007) point to managerial resources as social capital gained by political networking, 
indicated by ties with government officials. Woll (2007) and Oliver and Holzinger 
(2008) also use the term social capital (see Ch. 2), while Yoffie and Bergenstein 
(1985) term these relational resources political capital. Portes (1998) also sees 
networks as a social capital resource (see also Chisholm and Nielsen 2009 who 
incorporate social capital into the RBV in general). Relational resources lead to 
access to decision- and policy-makers (Attarça 2005) and can therefore be 
considered bridging social capital. 
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 Dahan (2005a) refers to Attarça‟s (1999 and 2000) distinction between technical-economic and 
politicolegal expertise as simplistic. In a later publication, Attarça (2002) distinguishes between 
economic, technical, scientific and legal expertise. Although not using a resource-based approach, 
Woll (2007) mentions legal or technical expertise or other information as resources, which can be 
placed in Dahan‟s typology. 
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 Attarça (2005) lists economic resources as a political resource in addition to financial ones. These 
economic resources include economic power, market power and corporate social power, and 
number of employees (Attarça 2002). 
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Organisational resource: This resource can be either internal such as a permanent 
representation and public affairs office or external such as a consultancy and trade 
association offices (Dahan 2005a). Attarça (2002 and 2005) includes human 
resources, public affairs structures and procedures in organisational resources.  
Reputation with other non-market actors: this resource is built up over time and thus 
relates to the concept of political capital (Dahan 2005a, Yoffie and Bergenstein 1985, 
see also Yoffie 1987) and corporate social capital (Preston 2004). Moon and Lado 
(2000) set reputation in relation to trust(worthiness) and legitimacy (similarly, Salorio 
et al. 2005), while Dahan (2005a) points out credibility in connection with reputation. 
There is a distinction between individual and corporate reputation of firm 
representatives and the company (Dahan 2005a). Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) also 
mention reputation as a political capability. Attarça (2002 and 2005) subsumes 
reputation and public image under the term symbolic resources. 
Public image: This resource is the perception of the firm‟s political action by public 
opinion (Dahan 2005a, b). The difference between reputation and public image is 
that reputation builds up over time while public image varies in the short run (Dahan 
2005a). Van Schendelen (2002) does not list public image in his discussion of 
resources but brings up a good image as a requirement for a successful lobby group. 
Support of stakeholders: This resource adds weight and legitimacy to a firm‟s 
position and can be of temporary or permanent, of formal or informal nature (Dahan 
2005a, b). Van Schendelen (2002) mentions external positions as a link between 
one‟s own group and the networks of stakeholders – in this context a network of 
different stakeholders could also be seen as a resource in the form of support119.  
Recreational skill: This resource creates opportunities for more informal and personal 
contacts with decision-makers and journalists, and includes recreational services 
such as „wining and dining‟, plant visits etc (Dahan 2005a). Dahan (2005b: 16) 
remarks on the rivalry in Brussels to “come up with the most original public relations 
event to attract influential public decision-makers who are oversolicited”. While being 
very common in practice and an example of social capital, this resource has not been 
acknowledged in the literature, according to Dahan (2005a). 
Dahan (2005a) consequently suggests that this conceptualisation be empirically 
validated through in-depth case studies or large-scale surveys. This thesis therefore 
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takes Dahan‟s typology as a basis for investigating what kind of resources MNEs use 
in CPAs in the EU. This research could therefore explore and validate his typology. 
These political resources differ in their characteristics (Dahan 2005a). Resources can 
be under internal or external control (Dahan 2005a, see also Boddewyn and Brewer 
1994, Attarça 2002). They can be externalised to agencies or hired lobbyists as well 
as an association (Dahan 2005a). This means they may be developed and used at 
firm level or at collective level. Dahan (2005a) highlights that problems with previous 
classifications are that some political resources are of collective nature that can be 
shared with outsiders. This creates a new category of political resources that are 
purely collective by nature – in contrast to individual resources becoming collective 
because they are shared (Dahan 2005a, Attarça 2002, Chisholm and Nielsen 2009). 
This application of resources is an important difference to the RBV applied in a 
competitive market environment where collusion is strictly regulated and mostly 
prohibited by anti-trust rules and competition policy. In the political context, resources 
can be pooled by bringing together existing firm-level resources, either through 
formal or informal co-operation. Market “collusion” is possible here and even desired, 
thus collective resources need to be considered in addition to individual resources.  
Jacomet (2005) notes that individual CPAs are not exclusive of collective action – 
both types of activities can develop simultaneously. While political resources used in 
trade associations such as expertise, financial and relational resources, can be 
pooled and provided by individual firm members, there are also political resources 
that are collective by nature, such as democratic legitimacy, private interest 
government arrangements, unity among members, and trade-offs between different 
political goals of the collective (Jacomet 2005: 78). Dahan (2005a) and Van 
Schendelen (2002) also point to the unity and internal cohesion of the members of an 
interest group as a resource. Business-government relations can thus be in the form 
of individual CPAs as well as in the form of industry associations, and one aspect of 
this thesis is to investigate the relationship between the two forms – whether these 
complement or compete with each other (RQ3). It is important not to overlook either: 
Because of the multiple interactions in a highly complex and uncertain 
environment, outcomes of the public policy process are undetermined 
and cannot be attributed to the efforts of a single organization. 
(Jacomet 2005: 91) 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) as a theoretical framework 83 
 
Two further characteristics of political resources include ad hoc versus semi-
permanent resources (Dahan 2005a) and formal versus informal political 
resources120 (Oberman 1993, Attarça 2005). Furthermore, Dahan (2005a) 
distinguishes political resources by their roles: primary, supporting and 
complementary resources, which differ in their importance and according to political 
strategies (cooperative or adversarial).  
In his first article of 2005, Dahan (2005a) only goes as far as the categorisation of 
political resources, not to the actual characteristics of resources within the VRIN-
framework. He only refers to the dynamic nature of resources being bundled 
together, which will lead to competitive advantage when mobilised. As an example 
for relational resources (or relationship capital), the relationship between a company 
representative and a politician or civil servant can be – once established – valuable, 
limited (e.g. restricted time of the politician), inimitable (on a personal level) and non-
substitutable (civil servant responsible for relevant dossier). This could limit the 
access of political newcomers to said decision-makers. Coen (1997b) also points to 
access, which can be limited to a few policy players; thus, membership is 
competitive, and firms need to use their resources to gain this access as a way to 
competitive or political advantage. Although Dahan (2005b) acknowledges this, he 
does not relate it to the VRIN-framework. In his second article of 2005 Dahan, 
(2005b) can also be criticised for applying the resource characteristics of the VRIN-
framework to the outcome of the political process (public policy/regulation) instead of 
applying it to the resources, as suggested originally by Barney (1991). Therefore, his 
application of the RBV to political resources does not seem to be consistent. He 
applies it to the outcome, the result of the resource utilisation, not the resources 
themselves and therefore this is not the application envisaged in the RBV. Keim 
(2001b) points out that SCA in CPAs needs to be based on political resources that 
are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. This thesis applies the VRIN 
framework as intended by Barney (1991): it investigates how political resources lead 
to advantages (of political or competitive nature) by being valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable, and therefore it contributes to research on political resources.  
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 For example, relational resources can be either formal or informal as Attarça (2002) underlines, 
which is echoed by Van Schendelen (2002) with networks ranging from informal, semi-formal (e.g. 
ad-hoc coalition) to formal (industry association). 
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4.3.3 The RBV and Environmental Regulations   
Having positioned the RBV to MNE characteristics and then to CPAs, we are finally 
able to view the RBV as a theoretical tool of MNEs‟ CPAs in the context of 
environmental regulations.  
Russo and Fouts (1997) start with the basic tenet of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) which is that society and business are tightly interwoven. Scholars, however, 
find it hard to specify the precise mechanisms linking companies and society. The 
economic impacts of environmental performance are a particular social issue with 
two sides: on the one hand environmental regulation can increase economic 
performance. On the other hand it can generate costs, which businesses might never 
recover (Russo and Fouts 1997, cf. Porter and van der Linde 1995a and b, Aragón-
Correa and Sharma 2003). The authors‟ argument is based on the RBV and 
emphasises the role environmental policy plays in creating wider organisational 
advantages allowing a firm to capture superior profits (Russo and Fouts 1997). 
Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003) also emphasise how exogenous factors such as 
environmental regulations impact on the development of internal environmental 
capabilities. The RBV is useful for two reasons, according to Russo and Fouts 
(1997): performance is a key outcome variable, and importance is placed on 
intangible assets like corporate culture, know-how and reputation. 
There are two modes of corporate environmental policy (cf. Hart 1995): firstly, a 
compliance strategy, and secondly, going beyond compliance with an emphasis on 
prevention. Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003) call these two modes reactive 
(compliance) and proactive (prevention), and add environmental leadership to this 
typology of corporate environmental strategies in a later publication, which goes 
further than the prevention aspect of proactive strategies (Aragón-Correa et al. 
2008). The thesis investigates how MNEs in the automotive industry approach CPAs 
regarding environmental policies: reactively or proactively (RQ2 and RQ4). 
Physical assets and technology, human resources and organisational capabilities as 
well as intangible resources are the capabilities and resources Russo and Fouts 
(1997) analyse in their application of the RBV. Intangible resources include 
reputation and an organisation‟s political acumen, rather neglected intangible assets 
in RBV development (Russo and Fouts 1997). Political acumen is “the ability to 
influence public policies in ways that confer a competitive advantage” (Russo and 
Fouts: 540). The neglect of corporate political strategy could be the result of 
managers seeing it as external to their primary responsibilities (cf. Post 1978). But 
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“savvy executives” have understood the potential of political strategy as a strategic 
resource (Russo and Fouts 1997: 540, cf. Mahon 1989). Political skills are then an 
“inimitable, valuable resource that can be used to neutralise, promote, or otherwise 
manage external constituencies” (Russo and Fouts 1997: 540). With a compliance 
strategy there is a tendency towards legislative and political lobbying aimed at 
slowing down environmental legislation‟s pace. Contrastingly, within the prevention 
policy, firms develop skills helping them to adopt external technologies in order to 
meet society‟s demands and possibly to “raise the bar”, whereas compliance-
oriented firms develop political acumen to fight against these imperatives. Such a 
reactive focus could however be seen as inferior to one of prevention (Russo and 
Fouts 1997). This thesis asks how firms view environmental regulations; whether 
MNEs are cost- and compliance-, or prevention- and opportunity-oriented (RQ4). 
The intangible resources of reputation and political acumen can both work for or 
against a company. The initial reputation is a matter of choice (e.g. “green” reputation 
or reputation for customer service): once it is established, it will be difficult to change. 
For both resources there are differences between mature, low-growth industries and 
new, high-growth ones. In the case of the development and use of political resources 
younger, high-growth industries‟ political strategies tend to focus on the industry – 
with the aim of establishing an institutional framework amenable to all players – not 
on obtaining firm-specific advantages vis-à-vis competitors. The situation is more 
complex in older lower-growth industries where political activities are more proactive, 
and securing competitive advantage is sought via political means (Russo and Fouts 
1997). Political tendencies also contrast in the environmental policies of compliance 
and prevention: compliance policy emphasises a political strategy for competitive 
advantage, whereas prevention policy instead emphasises technical and 
organisational solutions for competitive advantage. The industry to be investigated in 
this thesis, the automotive industry, fits Russo and Fout‟s typology, as i t is a mature, 
low-growth industry, and thus a suitable industry to investigate environmental 
regulations and CPAs in the context of the RBV. 
Russo and Fout‟s (1997) study maintains that it generally “pays to be green” as a 
rule; this relationship strengthens as industry growth increases. Taken as a whole, 
the authors show in their piece that the RBV can be applied to CSR issues, 
especially environmental ones, which thus shows a greater breadth of its application. 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998b) discuss the development of corporate capabilities in 
response to both national and international environmental pressures and regulations. 
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MNEs often have to comply with such regulations at several institutional levels 
simultaneously, which may lead them to develop firm-specific advantages in the form 
of green resources and capabilities (Rugman and Verbeke 1998b). 
Hart (1995: 986) criticises one serious omission of the RBV, that it “systematically 
ignores constraints imposed by the biophysical (natural) environment”, and focuses 
only on political, economic, social and technological aspects. In an attempt to 
integrate internal and external perspectives under the banner of the RBV of the firm, 
Hart inserts the natural environment into the RBV to develop a natural-resource-
based view of the firm. He argues that “one of the most important drivers of new 
resource and capability development for firms will be the constraints and challenges 
posed by the natural (biophysical) environment” (Hart 1998: 989).  
This section has shown that it is possible to introduce the natural/physical 
environment into the RBV, and to apply the RBV to analyses of environmental 
performance and regulations not only with regard to competitive strategies but also 
concerning political strategies. The RBV therefore presents a suitable theoretical 
framework for the topic of this thesis, i.e. how automotive MNEs respond to 
environmental regulations in the EU through pre-regulatory CPAs. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Related to the issue of globalization is the importance of the 
institutional context of international research. There is no theoretical 
work nor empirical findings suggesting that the existing body of 
knowledge, largely obtained in the context of the United States, is 
equally applicable in other countries. (Hoskisson et al. 1999: 445) 
The above quote illustrates the need to research the institutional (non-market) 
environment of international business. In IB research, the RBV constitutes an 
increasingly useful perspective on state-firm interaction within political markets (Doh 
and Teegen 2002, see also Peng 2001). A contribution of this thesis is the extension 
of the application of the RBV to the EU context in addition to the US political context. 
In this thesis, the resource-based framework of Moon and Lado (2000) on MNE-host 
government relations has been modified to apply to CPAs. Although the RBV focuses 
on competitive advantage, the advantage could also be political in the context of this 
thesis121. Dahan (2005b) calls this kind of advantage “public-policy advantage”.  
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 Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) include efficiency, market power and legitimacy as strategic 
objectives of business political behaviour.  
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The challenge facing researchers is to take a collection of firms that 
face a similar environment (e.g., firms in the same industry), to 
establish how these firms differ with regard to their resources (…). 
(Godfrey and Hill 1995: 530) 
Encouraged by Godfrey and Hill, this thesis investigates the political resources that 
MNEs in one industry, the automotive industry, use in their relations with the EU 
institutions when faced with a similar environment, in this case the political context of 
environmental policy, and investigate how these MNEs differ in their CPAs. The 
exogenous nature of this context is questioned. Should this be confirmed in the 
findings, this could possibly lead to a modification of the RBV in this (political) context 
in that governmental policies are endogenous factors to corporate strategy.  
According to Barney (1991), human and organisation-specific resources are the most 
difficult to imitate and therefore a more likely source of SCA than physical capital. For 
CPAs, it is expected that human resources – company representatives in Brussels – 
are very valuable resources for firms (see e.g. Wagner 2010). Intangible resources 
are analogous to human and organisational capital, while tangible resources and 
physical capital are analogous, and financial resources could be considered as a 
special kind of physical resource as Smart and Hitt (1994) remark122. It is expected 
that intangible resources could be more important than tangible ones for CPAs. 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) and Schoemaker and Amit (1994) differentiate 
between resources at an industry and an individual firm level which they respectively 
term strategic industry factors and firm-specific strategic assets. As CPAs invariably 
happen on both levels, interaction between levels should be expected123 and 
therefore the thesis investigates the relationship between individual CPAs and 
industry association activities as addressed in chapter 2. 
In this chapter, the RBV has been discussed in detail. It has been shown that there is 
scope and need to apply the RBV in the context of CPAs of MNEs in the area of 
environmental policies in the EU. The RBV is therefore used to investigate the 
research questions of what kind of resources and competences MNEs use in their 
CPAs and how CPAs differ across MNEs. Furthermore, the resource-based 
discussion on environmental policy elicited the question of how companies view 
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 “Financial resources typically refer to a combination of current liquid assets and unused or available 
debt.“ (Smart and Hitt 1994: 179) 
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 Moon and Lado (2000) remark that the industry and country context influences firm-specific 
resources and CPAs. Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) call these influences „conditioning factors‟ in the 
firm, the industry and the non-market environment. 
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environmental regulations. The latter two questions on differences and environmental 
policy perspectives also emerged as a result of the discussion in chapter 2, which 
brought up the question on the relationship between individual and collective CPAs.  
The following table summarises the gaps identified in this chapter, related to the 
RBV‟s application to CPAs of automotive MNEs regarding environmental regulations 
in the EU and how the thesis addresses these. 
Table 4.2: Identified Gaps and Contribution of Thesis to RBV 
Identified Gap Addressed in Thesis 
RBV only looks at economic and organisational 
competences of firms, not at political 
capabilities. Competitive advantages‟ 
“unavoidable political dimension” needs to be 
factored into strategy and IB research. 
(Boddewyn and Brewer 1994) 
Political resources and capabilities investigated 
Conceptualisation of political resources needs to 
be empirically validated through case studies 
(Dahan 2005a) 
The thesis employs a case study approach to 
investigate political resources according to 
Dahan‟s typology. 
Resource-based-view-oriented strategists take 
the non-market environment as exogenous and 
neutral. Attention to external environment 
needed 
(Boddewyn 2003, Amit and Schoemaker 1993, 
Priem and Butler 2001a) 
The thesis questions the exogenous view of 
non-market institutions 
RBV academics have primarily used a 
„domestic‟ context in theorising about the links 
between corporate resources and capabilities, 
and economic rent  
(Moon and Lado 2000) 
Research on firm-specific political resources 
focused on the US domestic political process 
and needs to incorporate the international 
dimension.  
(Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Frynas et al. 
2006) 
Focus on differences between MNEs from Triad 
regions, political resources in the EU context 
Research of the MNE-host government 
relationship has not used insights of RBV  
(Moon & Lado 2000, Blumentritt & Nigh 2002) 
RBV used to research MNE-host government 
relations  
Resource-based compliance or prevention 
strategy in corporate environmental policy  
(Russo and Fouts 1997) 
How do companies view environmental 
regulations? 
To summarise, the following research questions emerged from the discussion of this 
chapter: 
 What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? (RQ6) 
 How and why do CPAs differ across MNEs from the Triad regions? (RQ5) 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4) 
 What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? (RQ3) 
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5  Research Questions 
Based on the discussion of the previous three chapters, the research questions that 
this thesis addresses can now be drawn together in synthesis. The following 
research questions emerged from the discussion in chapter 2 (The Corporate 
Political Activities (CPAs) of MNEs) from the three perspectives on CPAs: the IB 
literature on MNE-host government relations, Strategic Management theory (with a 
US emphasis) on CPAs, and Political Science (with a European emphasis) on 
interest representation and lobbying: 
 Why do firms engage in CPAs? (RQ1) 
 How do companies organise and approach CPAs? (RQ2) 
 What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? (RQ3) 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4) 
 How and why do CPAs differ between MNEs from the Triad regions? (RQ5) 
Subsequently, chapter 3 (Environmental Regulations in the EU and their Impact on 
the Automotive Industry) discussed environmental regulations with regard to the EU 
and the automotive industry leading to the following research questions: 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4)  
 How and why do CPAs differ across different areas of environmental 
regulations? (RQ5) 
 What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? (RQ6) 
Finally, the following research questions emerged from the discussion in chapter 4 
(The Resource-Based View (RBV) as a theoretical framework) on the RBV in general 
and as applied to MNEs, CPAs and environmental regulations: 
 What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? (RQ3) 
 How do corporations view environmental regulations? (RQ4) 
 How and why do CPAs differ across MNEs from the Triad regions? (RQ5) 
 What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? (RQ6) 
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While RQs 1 and 2 emerged from a single chapter (Ch. 1), RQ3 and RQ6 
materialised from two chapters each (Ch. 2 and 4 for RQ3, Ch. 3 and 4 for RQ6), and 
RQ4 and RQ5 draw their justification across these three chapters, albeit with different 
emphases.  
To repeat and to review in synthesis, therefore, these are the research questions that 
the thesis addresses: 
 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs? 
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? 
 RQ4: How do corporations view environmental regulations? 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations and between MNEs from the Triad regions? 
 RQ6: What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? 
A methodology that addresses these research questions is proposed in the next 
chapter. 
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6 Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
There are multiple purposes of research: to describe, explain, 
understand, foresee, criticize, and analyse. The purpose in business 
research is to understand how and why things happen (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug 2005). 
The previous three chapters on the various perspectives of CPAs, environmental 
regulations and on the RBV have laid the basis for the investigation, the methodology 
of which is discussed in this chapter. The following sections, therefore, provide an 
overview of the choice of methodology, instruments and cases, and the data 
collection in 71 interviews. As Johnson and Harris (2003) accurately point out, 
quantitative and qualitative research methods can be viewed as labels describing two 
ends of a continuum. They specify that quantitative research will be used in an area 
where there is a reasonable amount of existing knowledge, specific constructs and 
relationships between them, since quantitative research is tighter and more 
structured. Whereas, qualitative research methods are used where there is not 
enough knowledge to pin down specific constructs, variables and relationships and 
such methods are more suited to exploratory and theory-generating research.  
Having shown in the previous chapters the exploratory nature of this piece of 
research, the benefits of the qualitative research methodology outweigh the 
shortcomings124. Qualitative methods enable the generation of in-depth data in a 
complex context to be collected in a focused and open way (Gillham 2000a, Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). Such an approach has certain limitations, however. Data 
collection in an open way can lead to large amounts of data with the potential risk of 
data overload that needs to be coped with (Johnson and Harris 2003, Harrison 
2003). As a result of the richness of the data, multiple interpretations might be 
available from the analysis (Johnson and Harris 2003). Case studies, in particular – 
mainly qualitative in character – are subject to the potentially biased nature of their 
samples and evidence, and there are doubts over cases‟ sufficient 
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 Quantitative methods were initially considered, as they offer measures of statistical validity to be 
established for tested hypotheses. They do have certain limitations, however, such as the collection 
of in-depth and complex data from actors whose relationships with each other and with their context 
are also complex for which qualitative methods are better suited. 
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representativeness to permit generalisation (Keddie 2006) while the approach has 
also been criticised as being comparatively weak (Harrison 2003).   
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of case studies and qualitative techniques do not 
outweigh the advantages to be gained from the use of this research design in a study 
of this type. A case study approach based on qualitative data was therefore chosen 
for this research, in view of the expected complexity from the discussion provided in 
the preceding chapters. It was also considered necessary in this study to triangulate 
data from representatives from EU institutions, the automotive industry and civil 
society (the societal triangle), and the case study approach is an established 
technique where triangulation is possible (Yin 1994). Furthermore, reasonable 
response rates are achievable from qualitative methods (Bryman and Bell 2003). In 
addition, some of the data to be collected could have been viewed as sensitive by the 
respondents, which also favoured the selection of a qualitative approach (e.g. Frynas 
et al. 2006) as respondents may have been unwilling to commit sensitive data to 
paper in response to a quantitative survey.  
Case studies can offer the advantages of breadth and depth of information for 
descriptive, causative, and inductive analysis to be performed to an extent that is not 
possible with purely quantitative methods (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and Huberman 
1984, Yin 1994, Corbin and Strauss 2008, cf. Levy and Rothenberg 1999), 
sometimes because questions seeking data from other, more quantitatively based 
methods have to be specific and bounded to match hypotheses, which in turn may 
become simplified. Furthermore, the process of discussion with case interviews may 
offer greater flexibility and refinement of research boundaries in the early stages of a 
study. This can be particularly useful for exploratory research of the type described in 
this thesis.  
6.2 Case Study Strategy as a Research Design 
6.2.1 Case Study Research Design 
The aim behind the case study approach is the comprehensive coverage of important 
factors and their interaction using different data sources (Yin 1993). In a very general 
manner, Bonoma (1985) defines a case study as a description of a management 
situation relying on multiple data sources, which are mostly qualitative – as in this 
research – but can also be of a quantitative nature. Verschuren (2001: 137) defines 
case studies holistically and iteratively in an open-ended way with the aim of 
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“creating maximum contrast” to quantitative surveys as reductionist types of 
research. Yin (1994), on the other hand, also advocates the use of relevant 
quantitative data in a case study research strategy. He defines a case study as an 
empirical inquiry, that  
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident. (Yin 1994: 13) 
To achieve that aim he advocates that a case study inquiry should rely on multiple 
data sources, which have to converge in a “triangulating fashion”.  
Bonoma (1985: 26) points out that the objective of data collection in case study 
research is not necessarily about quantification but more about description, 
classification, theory development and limited theory testing, “in a word, the goal is 
understanding”125. Thus, the goal is rather depth than breadth of knowing (Bonoma 
1985) as the basic case study involves the detailed and intensive analysis of a single 
case (Bryman and Bell 2003). Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005: 114) refer to case 
research as “qualitative and field-based construction and analysis of case studies” 
which often involves data collection from multiple sources. They point out that the 
trade-off between precision and generalisability, which can characterise case studies, 
is not useful for all situations.  
A case is a matter of explanation and description (Becker 2000). In this thesis, the 
general topic of study is CPAs of MNEs in the area of EU environmental regulations, 
and therefore the 11 automotive MNEs that are active in CPAs in Brussels constitute 
the cases126. Within the general regulatory area of environmental regulations, three 
specific subsets have been selected: pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and ELVs. 
These areas were all particular examples of environmental regulations and were 
therefore expected to show some similarities, but they may also have differences in 
view of their varying environmental objectives. As Stake (1995) underlines, 
researchers are interested in cases for both their uniqueness and commonality. 
Cases, according to Stake (1995), are specific, complex, functioning things, an 
integrated system – characteristics that apply to the automotive MNEs investigated 
for their CPAs with regard to EU environmental regulations. 
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 See also Denzin (1970) for discussions on qualitative observations serving more than exploratory, 
or pilot, function for theory, that is, also testing and verifying theories. 
126
 This implies that the whole population of politically active automotive MNEs in Brussels are 
investigated. 
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6.2.2 The Case Study and the Research Question 
The main research question “how do MNEs‟ CPAs differ?” (RQ5) is derived on the 
one hand from the RBV as reviewed in chapter 1 and 4, and on the other hand it 
responds to a call for papers for a special issue of the Journal of International 
Business Studies127. A sub-question of RQ5 asks, “why do CPAs differ?”. The source 
of the research question is thus from the technical literature as classified by Corbin 
and Strauss (2008). 
According to Yin (1994), the case study strategy is an appropriate and advantageous 
strategy for “how?“ and “why?“ questions (see also Long and Godfrey 2004). As this 
research attempts to answer how and why CPAs differ, the research design is 
consistent with the research question, which is the best way of solving a question, 
according to Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) and Corbin and Strauss (2008), i.e. letting 
the research question guide the methodological approach. 
6.2.3 The Case Study and CPAs  
Shaffer (1995) emphasises the strength of case study approaches to the 
investigation of CPAs, which comes from the mainly qualitative nature of case 
studies, and the use of longitudinal designs. In particular, case studies, he argues, 
account better for political behaviour on specific policy issues. On the other hand, he 
also acknowledges the classic limiting problem of generalisability which has been 
countered by investigating the whole population of automotive MNEs politically active 
in Brussels (11 cases) in three environmental regulatory areas and by triangulating 
the sources of data. 
Boddewyn (2006) advocates the use of case studies and personal interviews for the 
study of international public affairs, that is, CPAs128. Holtbrügge and Berg (2004) also 
point out that respondents only talk about these subjects in an atmosphere of trust, 
which is facilitated by face-to-face interaction. This is echoed by Frynas et al. (2006) 
who underline that political resources are difficult to evaluate in quantitative terms. 
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 This call was published in 2005 for a focused issue on “Three lenses on the Multinational 
Enterprise: Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility” and the research questions 
included amongst others “How do MNE political strategies vary across nations?”. 
128
 Boddewyn (2006) refers to Gummesson (2001) and Schuler (2001) as well as Shaffer (1995) for 
data and justifications regarding the use of more qualitative methodologies. See also Skippari 
(2002). 
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The case study method offers the opportunity to adopt a longitudinal perspective 
instead of only a snapshot of a present point in time as in many studies (see 
Schofield 2002, Ghauri 2004, Orum et al. 1991)129. Since the policy process in the 
EU can take years from proposal to adoption of legislation (as for example with the 
ELV directive) a longitudinal element is important. 
In the Political Science literature, the case study approach is frequently used and 
often the norm (see for example Mitchell 1983, Orum et al. 1991, Eckstein 2000, 
Verschuren 2001, Gerring 2007, personal exchange with political scientists). 
Greenwood et al. (1999) point out that case study research is well suited to many of 
the research questions within European interest representation.  
Bonoma (1985) highlights that not all phenomena are amenable to quantification, as 
there are limitations to the understanding that can be gained through quantitative 
methods due to difficulties in measurement and analytic technology. Given the 
sensitive nature of CPAs, the often covert nature of political behaviour, and 
companies‟ reluctance to disclose quantitative information like expenditure in this 
area, a qualitative approach is therefore more suitable (see e.g. Frynas et al. 2006). 
Considering the sensitivities interviewees might have and did have with this topic, it is 
questionable whether they would commit themselves to paper in a questionnaire130 
(in addition to the researcher‟s uncertainty of who would actually fill it out). 
Furthermore, the area is a contemporary set of issues over which the researcher has 
no control, and it is a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, where a case 
study strategy offers benefits (Yin 1994, Harrison 2003, Ghauri 2004). One of the 
strengths of the case study approach is the ability to handle a variety of evidence 
(Yin 1994): as CPAs are often seen in a critical light it is important to collect data not 
only from firms but also from other stakeholders (the “lobbied” European institutions 
and other stakeholders and observers such as related industries and NGOs). 
6.2.4 The Case Study and the RBV 
An acceptance of qualitative methods does not reduce the 
importance of the traditional positivist economic method, rather it 
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 See also Buckley and Chapman (1996) for the importance of the time dimension in IB research. 
130
 Weiss (1996: 226) also points out that respondents from different cultures – as is the case with this 
research – might also “differ in their attitudes toward providing factual versus desired information, 
and written versus verbal information, and in their willingness to divulge information to researchers” 
in research involving questionnaires.  
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should be considered to be complementary. (Lockett and Thompson 
2001: 742) 
Rouse and Daellenbach (1999, cf. Barney et al. 2001) argue for the use of qualitative 
methods when intangible resources are to be diagnosed. Resources that are 
valuable, rare and inimitable are usually intangible and thus difficult to measure 
(Godfrey and Hill 1995, Hoskisson et al. 1999).  
It may be that many of the insights of the Resource-Based View, 
particularly where less tangible resources are involved, can only be 
explored using a case study approach, something many economists 
have been reluctant to do. (Lockett and Thompson 2001: 742) 
In line with the view expressed by Lockett and Thompson, this thesis adopts a case 
study approach to investigate political resources employed by MNEs for CPAs in the 
EU. Qualitative methods are increasingly used to identify corporate resources in the 
RBV. Indeed, it is the RBV that reintroduced (inductive) case-based methods focused 
on a single case or a few companies to the field of Strategic Management (Hoskisson 
et al. 1999). Similar points are raised by Gibbert (2006a) and Denzin (1970) who 
advocate bringing theory and method closer together – methods are major ways by 
which observations are gathered to test, modify and develop theory (Denzin 1970). 
Case study methodology can be appropriate for RBV studies as it has the potential to 
provide much richer information about corporate idiosyncrasies as Hoskisson and his 
fellow authors (1999: 418) point out:  
Calls for the use of qualitative methods to identify a firm‟s resources 
are increasing as each firm is considered to have a distinctive bundle 
of resources. 
Kor and Mahoney (2000: 123) emphasise that Penrose, one of the predecessors of 
the RBV, is an “exemplar of building theory from case-study research” and point to 
several examples of the use of case studies in RBV.  
Single industries provide an important context for the examination of resources, 
which are critical to the industry in question (Hoskisson et al. 1999), although there 
must be a trade-off in terms of limited generalisability. By selecting cases 
strategically, however, generalisability can be increased (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
6.2.5 The Case Study for Industry Research 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the case study is a research strategy, which 
concentrates on understanding the dynamics within single settings. The approach is 
therefore suited to study the CPAs of 11 cases of automotive MNEs for three areas 
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of environmental regulations within the unique setting of Brussels as the so-called 
capital of the EU. 
Multiple levels of analysis are possible within case study research and embedded 
multiple case studies can handle several units of analysis of several cases (Yin 
1994). In the context of this thesis these considerations translate into the following: 
 Within one single industry – the automobile industry – there are the following 
units of analysis. The main unit of analysis is the case (see Miles and 
Huberman 1994), i.e. the individual MNEs at the firm-level – 11 cases of 
automotive MNEs politically active in the EU, as the main research question 
addresses differences in MNEs‟ CPAs. This unit of analysis also ties in with 
the theoretical framework of the RBV where individual firms are the focal point 
for the study of firm differences. The overarching unit is the car industry at 
supra-level whereas corporate government affairs functions and offices with 
the individuals working in them at the sub-level are sub-units of analysis. The 
industry as a separate level needs to be considered due to the nature of CPAs 
in the EU, which is not only at a firm-level but also strongly at the industry-
level through industry associations.  
 Three areas are chosen within one industry as the focus of the case studies. 
These are the regulatory areas of pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and 
ELVs. Three subsets have been selected within environmental regulations for 
the automobile industry so as to not rely on one single area and thus to 
increase external validity (Yin 1994). Furthermore, by looking at three areas in 
comparison, idiosyncratic aspects may be seen in perspective (Miles 1979). 
It was decided to focus on three regulatory areas within one single industry in order 
to increase the depth and richness of the data. The selection of more industries 
would have added breadth, but at the same time it would have made it impossible to 
cover the topic in adequate depth in the time available for a PhD thesis. As Gerring 
(2007) points out, better understanding is gained of the whole (that is, CPAs in the 
EU) by focusing on a key part (the automotive industry as the largest manufacturing 
industry in the EU).  
6.3 Instruments and Sources for Data Collection 
This use of multiple sources of evidence, each with its strengths and 
weaknesses, is a key characteristic of case study research. (Gillham 
2000a: 2) 
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According to Gillham (2000a), the case study approach is a main method with 
various sub-methods consisting of for example interviews, observation, document 
and record analysis. It is a multi-method approach that uses triangulation, one of the 
“defining features” of a case study (Ghauri 2004: 115). Triangulation is  
[t]he use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a 
social phenomenon so that findings may be cross-checked. (Bryman 
and Bell 2003: 575) 
Triangulation is thus the rationale for using multiple sources of evidence131. A single 
source approach is not recommended for case studies and a good case study will try 
to use as many sources as possible (Yin 1994). Denzin (1970) underlines that each 
method reveals different aspects of empirical reality and therefore multiple methods 
of observation need to be employed, that is, triangulation. Dealing with a wide variety 
of evidence is inherent to the case study strategy and the opportunity to use many 
different sources of evidence is a major strength of the approach (Yin 1994). The 
most important advantage presented by using several sources is the “development of 
converging lines of inquiry”, which is the process of triangulation (Yin 1994: 92). Any 
finding or conclusion is more convincing and accurate if based on different sources of 
information, following a corroboratory mode, using multiple perceptions for 
clarification (Yin 1994, Stake 2000a). This is confirmed by Ghauri and Grønhaug 
(2005: 222):  
The main advantage of triangulation, however, is that it can produce a 
more complete, holistic and contextual portrait of the object under 
study. In the case study method this is particularly important as you 
need to check and validate the information you receive from various 
sources. 
By adopting triangulation strategies, data validity and generalisability can be pursued 
simultaneously. These also provide the corroboration of findings across instruments 
within a single research project (Bonoma 1985). Additional observations may give 
grounds for revisiting interpretations of the data (Stake 1995). 
Two kinds of triangulation are used in this thesis – the triangulation of methods and 
the triangulation of sources – in order to be able to research CPAs in their context. 
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 Seale (1999) points to the term‟s analogy with surveying or navigation and Stake (1995) to celestial 
navigation. 
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By using two types of triangulation a strategy of multiple triangulation is followed 
(Denzin 1970). These two types of triangulation are now discussed in turn132. 
6.3.1 Triangulation of Methods – Interviews and Documentation 
The research instruments used in this thesis are semi-structured interviews, 
supported by documentation from primary and secondary sources such as reports, 
policy and legal documents, from the stakeholders. Verschuren (2001: 131) points 
out that using several methods to gather material avoids “tunnel vision“ and Crotty 
(2006a) uses triangulation of interviews with other, secondary, materials to counter 
„self-reporting bias‟ or „halo‟ affected responses.  
With interviews and documentation, the research instruments used are mainly 
qualitative tools. As there are only a limited number of companies (11 cases of MNEs 
active in CPAs in Brussels), which would obstruct statistical analysis, and as the 
nature of the research is rather exploratory, qualitative instruments are appropriate 
for this study. Another factor supporting the use of qualitative instruments is that the 
evaluation of CPAs is rather problematic as the outcome is very difficult to measure 
in quantitative terms and, often, there is a wide range of factors contributing to a 
policy result. There are debates among practitioners in the field as to what extent the 
successes or results of CPAs are measurable and quantifiable (Public Affairs 
Manager 2005, ECPA Annual Conference 2007).  
Interviews 
The main advantage of interviews is that they are collected for a particular project or 
specific study at hand (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005) and provide rich, original data 
(Travers 2001). The potential weaknesses of interviews include bias due to poorly 
constructed questions, response bias, inaccuracies due to poor recall, and reflexivity, 
where the interviewee gives what the interviewer wants to hear (Travers 2001). 
These weaknesses have been carefully considered when constructing the interview 
guide. They have been countered by using documentation as a supportive method. 
Furthermore, using multiple sources of interviews has been the strongest factor in 
meeting weaknesses such as response bias and poor recall, which could then be 
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 Patton (1987) furthermore distinguishes between investigator triangulation and theory triangulation. 
Here, data triangulation and methodological triangulation are considered (see also Corbin and 
Strauss 2008 and Denzin 1970 on these types of triangulation). 
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cross-checked. Harrison (2003) also advises to obtain a range of views from a wide 
body of opinion when selecting informants. 
Gillham (2000a) supports the use of interviewing when material is sensitive in 
character, which is the case for topics such as lobbying and interest representation. 
This means that trust is involved and people might disclose more face-to-face than 
they would in an anonymous questionnaire (Gillham 2000a). A deeper rapport can 
also be developed with informants in interviews (Daniels and Cannice 2004, Denzin 
1970).  
There are several forms of interviews ranging from open-ended, narrative to survey-
like structured closed interviews133. The semi-structured interview is both flexible and 
standardised at the same time (Gillham 2000a). The standardised or structured 
element is important in case study research involving multiple cases in order to 
compare responses and to ensure cross-case comparability (Daniels and Cannice 
2004, Bryman and Bell 2003).  
Documentation 
Documentary information is a relevant source of data for case studies (Yin 1994). It 
can take many forms and varieties (Yin 1994: 81, Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005: 92ff, 
Corbin and Strauss 2008: 27). For case studies, “the most important use of 
documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin 1994: 
81). Documents are secondary sources not specifically created or collected for the 
purpose of the current research. The most important documentation for this research 
consists of documents from the chosen stakeholder organisations (automotive and 
related companies and industry associations, European Commission and Parliament, 
NGOs). Further secondary sources include academic writings and other published 
material related to the regulatory areas, for instance from the mass media. 
By combining information from secondary and primary data, the research questions 
are often best understood, as Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) stress. Furthermore, 
secondary data is easier to access and collect than primary sources. The authors 
advocate consulting secondary sources before the primary data collection. This 
procedure was followed for the thesis at hand where secondary sources provided a 
very important input into the preparation for the data collection through interviews. 
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 Bryman and Bell (2003: 119) list the following types of interviews: structured, standardised, semi-
structured, unstructured, intensive, qualitative, in-depth, focused, focus group, group, oral history 
and life history. 
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As a tool, documentation is stable and can be reviewed repeatedly; it is unobtrusive 
and can be very exact for names, references, and details. Furthermore, it ensures a 
broad coverage in terms of time, events and settings (Yin 1994). The coverage of 
time is relevant in this context as the three regulatory areas researched had 
preceding events in the early 1990s and late 1980s (e.g. for pollutant emissions).  
Documentation exhibits weaknesses as well (Yin 1994) such as potential low 
retrievability (countered through online availability and contact to organisations), 
biased selectivity if the collection is incomplete (met by different sources selected), 
reporting bias may reflect (unknown) bias of author (countered by multiple sources), 
or access could be deliberately blocked (paid information sources consulted through 
free trials). 
6.3.2 Triangulation of Sources – Sampling 
Case study research can consist of hybrid strategies with multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin 1994). Due to the negative image and connotation that CPAs have in 
some countries and languages (“lobbying scandals”), it is vital to use multiple 
sources of evidence. These are needed to convey a “true picture” of CPAs instead of 
“painting a one-sided picture” solely by companies who might try to portray their 
political activities in a positive light or might be reluctant to answer critical questions. 
Multiple sources of evidence were thus envisaged from the outset in order to 
enhance the reliability through different perspectives. Luo (2001) suggests obtaining 
matched samples to investigate MNE-host government relations from both MNE and 
government perspectives which was done in this thesis by interviewing 
representatives from companies and EU institutions. The following details how the 
sources were chosen. 
The chosen organisations and interview partners were identified due to their role as 
stakeholders in the policy-making process of EU environmental regulations for the 
automobile industry. These organisations have an interest in this process and try to 
influence it.  
Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006: 8, Figure 1.1) introduce the societal triangle 
which consists of the institutions of the state, market and civil society. In this thesis, 
these three corners or sides of the figure as sources of data specifically triangulate 
MNEs‟ CPAs in EU environmental regulations as graphically demonstrated in the 
figure below. Whilst it could be argued that the societal triangle is simplistic, it serves 
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as a conceptual tool rather than as an accurate reflection of reality. This is also 
acknowledged by Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006: 12) who state that none of 
the three institutional spheres operate in isolation as the “societal triangle and its 
institutional arrangements are complex”. 
Figure 6.1: The societal triangle – Triangulating CPAs (based on Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006: 
8, Figure 1.1: The societal triangle
134
) 
        Government 
 
 
 
 
   
Market                      Civil Society 
Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006: 8-9) define civil society to represent the “sum 
of social relations among citizens that structures society outside politics and 
business”, which includes voluntary organisations, societal groupings, churches and 
trade unions as well as the family. This is similar to the definition by Richter (2002), 
used by Crotty (2003a: 490), whereby civil society consists of “autonomous voluntary 
associations”, also referred to as the “third sector”135. By including civil society, the 
“widest possible coverage of knowledge and opinions” (Crotty 2003b: 464) regarding 
automotive MNEs and their CPAs was attempted. 
In this context, the most important stakeholders, from each side of the triangle are 
the following:  
 Government: these are legislators, policy-makers, and public decision-makers, 
that is, the European Commission and the EP, the Council of Ministers 
(governments of member states). The Commission is responsible for 
proposing and executing legislation, whereas the EP and the Council adopt it 
after possible amendments.  
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 Meznar and Nigh (1993: 32) use a similar graphic, calling it the “social contract framework“. 
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 There are indeed various definitions of civil society in literature (Crotty 2009, based on Jensen 
2006). 
MNE Corporate 
Political Activities in 
EU Environmental 
Regulations 
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 Market: this is the business side represented by the major stakeholders – 
automotive companies and the European industry association as well as 
national industry associations. The market consists of the players that affect 
the natural environment through their operations and are thus affected by 
environmental legislation introduced by the government side. Other market 
stakeholders are companies and associations from adjacent and related 
industries such as suppliers (components, units and raw materials), petroleum 
companies (for fuel emissions quality), and recyclers (for ELVs).  
 Civil society: mainly environmental NGOs. Their stake in environmental policy 
is their interest in environmental protection, which involves trying to influence 
government to restrict business activities, which are potentially harmful to the 
environment. Other stakeholders here include unions, consumer 
organisations, media and academic institutions. As civil society organisations 
are involved in the Commission‟s pre-legislation discussions through 
stakeholder meetings, these organisations are able to provide a third 
perspective on CPAs.  
The stakeholders were identified by investigating contributions to the consultation 
process of EU legislation as well as by following up references in organisational 
documents, and academic and professional publications related to the regulatory 
areas. In those situations where the initial contact felt they were not able to offer 
helpful information, they recommended alternative respondents in their stead. 
Importantly, the author was also given recommendations by interviewees. Appendix 
A specifies which particular organisations were contacted as sources for interviews 
and documentation. 
6.4 Data Collection 
The following is a summary of the data collection process for this research in 2006 
and 2007136. Potential interview partners who were contacted fell in two categories: 
individuals who had been identified through the investigation of various secondary 
sources, and individuals who were recommended by interviewees and/or other 
contacted individuals (who were not available themselves for interviews). Through 
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 See also Zalan and Lewis 2004 for writing about data collection. 
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this process it was attempted to find the right individuals for the research question 
and for this study, and not the most “important” person (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005) 
who might not necessarily be familiar with policy details.  
Addresses and names of the individuals were accessed through web-based research 
(organisational websites, e.g. EP hearings and plenary discussion, Commission 
documents) and The European Public Affairs Directory, which is a comprehensive 
guide to key contacts in corporations, EU institutions, trade associations and NGOs, 
as well as law firms, consultancies and media (Landmarks 2006). This enabled the 
author to contact all 11 case companies. When this author was referred to the same 
people repeatedly it was clear that the relevant stakeholders had been targeted and 
reached (saturation sampling). 
Table 6.1: Interview guide for semi-structured interview 
GENERAL 
questions 
on CPAs 
ASSOCIATION v. 
FIRM level 
EUROPEAN v. 
NATIONAL 
level 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
regulations 
ASSESSMENT 
Motivational 
factors 
Organisation  
Approach 
 
Coordination, 
Cooperation, 
Competition 
Resources and 
competences 
(Personnel, 
Expertise, 
Organisation, 
Learning 
Processes) 
Experiences 
Relations 
Headquarters v 
Brussels 
Producer 
Regions 
Europe, North 
America, Japan 
 
Interests and Positions 
Euro norms 
CO2 
ELVs 
 
Strengths 
Weaknesses 
Overall. 
 
Contact was made initially by e-mail, which was then followed up by telephone calls 
to arrange meetings. A general interview guide was prepared (see Table 6.1 above) 
which was then adapted to each interviewee and given greater detail (see Table 6.2 
below). Extensive documentation research served as input to the interview questions  
based on the research questions that arose out of the literature and theory (see 
previous chapters). Interview guides were discussed with a social science lecturer at 
Loughborough University working on political marketing137 and the academic director 
of the DIPA (German Institute for Public Affairs, Berlin) where the author was a 
research fellow during a two-month research visit in 2006. Suggestions were also 
received from a practitioner in Brussels who had written her PhD on policy networks 
in Japanese automobile lobbying in Europe a few years earlier. Furthermore, the 
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 He was recommended to this author at the annual conference of ECPA – European Centre for 
Public Affairs – by a lecturer in Political Communication and Public Affairs from the University of 
Ulster. 
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book of Gillham (2000b) on research interviews was used for advice. It was ensured 
that the interview questions addressed the research questions raised by this study. In 
the interviews, general questions across the three regulatory areas were asked first 
(e.g. motivational factors and organisation) and the subsequent questions were then 
narrowed down to the specific instances of environmental regulations to allow for 
greater exploration of themes.  
The following table shows the core questions for the interviews, including sub-
questions and prompts, and how the wording was adapted for specific interviewees 
as different stakeholders138. 
Table 6.2: Interview guide with core interview questions 
GENERAL questions on government relations 
1. What are the main motivational factors for your firm to engage in CPAs? (for 
automotive firms, for your association, for the automotive industry) 
2. How are your company‟s/the industry‟s CPAs organised? Are CPAs integrated 
into your/the company‟s overall strategy? 
3. What is your company‟s/the industry‟s approach to CPAs? How would you 
describe the approach? (Prompts: cooperative? confrontational? proactive? 
reactive?) (Is it different than other companies in the industry and if so how? Why 
are there differences?) What are the main topics you cover/that are covered? 
ASSOCIATION V FIRM level 
4. What is the relationship between your firm‟s activities and the association‟s 
activities in interest representation? (between individual firm‟s and the 
association‟s) (Prompts: cooperation? competition? complementarity? What role 
does your firm play in the association?) 
5. What kind of firm-specific resources and capabilities does your firm/the 
industry employ in your/their CPAs? What role do they play? (Prompts: Dahan‟s 
typology of political resources: human resources and expertise, financial resources, 
relational resources, organisational resources, reputation with other non-market 
actors, public image, support of stakeholders and recreational skills) 
EUROPEAN V NATIONAL level 
6. Where are policy positions developed? At headquarters? At Brussels? How is it 
coordinated? 
7. What is the European lobbying approach in the automotive industry? How 
would you describe American and Japanese approaches to lobbying? 
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 See also Crotty (2003c) as well as Crotty and Crane (2004) for an approach with a set of base or 
core questions with individual adaptation and supplementary questions in semi-structured 
interviews.  
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Differences? What kind of differences? Do you see differences in the automobile 
industry between firms from different regions when it comes to interacting 
with policy-makers? In how far are companies influenced by their home country 
culture in their lobbying? Are European companies at an advantage compared to 
US and Japanese companies? 
ENVIRONMENTAL regulations 
8. How are environmental regulations viewed in your organisation/the industry? 
(Prompts: costs versus innovation?) Has the approach to CPAs changed with the 
growth in environmental regulations? 
9. To what degree was your company (the industry association) involved in 
discussions on Euronorms/CO2/ELVs? What was your/their approach in the 
discussions? Could you describe (in detail) what happened during the process? 
ASSESSMENT 
10. Where do you see strengths and weaknesses in the work of your company/the 
association/the automotive industry in the area of government relations? 
11. Overall: Looking back at your time (in/with the automotive industry) how do you 
rate/assess the government relations activities of the automotive industry in 
general/ with regard to environmental policies (Euro norms/CO2/ELV)? 
 
As a reminder, the following are the research questions that emerged from the 
discussion in the previous three chapters: 
 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs? 
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? 
 RQ4: How do corporations view environmental regulations? 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations and between MNEs from the Triad regions? 
 RQ6: What kind of resources and competences do firms use in their CPAs? 
Interview question (IVQ) 1 relates to RQ1, while IVQs 2 and 3 address RQ2. RQ3 is 
addressed by IVQ4. IVQ5 addresses RQ6 while IVQ8 addresses RQ4. RQ5 is 
addressed by IVQs 6, 7 and 9 concerning the three areas of environmental 
regulations. IVQs 10 and 11 were asked in order to conclude the interviews with an 
assessment and to obtain the overall views of the respondents on automotive MNEs‟ 
CPAs regarding EU environmental regulations, and to allow the development of 
recommendations for the constituent stakeholders (Ch. 9).  
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Before the interview, a letter was sent confirming the time and place of the interview 
and offering interviewees advance sight of the interview questions. Some 
interviewees were contacted by telephone at short notice directly in Brussels after 
having been recommended in interviews. 
Data was collected in Brussels where corporate managers in the governmental 
affairs functions (all 11 case companies bar one), industry associations (automotive 
and related industry), EU institutions (Commission and EP), and environmental 
NGOs were interviewed. Most interviews were face-to-face although some had to be 
carried out over the telephone due to time and travel restraints. Some interviews 
were followed-up by questions via e-mail. Afterwards, the interviewees received an e-
mail to thank them for their time and contribution to the research with an offer for a 
summary of the findings once completed. 
The most recognizable term for public policy advocacy is lobbying. 
Unfortunately, this term carries an unfavorable image in today‟s 
political environment. (Lumpkin 2007: 42) 
Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) advocate the use of simple and understandable 
language and careful consideration of terminology and the use of concepts of a 
particular discipline. It was noticed during the first stage of data collection (Brussels, 
June 2006) that the main (academic) terminology used in the thesis, that is, 
“corporate political activities”, was not necessarily familiar for interviewees. 
Consequently, the author adopted terminology that was more familiar to the 
respondents, such as, “business-government relations”, “lobbying” and “interest 
representation”. Allowing time for reflecting on experiences during the first stage 
benefited the research design, in that modifications could be made to improve the 
second stage. In the second and third stage (Berlin, October 2006; Brussels, March 
2007) the term CPAs was – also upon advice of the DIPA‟s director – modified to 
terms like government and policy relations as lobbying can have a negative 
connotation in several European countries and languages (see above quote and 
McGrath 2005). The wording was also changed because anything “political“, as in 
corporate political activities, might arouse suspicion in corporations. These issues 
about terminology and the potentially negative connotation of the word “lobbying” or 
misunderstandings could easily be clarified in the face-to-face interviews which is 
certainly an advantage over surveys where there is limited control as to how 
respondents understand terminology and as to who is responding.  
The issue of CPAs is – as demonstrated – a controversial topic and for this reason 
anonymity is important to interviewees and therefore all quotes have been 
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anonymised, even though Yin (1994) advocates that it would be preferable to 
disclose information (see also Miles 1979 regarding issues with anonymity, and 
Corbin and Strauss 2008 regarding confidentiality). During the first stage of the data 
collection, some companies (particularly French and Japanese ones) were very 
reluctant to grant interview requests despite reassurances regarding confidentiality 
and anonymity. After continued requests, these companies eventually also agreed to 
be interviewed, thus enabling a broader basis for the analysis and findings. Gillham 
(2000a) supports the use of interviewing when material is potentially sensitive in 
character, which is the case for lobbying (Hadjikhani and Ghauri 2001). This means 
that trust is involved and people might disclose things face-to-face, which they might 
not disclose in an anonymous questionnaire (Hadjikhani and Ghauri 2001).  
Interviews were mostly recorded on tape (42 interviews), and partly recorded by 
means of hand-written contemporaneous notes (29 interviews). Notes were taken 
due to the potentially sensitive nature, and when requested by interviewees. 
However, when the interviews were recorded, the answers did not seem to be 
affected and consequently this author continued to record further interviews. This 
made the interviews more flexible (Bryman and Bell 2003) as the author could better 
react to the responses of interviewees, and potential information loss through 
insufficient notes could be avoided. Other advantages of recording and subsequently 
transcribing interviews aside from correcting natural memory limitations include a 
more through examination of interviewees‟ answers, repeated study of their answers 
and the possibility for the data to be reused in other ways (Bryman and Bell 2003, 
see also Roulston et al. 2003).  
In total, 71 interviews were carried out. In the following, some descriptive statistics 
about the interviews and interviewees are displayed and discussed. Between 130 
and 140 potential interviewees were contacted, and thus the response rate is above 
50%. Considering the contentious nature of the subject, this is deemed to be a very 
high response rate. As the policy community involved in regulations for the 
automotive industry at any one time involves 30-50 people who work on this issue 
and are in a permanent discourse (Interview MEP7139, Rel3) where the “same faces” 
are seen “in many different fora” for the automotive environment area (sic, IV 
Com11), this study is expected to have covered exhaustively most people involved in 
this type of legislation in the past and recently, as well as the wider circle of 
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 See List of Abbreviations and separately provided key to interviews, according to societal triangle 
and organisational type (for examiners‟ use only).  
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observers and related stakeholders and industries not continually involved in 
automotive legislation140. Furthermore, 11 automotive companies active in Brussels 
except for one were directly interviewed and therefore the whole population was 
covered141. When this author was continually referred to the same people it was clear 
that all the relevant stakeholders had been interviewed and saturation had been 
reached (Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
Following the societal triangle of Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006), the 
distribution of interviewees among these three sides is as follows, which also roughly 
reflects the distribution of these three sides in reality. 
Table 6.3: Side of Triangle 
 Market State Civil Society Others 
Total 36 26 8 1 
Percent 50.70 36.62 11.27 1.41 
The following table shows the distribution of interviewees among the stakeholder 
organisations in more detail. 
Table 6.4: Overview of distribution of interview partners 
Organisation/Interview Partner Number of Interviews Total 
Market Side: 
Corporate Public Affairs Offices (Automotive 
Industry + Related Industry) 
Business Associations (Automotive Industry + 
Related Industry) 
 
(15 + 5) = 20 
 
(7 + 9) = 16 
 
 
 
36 
State Side (EU Institutions): 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
 
13 
12 
1 
 
 
 
26 
Civil Society Side: 
Environmental NGOs 
Consumer Organisations 
 
7 
1 
 
 
8 
Others (Informal Meeting, automotive industry) 1 1 
Total  71 
The response rates for the individual triangle sides were approximately 60% for the 
market side, 50% for the state side and 30% for the civil society side. The latter can 
be explained by the job sharing environmental organisations tend to do in Brussels 
where the big organisations (the so-called “Green 10” group of environmental NGOs) 
do not cover everything and leave certain specialised areas to one another (see e.g. 
                                              
140
 This limited number of potential interviewees also advocated against a quantitative approach. 
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 This less active company had closed its offices a few years back and these were due to open 
again. It is closely affiliated to another company through cross share-holdings, which was 
interviewed, and also other companies were able to inform and comment about its activities.  
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IV NGO2-A)142. It should also be noted that whilst significant effort was made to 
include trade unions and media (newspapers) from civil society in the data collection, 
they did not respond to the author‟s repeated requests for interviews, despite those 
requests being made by both email and telephone.  
Among the regulatory areas, the interviewees were distributed as shown in Table 6.5. 
As company representatives in Brussels often cover environmental regulations in 
general, many had covered all three areas whereas Commission officials or 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were more likely to have dealt with 
only one area at a time. 
Table 6.5: Distribution of interviewees among regulatory areas 
 ELV CO2 Euro Euro/CO2 ELV/Euro All 3 
Total 14 7 12 2 3 33 
Percent 19.72 9.86 16.90 2.82 4.23 46.48 
 
Table 6.6: Data Collection Stage  
 1 Brussels 
June 2006 
2 Berlin 
autumn 2006 
3 Brussels 
March 2007 
4 Telephone 
2007 
In 
between 
Total 15 7 31 15 3 
Percent 21.13 9.86 43.66 21.13 4.23 
As shown in Table 6.6 the main data collection stage was in 2007. Whereas the first 
stage of interviews in 2006 only regarded the voluntary CO2 agreement between the 
European Commission and carmakers, the subsequent interviews included the two 
further areas on pollutant emissions and ELVs. Although the CO2 agreement had 
been concluded in the late 1990s, it was nearing a stage of review and assessment 
for future policy options in 2006 and 2007, and hence there was limited willingness to 
discuss it among company sources. This is exemplified by the following email this 
author received in May 2006: 
This issue being very strategic and sensitive for our association and 
other car manufacturers associations as well, you may understand 
that we cannot have an open discussion for the time being. Any 
misinterpretation at this stage may damage the auto industry in 
Europe and, result in regulatory measures targeting CO2 ahead of 
2008/2009, whether at EU or Member States level. 
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 This was confirmed by a former employee of one of the “Green 10” group of environmental NGOs, 
turned doctoral researcher, who underlined that, although these organisations are small in numbers 
(in terms of human resources), they are a trusted source of information for the Commission (see 
also NGO1-A). Therefore, they were an important part of the data collection for this thesis to provide 
credibility to the findings. Furthermore, as these organisations tend to share the workload in 
between them, only the relevant organisations made themselves available for interviews. 
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As a result of this communication and the first data collection stage, it was decided to 
broaden the area of research, as there was a concern that only limited data would be 
forthcoming. This approach was consistent with Yin (1994) who stresses the need for 
adaptiveness and flexibility when conducting case study research including the 
identification of (a) new case(s) for study (see also Harrison 2003 for adjustments 
when data cannot be collected as originally planned). Adding two additional but 
related areas enabled the triangulation of findings across three instances of 
environmental regulations sharing both differences and similarities. It added breadth 
to the use of just one area – which would have been a less optimal foundation for 
generalisation (Stake 1995 and 2000b) – and depth to the investigation of one single 
industry in which all 11 case companies were covered. The first data collection stage 
can therefore be seen as a pilot inquiry, the importance of which Yin (1994) stresses. 
The interviews took place in various locations (see Table 6.7 below), and 15 
telephone interviews were conducted with people not or no longer located in Brussels 
or not available at the time of the author‟s research stay there. 
Table 6.7: Place of Interview  
 Telephone Respondent 
office, 
Brussels 
Public 
place, 
Brussels 
Respondent 
office, 
Berlin 
Public 
Place, 
Berlin 
Email 
Total 15 45 5 3 2 1 
Percent 21.13 63.38 7.04 4.23 2.82 1.41 
 
The following two tables display some of the demographics of the interviewees. It can 
be seen that the automotive industry and its stakeholders in related industries and 
the EU institutions is a male-dominated industry. As the German automotive industry 
is the largest in Europe (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009), with a market share of 
30%, and as German MEPs have been rapporteurs for many car-related dossiers 
(see EP website), a high number of German interviewees was expected from the 
outset. Although French manufacturers have a market share of above 20%, French 
MEPs do not hold any important or relevant committee or rapporteur positions as an 
interviewee from a French company pointed out (Interview EU5-B), a circumstance 
which was confirmed by the information in the EP‟s organisational documents on the 
various relevant dossiers.  
Table 6.8: Distribution of gender 
 Female Male Mix (+2) 
Total 9 59 3 
Percent 12.68 83.10 4.23 
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Table 6.9: Nationality of Respondents 
(Abbreviations: United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Belgium, 
Japan, Netherlands, United States of America, Mix
143
, Unknown) 
In response to potential objections to the relatively high number of interviews with 
German interviewees (42.3%) and interviews conducted in German (46%), 
Boyacigiller et al. (1996: 189) point out “logistical obstacles” such as cultural fluency 
that must be addressed and overcome by the researcher. By using German as a 
language to talk to German interviewees, the response rate was increased and the 
ease of respondents to speak openly was encouraged – Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998: 253) point out that a common language “facilitates” the ability to gain access 
to people and their information and, therefore, the use of the author‟s native mother 
tongue provided an advantage in the data collection process and enhanced the 
quality of the data as opposed to interviewing respondents in a foreign language. 
Furthermore, as already indicated above, the number reflects the realities of the 
industry and the policy-making situation: 45% of total value added in the industry is 
generated in Germany (John and Schwarzer 2006) while the head of the automotive 
unit in the European Commission pointed out that 60% of the European automotive 
industry is located in Germany (IV Com12). 
Within the sides of the societal triangle, the respondents came from the following 
countries: 
Table 6.10: Nationality of Respondents according to side of societal triangle 
Interviews lasted between 15 minutes (telephone interviews) and 2 hours with the 
majority ranging between 30 and 60 minutes, on average 47 minutes. Interviews 
were mainly conducted in English (38 interviews); interviews with German or 
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 Mix denotes the interviews with two interviewees of differing nationality: Czech-French, Canadian-
Czech, French-Belgian, Dutch-Belgian. 
 UK D F It Sw. Fi. AU IR Belg. Jap. NL US Mix ? 
Ttl 9 30 8 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 5 1 
% 12.7 42.3 11.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 2.8 1.4 2.8 1.4 2.8 1.4 7.0 1.4 
 UK D F It Sw. Fi. AU IR Belg. Jap. NL US Mix ? 
Market side (Total 36) 
Total 4 14 4 2 2  1  2 1 1 1 4  
Pct. 11.1 38.9 11.1 5.6 5.6  2.8  5.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 11.1  
State side (Total 26)  
Total 4 11 3 1 1 3 1 1      1 
Pct. 15.4 42.3 11.5 3.8 3.8 11.5 3.8 3.8      3.8 
Civil Society side (Total 8) 
Total 1 5 1        1    
Pct. 12.5 60.0 12.5        12.5    
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German-speaking interviewees (33 interviews) were conducted in German with 
subsequent translation into English.  
6.5 Tools for Analysis 
A key purpose of analysis is to understand and to gain insights from collected data 
(Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005). Analysis is “a process of examining something in order 
to find out what it is and how it works” (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 46). Within 
analytical activities, the following can be distinguished: categorisation, abstraction, 
comparison, dimensionalisation, integration, iteration, and refutation (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug 2005).  
Qualitative analysis is a process of studying and interpreting data in order to obtain 
meaning, acquire understanding and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008). There are many ways of analysing qualitative data144. Common to all 
approaches is a central concern with “transforming and interpreting qualitative data” 
in a scholarly and rigorous way in order to “capture the complexities of the social 
worlds we seek to understand” (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 3). Huberman and Miles 
(2002: 394) also point out that sets of data are like the phenomena they mirror: they 
are complex, ambiguous, and sometimes even contradictory. Common lines of 
analysis for qualitative data are for example grounded theory, analytic induction and 
content analysis (Bryman and Bell 2003).  
Miles and Huberman (1994) define data analysis as three linked sub-processes: data 
reduction145, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. A variety of 
different tactics can be used. A systematic approach is taken to the process of 
qualitative data analysis, but not in an over-prescriptive way (Coffey and Atkinson 
1996): one either arrives deductively or inductively at categories and there are 
multitudes of possibilities146. A process leading to categories and concepts is coding 
which forms part of the analysis of qualitative data. According to Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 56), “coding is analysis”. Coding involves extracting concepts from “raw data” 
and interacting with the data (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 159). Coding and 
categorising aids the interpretation of data and supports searching for common or 
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 The data mostly consists of qualitative interview data. Consequently only tools for the analysis of 
qualitative data will be considered here. 
145
 Data reduction is a form of preliminary analysis, according to Miles (1979), in which data is refined, 
iterated, revised. 
146
 Corbin and Strauss (2008) stress flexibility and openness when dealing with ambiguity in data. 
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conflicting themes; looking for commonalities and differences is one way to draw 
conclusions (Ghauri 2004). The aim is not description but understanding and making 
sense of the data (Stake 1995, Long and Godfrey 2004). 
Comparative analysis is the term Verschuren (2001) uses to analyse case study 
material. Comparison is a powerful conceptual mechanism as Stake (2000a) 
underlines, where incident is compared against incident for similarities and 
differences (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Miles and Huberman (1994) differentiate 
between within-case and cross-case analysis. Within-case analysis typically involves 
detailed write-ups for each site or case; these can often be “simply pure 
descriptions”, but can be very helpful in the generation of insight (Eisenhardt 1989: 
540). Cross-case analysis can is carried out across multiple cases, looking for 
commonalities and differences (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005), as pursued here. 
Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005) recommend the keeping of records of analysis. This 
may be either in hand-written or computerised form. Yin (1994) similarly advocates 
the creation of a case study database as a way of organising and documenting the 
amount of data collected (see also Patton 1987, and Lee and Fielding 2004). For this 
thesis a case study database was created in computerised form (word and NVivo), 
containing all 71 interview transcripts, in addition to printouts and hand-written notes 
of the interviews. 
For analysing interview data, Gillham (2000a) recommends being aware of what 
respondents avoid telling the interviewer: what they do not tell could be more 
important than what they say. Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005: 213) recommend letting 
a priori assumptions or hunches guide and direct the research rather than dictate it:  
even though some a priori theory may exist, it is assumed that a priori 
insights should not allow for complete structuring and explanation of 
the research problem. 
Gillham (2000a) advises to be aware of „prejudices‟ in research147, for instance what 
does the researcher expect to find?, what are his or her preferences?, what does he 
or she want to find?, and he recommends writing out expectations before the 
analysis, to acknowledge them and to be critical with his- or herself148. During this 
                                              
147
 Yin (1994: 56) talks about the researcher‟s being “unbiased by preconceived notions”. Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) doubt the possibility of “objectivity” in data collection and analysis and advocate the 
acknowledgment of biases and experiences. Denzin (1970: 300) also asserts that  two investigators 
will reach different conclusions, due to the “human-personalistic element in the scientific process”. 
148
 See also James and Vinnicombe (2003) on acknowledging the individual in the researcher.  
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research, this author was aware of her environmental preferences as well as her 
enjoyment of driving.  
Data analysis was carried out mainly by hand, although initially with NVivo, a 
programme allowing researchers to code and retrieve text (Lindeque 2007, Bryman 
and Bell 2003). It does not interpret data, but takes over mechanical activities linked 
with the coding process (Bryman and Bell 2003). 
Recorded interviews were transcribed by the author and by two external supports. 
The external transcriptions were thoroughly examined by the author to check for 
technical language and specific terminology possibly unknown to the external 
transcribers149. Interviews conducted in German were subsequently translated into 
English (see Corbin and Strauss 2008 for translation considerations). Interviews 
based on hand-written notes were written up on a word processor to be brought into 
a suitable format to be printed out for manual analysis. 
As many interviewees are non-native speakers of English, some quotes as presented 
in the findings are grammatically wrong. However, in order to preserve their original 
nature, all quotes from the interviews have been left un-edited in terms of language 
and grammar. Companies are referred to by their region of origin and a number (e.g. 
EU1, US1, and JP2). Company representatives are identified by their company code 
and a letter (e.g. EU1-A, US2-B) in order to protect their anonymity. Other 
interviewees are referred to by societal triangle and organisational type (e.g. Rel1, 
Com10, MEP4, NGO1-A). The abbreviations are detailed in the List of Abbreviations 
on p. VIII for the reader, while a separate, confidential, interview key has been made 
available for examiners‟ use. In the cases of more than one respondent per 
organisations, these are differentiated by letter, e.g. US2-A and US2-B or NGO1-A 
and NGO1-B. 
Questions for the interviews (semi-structured in nature) were posed in an open 
manner (e.g. “What are the main motivational factors for your firm or association/for 
firms in the automotive industry to engage in government relations?”), which resulted 
in open answers. For some questions prompts were given (see Table 6.2 above). It 
was expected that open questions would produce more ideas for this exploratory 
research than would questions in a quantitative survey, which would be defined 
beforehand and thus limit answers by this ex ante restriction. More possibilities to 
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 Johnson and Harris (2003) recommend the delegation of the task of transcription. See also 
Roulston et al. 2003 for transcription issues. 
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explore the depths and breadth of CPAs in their complexity are thus provided by 
open and semi-structured questions.  
The respective interview sections concerning the questions were coded on paper 
(initially in NVivo), with codes developed during data analysis (Harrison 2003) as in 
vivo150 codes or closely fitting ones, thus resulting in data-driven codes (Gibbs 2002) 
or open coding (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Sets of codes resulted for each area and 
research question examined. In order to arrive at a smaller number of analytic units 
(Miles and Huberman 1994), clusters were formed and defined by the author to 
subsume the codes into higher-level sub-categories or concepts and themes (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008), allowing the identification of key themes in the responses (see 
Crotty 2006b). Quotes are used to provide evidence and to make sense of the 
analysis (Corbin and Strauss 2008), according to themes and concepts arising out of 
the data. An iterative process of presenting the data and writing about them and 
going back to the data was followed which helped clarify thoughts and logic (see 
Corbin and Strauss 2008). The two following chapters (7 and 8) address each of the 
six research questions in turn, addressing similarities and differences (e.g. Crotty 
2006b) across and within the cases and regulatory areas, with the exception of RQ6 
which will be discussed in both chapters, based on cross- and within-case analysis. 
6.6 Reflections on Validity and Reliability  
There are different criteria to assess the quality of research, of which the most 
important ones are reliability and validity. Reliability is the concern whether the 
results of a study can be repeated or replicated (Bryman and Bell 2003), using the 
same instruments (Orum et al. 1991). It is particularly an issue for quantitative 
research but for qualitative research – as in this study – reliability is also an important 
criterion. Its goal is the minimisation of errors and biases in a study (Yin 1994). One 
way of ensuring this is the development of a case study database where all data is 
organised and documented (Yin 1994). This procedure was followed. The 
triangulation of methods and sources of data collection increase reliability. 
Triangulation, as discussed above, was a vital component of the data collection for 
this thesis. Furthermore, letting informants review the written report can also enhance 
reliability, also called respondent validation (Bryman and Bell 2003). This was 
considered at some stage during the research but time constraints and feasibility 
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 In vivo coding is a term from grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and refers to the use of 
words taken directly from interviewees or respondents to name the codes used (Gibbs 2002). 
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concerns associated with further contact and responses from interviewees precluded 
the use of this technique. In addition, the recordings contained the complete 
information from the interviews. 
Validity is the most important criterion of research and frequently mentioned (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). Its main concern is the integrity of conclusions generated from a 
study (Bryman and Bell 2003), that is the generalisability of findings (Gibbert 2006a). 
As Ghauri and Grønhaug (2005: 218) put it aptly 
Validity claims are responses to the question: How can I trust you? 
There are various types of validity and the terminology is not always the same 151. 
Whereas quantitative research addresses validity beforehand, qualitative often does 
it afterwards (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005). Maxwell (2002: 41) describes the nature 
of validity in qualitative research as following:  
Validity, in a broad sense, pertains to this relationship between an 
account and something outside of that account, whether this 
something is construed as objective reality, the constructions of 
actors, or a variety of other possible interpretations. 
Janesick (1998: 50) points out that in the quantitative field, validity has a set of 
“technical microdefinitions”, whereas in qualitative research, validity deals with 
description and explanation and “whether or not a given explanation fits a given 
description”; in other words, “is the explanation credible?”. Orum et al. (1991) point 
out that with regard to validity a case study approach offers advantages in terms of 
the variety of data sources that can be used to cross-check and thus validate findings 
– a procedure followed in this study. 
There are different approaches to validity in qualitative research. Ghauri and 
Grønhaug (2005) for example apply the following types of validity for qualitative data: 
descriptive, interpretative, theoretical and generalisable validity152. One approach is 
to stick closely to the validity criteria of quantitative data (Bryman and Bell 2003). 
Another approach is to use different terms and ways to assess qualitative research. 
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 See e.g. Bryman and Bell 2003 and Yin 1994 for types of validity. 
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 Maxwell (2002) adds evaluative validity to this list. 
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Lincoln and Guba (2002) for example, propose two sets of criteria, trust-worthiness 
and authenticity153.  
External validity refers to the degree to which findings are generalisable across 
settings. Generalisability is the main component of external validity (Bryman and Bell 
2003). It refers to the “extent to which one can extend the account of a particular 
situation or population to other persons, times, or settings than those directly studied” 
(Maxwell 2002: 52). Generalisation is not an irrelevant issue for case study 
researchers. It is important for two reasons: firstly, it is one means to argue for 
general relevance of the findings; secondly, much case study research includes 
generalisation within the investigated case(s) (Gomm et al. 2000)154. For this 
research, three areas were selected within the area of environmental regulations for 
the automotive industry so as not to rely on a single area and thus to increase 
external validity and hence generalisability. Furthermore, the whole population of 
politically active automotive MNEs in Brussels were studied in 11 cases. 
Construct Validity mainly applies to quantitative research and is also called 
measurement validity (Bryman and Bell 2003). It refers to correctly establishing 
operational measures for the investigated concept (Yin 1994), that is, does it 
measure what it claims to measure? To increase construct validity (Yin 1994) and to 
avoid one-sided or biased evidence, multiple sources of data are used. With 
triangulation – as pursued in this thesis – potential problems of construct validity can 
be addressed: 
The main advantage of triangulation, however, is that it can produce a 
more complete, holistic and contextual portrait of the object under 
study. In the case study method this is particularly important as you 
need to check and validate the information you receive from various 
sources. (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005: 222) 
Internal validity involves causal relationships where it is demonstrated that certain 
conditions lead to other conditions unlike spurious relationships (Yin 1994). Within 
case study research internal validity also relates to the issue of making inferences 
(Yin 1994). The goal is a “coherent and illuminating description” (Schofield 2002: 
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 Trustworthiness consists of four criteria, which have approximate equivalents in quantitative 
research (Bryman and Bell 2003, see also Seale 1999): credibility paralleling internal validity,  
transferability paralleling external validity, dependability paralleling reliability (see above), and 
confirmability paralleling objectivity. 
154
 Gibbert (2006a) raises the point that generalisability should not be an unconditional methodological 
requirement in RBV research and might have to be de-emphasised in favour of internal and 
construct validity. 
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174). An alternative expression for internal validity is credibility, that is, how 
believable the findings are (Bryman and Bell 2003: 35). Respondent validation and 
triangulation are both techniques that can ensure credibility and thus internal validity 
(Bryman and Bell 2003). Corbin and Strauss (2008) also stress credibility as an 
important criterion of qualitative research, indicating that findings need to be 
trustworthy and believable. Credibility for the current study has been established as a 
result of carrying out 71 interviews whilst also triangulating the choice of interviewees 
from different sides of the societal triangle. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the choice of methodology, research design and analysis as 
well as aspects of validity and reliability. The reliance of this thesis on the case study 
design and qualitative instruments is due to methodological, theoretical, ethical as 
well as practical considerations. The chapter furthermore detailed the data collection 
of documents and 71 interviews with stakeholders of the 11 cases of automotive 
MNEs engaging in CPAs.  
 
Analysis of the Similarities in CPAs across Environmental Regulations and Individual MNEs 120 
 
7 Analysis of the Similarities in CPAs across 
Environmental Regulations and Individual 
MNEs 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the general findings from the interviews in 
relation to the research questions – across the three areas of environmental 
regulations and across individual MNEs (cross-case analysis). The following 
research questions are addressed: 
 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs?  
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? and  
 RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in their 
CPAs?  
The subsequent chapter looks at the three areas of environmental regulations – Euro 
norms, CO2 emissions and ELVs – specifically as well as the individual MNEs, and 
their different countries of origin (within-case analysis) (RQs 4 and 5).  
A note regarding the use of language in the interview quotes is necessary at this 
point: as many interviewees are non-native speakers of English, some quotes are 
grammatically wrong. However, in order to preserve the original nature and 
authenticity of the spoken word, all quotes from the interviews have been left un-
edited (verbatim quotes) in terms of language and grammar. As triangulation is 
applied throughout (see previous chapter), the results are presented accordingly and 
interviewees are identified by the societal triangle and type of organisation, the codes 
of which can be looked up in the List of Abbreviations155.  
As a reminder for the reader, CPAs are defined as “any deliberate firm action 
intended to influence governmental policy or process” (Getz 1997: 32f), including any 
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activities that keep relations with governments on an ongoing basis as a pre-
condition for influence as well as including the distinctive aspect of communication.  
7.2 RQ1: Why do Firms Engage in CPAs? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the interviews started with the first research 
question of why firms or industries engage in relations with governments or – in this 
context – with the European institutions (IVQ1). The purpose of this question was to 
investigate what the motivational factors behind CPAs are, whether CPAs are 
endogenous or exogenous factors in corporate strategy. According to Boddewyn 
(1988: 357), non-market factors such as governmental institutions are taken as 
exogenous “givens” instead of being endogenised, and thus previous work may 
suffer from a “black box” economic bias. It was expected that the reasons why firms 
engage in CPAs would raise questions about the exogenous nature of governmental 
policies as external givens.  
The question was posed in an open manner (IVQ1: “What are the main motivational 
factors for your firm/association/for firms in the automotive industry to engage in 
government relations?”), which resulted in open answers and a more in-depth 
exploration than a question with pre-defined answers. It also allowed respondents to 
provide multiple replies. The results are presented according to the categories of the 
societal triangle (market, state, civil society) and by organisational type (companies, 
association, Commission, EP, NGOs), thereby triangulating responses.  
During the coding, key themes were drawn out and identified from the initial codes, 
and thus a smaller number of analytic units (than the individual codes) emerged 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). The following five key themes emerged in the data 
analysis process, each consisting of several individual sub-themes or codes, which 
will be discussed below: 
 Information and communication, which concern the need to be informed by 
policy-makers (passive aspect) and to inform policy-makers (active aspect), 
characterised by flows of information between policy-makers and firms, which 
includes relational aspects and therefore social capital.  
 Business interest, which states the impact of legislation on firms and the 
desire to influence legislation according to business interests as motivation to 
get involved in CPAs. 
Analysis of the Similarities in CPAs across Environmental Regulations and Individual MNEs 122 
 
 Predictability and fairness which stress the importance of ensuring feasibility 
and predictability for planning purposes as well as a level playing field for 
companies. 
 Avoiding, weakening or postponing legislation and “preventing the worst”. 
These are summarised as defensive motivators. 
 Positive motivators include elements such as working for the best solution, 
better regulation and being a good corporate citizen. 
The Market side 
The market side was interviewed through automotive companies (15 interviews – 
IVs), automotive industry associations (7 IVs) as well as companies (5 IVs) and 
industry associations (9 IVs) from related industries who were included to triangulate 
responses. 
Firstly, automotive companies are discussed. For these, the main motivation to 
engage in CPAs is to inform policy-makers and to be informed. While informing 
policy-makers is the active side of information and communication, being informed 
could be seen as the complementary passive side to it. The active side of this key 
theme includes codes such as the provision of expertise, information and data (being 
a source of information), the promotion and creation of understanding as well as the 
informing of consequences (EU1-A, EU3-A, EU3-B, EU6-A, US1-B, US2-B, JP1-A, 
JP2-A). The following quotes are indicative of this active side of information and 
communication: 
The decisive factor is always to transmit the factual information in the 
right form to the right person. We are trying to advise politics by good 
factual information. (EU3-B)  
(…) contribute expertise for legislation in the sector and beyond; 
information. (JP2-A) 
The overlap between the passive and active side can be seen that companies want 
to be informed in order to inform as in the following quote (see also EU2-A):  
Firstly you need to know, which scenarios to prepare for. Then, when 
you know it, then you have to point out what it could mean in 
consequence. (EU1-A)  
This quote also illustrates an overlap between information and communication and 
predictability and fairness as there is a desire to be informed for planning purposes 
(EU2-A, JP1-A, EU4-A). In the following quote, information and communication is 
also related to ensuring technical feasibility (see US2-B as well): 
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EU civil servants as well as particularly MEPs don‟t have the know-
how at all to fulfil certain regulations in their details, that means, to a 
certain extent they need us as well in order to pass a law in a 
reasonable way. So they need the technical input, our experts in 
order to polish legislation in the end; legislation which accordingly 
comprises technical opportunities, but also technically clean 
requirements. (US1-B) 
Although the literature discusses the influences and effects that government 
decisions and policies may have on business enterprises and their competitive 
environment as justification for CPAs (e.g. Keim and Hillman 2008), the business 
interest is much less observed in the actual responses given by automotive 
companies (though still more prevalent than predictability and fairness). It is a 
surprising result that the main motivation seems to be to inform policy-makers while 
the actual impact on the companies, the business case and interest, plays a lesser 
role. This raises question as to whether there is an element of social desirability (as 
in serving policy-makers by informing them) in these replies and whether the 
business case is taken for granted as a reason for lobbying. The elements or codes 
mentioned as part of this key theme include the business impact of legislation and 
the avoidance of cost (US2-A, EU1-B, EU5-B), safeguarding the economic 
framework, widening business options (EU3-B), impact on products and design, 
depending on product portfolio (JP1-A, EU1-A), staying competitive (US1-A) and 
protecting or advancing the business or interests of the company through influencing 
the policy-making process (JP2-A, US1-B, EU5-B, EU4-A). The following two quotes 
illustrate these: 
(…) political decisions definitely influence corporate operations and 
also investment decisions. And that‟s why one tries to influence these 
decisions as early as possible as adjustments afterwards are much 
more cost-intensive than trying to prevent it from the start. So cost 
avoidance through influencing certain decisions. (EU1-B)  
That‟s very clearly the business case: If we don‟t adhere to certain 
requirements in the area of environmental policy, then we‟re out of 
the market, we are no longer competitive, our products won‟t be 
bought anymore. (US1-A) 
The two themes that receive least attention by car manufacturers are the 
complementary factors of positive and defensive motivators. Only two interviewees 
mention positive reasons for engaging in CPAs: 
To be a good European corporate citizen: that is our working premise; 
it‟s also in our mission statement. (JP2-A)  
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(…) to support all the institutions to build up a technical dossier and to 
find out political solutions for the best for the industry, for the society, 
for the competitiveness and for the environment as well. (EU6-A) 
These two companies constitute a minority, which is also true for the three 
companies stressing defensive reasons for engaging in CPAs: 
(…) to prevent the worst. (EU1-A) 
I could maliciously say, we try to prevent the worst. (US2-B) 
To (…) defend the interest of the company. (EU4-A) 
The last quote also shows an overlap with the business case as motivation for CPAs, 
which, together with information and communication, is the main reason stated by 
automotive companies in the interviews to engage in CPAs. 
Automotive associations show a similar result with the emphasis on information 
and communication, albeit with a pronounced tendency towards the active side of 
this key theme, where typical responses are: 
In particular cases we bring up certain positions and supply technical 
information that is needed to draft the technical parts, e.g. test 
procedures. (AA1-B) 
(…) we need to promote understanding of the automobile industry for 
the European economy. (AA3)  
Unlike automotive companies, however, respondents from the associations stress 
predictability and fairness in terms of ensuring technical feasibility as much as 
information and communication as main motivation for automotive firms and 
associations to engage in CPAs: 
That creates a motivation of course, to communicate their uniqueness 
with respect to different characteristics, and perhaps also give as a 
result that they might have a very different view as to what is feasible 
and what is not feasible to comply with it. (AA1-D) 
In this respect, association respondents, more than corporate respondents, also 
stress harmonisation of standards (AA3) and the creation of a common playing field 
for manufacturers, which might be due to the nature of their activities as associations, 
trying to put across a unified industry view with regard to regulations: 
(…) to make sure that all of the manufacturers face a common 
playing field across the EU. (AA1-C) 
The business interest for companies to engage in CPAs feature prominently among 
association interviewees. This includes codes such as the dependence of CPAs on 
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product portfolios (AA1-A, AA1-D), influencing and remaining competitive (AA1-C), 
reducing costs (AA3) and protecting the products and the business (AA1-E) as 
motivation to engage in CPAs. 
As for corporate responses, positive and defensive motivators for CPAs can hardly 
be observed within association responses. Only one respondent points to attaining 
better regulation (AA1-D) as positive reason for engaging in CPAs, while two 
association representatives mention defensive reasons. The first respondent 
stresses the need to cope with the problems the industry is faced with, whilst the 
second points to engineers influencing the defensive nature of CPAs: 
One reason for that is (…) we are faced with the same problems. 
(AA3)  
It is rather seen defensively than perceived as a chance. It‟s often like 
that development engineers are saying, by all means keep it away 
from me; keep it at arm‟s length. (AA1-A) 
Interestingly, respondents from related industries do not mention defensive 
motivators as reasons to engage in CPAs. A possible explanation for this is that 
related industries are less in the limelight of policy-makers and observers than the 
automotive industry, which is a very visible industry (Rel9). Positive motivators are 
observed by one interviewee each (association and company): 
To act as a credible and trustful source. (Rel7) 
Then, it's hot air, but actually to enable the industry to make a 
contribution to society so it can be seen as doing so (it's linked to 
image), a sincere attempt to make a positive contribution. (Rel12) 
Stakeholders from related industries stress predictability and fairness and the 
business interest equally, although companies emphasise the former and 
associations the latter. The following examples are typical for responses in related 
industries, firstly for predictability and fairness where a level playing field and 
feasibility played a role for associations and companies: 
(…) a good regulatory environment so that your markets can be 
developed and done in the proper way, that there is no discrimination. 
(Rel6)  
(…) to make sure that the proposals become as realistic as possible. 
(Rel9)  
(…) to have a picture of what level of playing field we expect to act at. 
(Rel11) 
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Secondly, for the business case, associations mention the interests of companies 
(Rel1), the impact of legislation, profitability (Rel5), the development of business and 
markets as well as maintaining good conditions for the industry (Rel9) as reasons to 
engage in CPAs. For related companies, the protection of industry interests (Rel12) 
and the impact of legislation (Rel14) are observed. The following two quotes 
represent the business case for related industries: 
(…) that determines their profitability as well. (Rel5) 
There is a lot of legislation, which directly or indirectly refers to the 
automobile industry; this alone is already motivation and justification 
to engage in government relations. (Rel14) 
As with automotive companies and association, the most important motivational 
factor to engage in CPAs, as stated by related industries, by associations and firms, 
is information and communication, both to inform policy-makers and to be informed. 
Unlike the automotive industry, however, respondents in related industries also 
include elements of promoting and improving the image and reputation of the 
industry as motivational factors (Rel6, Rel8, Rel10, Rel12). These responses might 
be influenced by the less visible position of related industries compared to the 
automotive industry156:  
Of course we want to do something about the image or reputation of 
[the material] so that we can do business in a proper way. (Rel6) 
On a secondary level it's to improve the image of the industry and to 
maintain a dialogue with key stakeholders with government at every 
level. (Rel12) 
The second quote reveals a relational aspect of information and communication in 
addition to improving the image of the industry – to be in contact and in dialogue with 
governmental stakeholders:  
(…) our purpose is really to have those relationships (…) (Rel4) 
This motivation could be interpreted as building up social capital, especially in its 
bridging form, which was discussed in Ch. 2 as facilitating access to power, decision-
making and policy formulation (Serageldin and Grootaert 1999), which is crucial in 
CPAs.  
                                              
156
 PR and image reasons are mentioned by one automotive industry respondent (EU1-B); their 
response might however be influenced by the fact that they left the company to pursue research in 
global climate policies and protection. 
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To summarise, the main reason for respondents from the market side – across 
industries and organisational types – to engage in CPAs is information and 
communication, to inform policy-makers and to be informed, followed by the business 
case and predictability and fairness, while positive and defensive motivators play a 
rather negligible role. 
In triangulation, the responses of the market side differ markedly to the responses 
from the state side, i.e. the Commission and the EP, which are now discussed in 
turn. 
The State side  
Interviews from the state (EU) included respondents in the Commission (12 IVs) and 
the EP (13 IVs) plus one respondent who had experienced both sides as well as the 
Council side (Com13). As the Commission is normally the first point of contact in 
policy-making and therefore CPAs, Commission responses are discussed first. 
Unlike the market side responses, information and communication hardly feature as 
a key theme in how Commission respondents view the industry‟s motivation to 
engage in CPAs. One respondent mentions the active side of information and 
communication, to inform the Commission of what is at stake (Com9), the second 
mentions the passive side, to be informed (Com5), while the third brings in marketing 
reasons (Com2) which is related to the improvement of image as discussed for the 
market side above:  
And perhaps another reason is maybe for marketing reasons, they 
want to appear as proactive in certain fields like safety and 
environment, they will be seen as involved with policy-makers to say 
what we should do. (Com2) 
This could also be interpreted as a positive motivator, which is only mentioned once 
in the Commission as a reason for companies to engage in CPAs: 
(…) going beyond that, there are indeed individual companies, 
individual persons that also have a political vision, who want to 
contribute their ideas, who have a European vision, but I think, we 
shouldn‟t cherish an illusion here, the driving force is very clearly the 
economic interest. (Com10) 
This respondent acknowledges such positive reasons whilst also clearly being very 
realistic about the actual reason for CPAs, the economic interest or business interest 
that receives the heaviest emphasis for key themes among Commission 
respondents. This includes various elements, among them the cost factor – to save 
or reduce costs (Com2, Com11, Com3), the impact of legislation (Com1, Com4, 
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Com10) and the influence of political decisions according to interests and for a 
beneficial environment for industry (Com5, Com7, Com8). Representative of these 
responses are the following two quotes, typical for this key theme: 
The main reasons I see in the effort to create, foster, and maintain an 
environment that is beneficial for the industry. (Com7)  
Well, I think the motor industry, probably, of all industries, are one of 
the most affected by regulation at European level, especially now in 
the context of the fight against climate change. I think that will 
become even more and more the case. (Com1) 
The business case overlaps with defensive motivators, illustrated by the following 
quote: 
I think the main motivation is of course to influence political decisions 
in a way that they either benefit the corporation or burden it with as 
little cost as possible. (Com8) 
Whilst acknowledged by very few market side respondents, defensive motivators 
play a larger role within Commission respondents and are more emphasised than 
information and communication. Companies are seen as engaging in CPAs to avoid 
legislation (Com6) and to minimise the economic impact or postpone legislation 
(Com4), engaging in a defensive stance (Com4, Com12) – this is summed up by this 
respondent: 
My experience is, that the automotive industry, its sole purpose in 
engaging in discussions with regulators was to minimise the 
economic impact and there is, no, I never experienced any 
discussions with the automobile industry where it has been anything 
other than a damage limitation defensive posture. (Com4) 
The business case also overlaps with predictability and fairness as emphasised by 
the following respondent: 
Cost and predictability of planning new products, they are sort of 
related factors, really. But ultimately what we do results in higher 
costs and so that is obviously an important factor for the industry. 
(Com11) 
Predictability for planning purposes is related to regulatory certainty (Com2), while 
the other elements include the guarantee of a level playing field (Com12) and the 
harmonisation of standards (Com5) for companies to engage in CPAs in the eyes of 
Commission respondents. 
Among respondents from the European Parliament, which is the second point of 
contact for companies in CPAs, predictability and fairness in the form of a level 
playing field (competitive equality) as a motivational factor are only observed by two 
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members who were both involved in the CARS 21 process157 (MEP6, MEP7) and in 
the EP‟s Forum for the Automobile and Society (European Commission 2006b). 
Interestingly, one of them relates both an equal playing field and defensive 
motivators as being behind the motive of the business case for CPAs: 
The attempt of exerting influence is certainly the main motive. And I 
think driven by two motives behind it. One is partly to organise 
competitive equality and secondly of course is also to reduce 
regulatory density that goes against individual interests or to prevent 
regulation. (MEP7) 
Defensive motivators, similarly to the Commission, are more emphasised among 
MEPs than among market side respondents and include desires to keep costs down, 
to avoid legislation (MEP10), to weaken or postpone it (MEP1) or even to stop it 
(MEP12). Depending on the wording, the cost factor can be placed or interpreted as 
defensive motivators (MEP10) or as the business interest, which – unlike the other 
themes – is mentioned by every single EP respondent, and therefore seems to be 
the most important key theme among these respondents:   
(…) for motor vehicle manufacturers the legislative environment is a 
major strategic input into the business. And legislation represents a 
significant cost for them in terms of product development. (MEP3) 
While most EP respondents observe mixed motivational factors (i.e. more than one 
key theme), the business interest as sole reason is observed by five of the 13 EP 
respondents. Typical responses in this category are: 
The motivation is to enforce individual interests in political decisions. 
(…) A firm can be massively affected by a proposal. (...) For the 
companies it‟s about safeguarding favourable conditions for their 
corporate operations, costs accordingly. (MEP2)  
(…) they want to protect the interests of their business. (MEP11)  
Influence on legislation, of course. (…) I think that is the most 
decisive, it all comes to this in the end. (MEP4) 
Beyond influence, the cost factor and the impact of regulation (see also MEP6, 
MEP3, MEP13), the other responses for business case include elements and codes 
such as profitability and creating beneficial conditions for the industry (MEP1, MEP5).  
                                              
157
 CARS 21 stands for “A Competitive Automotive Regulatory System for the 21st century”, a report 
issued by the CARS 21 High Level Group. It was launched in 2005 and mandated to make 
recommendations for the “short, medium and the long-term public policy and regulatory framework” for 
the European car industry, integrating competitive, environmental, safety, employment and 
affordability aspects (European Commission 2006b: 2). The group consisted of key stakeholders in the 
automotive field: Commission, Member States, EP, Industry, Trade Unions, NGOs and Users (ibid.). 
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As with the Commission, only one positive motivator is mentioned, overlapping with 
the business interest: 
Whereas I think there are hopefully a growing number of enterprises 
and interest organisations who actually want to be part of the change 
and who also feel there is something to be gained in terms of 
business and new opportunities. (MEP12) 
Lastly, information and communication, as one of the five key themes, seems to have 
a more relational aspect among EP respondents, in addition to the already 
mentioned elements of being informed and to inform policy-makers (MEP13, MEP8, 
MEP9, MEP12). The following quotes illustrate this relational aspect (emphasis 
added, SMW): 
In order to accompany legislative procedures. (MEP8)  
I think the main motivational factors are to participate in the drafting of 
policy/policy-making or to influence it (…). (Com13158) 
I think that it is the policy makers after all who are going to change the 
law and make emissions tougher, or safety conditions tougher, or 
whatever, and it is in the interests of the manufacturers therefore to 
stay in touch with policy makers and to try and, well frankly, to 
influence them. Or at least educate them about the reality of car 
manufacturing. (MEP9) 
Whilst acknowledging the business case as reason to engage in CPAs, the third 
respondent heavily stresses the relational aspect later in the interview: 
In the essence of good public affairs and the essence of good 
lobbying is to know their client long before there is something to lobby 
them about. So the contacts have got to be there. You shouldn‟t be 
making the contacts once you have a proposal for the commission, 
you should already have the contacts and be able to use them. 
(MEP9) 
It can therefore be said that the building up of social capital is an important reason 
why firms engage in CPAs, in order to be then able to influence policy-makers based 
on the business case. It is the bridging form of social capital as the contacts are built 
up between members of different groups (Putnam 2000, Grix 2002). 
To summarise, respondents from the state side (Commission and EP) see the 
business interest as the main reason for companies to engage in CPAs, to engage in 
relations with policy-makers. 
                                              
158
 Please note this respondent has worked for both the Commission and the Parliament. 
Analysis of the Similarities in CPAs across Environmental Regulations and Individual MNEs 131 
 
The Civil Society side 
Lastly, interviews were also triangulated with respondents from the civil society side, 
which is now discussed. This included seven interviews with environmental NGOs 
and one interview with a consumer organisation159. As could almost be expected 
from this side of stakeholders, no positive motivators are identified and only the 
respondent from the consumer organisation acknowledges the desire to be informed 
within information and communication as a reason for companies to engage in CPAs 
(NGO6). Two respondents recognise the creation of a level playing field (NGO1-A) 
and the provision of clarity and certainty (NGO1-B) and therefore predictability and 
fairness as motivational factors. The business interest is more prevalent in the civil 
society responses where the extension of business strategy and the creation of 
market opportunities are mentioned (NGO1-A) in addition to influencing legislation as 
mentioned by other stakeholders above (NGO3, NGO5, NGO6), where a typical 
response is: 
If you can‟t prevent it, then to influence it according to your own 
interest, to optimise it. (NGO3) 
Here the business interest overlaps with defensive motivators, which, 
overwhelmingly, the majority of civil society respondents (six out of eight) refer to as 
main reasons for automotive companies to engage in CPAs. Given that the 
relationship between the market side and the civil society is often portrayed as 
antagonistic, this should not come as a surprise. Companies are perceived to engage 
in CPAs with a defensive posture in principle (NGO2-B), for which the following 
respondent uses the strongest language: 
“To keep those damned politicians off our backs”, this motivates most 
political action. (…) The main motivation is keeping off everything. 
(NGO1-A) 
A more elaborate example of this key theme is provided by the following respondent: 
I would say, controlling the regulatory output. With other words, to try 
that the state intervenes in market processes as little as possible. So 
that the autonomy of producers is held up as much as possible and of 
course that costly measures are avoided. (NGO4) 
Other elements and codes of this key theme of defensive motivators have been 
mentioned above already, such as preventing or avoiding legislation and avoiding or 
minimising costs (NGO2-A, NGO3, NGO1-B), exemplified by the following quote: 
                                              
159
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, while trade unions as a civil society stakeholder of the 
automotive industry were contacted, they did not reply to any contact attempts by this author. 
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(…) to minimise costs, to minimise the requirement for future 
investment, to allow from an industry perspective a free hand as to 
what their financial resources can be invested in, what part of the 
product their investments can go towards. (NGO1-B) 
To summarise, respondents from the civil society side (environmental NGOs, 
consumer organisation) see defensive motivators as main reasons for firms to 
engage in CPAs. 
Summary 
How do these findings for the first research question – why do companies engage in 
CPAs? – according to category and organisational type relate to previous studies? 
Compared with the literature on CPAs of MNEs (Ch. 2), the findings relate as follows: 
Yoffie (1987) stresses high strategic salience of an issue as a reason for companies 
to become politically active. Baysinger (1984) also cites the attainment of public 
policy results favourable to the firm‟s success as the overall objective of CPA. This 
clearly relates to the findings of the business interest as main reason for companies 
to engage in CPAs (see also Keim and Hillman 2008). 
Gale and Buchholz (1987) distinguish between two goals of corporate involvement in 
the political process – pursuit of legitimacy and pursuit of competitive advantage. 
Looking at the findings, the pursuit of legitimacy only emerges in the key theme of 
positive motivators whereas competitive advantage is strongly linked to the business 
interest as a motivation for companies‟ political activities, as well as to the key theme 
of defensive motivators. What Gale and Buchholz (1987) term competitive advantage 
is in line with what Baysinger (1984) terms public policy results favourable to the 
success of an organisation. What the findings add to the literature is the motivation to 
inform and communicate with policy-makers as well as to be informed – the key 
theme of information and communication. Furthermore, the desire for predictability 
and fairness are added to this typology of reasons for engaging in CPAs. 
The findings support the proposition that government policies are not seen as 
exogenous factors by firms, but that government relations and policies are indeed an 
endogenous factor, and thus an important part or even extension of strategy as one 
respondent put it (NGO1-A) that firms can indeed influence. This corroboration of 
government as endogenous factor for companies is an important theoretical 
contribution in the RBV, which takes government policies as exogenous givens. 
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The following table summarises the discussion on RQ1. There are five overarching 
factors as key themes why MNEs engage in relations with policy-makers, each 
consisting of underlying factors as discussed above.  
Table 7.1: Key themes in the discussion on RQ1 – why do firms engage in CPAs? 
Information & 
Communication 
Business Interest Predictability & 
Fairness 
Positive 
motivators 
Negative motivators 
To promote/ create 
understanding 
To be informed 
To provide 
information/ 
expertise 
To inform of impact/ 
consequences 
Image & PR 
reasons 
To be in contact/ 
dialogue/ 
relationship with 
institutions 
To improve image 
of industry  
To accompany 
legislation 
To communicate 
uniqueness 
To influence the 
process/legislation 
Product portfolio 
Business impact of 
legislation 
To reduce/ avoid costs (cost 
factor) 
To safeguard economic 
framework 
To widen business options/ 
access to markets 
To protect business 
To remain competitive  
To work for company 
interests 
Profitability 
To create beneficial 
conditions 
Keep business as usual 
Extension of business 
strategy  
Predictability 
Planning 
purposes 
To adapt 
To ensure 
(technical) 
feasibility 
To harmonise 
(global) 
standards 
To ensure a 
common/level 
playing field 
Regulatory 
certainty 
To provide clarity 
 
Be a good 
corporate 
citizen 
To support 
policy-makers 
To work for 
best solution 
Better 
regulation 
To make 
positive 
contribution to 
society 
European 
vision 
Prevent the worst 
To cope with problems 
industry is faced with 
To prevent, avoid or 
stop legislation 
To minimise economic 
impact 
Defensive damage 
limitation 
Postpone or weaken or 
reduce standards/ 
legislation 
To avoid or keep down 
costs 
To keep politicians 
away 
To keep state away 
from market processes 
Defensive position or 
stance (in principle) 
Appendix B visualises this table with the codes and subordinate elements making up 
the five key themes.  
7.3  RQ2: How do Companies Organise and Approach CPAs? 
7.3.1 Organisation of CPAs 
It is an emerging science, an emerging profession. (US2-A) 
The organisation of CPAs is internal to firms and therefore the discussion relies on 
market side responses for the first part of RQ2 (IVQ2): How do companies organise 
CPAs?  
As public affairs is in most cases a growing function (Althaus et al. 2005, US2-A, 
EU3-B), its organisation varies across the cases. As such, the public affairs or CPAs 
role is not yet an established corporate function as for example purchasing, 
marketing or R&D. Both the name of the function as well as the label of the Brussels 
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office and the titles of the responsible executives vary widely among the 11 cases 
investigated160 as illustrated in the table below with regard to the name of the function 
and the Brussels office: 
Table 7.2: Name of CPAs function in case companies  
Case Firm Name of Function Brussels office 
EU1 Communication and Policy (for corporate interest 
representation) and Corporate Planning (for association 
work) 
Brussels group office 
EU2 External Affairs and Public Policy (separate from public 
relations/global communications) 
Representative office for 
European Affairs 
EU3 External Relations  Liaison Office to EU 
EU4 Institutional Relations/European Relations  EU Delegation 
EU5 European Affairs/Public Affairs Representation to the 
European Institutions 
EU6 Institutional Relations and Environment  EU6 Delegation to Europe 
US1 Communications and Public Affairs (separate from 
Legal, Governmental and Environmental Affairs, 
distinction grown historically, used to be one area) 
EU Affairs 
US2 Public Policy (grown historically, connections with legal 
affairs, communications, engineering/type approval; 
growing function) 
International Regulations 
Europe c/o US2 
Coordination Center 
JP1 Governmental Relations – Regulations  Aalst Office 
JP2 Government Affairs – part of External Affairs (Corporate 
Affairs also part of it) 
JP2 Motor Europe – Head 
Office 
JP3 Legal & External Affairs / 
Sources: Interviews, and company websites  
Depending on the case company, the function has internal hierarchical connections 
to corporate communications, corporate planning, legal affairs, environmental affairs, 
external or regulatory affairs. Consequently, there are also differences as to how 
activities are coordinated within the company – several interviewees point out the 
difficulties in highlighting the importance of their role within their companies: it is a 
struggle for representatives in Brussels to communicate the significance of their work 
in-house to their companies as there is often little understanding of the political 
environment and its importance within companies161. This is exemplified by the 
following two quotes: 
[H]ow do I communicate to my company what we have done here in 
terms of lobbying. That‟s also not measurable, because the fewest 
people at [US2-sub1] in A [Germany] or at [US2] in B [Switzerland] 
know what we‟re doing here. That‟s very difficult to communicate. 
(US2-B) 
                                              
160
 As the literature has clearly defined CPAs (see Ch. 1 and 2), respondents were not asked what 
CPAs are. However, this table and the varied names for the function could throw up questions 
whether companies demonstrate different understandings of CPAs.  
161
 Michalowitz (2004) highlights that lobbyists provide both internal and external lobbying, which 
means that they represent their firm in Brussels and represent Brussels in their firm. 
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(…) the internal activities of lobbyists are decisive, 60% of your time 
you have to use for internal activities of coordination for the rather 
factual technical information you have from in-house and to make 
positions politically usable; that is indeed a task. (EU3-B) 
This is also confirmed by association respondents, where especially the second 
respondent bemoans the lack of responsibility given to corporate representatives in 
Brussels by their companies:  
The decisions are made in headquarters and these are not always 
realistic positions. There is the pressure of headquarters on offices in 
Brussels, you can notice it here, they are complaining here. (AA1-E)  
I wish that it would play a larger role in their strategy. (…) I (…) think it 
would be good if the people in Brussels, the lobbyists, would sit on 
the board as well, so that they are high up in the hierarchy. Then they 
wouldn‟t be so careful in negotiations, but more decisive, not so risk-
averse, you can compare it with a divisional director/manager who 
can‟t necessarily take decisions, has no responsibility, they then can‟t 
simply co-decide. It would make things easier. (AA1-A) 
Interestingly, a state side and a civil society respondent also acknowledge this 
tension between Brussels representative offices and headquarters: 
I think for corporate headquarters it is very upsetting that there is a 
parliament and a legislator, who don‟t know anything about how an 
automotive market works. I think this is also not very easy for the 
representatives here in Brussels to communicate to headquarters, 
how, hm, it‟s not a governmental machinery, but how the whole thing 
works here, the European institutions. (MEP6)  
The people who work here show that top management has little 
interest for it. (NGO1-A) 
Thus, questions need to be raised about the integration and organisation of market 
and non-market strategies within companies. This has been suggested by Baron 
(1995) and Boddewyn (2003) as worthwhile research and could provide an 
interesting and important avenue for potential future research to investigate to what 
extent the role of CPAs is acknowledged within the firm beyond the handful of people 
active on the ground in Brussels and in how far it is integrated and organised into the 
overall strategy and structure of firms. This field is certainly an area where public 
information is not easily available (e.g. on corporate websites), and therefore 
encourages further research. This could possibly be due to the fact that „lobbying‟ 
has rather negative connotations in some European languages (see Ch. 2) and 
therefore companies are reluctant to put out information, and that it is rather new and 
growing function (see above). One respondent actually encouraged research on how 
CPAs are organised (EU3-B). 
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For the American companies (US1, US2 and, until 2007, partly EU2), the European 
subsidiaries are organised and work independently from headquarters in their public 
affairs work. Although both US1 and US2 respondents point out their use of the 
American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham, US2-A, US1-B) and dialogue with their 
US headquarters (US1-B, US1-A), they see themselves (US2-B, US1-B) and are 
seen by other respondents as distinctly European and independent subsidiaries of 
their American parents (MEP3, NGO1-B).  
Among the Japanese companies, there is an interesting feature with JP1 operating 
under strong central coordination with the office in Aalst, Belgium, directly reporting 
to the head office in Japan (JP1-A), whereas the government affairs function of JP2 
does not seem to have this link with headquarters in Japan (JP2-A). JP2 Motor 
Europe (JP2-ME) is very much an independent European subsidiary and, as the 
headquarters of JP2-ME is in Brussels, it is the only automotive government relations 
function in Brussels directly operated from a regional headquarters and therefore 
rather unique (JP2-A). The third big Japanese company, JP3, is partly owned (44%) 
by EU5162, but this is not evident in the organisation of its public affairs function which 
was virtually non-existent at the time of the data collection (JP1-A, MEP5). 
Among the European companies, the picture varies as well. EU4, EU5 and EU6, the 
three non-German (i.e. Latin) European companies, display strong central 
coordination in their institutional relations. EU6‟s work is centrally coordinated from 
the head office whereas for EU5, staff of the Brussels office commute frequently to 
Paris, often several times during a week (EU6-A, EU5-A, EU5-B), and EU4 has so-
called “pilots” for the most important issues in its headquarters (EU4-A). Similarly, 
EU1‟s activities in Brussels are also heavily influenced by headquarters where the 
head of the office is for coordination meetings every Monday (EU1-A). EU2‟s 
coordination with headquarters (Germany and US) seems to be rather on an ad hoc 
basis (EU2-A). Similarly, EU3 coordinates its CPAs with headquarters and other 
offices depending on the issue (EU3-B).  
Another aspect of the organisation of CPAs is that all corporate representative offices 
in Brussels work together with their respective association (ACEA for the European 
companies and American subsidiaries, JAMA for the Japanese firms). The CPAs of 
the individual firms are coordinated via the association (AA1-A, EU1-A) unless the 
companies have different positions concerning technologies (EU1-B) and therefore 
                                              
162
 At the same time, JP3 holds 15% of EU5‟s shares (source: JP3‟s corporate website). 
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the relationship between those two types of activities (RQ3 on individual and industry 
CPAs) will be investigated in section 7.4. 
7.3.2 Approach to CPAs 
The second part of RQ2 regarding the approach of companies and the industry in 
CPAs formed part of the revised interview schedule after the first stage of interviews  
(IVQ3). Within the automotive industry, 11 of the 14 respondents from companies 
responded to the question, hence the discussion is industry-level based rather than 
company-based, as in the next chapter on the case companies.  
Initially, this was an open question (IVQ3: “What is your company‟s/the industry‟s 
approach to business-government relations? How would you describe the 
approach?”). Prompts that were then given to interviewees from all societal triangle 
sides included the terms interactive-cooperative, confrontational-defensive, reactive 
and proactive (based on e.g. Luo 2001, Mahon 1989, Blumentritt and Nigh 2002, 
Hillman et al. 2004, Hillman and Hitt 1999, see also Ch. 2). 
The Market side  
Respondents from the automotive companies point out that the approach to CPAs 
depends on the area or topic: 
It‟s not a general policy, it depends on the issue, sometimes we can 
be very proactive, sometimes on other topics, we have to be reactive. 
(EU5-B) 
It depends on the topic but in general we are kind of in between. 
(JP1-A)  
That‟s an interesting question and I think you need to differentiate. 
(…) But I really think that depends a bit on the areas. (EU1-B) 
This therefore leads to a range of approaches (EU3-B), confrontational or 
cooperative, proactive or reactive, according to the legislative issue being discussed. 
Several respondents emphasise that their goal was an interactive, cooperative 
approach (US2-B, EU3-B), avoiding a negative approach or attitude of blockade 
(JP1-A, US1-B), in the realisation that such an approach would not be helpful (US2-
B): 
My goal is definitely the first, interactive. With confrontation you can‟t 
succeed in Brussels. (EU2-A) 
At the same time, it is acknowledged that  
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There is a difference between the theory and the practice. (EU4-A) 
There are, therefore, instances where the industry and individual firms approach 
CPAs in a confrontational or reactive way (EU1-B, EU5-B). Two respondents point to 
the issue of timing determining the approach; one refers to the dynamics of the policy 
process (EU1-B) while the other points to a change over time in CPAs with a history 
of an attitude of blockade for the automotive industry regarding legislation (US1-B).  
This historic change from a reactive to a more proactive and positive approach is 
confirmed by a respondent in the automotive associations who also points to 
efforts to “balance non-cooperative aspects with cooperation” within the industry‟s 
CPAs (AA1-C). Another interviewee observes an active, involved and quite 
cooperative stance of the industry (AA1-D). Similarly to corporate respondents, the 
aim is seen in being cooperative (AA2, AA3), whilst it is also observed that there are 
exceptions to cooperation (AA2) which means that the approach is not always 
proactive or cooperative (AA1-E, AA1-C): 
So all of those sorts of activities go all together in promoting the 
industry and giving a forum or a platform for the industry to express 
its views, to lobby, but also to have a more friendly intercourse with 
people as well. So it is not always a stand-off position, at least, you 
know, our Secretary General may have to take very hard positions 
against Verheugen in meetings (…). We understand that it is not all 
confrontational, that it is commercial; it is a commercial business so 
there has to be some element of confrontation. (AA1-C) 
This is the case where firms are defensive (AA1-E) – one respondent even calls the 
majority of firms defensive (AA1-A). 
Whilst automotive respondents – whether from firms or associations – acknowledge 
instances of negative behaviour, in general they veer towards more positive 
descriptions of the approach taken. From the triangulating perspective of 
respondents in related industries the automotive industry‟s approach to CPAs is 
perceived rather differently across the board of associations and companies. Only 
three respondents observe that the automotive industry is proactive in organising 
stakeholder events (Rel7), more proactive than other industries (Rel8) and stronger 
than the suppliers (Rel14). Whilst this last element is value-neutral, other 
respondents are less reserved when comparing the approach of the automotive 
industry with their own industries, calling the automotive industry dictatorial with their 
suppliers in its CPAs (Rel11), demanding (Rel2) and dominating stakeholder events 
(Rel9). Furthermore, the automotive industry is perceived to be not very cooperative 
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(Rel4), negative and aggressive (Rel5, Rel13), reactive (Rel6, Rel7, Rel12) and 
“much more violent, stronger, passionate” (Rel10). 
Only two respondents in the related industries acknowledge that a cooperative 
approach is more effective in general (Rel5) or that lobbying is not possible if only a 
defensive approach is taken (Rel14). The latter also states that it depends on the 
topic (Rel14), in line with automotive respondents (see above). 
The discrepancy between responses from the automotive industry and related 
industries raises the question whether the former give socially desirable answers, 
trying to put the industry in a more positive light – a point which is also raised with 
regard to RQ1 (see above). The key themes on the market side for the approach to 
CPAs are, on one hand, the dependence on topics and times and an aim to be 
cooperative whilst acknowledging confrontational examples in the automotive 
industry and, on the other hand, a more negative approach in addition to cooperative 
instances as seen by respondents in related industries. 
The rather negative view on the automotive industry‟s approach by related industries  
is possibly mirrored in the reputation the industry has in Brussels in general:  
(…) in general their reputation in Brussels is not so very good. (Rel6) 
 (…) the image of the automotive industry is in large circles here in 
Brussels a negative one. (US1-B)  
There is a general perception to regulate cars even if with a more 
rational or scientific approach it would be to achieve it with other 
sectors. This is an inherent disadvantage for the car industry. 
Everybody sees traffic jams, thinks „bloody cars‟, we need to regulate 
them. (US2-A) 
In some circles there is a negative conception of the automobile 
sector in general. (AA1-E) 
This is also confirmed by members of related industry associations with regard to 
how the state side views the industry: 
The DG Environment is against the industry, especially the 
automotive industry. (Rel3) 
 (…) they get quite a bit of a strong headwind from some MEPs or 
from some Commission people. So I don‟t think they have an easy 
stand. (Rel8) 
With this in mind, the state side‟s perspectives on the industry‟s approach to CPAs 
are now discussed. 
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The State side 
As DG Environment is pointed out as being against the automotive industry, it is 
discussed first, among the Commission respondents. Whilst the industry might 
perceive the Commission to be against it, the industry itself is also viewed as 
confrontational by state side respondents in the Commission, particularly DG 
Environment, where typical responses by policy officers, who have been dealing 
directly with the industry and its companies, are: 
When my colleagues and I were preparing the end-of-life vehicles 
directive, the attitude of the European association was defensive-
confrontational and reactive, very clearly. (Com7)  
What we received from the association was first of all a universal 
rejection without substance, that is damaging the association, if it is 
only saying no, then this position is not meant seriously, is not taken 
seriously. With the dossier of climate change the political pressure is 
so strong, so great, that they will do it without this stakeholder. 
Stakeholders are always best off when they have a substantial idea, 
because something is going to happen anyway. In the association the 
members have contrary interests and then the association can‟t 
produce a substantial position. (Com3) 
The last quote already points to the task of the industry to present a unified view – a 
difficult task for an industry association when individual member companies have 
conflicting interests. This will be investigated in the next section on the relationship 
between industry and individual CPAs (RQ3). In general, respondents from DG 
Environment who have experienced automotive CPAs in the past and the present 
view the approach as aggressive (Com3), defensive (Com3, Com4, Com7), negative 
(Com4, Com6), reactive (Com4, Com8), confrontational (Com4, Com7), and even 
violent (Com6). One respondent from DG environment offers a more balanced view 
in stating: 
It depends very much from company to company and issue to issue. 
(Com5) 
He also points out, however, that the sector as a whole is more reactive than 
proactive. This respondent has, unlike the previous ones, been less directly involved, 
which could explain his more balanced views. Similarly, one respondent from DG 
Enterprise observes that the industry was defensive at times, not proactive and 
rejecting at points while also stating that it is cooperative at times (Com12). The other 
respondents from DG Enterprise perceive the industry‟s approach to CPAs as 
cooperative (Com9) and one of confidence- and consensus-building since 
confrontation closes doors and stops the information flow (Com10), or point out that it 
is not generalisable as observed by the following interviewee: 
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I don‟t think you can generalise because I think in certain cases it is 
cooperative and in others it‟s not so interactive. It depends on the 
issue; it depends how you approach the subject in terms of what you 
are doing and what sort of consultation processes you set in place. I 
suppose it also depends on the nature of the specific interest of 
different OEMs on certain issues as to the reactions you get. (Com11) 
It is, however, also acknowledged that the approach could be confrontational or not 
cooperative at times (Com10, Com11). An interesting observation is offered by the 
only respondent from DG Employment on the approach of the automotive industry 
and industry in general: 
Well I mean the rule of the game here in Brussels is rather 
straightforward, you remain dormant, you monitor issues, without 
making too much activities, you just organise events to make yourself 
known, to establish contact with people, I would say in peaceful time, 
in peace time when there is no legislation on the horizon. Then when 
there is legislation on the horizon and you move into war time it 
means that all the nice contacts you have established with people, all 
the links that you have created, all the information you have provided, 
all this can become useful in the context of legislation that comes and 
may not be the type of legislation that you would agree with, and you 
would try to alter or change you know, how can I say that attenuate. 
So in certain ways this is the way lobbyists operate in Brussels and 
the automotive industry here is no different. (Com1) 
He also points out that the perception of the automotive industry depends on the DG, 
which seems to confirm the observations above, that the DGs differ in how they view 
the industry. The respondent that has worked for all three state sides (Commission, 
Council, and Parliament) observes that it depends on the respective situation but that 
in general he has found the industry to be cooperative and proactive in its approach 
to CPAs (Com13). 
In the European Parliament, one respondent observes the dependence of the 
approach on persons and structures (MEP7), while two others observe good and bad 
examples (MEP6) and a mix of approaches (MEP12). Whilst the latter is a member of 
the Green group within the EP, the other Green MEP points to an experienced 
approach by the industry (MEP11). This is echoed by the liberal MEP who observes 
a professional approach (MEP13). Respondents from the social democrats (Labour) 
tend to remark a rather confrontational (MEP8), defensive (MEP9) or even clumsy 
(MEP8) approach as exemplified in the following two quotes:  
I think sadly they were reactive rather than proactive. (MEP9)  
Well, not charming and elegant, but rather like woodcarving or 
woodcutting. (…) Well, certainly from the approach it was rather 
confrontational. That is very clear (…) (MEP7) 
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At the same time, these two respondents point out a change over time in the 
approach used by the industry from confrontation to more cooperative and proactive 
(MEP7) and to less reactive (MEP9): 
Yes, definitely, I think you can clearly see it, which is certainly also 
due to the experience they got, that proceeding purely in 
confrontational manner is not very promising. And in this respect a 
proactive approach is more beneficial, and a change has taken place. 
(MEP7) 
This change over time is also confirmed by two of the conservative respondents who 
have both observed a learning process within the industry from reactive and negative 
in the past to more constructive now (MEP3) and from defensive at first to more 
cooperative later (MEP4). The other conservative respondent reflects the last quote 
in observing that, in general, confrontation is not successful, but still has found that 
the industry tends to be reactive and defensive (MEP5).  
The key themes on the state side regarding the industry‟s approach to CPAs are the 
dependence on the topic, instances of both cooperative and defensive behaviour, a 
change over time but also generally a reactive approach.  
Whilst the latter key theme could have been expected from civil society respondents 
based on the findings on RQ1 (motivational factors), this is not the case. 
The Civil Society side 
Like respondents from the market and state side, three of the six civil society 
respondents who remark on the industry‟s approach to CPAs stress that it depends 
on the time, the topic or the situation (NGO1-B, NGO4, NGO5). A typical response 
here is: 
It‟s not either-or; it‟s a hybrid, depending on phase and topic. (NGO4) 
This respondent mentions both proactive and defensive examples of the industry‟s 
approach, but concedes that in general the industry is in a defensive corner as it has 
not succeeded “in controlling the political process according to its terms” (NGO4). 
Similarly, the respondent pointing out the dependence on time also observes that the 
approach taken by the association is negative (NGO1-B), therefore offering a more 
balanced view than the two respondents who see the approach as only defensive 
(NGO1-A, NGO3) and negative: 
(…) it acted certainly very aggressively back then. (…) so 
cooperative, no, you can‟t really say that. (NGO3) 
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A different observation is made by the respondent from a consumer organisation who 
states that the industry‟s approach is interactive-cooperative (NGO6).  
The key themes for civil society responses are again the dependence on the topic or 
time and a defensive approach. 
Summary 
Summarising this second part of RQ2, the approach to CPAs taken by the 
automotive sector and its individual companies, as viewed by respondents from 
industry, state and civil society, cannot be simply categorised as cooperative or 
confrontational, proactive or reactive, as there are different perceptions between 
respondents and as the approach depends on various factors such as: 
 The topic and issue being debated, 
 The individual firms and the association, 
 The timing and stage of legislation (policy process), 
 The timeframe (development of automotive CPAs over time). 
It is therefore not possible to classify CPAs as either conflictual or cooperative as 
proposed by Luo (2001, see also Mahon 1989), but they are a complex function for 
MNEs which vary in nature from collaborative and divergent, as Blumentritt and Nigh 
(2002) emphasise. The either/or distinction in the literature might be influenced by 
the American perspective on CPAs where interest representation tends to be more 
conflictual and bipartisan as a respondent confirms who worked in his company‟s 
Washington office before working for the Brussels office (EU2-B). 
In this section, it already emerged that there might be differences between individual 
firms and the industry association for CPAs where, for some respondents, firms are 
“leaving the dirty work to the association” (EU3-B), and observe the association to 
engage in “much more aggressive lobbying in general” as “it has to justify its 
existence” (Com3). The relationship between individual firm and industry CPAs is 
discussed in the next section on RQ3.  
7.4 RQ3: The Relationship between Firm and Industry CPAs 
All is fair in love, war and business as they say. (MEP5) 
It already emerged in the discussions on RQ1 and RQ2 that the relationship between 
individual CPAs through corporate representative offices and industry CPAs through 
the association(s) should be further investigated. This section therefore addresses 
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RQ3 (IVQ4): What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? Three key themes emerged from the 
responses: 
 Complementarities and cooperation between the association and individual 
firms, which leads the industry to speak with a common voice. 
 Difficulties and challenges for the association which lead to individual CPAs by 
firms, due to different interests, technologies and product portfolios resulting in 
lowest common denominator positions in the association. 
 Communication channels where it is observed that the association mainly 
talks to the Commission while companies talk to MEPs. 
These are now discussed according to the societal triangle and organisational type.  
The Market side 
Among respondents from the automotive companies, the three key themes 
emerged as follows. The first key theme revolves around coordination and 
cooperation between the companies and the association (EU3-A, US1-B) through 
meetings (EU4-A, EU1-A), where a common position is sought (US1-A, EU6-A) 
leading to a heavier weight of a unified industry voice (EU1-B, EU5-B), necessary for 
success (EU1-A), and where companies and association complement each other 
(JP1-A, EU2-A) and do not compete (EU6-A, JP1-A, US1-B) in their interest 
representation. The following two quotes are typical responses for this key theme of 
cooperation and complementarity: 
Coordination is strongly via ACEA. (…) we can only achieve 
something if we have a unified position. (EU1-A) 
(…) it‟s the case that every association has an advantage that when it 
agrees it can speak with the whole force of the industry. But where it 
doesn‟t agree for many reasons, then it can‟t speak. And that‟s our 
market then, we have to voice ourselves and we have to engage 
there. (EU3-B) 
This latter quote, while in its first part illustrating the first key theme, introduces the 
second key theme in the second part. This key theme revolves around problems in 
the association leading to difficulties and challenges (EU6-A, EU2-A) when there is 
no agreement (US1-B, EU3-B), only a lowest common denominator agreement 
(EU3-A, US1-A) and no common strategy possible (EU1-B) which then leads to 
individual CPAs where firms and the association compete (EU3-B) with each other. 
Individual CPAs are due to differences between companies (EU5-B, EU1-B), 
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regarding their understanding of issues (JP1-A), interests (US2-B) and technologies 
(EU1-B, EU2-A, US1-B). Furthermore, competitive issues cannot be discussed in the 
association (US1-B, EU2-A), the companies want to assess legislation and 
information independently (EU2-A) and can explain the impact of legislation more 
directly (US2-B). This key theme of individual CPAs when the association is not able 
to find a common voice is exemplified by the following: 
And then of course there is the case that within ACEA there isn‟t unity 
on a position. And in this case it‟s the more important to have 
representatives of your own company because then you have to visit 
the colleagues and then you have to lobby for the case of your own 
company. (…) It‟s just the case that certain issues are very close or 
have a clear influence on the competition on the market and then of 
course the unity comes to an end because firms of course have 
different strategies what kind of technologies they want to bring to the 
market at what time and then, when competition is guiding the 
political discussion then it‟s often the case that there is no agreement 
and then it always becomes difficult in politics because then 
politicians hear one thing from French manufacturers and another 
thing from German manufacturers and then the confusion is perfect of 
course and it‟s always a bit difficult. (US1-B) 
Three respondents actually put numbers on the degree of difference and 
commonality within the industry, stating “90% same interests” (US2-B), “80% one 
opinion” (US1-B) and “95-98% one opinion for the Euro norms” (EU2-A). It is the 
regulatory areas that are emphasised as areas of differences (EU4-A, US1-B) and 
therefore these differences will be explored in the next chapter on the basis of RQ5. 
Two respondents acknowledge ad hoc cooperation or alliances when a smaller 
number of companies agree on specific topics (EU5-B, US2-B) rather than the whole 
association (which is still acknowledged as priority). The following provides an 
adequate account of the relationship between individual, alliance and association 
CPAs: 
So the association is key here, and it‟s really an important partner for 
the institutions on all car industry related issues. Then of course, we 
have also sub-groups because we share interests with for instance, 
with what we call the Latin car manufacturers, so [EU6] and [EU4], 
sometimes [EU3] also and [US2], so we have some sub-groups, you 
know, to push our interests, because it is very hard to go alone, one 
company to the institutions. We always have interest to go as much 
altogether as we can, but if not possible, we constitute, we build 
dedicated alliances for one issue or the other. (…) we build ad hoc 
dedicated groups to put pressure on the institutions depending on our 
common interests. That‟s very important also to build common 
interest sub-groups. (EU5-B) 
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The third key theme is on communication channels where it is found that companies 
tend to talk to MEPs (EU1-A, EU1-B, EU2-A, EU4-A, EU6-A) while the association 
talks to the Commission (EU1-B, EU3-B) as the Commission wants one voice from 
the industry (EU2-A), particularly DG Environment (EU3-B). 
When triangulated, respondents within the automotive association observe the 
following. They also emphasise a similar first key theme around complementarity 
between firm and association activities (AA1-A, AA1-B, AA2), with no competition 
(AA1-C) but a division of labour (AA1-B, AA1-C) and coordination between them 
(AA2, AA1-E, AA3) where the company representatives support the association 
(AA1-C) to agree on a position within the association (AA1-A) as it is better to lobby 
with one voice (AA1-C), which is often the case (AA1-D). The reason is that the 
Commission wants one voice, which is stressed more among association 
respondents (AA1-A, AA1-C) as an important element of the third key theme of 
communication channels than among company respondents. Here it is also stated – 
as above – that the association talks to the Commission (AA1-D, AA3) and that it is 
the dialogue partner of politics (AA1-E). Complementarily, the companies speak to 
MEPs (AA1-C, AA1-D, AA1-E). The connection between the member state level and 
companies is confirmed by the association respondent who had previously worked 
for a national government, stating that companies talk to council members (AA1-C). 
These results corroborate the findings of this communication key theme as stated by 
company respondents. Interestingly, two association respondents acknowledge 
contacts to the Commission by some firms (AA1-A, AA1-D). The following quote 
illustrates all three key themes by acknowledging the importance of one voice for the 
industry as it is wanted by the Commission and as otherwise, individual CPAs would 
result for certain regulatory areas: 
On a lot of areas, for example on CO2, it is absolutely key and very 
important that ACEA speaks with one voice on these forthcoming 
discussions on CO2, primarily because the Commission has said 
quite clearly that it wants to see a common viewpoint from the 
industry, if it starts seeing other view points then it will listen to them. 
(AA1-C) 
Association interviewees therefore also recognise individual CPAs and difficulties in 
the association as another key theme, where company representatives communicate 
their firms’ views on different issues (AA1-D). Again, there are competitive reasons 
(AA1-C, AA1-E) and differences with regard to product range (AA1-D) behind 
individual CPAs. These different technologies make it difficult to have a common 
position in the association (AA1-C) and there is a danger of a lowest common 
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denominator but this is rarely the case (AA1-E). One respondent however, put this 
key theme into context and emphasised that agreement is indeed reached, even with 
difficulties: 
It‟s rather a process of small steps, it takes a lot of time, it‟s very long-
winded; yes, we agree eventually, despite different interests indeed, 
but we agree in the association. The association is well positioned 
indeed, you can notice it. I think that it is perceived by the 
Commission, that ACEA is strong. When individual firms are trying 
individually and it gets public, then it is criticised and the Commission 
is saying anyway, let‟s wait what the association is saying. It‟s not 
necessarily an advantage if firms are trying to go it alone. (AA1-A) 
Individual CPAs are therefore not necessarily an advantage for firms or indeed, the 
industry itself. Such individual CPAs are particularly mentioned (often unasked, EU4-
A, US1-B) for the environmental regulations and therefore the way in which CPAs 
differ across individual companies and different regulatory areas will be investigated 
in the next chapter (RQ5).  
In the same line, respondents from related industries, more than automotive 
respondents however, referred to the environmental regulatory areas of Euro norms, 
CO2 and ELVs as instances of individual CPAs (Rel5, Rel7, Rel8, Rel12). 
Interestingly, only one respondent from related industries acknowledges that a 
common position is sought in the automotive industry (Rel14). Three association 
respondents stress the differences between their industry and the automotive 
industry (Rel3, Rel4, Rel5): 
I think we have a different situation from ACEA because ACEA is 7 
very big companies, each of them has their own representative here 
(…). We at [Rel3] we know we have 3 or 4 companies out of 80, 
which have their representation here. (Rel3)  
(…) for me it is a somewhat strange observation. You have the 
European car industry here as ACEA but the German car 
manufacturers they are all here present in Brussels with their 
individual interests. (Rel6) 
Significantly, the key theme most stressed among respondents from related 
industries relates to individual CPAs and difficulties of the automotive association to 
find a united voice. None of the respondents refer to the relationship as 
complementary or cooperative. The general tenor is that there is no unity or 
unanimity within ACEA (Rel8, Rel10, Rel11) due to a tension between the 
association and its member firms (Rel12) that compete against each other (Rel7, 
Rel10) or even against the association (Rel7). This makes work difficult for the 
association (Rel3, Rel7, Rel12, Rel14) and results in lowest common denominator 
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positions (Rel8, Rel12, Rel14) and individual CPAs (Rel14) which are also attributed 
to different technologies (Rel7, Rel8, Rel12). This key theme is captured by the 
following respondent who previously worked in the car industry: 
The industry is forced to get along, but the companies are trying to kill 
each other on the market. The attitude is different. A good thing about 
the industry association is that you can use it for the bad, nasty things 
– let ACEA do it so we don't look so bad. And then find an opportunity 
individually to show how good you are. Each company protects itself, 
fundamentally. (Rel12) 
He is also the only respondent from related industries that touches on the key theme 
of communication channels (see above), stating that the Commission wants one 
voice (Rel12). 
The State side 
The key theme of communication channels is stressed by all Commission 
respondents bar one. This has several aspects to it. As also stated by the market 
side, respondents in the Commission do indeed want or prefer one voice of the 
industry (Com5, Com9, Com10): 
The Commission needs a strong ACEA. (Com9) 
It is generally acknowledged that the Commission speaks to the association (Com6, 
Com7, Com8, Com11, Com12). Two respondents point out that it is the official 
approach of the Commission to talk to the association (Com2, Com3). Nevertheless, 
there are instances where individual companies talk to the Commission in parallel to 
the association (Com2, Com6, Com10), but this seems to be an exception (Com11) 
and can be done deliberately by the Commission to “break up the fronts” between 
manufacturers (Com7) when the association is not able to present a unified view. 
This leads from the key theme of communication to the key theme of challenges for 
the association when companies lobby individually. The lowest common denominator 
as a characteristic for the association comes up frequently among Commission 
respondents (Com3) and is based on the position of the weakest company (Com4, 
Com11). This leads to situations where there is “very often no united view” (Com5) 
and the association and individual firms contradict each other in their CPAs (Com6). 
The occurrence of individual CPAs (Com8) is a reflection of different interests and 
technologies (Com3, Com5, Com11), especially for certain environmental regulations 
(Com3, Com10). This key theme of individual CPAs and difficulties in and with the 
association is reflected in the following quote: 
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ACEA, (…) they tend to go for the lowest common denominator. In 
that they are a group of bitter rivals and when they come forward with 
any sort of proposals, it‟s usually; they have to agree on the bottom, 
the worst case that everyone can sign up to. So it reflects normally 
the position of the weakest company. (Com11) 
The same respondent also acknowledges that 
I think they work hard to promote a united front through ACEA (…). 
(Com11) 
This key theme of a united industry voice reported by automotive respondents can 
therefore also be found among Commission interviewees. ACEA as association 
represents the companies (Com12), presents one voice (Com9) and does most of 
the lobbying (Com8). Instances of a united view are mentioned (Com5) and 
coordination between the association and firms (Com4), leading to “two strands” of 
CPAs (Com2). One interviewee even denies individual CPAs: 
They lobby only with common denominators, they build up 
consensus, speak with one voice; they won't speak of individual 
interest. They don't bring it here, it wouldn't be productive. (Com9) 
In this quote it is also emphasised that individual CPAs would not be advantageous 
which is confirmed by this respondent‟s superior who states that individual CPAs 
would undermine ACEA’s position (Com12).  
How do these views of Commission respondents compare to responses in the 
European Parliament when triangulated? Following on from the last key theme 
discussed among Commission respondents, unity within the industry is discussed 
first. Complementarity is pointed out as a characteristic of the relationship between 
association and individual firms (MEP6, MEP7, MEP9), where a united voice is 
attempted between association and individual firms (MEP6, MEP8, MEP9) and the 
association is visible (MEP10) although difficulties in finding a common position are 
acknowledged (MEP7, MEP9). The following quote illustrates the attempt to have a 
united voice:  
They always try to be of one opinion, the individual corporations in the 
automotive industry. (MEP8) 
The two MEPs, who, according to other interviewees (MEP1, MEP11) are close to 
the automotive industry (one even worked for the automotive industry in the past), 
see the association presenting a common position or consensus opinion which they – 
as legislators – prefer (MEP3, MEP13). While the first interviewee points out that a 
fragmented view is not good for the industry as it is a total relationship between the 
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association and individual firms (MEP3), the second assigned individual CPAs to late 
technological development and financial difficulties (MEP13). The latter illustrates the 
key theme of unity as well as the key theme of individual CPAs in this quote: 
Let‟s stay with ACEA, the European association, which is I think one 
of the most professionally organised industry association on the 
European level (…) that is a consensus opinion within the industry, 
where respective individual interests have been filtered already. And 
therefore I have a good feeling with ACEA overall (…). I conduct talks 
with ACEA, and then in most cases afterwards companies are 
knocking at the door and they of course have specific interests due to 
their product specifications. And mostly I don‟t like that, because 
when companies are knocking at the door, they then pursue 
sometimes really some special concrete interest where they are 
possibly currently not able to achieve it technically because they have 
overslept some development. That‟s why I prefer the position of the 
association. (MEP13) 
This key theme of individual CPAs and disunity within the association is stressed 
across party lines in the EP, with a lowest common denominator (MEP4 to MEP7, 
MEP13) and the position of the least progressive company determining ACEA‟s 
position (MEP12). Automotive firms therefore engage in individual CPAs so as not to 
rely on the association and a lowest common denominator (MEP6), which can lead to 
a contradiction or competition of companies against the association (MEP5, MEP7). 
Individual CPAs are due to differences between companies, in general (MEP4, 
MEP7, MEP9), financially (MEP9, MEP13) and technologically (MEP6, MEP13). 
Similar to respondents from the other societal triangles, EP respondents also 
attribute divisions among companies and a fragile association position to differences 
in environmental regulatory areas (MEP5, MEP7, MEP8) which will be investigated in 
the following chapter.  
Interestingly, while the key theme of communication channels in the previous 
sections consists of communication between the Commission and association, and 
between MEPs and companies – which is also acknowledged by EP respondents 
(MEP6, MEP7) – these also point out that they speak to both the association and 
firms (MEP5) where meetings with the association are followed by individual CPAs 
(MEP6, MEP9, MEP13):   
Both, I saw individual companies many times and I saw ACEA many 
times. (MEP5) 
The Civil Society side 
Civil society respondents show a remarkable similarity with automotive respondents 
in emphasising the key theme of a united voice from the sector and the association 
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(ACEA) as the main actor in CPAs (NGO1-A, NGO1-B, NGO3) that attempts an 
overall strategy (NGO5). Individual CPAs are seen as a support or addition to ACEA 
(NGO1-B, NGO5) and as part of activities on two levels (NGO6). One respondent 
raises the question whether individual CPAs undermine ACEA, but stresses it is no 
competition (NGO1-B). This seemingly surprising result is qualified by the statements 
of two interviewees who stress that the unity of the industry is in terms of opposing 
legislation (NGO1-A, NGO1-B): 
(…) that‟s very much the line of ACEA; it comes down to “please to 
nothing”. Companies don't go public with any opinion that might be 
diverting from that. Representatives individually differ. Some are more 
in favour of legislation on follow up than others. They don't all think 
the same. One reason is the product portfolio. (NGO1-A) 
Whilst this interviewee stresses the unity of the industry he also acknowledges 
individual CPAs due to different product portfolios here and later also due to 
environmental legislation where companies have different interests (NGO1-A). Only 
one other civil society respondent stresses this key theme of individual CPAs that are 
noticeable as the association has difficulties to present a unified voice and these 
differences and difficulties are particularly the case for environmental regulations 
such as CO2 and ELVs (NGO4). The key theme of communication channel is 
observed by one respondent with the Commission preferring a single contact point 
and MEPs talking to companies in their constituencies (NGO1-B), thus reflecting 
what respondents from other sides mention. 
Summary 
To summarise this section, three key themes have been identified for the relationship 
between individual and industry association activities for interest representation:  
 Cooperation and complementarities between individual firms and the 
association leading to a unified voice. 
 Difficulties and challenges for the association through lowest common 
denominator positions, leading to firms pursuing individual CPAs due to 
different interests, technologies and product portfolios. 
 Communication channels where it is observed that the association mainly 
talks to the Commission while companies talk to MEPs although there are 
exceptions to this general rule. 
As individual CPAs are particularly stressed for specific environmental regulatory 
areas, these will be investigated through RQ5 in Chapter 8. 
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7.5 RQ6: Political Resources and Competences used in CPAs 
This section addresses RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do 
firms use in their CPAs? In the interviews, respondents were asked what kind of 
resources and competences companies and the association use in their interest 
representation, and which role they play (IVQ5). The question was asked openly; 
prompts that were given to interviewees are based on Dahan‟s (2005a) typology of 
political firm resources and include expertise (and therefore human resources as 
carriers of expertise), financial resources, relational resources, organisational 
resources, reputation with other non-market actors, public image, support of 
stakeholders and recreational skills. These resources constitute the basic structure 
for the analysis. They are now discussed in a triangulating manner, based on the 
respective societal triangle sides, starting with the market. 
The Market side 
Respondents from the automotive companies generally see expertise as important 
in CPAs (JP2-A, EU3-B) and even as core competency (US1-A). Few respondents 
detail the sort of expertise and information needed (EU1-A, US1-A, EU4-A), but two 
types that are stressed include technical expertise and political expertise. In terms of 
technical expertise, views differ as to how important it is. Some technical expertise is 
required (US1-B), but some respondents view it as less important (EU1-B, EU2-A) 
whilst for others it is important (JP1-A, EU6-A) and not easily acquired (JP2-A). 
Political expertise includes learning to communicate with (non-technical) laymen in 
the European institutions (US1-B, EU2-A) and learning how Brussels works (EU2-A, 
EU5-B). Understanding the regulatory process is a key issue (JP1-A), but often 
involves learning by doing (US1-B, EU2-A, JP1-A, EU5-B): 
You basically learn as you do the job. (EU5-B)  
Well in our case here we only have mainly technical people with a 
technical background. The political side, it is something you learn and 
you get to know during your relations and discussions in meetings 
and things. (JP1-A) 
This second quote relates the expertise needed to the people involved in CPAs and 
there is a mixed picture as to what background human resources (HR) in CPAs come 
from. For many firms, their HR are from within the company (EU2-A, EU3-A, EU3-B, 
EU5-B, US1-A, US1-B). HR have a technical (JP1-A) or political background (EU4-
A), but most offices are composed of HR with mixed (academic) backgrounds (EU1-
B, EU2-A, EU5-B, EU6-A, US1-B, US2-A) and mixed (international) backgrounds 
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(EU2-A, EU4-A, EU5-B, US2-B, JP1-A, JP2-A). Furthermore, firms send experts from 
headquarters to Brussels if detailed technical expertise is needed (EU1-A, EU1-B, 
EU2-A, EU2-B, EU3-A, EU5-B). 
According to one respondent, expertise and information are related to the next 
resource, reputation and public image, who states that 
(…) the reputation we have comes from the information we are 
providing. (…) you gain credibility only if you can provide clear, clean, 
and well-detailed and credible information. (EU6-A) 
While public image is used as well (EU1-B), in line with the marketing image (EU5-B) 
and can open doors (US1-A) for some firms, it is less important (EU3-B) or plays no 
role (US2-B) for others, for whom the reputation is more important (US2-B, US2-A), 
which plays a crucial or big role (JP2-A, EU2-A). While the reputation of a firm can be 
good for contacts (US2-B), it is the reputation on a personal, individual level that 
plays an important role (US2-B, EU3-B).  
As reputation is built up and accumulated over time (Dahan 2005a), it is closely 
related to relational resources, which, among automotive company respondents, are 
stressed as the most important resource in CPAs: 
It‟s the heart of our work. (EU5-B)  
That‟s the basis, without relationships and contacts to relevant 
decision-makers your position will not be heard, not be registered. 
(US1-A) 
Contacts and relationships are seen as “absolutely important” (EU1-B) and as “the 
nuts and bolts” of CPAs (US2-B). Building up a network through developing (new) 
contacts and getting to know people is therefore key (JP2-A, EU1-B, JP1-A). 
Although it takes time to build up a network (EU1-B), this can then provide continuity 
(US1-B) which is considered important (US2-B, EU5-B). Personal relationships are “a 
bonus” (JP1-A) which lead to being known, to trust, reliability, access, trustworthiness 
and credibility (EU1-A, US1-B, JP1-A) of which the latter two are the “greatest asset” 
and “indispensible” according to two interviewees (EU1-A, EU2-A). Relational 
resources in the form of networks and relationships are a form of social capital (see 
Ch. 2163) which is therefore inherent in the nature of CPAs. Social capital in the form 
of networks includes both bridging and bonding forms of social capital:  
As important as an external network is an internal network (EU2-A)  
                                              
163
 Based on Serageldin and Grootaert 1999, OECD 2001, and Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002. 
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The external and as well as the internal network. Both are very 
important. (EU5-B) 
Bridging social capital is outside corporate boundaries in external networks while 
internal networks constitute bonding social capital which are mentioned by two 
further interviewees (EU1-B, US2-A) as necessary resources for CPAs. 
Organisational resources are defined by Dahan (2005a) as internal resources such 
as permanent representations in Brussels and as external resources such as trade 
associations. As only companies with permanent offices in Brussels were interviewed 
and as all of them are association members, and as it is not mentioned by 
automotive respondents, this resource is not discussed further here.  
The support of other stakeholders tends to be seen as mixed (EU3-B) which is 
important in theory, but rarely the case in practice (EU2-A) and therefore less 
important (US1-A), depending on the topic (US1-B, US2-B, EU5-B). 
Only two companies mention recreational skills as resources and competences used 
in CPAs. While US1 uses events to interact with policy-makers (US1-A) it also 
acknowledges that due to financial difficulties this has had to be cut back (US1-B). 
Contrarily, EU2-A sees recreational skills as unnecessary if “the contacts are there” 
and financial resources are not used for events (EU2-A).  
Financial resources receive mixed responses among automotive companies, ranging 
from stable, increased and declined financial resources.  
This interview question yielded less material among respondents in automotive 
associations who mention HR and their expertise as the main resource used in 
CPAs. While HR in the association have a mixed background (AA1-C), the 
association partly gets its experts and HR from companies (AA1-A, AA1-B, AA1-C) 
where an industry background is important (AA1-D). Technical expertise is important 
(AA1-B, AA1-C, AA2) as well as background information (AA1-D), but it is also 
pointed out by two association respondents that there are different levels of expertise 
between the association and the Commission which makes it difficult to communicate 
(AA1-B, AA1-D). The latter respondent indicates that it might therefore be more 
important to know where the expertise is rather than having it yourself (AA1-D): 
It seems that it is more important to have a resource from which you 
can draw information that you can communicate, than to have the 
competence and experiences by yourself, on your own. (AA1-D) 
Similarly, his colleague suggests that it is more important to know whom to contact 
than having a contact (AA1-E). Unlike the other respondents, he points out that a 
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basic understanding of the political process is crucial and that a mixed technical and 
political expertise is needed (AA1-E).  
Other resources that are briefly mentioned among association respondents are 
recreational skills (used by the association in the form of events, AA1-C), financial 
resources (decreasing, AA1-D) and reputation which is important in the case of 
individuals (AA1-D). The latter also relates to relational resources of which the same 
interviewee emphasises that personal chemistry is important (AA1-D). His colleague 
attributes a strong role to contacts and networks while at the same time conceding 
that interfacing skills with decision-makers are hard to learn (AA1-C): 
It plays a strong role, because, and since I know most of the people it 
has made my job a bit easier in being able to communicate with them 
without having to introduce myself and get to know them. (…) What 
sometimes is hard to learn is the ability to, is the interfacing skills with 
decision-makers out there. (AA1-C) 
It is relational resources that are most emphasised by respondents from related 
industries, together with expertise and reputation. Only one interviewee mentions 
ACEA using recreational skills by organising events and conferences (Rel8) while 
support from other stakeholders and financial resources are not mentioned at all by 
this category. Three interviewees emphasise the importance of image and reputation 
(Rel6, Rel9, Rel14), two interviewees see the basis for this resource in credibility 
(Rel3) and expertise and information (Rel5). Expertise is itself a resource, which is 
stressed in this segment. Similarly to responses from automotive associations, 
expertise is provided by experts from member companies (Rel3, Rel4, Rel5, Rel14). 
HR involved in CPAs come from a mixed background, i.e. from industry and from 
European affairs or Communications (Rel3, Rel6, Rel14). This means that both 
technical and political expertise is important (Rel9). While industry experience is 
needed for credibility (Rel3) and experts come from member companies, and 
therefore tend to have more of a technical background, the political expertise is 
acquired in learning by doing (Rel3, Rel6, Rel8, Rel9). As with automotive 
association interviewees, different levels of expertise are emphasised between the 
industry and the European institutions (Rel6, Rel8). Similarly, relational resources 
might be influenced by the institutions: two interviewees attribute a less important 
role to personal contacts and continuity as the Commission tries to include all 
stakeholders (Rel8), and as people in the institutions change as well (Rel13). 
Furthermore, while continuity might be good for policy-makers, it might be less so for 
company representatives concerned about their prospects back in the company 
(Rel14). Nevertheless, the latter respondent stresses the role contacts and 
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relationships play and the importance of being well connected (Rel14) which is 
confirmed by other interviewees: contacts and networks are the “basis of the work” 
(Rel3) and “most important” (Rel7), and “being known is very important” (Rel6). 
Continuity as part of relational resources is seen as important (Rel3, Rel6) and 
helpful (Rel9): 
(…) it helps to be seeing the same people. And then you can build up 
a certain amount of trust. (Rel5) 
Trust and credibility play a role as resource (Rel3, Rel7) and are connected to 
continuity (Rel9). At the same time, dynamics are seen as important as continuity 
(Rel7).  
To summarise, the main resources for respondents from the market side – across 
industries and organisational types – are expertise and relational resources. 
Relational resources are one form of social capital and are used both in its bonding 
and bridging form, developing internal and external networks.  
The State side 
Similarly to automotive association respondents, this interview question yielded less 
information among Commission respondents, of whom four emphasise that it is 
difficult to say or see from outside (Com1, Com2, Com3, Com7): 
It‟s difficult to see that from outside. (Com3) 
While support from other stakeholders, financial resources and recreational skills are 
not mentioned, five respondents do mention organisational resources – unprompted 
– as resources used by the industry in the form of company and association offices in 
Brussels (Com2, Com3, Com7, Com9, Com10): 
(…) the big companies, the big associations, the national 
associations, they all have offices in Brussels here and this helps as 
well – if you want to have access, then it‟s simply practical when the 
people are here in Brussels. (Com10) 
The remaining respondents stress the same resources as market side respondents, 
that is, expertise, relational resources and reputation. Public image is seen as less 
important (Com11) and, similarly, the reputation of individuals interacting with 
decision-makers matters more than the reputation of their firm or association (Com4, 
Com7, Com11, Com13). Correspondingly, the credibility of individuals is more 
important than the credibility of the company they represent (Com4). As established 
above, credibility is a relational and reputational resource. Other relational resources 
mentioned by Commission interviewees include the importance of (personal) 
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relations and contacts (Com11, Com13), of networks (Com13) and of continuity 
(Com4), which also depend on personal chemistry (Com13). Lastly, information and 
expertise are also used in CPAs, as seen by Commission respondents (Com1). 
While one respondent experienced HR with political expertise and less technical 
expertise (Com6), his colleague had dealt with many engineers from a technical 
background and „engineers-turned-lobbyists‟, but also stresses that the background 
depends on the topic (Com4). It is therefore rather a mix of backgrounds including 
both engineers and government relations people (Com11, Com13) with experts sent 
from headquarters (Com13). 
Respondents from the European Parliament, unlike respondents in the 
Commission, do mention support from other stakeholders, financial resources and 
recreational skills. One MEP mentions recreational skills in the form of events, but 
states that financial resources are not visible (MEP3) which are a basis for HR 
(MEP10). While support from other stakeholders is deemed less important by one 
respondent (MEP8), his colleague points this out as “very important” for decision-
making in the EP (MEP4). Organisational resources are mentioned by three 
respondents (MEP7, MEP9, MEP10), one of whom points out that the industry is 
well-staffed (MEP9). One MEP confirms that it is difficult to say what kind of 
resources are used, confirming Commission responses above (MEP11), while her 
colleague indicates that the situation is very varied and different concepts are used 
(MEP7). 
In line with Commission and market side respondents, expertise, relational resources 
and reputation are the resources and competences that EP respondents stress most. 
Here again, it is the reputation of individuals that plays a role (MEP5, MEP7, MEP8, 
MEP9), while the public image and reputation of the company does not play a role 
(MEP4, MEP5, MEP7, MEP8, MEP9) although companies pay more attention to it 
than before (MEP10). One respondent relates the importance of individual reputation 
to lobbying as a social activity (MEP9) where personal chemistry (MEP8) and 
informal talks (MEP3 play a role which links the resource of reputation with relational 
resources. Contacts and relationships are crucial for CPAs (MEP3, MEP9), providing 
reliability and trust (MEP6, MEP7, MEP13) and credibility (MEP13). A long-term view 
of contacts provides continuity (MEP9, the importance of which as a resource is 
brought up by an interviewee (MEP3), which is confirmed by several others across 
the party spectrum (MEP4 to MEP7, MEP13). Networks play a significant role in this 
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respect (MEP7, MEP8, MEP11), the continuity of which is important (MEP13). The 
following quotes illustrate this: 
I think, in order to be successful, this is a keystone, to have real 
continuity in the network structures. (MEP7) 
(…) politics is a people business so the quality expertise and 
willingness to engage with us are really the crucial resources that you 
have in external affairs. (MEP3) 
This second quote refers to the last resource discussed, expertise (MEP3, MEP6, 
MEP11) as well as information (MEP10, MEP13) and the HR providing it. The 
expertise – similarly to responses discussed above – consists of political expertise 
(MEP4, MEP8, MEP11) and technical expertise (MEP2, MEP9, MEP10). The 
expertise can also be in the form of publications (MEP8). One respondent points to 
the importance of being able to communicate technical details to non-technical 
people (MEP9). There is a mix of backgrounds for HR, with generalists and 
specialists (MEP2), lawyers (MEP8), engineers and public affairs people (MEP9) with 
some experts being sent from member companies (MEP2, MEP3). 
To summarise, the main resources for respondents from the state side are expertise, 
relational resources and reputation, and, to a lesser extent, organisational resources. 
The Civil Society side 
Interestingly, financial resources are not mentioned by interviewees in environmental 
NGOs, even though this could have been expected. One respondent, however, does 
refer to the automotive industry as putting in “a huge amount of resources” albeit 
without specifying them, and mentions organisational resources such as offices of 
firms and of associations (NGO1-B). As with respondents from the EP, support from 
other stakeholders is mentioned twice: social partners as well as local and regional 
politicians support the industry in its CPAs (NGO1-B) but, although it plays a role,  
the automobile industry is economically such a strong sector that it 
doesn‟t need any broader alliances (NGO4). 
This respondent also attributed less importance to the relational resource of 
continuity as it is more important to be able to build networks rapidly (NGO4). 
Nevertheless, personal contacts play a central role through relations and networks 
(NGO4, NGO5), and the network can be improved through continuity (NGO5). 
Contacts can be established through events (NGO1-A). Recreational skills in the 
form of receptions, events, conferences and lunches are observed by more 
respondents than in other triangle sides (NGO1-A, NGO1-B, NGO3). The resources 
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of reputation and public image get mixed views among civil society respondents 
where reputation of the individual is said by some to have a role (NGO5) and by 
others not to have a role (NGO1-B), while it also depends on the company (NGO1-
B). The public or brand image is used in CPAs by some companies (NGO1-B) which 
plays a role as the industry fears being labelled an “environmental pig” (NGO4). Trust 
as a relational and reputational resource is important for the provision of data 
(NGO1-A). 
Expertise and information is the most important resource mentioned by civil society 
respondents in environmental NGOs (NGO1-A, NGO1-B) where technical expertise 
is essential (NGO2-A, NGO4) which has to be used together with political expertise 
(NGO4). Expertise can be in the form of studies (NGO1-A, NGO3). As with other 
respondents, HR consist of different backgrounds, where (technical) experts come 
from headquarters or member companies (NGO1-B, NGO2-A, NGO5) and people in 
Brussels are generalists with a government affairs background (NGO1-B, NGO2-A). 
Two critical respondents mention that HR play an important role but not the most 
important (NGO4) or are “not good” (NGO1-A), attributing this to a lack of interest on 
the part of top management (NGO1-A). Again, different levels of expertise between 
the Commission and industry are observed (NGO2-A). Therefore, the ability to tailor 
the message is important (NGO1-B). 
Summary 
The two main resources used in CPAs as stressed by respondents from all triangle 
sides are expertise and relational resources. Reputation plays a role as well, while 
public image is less important and, similarly, financial resources, recreational skills 
and support from other stakeholders. Organisational resources are seen as given as 
the companies and associations interviewed are all represented in Brussels through 
offices there. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the general findings of the interviews were examined in a triangulating 
manner, according to four research questions (RQs 1-3, RQ6; IVQs 1-5).  
 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs? 
This question investigated the motivational factors, the reasons why companies in 
the automotive industry are politically active. The analysis and discussion resulted in 
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the following five key themes as main motivational factors and thus a typology of 
reasons to engage in CPAs: 
 Information and communication: This was the main reason for CPAs as stated 
by market side respondents, both in the automotive and related industries, 
companies and associations. It included an active and passive aspect (to 
inform and to be informed), and a relational aspect (to be in contact with the 
institutions). 
 Business interest: This key theme received most attention by state side 
respondents, which included the business impact of legislation on business 
operations and the desire to influence legislation to protect business. 
 Predictability and fairness: Planning purposes and the creation of a level 
playing field were mentioned by all societal triangle sides but more so by the 
market side.  
 Positive motivators: Such reasons played a minor role for state and market 
side respondents, slightly more emphasised by the market side. 
 Defensive motivators: Whilst negative motivators such as avoiding, weakening 
or postponing legislation were acknowledged by all sides (except by related 
industries), this was heavily stressed by civil society respondents. 
Furthermore, it was demonstrated in the discussion that due to the business impact 
of legislation on business operations, government policies can be an endogenous 
factor for corporate strategy as they can be influenced according to business 
interests. This concerns particularly the pre-regulatory aspect of CPAs.  
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
In the discussion for this research question it was found that companies differ widely 
in how they organise and name their business function. A communicational distance 
between representative offices in Brussels and headquarters emerged as a result 
which meant that the significance of CPAs undertaken in Brussels was not 
necessarily acknowledged or recognised at corporate headquarters. In terms of the 
approach taken in CPAs, this could not be generalised as either cooperative or 
confrontational. Whilst automotive respondents tended to portray it as cooperative in 
general, respondents from related industries and the other triangle sides saw it 
generally as more defensive. However, it was stressed by all three triangle sides that 
it depends on topics, individual firms and the association, and on the time scale (both 
of policy processes and automotive CPAs over time).  
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 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation?  
In the discussion on how individual firm activities and industry activities relate to each 
other, three key themes emerged from the discussion on all triangle sides. The key 
theme most stressed by automotive respondents (but acknowledged by all others, 
too) was cooperation and complementarities between individual firms and the 
association, leading to a unified voice where individual activities were not seen as 
advantageous. The second key theme was observed particularly by related industry 
respondents as well as state side respondents where difficulties and challenges for 
the association through lowest common denominator positions led to firms pursuing 
interests through individual CPAs based on different technologies and product 
portfolios. The third key theme across the triangle was communication channels 
where it was observed that the association mainly talks to the Commission while 
companies talk to MEPs, although there are exceptions to this general rule. In this 
part there were already indications that there might be differences in CPAs with 
regard to environmental regulations and individual MNEs, which will be investigated 
in the next chapter. 
 RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in their 
CPAs?  
The last research question examined in this chapter was based on the discussion of 
the RBV in Ch. 4 and Dahan‟s typology of political resources. For market side 
respondents, the main resources that were stressed as being used were expertise 
and relational resources with an aspect of reputation. This includes a strong element 
of social capital in the form of relational resources – contacts and relationships were 
emphasised as key to CPAs. Similarly, state side respondents – while stating that it 
is difficult to observe from outside – highlighted expertise, relational resources and 
reputation as main resources used for CPAs. 
Civil society respondents – more than other respondents – observed recreational 
skills as resources used by firms in CPAs, but in line with them, also stated expertise 
and relational resources as important resources for CPAs.   
It can therefore be concluded that social capital, both in bonding and bridging form,  
through reputation and relational resources is an important (political) resource and 
competence that automotive companies (and associations) use in their CPAs which 
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provides them with access to and information from policy-makers. Furthermore, 
expertise is a vital resource used in CPAs. 
This concludes the discussion of the general findings of the thesis according to four 
research questions (RQs1-3, RQ6). The following chapter now discusses the 
perspective of companies on environmental regulations (RQ4) and how CPAs differ 
across different areas of environmental regulations and between MNEs from the 
Triad regions (RQ5).  
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8 Analysis of the Differences in CPAs within 
Environmental Regulations and Individual MNEs 
8.1 Introduction 
As suggested in the previous chapter on general findings, there are indications that 
companies differ in how they carry out CPAs with regard to their country of origin, 
their technology, and market positioning. These issues are investigated in this 
chapter, starting with environmental regulations and how companies view these. The 
three chosen regulatory areas are then discussed in turn. The second part of the 
chapter looks at the country of origin of the MNEs engaged in CPAs and how the 
individual companies carry out their interest representation. It will thus be presented 
according to the main unit of analysis, the individual firm level. The chapter 
addresses these research questions, and revisits RQ6 on their basis: 
 RQ4: How do enterprises view environmental regulations? 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations, and between MNEs from the Triad regions?  
The selected instances of pollutant emissions, CO2 emissions and scrap cars are all 
areas of environmental policies that have been intensely debated between policy-
makers and companies, between OEMs and suppliers, and between different 
countries. The chapter starts with a general perspective on how companies actually 
view these environmental regulations. 
8.2 RQ4: How do Enterprises view Environmental Regulations? 
Environment is the hottest issue. (Rel12) 
The interview question regarding companies ‟ views on environmental regulations 
was posed openly (IVQ8). Prompts that were given included opportunities for 
innovation from environmental regulations versus costs of environmental policies, 
based on the so-called „Porter Hypothesis‟164.  
                                              
164
 Conventional wisdom claims that economic growth and environmental protection measures are 
mutually exclusive, while the Porter Hypothesis states that tougher environmental standards – if 
properly designed – can lead to more innovation and thus to more economic benefits for corporate 
environmental leaders (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a). 
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The environmental area has become the single most important issue in CPAs for 
automotive companies as interviewees emphasise in triangulation (EU5-B, US1-B, 
AA1-D, AA3, Rel3, Rel14, Com1, MEP6, NGO6). The responses are now discussed 
in turn, according to triangle side. 
The Market side 
Responses from automotive companies show mixed results for this question with 
wide-ranging replies. On the one hand, the importance of environmental regulations 
is acknowledged and taken seriously (EU3-B, US1-B, JP1-A, JP2-A), which create 
“chances and opportunities” (US2-A) to be proactive (EU6-A) and to drive 
technological progress (US1-A): 
We take the position on environmental issues very serious, and we 
have adopted a position of environmental leadership, which gives us 
a heavy weight of responsibility of obeying the law. (JP2-A) 
Both Japanese companies that were interviewed stress their goal of being leaders in 
environmental regulations or performance (JP1-A, JP2-A), while European and 
American firms seem to be more mixed in their responses. The two American 
companies try to turn environmental challenges into opportunities (US2-A) and try to 
do what is technically feasible while not being in opposition to environmental 
regulations, stressing the issue of timing (US1-B). The respondent who had worked 
in both the Washington and Brussels office of their firm points out that the opposition 
to environmental regulations is much stronger in the US than in the EU because of 
the public debate in Europe (EU2-B). 
On the other hand, environmental regulations are seen as imposed (EU1-A), as too 
numerous and too strict (EU1-B), as challenges (EU2-A), even a key challenge in 
public relations (EU5-B) and as considerable cost factors (US1-A): 
The fact that costs is a constraint, big constraint for us, because we 
are mass producers, lies in the fact that the solution is not always first 
innovation, because it‟s very costly. (EU5-B) 
We are very finance-driven as a company, these are all considerable 
cost factors (…) it is very difficult to pass on costs to the consumer. 
(US1-A) 
In this respect the consumer aspect is emphasised: customers are not prepared to 
pay for cars that meet environmental standards (EU1-A); it is difficult to pass on the 
costs to consumers (US1-A) as affordability is a problem for them (EU4-A). Similarly, 
profitability is a priority for companies where the cost factor comes first and 
innovation second (EU5-B). Furthermore, regulatory conflicts and contradicting 
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requirements within environmental regulations are pointed out (EU2-A, EU3-B, EU6-
A) which should be avoided by policy-makers as there is otherwise the danger of 
promoting certain technologies at the cost of innovation ability when only the goal 
and not the technology should be prescribed (EU3-B). Environmental regulations 
should therefore be reasonable, balanced, and realistic, at justifiable costs (EU3-B, 
US2-B).  
Similarly, a balanced view is offered by respondents who see both an opportunity for 
innovation and cost factors in environmental regulations (EU6-A, US2-B, JP1-A); it is 
acknowledged that a balance is difficult to strike in terms of questions of cost and 
wishes to prioritise environmental issues (EU4-A): 
(…) on the one hand first of all, these are costs factors, very clearly, 
we are in a highly competitive environment in principle and in this it is 
very difficult to allocate the additional costs of EU legislation to the 
consumer. But it has its environmental advantages; that‟s 
recognisable, without the legislation on the European side (…). This 
way, the European Commission is demanding on the automobile 
industry in terms of the environmentally conscious consumer; they 
also push and drive technical progress. (US1-A) 
As with the research questions in the previous chapter, the issue of social desirability 
emerges again, illustrated in the following quote, possibly pointing to “green PR” of 
firms: 
The firms also want to show that they are active regarding the 
negative effects of their activities. (EU3-A) 
Among respondents in automotive associations this issue seems to be more clear-
cut, albeit under the caveat of fewer responses. The importance of a cost-effective 
solution for environmental issues is stressed (AA1-B, AA1-D) and, similarly to 
corporate responses, contradictory or conflicting requirements within environmental 
regulations are pointed out (AA1-C, AA1-D). The respondent of the Japanese 
association confirms above statements about its members building environmentally 
friendly vehicles but also acknowledges that environmental regulations, especially 
CO2, are a serious issue with a negative impact on the automotive industry (AA3). 
Therefore, “it has to be a balance” as association membership may be 
heterogeneous in this respect (AA2). 
Similarly, respondents from related industries emphasise an aspect of balance with 
regard to how environmental regulations are viewed. Rel4 see the balance between 
being necessary and welcome, and being realistic and cost effective, while Rel6 
agrees with the objectives but views regulations as sometimes too detailed and 
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bureaucratic, and hence they are both a cost factor and opportunity for innovation 
(Rel6) which also depends on the topics (Rel14): 
(…) it depends on the individual regulations. (Rel14) 
Rel3 see environmental regulations becoming stricter and stricter whilst also stating 
that it is important to recognise the needs of society with regard to the environment. It 
is therefore a compromise (Rel9) where the industry favours the biggest 
environmental gain at the lowest cost (Rel6). Whilst the car industry is seen as being 
technologically advanced, it is also perceived as only seeing costs and putting brakes 
on environmental regulations (Rel8). This is particularly the case for ACEA who is 
seen to use the cost factor as a reason to push against such legislation (Rel7, see 
quote below). In order to keep costs down, firms and their association are seen to 
“blow the cost factor out of proportion” (Rel8) which leads to the car industry being 
seen to “cry wolf” on environmental regulations (Rel8). There are, however, real 
concerns about contradictory requirements in environmental regulations for car 
manufacturers (Rel12), but their negative approach makes them “look bad” in this 
respect (Rel12). It is an “issue of timing” for car manufacturers (Rel9) and an 
important distinction is made by respondent Rel7 who points to such regulations 
being a cost factor in the short term and an opportunity in the long term: 
The cost of technology, ACEA is using it as one factor against 
pushing legislation. What looks as cost in the short term is an 
opportunity in the long term on a wider scale. (Rel7) 
He emphasises a difference between European and Japanese car manufacturers in 
this respect (Rel7), with the latter being more advanced in clean technology 
development, thereby confirming car industry responses (AA3, JP1-A, JP2-A).  
The State side 
Two Commission respondents confirm and echo this last respondent from related 
industries (Rel7) in two respects. Firstly, it is confirmed that the European car 
industry especially sees environmental regulations as additional costs while the 
Japanese industry, particularly JP2, is open, or even positive for future environmental 
regulations (Com12). Secondly, the long-term perspective of environmental 
regulations is stressed as an opportunity for competitive advantage for the industry 
(Com8). Relating to this, another respondent remarks:  
What tends to happen is once a standard gets announced it is seen 
as very high cost. But then due to the power of technical development 
the industry is incredibly effective at reducing those costs. (Com11) 
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Whilst one respondent views the industry as ambivalent with regard to environmental 
regulations (Com10), which needs to be pushed to regulations (Com9), the majority 
of respondents in the Commission across DGs see the cost factor as the main 
concern of the industry in relation to environmental regulations (Com1 to Com5, 
Com8, Com11): 
There are exceptions, but in general it tends to be the cost factor.  
(Com5) 
The cost may be passed on to the consumer with negative effects on market share 
(Com1). The industry is seen as defensive (Com12), putting an emphasis on making 
standards weak, postponing them or putting them off (Com4). It is perceived to view 
environmental regulations negatively (Com5, Com6, Com7, Com12) and not as 
opportunities for competitive advantage (Com1), innovation, or employment (Com6, 
Com12) as they are perceived to be a barrier to profit (Com4).  
In the European Parliament, similar perceptions emerge: the industry is perceived 
to see environmental regulations negatively (MEP3, MEP6), and therefore as being 
very defensive (MEP9) and cautious (MEP13), trying to weaken or postpone 
environmental legislation (MEP8, MEP1), even “favouring pollution” as one MEP puts 
it (MEP11). The following quote illustrates this key theme: 
When it comes to the automobile industry, there is a general 
impression that they've been laggards for most of the time. The ones 
who lobby on environmental legislation so far on CO2 and air 
pollution in the recent past do so to try to weaken or postpone 
whatever action we want to take. (MEP1) 
Whilst one MEP sees car firms as environmental laggards (MEP1), another relates 
their cautiousness to their experience of “once bitten, twice shy” – according to him, 
they have delivered much in advance but have still been regulated and therefore are 
seen to push against environmental legislation (MEP13). Although politicians might 
see opportunities for innovation in environmental regulations the industry largely sees 
it as a cost factor (MEP6, MEP7, MEP9, MEP12): 
(…) the car manufacturers felt that the cost burden was much more 
on their side. (MEP12) 
Although some companies do indeed see it as opportunity for innovation (MEP5, 
MEP7), this is also perceived as paying lip service to the environmental agenda in 
terms of “green PR” (MEP5). A notable exception is again emphasised for Japanese 
companies (MEP5, MEP11), which thereby triangulates and confirms other 
responses from industry and the Commission. One MEP also echoes other 
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respondents in pointing out that timing is an issue, that environmental regulations are 
a cost in the short run, but an opportunity for innovation in the long run (MEP7). At 
the same time he emphasises that it is difficult to answer in general, as there are 
different perceptions within organisations concerning environmental regulations, 
pointing to work councils, engineers and strategists seeing opportunities in them 
(MEP7). Environmental regulations are therefore a balancing act between being 
ambitious and being acceptable (MEP10), and a compromise between being 
defensive and marketing environmentally friendly products (MEP2).  
The Civil Society side 
While the consumer NGO respondent agrees with above reports that environmental 
regulations are a compromise (NGO6), respondent NGO4 sees the industry taking a 
“trade-off perspective” where too much environmental protection costs jobs. At the 
same time, this respondent also perceives car firms to engage in green PR, 
underlining that they stress being “very innovative, environmentally friendly” (NGO4), 
which is confirmed by another interviewee: 
Externally, one represents oneself as green as car manufacturer. 
(NGO2-B) 
Again as above, Japanese companies, particularly JP2, seem to have a more 
positive view on environmental regulations as an opportunity to progress (NGO5, 
NGO1-B). In general, however, the industry (through ACEA) is perceived to be 
negative towards environmental regulations (NGO1-B, NGO2-B, NGO5), which cost 
too much (NGO1-A), are too strict, “overachieving the target” (NGO1-B), and which 
are to be avoided as they are not an opportunity but an international competitive 
disadvantage (NGO2-B). One respondent puts it as follows: 
(…) the industry as such, doesn‟t shy away from means and efforts to 
defend environmentally harmful activities. (NGO3) 
Only one respondent here emphasises that it depends on the brand (NGO5).  
Summary 
While car firms saw both cost factors and opportunities for innovation in them, 
association respondents stressed cost-effectiveness and contradictory requirements 
with regard to environmental regulations. Related industries saw a balance but also 
point to the car industry putting the brakes on despite being technologically 
advanced. While also acknowledging the need for balance and compromise in this 
area, state side respondents from both the Commission and the EP perceived the 
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industry to view environmental regulations mainly negatively and as a cost factor. 
This was echoed by civil society respondents who also saw an element of “green PR” 
in the industry‟s stance towards environmental regulations. 
It emerged from both the market and state side that timing is an issue where 
environmental regulations might be a cost in the short term but can be an opportunity 
for innovation in the long term. Japanese companies, particularly JP2, were identified 
as firms that – more than their European and American counterparts – see 
opportunities for innovation and environmental leadership in such legislation.  
8.3 RQ5: CPAs across Three Areas of Environmental Regulations 
In the following sections the first part of RQ5 is addressed, on pollutant emissions, 
CO2 emissions and ELVs (IVQ9): 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations? 
It is worth re-stating at this point that not every respondent covered each regulatory 
area (see Table 6.5) and therefore some parts of the discussion rely on fewer 
responses than other parts. 
8.3.1 Area 1: Pollutant Emissions  
Regulations for pollutant emissions have been successively tightened165, starting with 
the introduction of the catalytic converter in the 1980s and continuing with the Euro 
norms in the 1990s166. There is therefore a historical dimension to this, which will be 
referred to as well. The discussion starts with the market side, followed by the state 
and civil society, thereby following the same triangulating pattern as the preceding 
chapter and section.  
The Market side 
Starting with automotive companies, the Euro 5 standards were “in the making” at 
the time of data collection, and the industry does not like to talk about topical things 
                                              
165
 For the introduction to Euro norms see Ch.3. The standards are regulating tail pipe emissions such 
as carbon monoxide (CO), Hydrocarbons (HC), Nitrous Oxide (NOx) and particulate matter (PM). 
166
 The norms were passed in the following years: Euro 1 and 2 in 1991 and 1994, then Euro 3 and 4 
in 1998, with the latest norms Euro 5 and 6 adopted in December 2006. The standards came into 
force in the following years: Euro 1 in 1993, Euro 2 in 1996, Euro 3 in 2000, Euro 4 in 2005, Euro 5 
in 2009, and Euro 6 in 2014 (Dieselnet 2007). 
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as “one never knows how it ends up”, as one respondent points out (EU3-B). For 
respondent US2-A Euro 5 also seems to be “not going too well” as component 
suppliers are lobbying “very aggressively” which is confirmed by respondent US1-B 
in stating that suppliers go “completely” against the car industry‟s position – suppliers 
have developed the technology and want to sell it, but components (e.g. catalytic 
converters) need to be fitted and aligned to vehicles at great cost (US1-B, US2-A). 
The respondent points to the cost of equipping a small car with particulate and NOx 
filters, which can make it up to one third more expensive, which is a “killer argument” 
for buyers in that car range (US1-B). Such extra costs are easier to tolerate for 
higher-end companies such as EU1 compared to EU6 (EU1-A) – the respondent 
highlights different cost structures of small or cheap manufacturers which is a 
“natural difference rooted in products” (EU1-A), thereby explaining different CPAs in 
this respect.  
One important aspect of pollutant emissions legislation is the question of particulate 
matter from and filters for diesel cars. In this respect, it is “no secret” that there is a 
rift between French and German manufacturers (US1-B, EU3-B) which is confirmed 
by EU4-A stating that EU4 has “problems” with small diesels while US1‟s German-
based subsidiary can be “proactive” (EU4-A). One respondent puts the particulate 
matter into perspective by highlighting that passenger cars are responsible for 5% of 
such emissions, but that the whole discussion focuses on cars, thereby forcing the 
industry automatically into a defensive corner (US1-B). This is also true for the 
historical dimension of pollutant emissions legislation: the industry is “regularly 
accused” of the catalytic converter debate as it opposed such converters, saying “it 
wouldn‟t work”, but then introduced these nevertheless (EU2-A). The respondent 
points out that the industry had to introduce the technology prematurely which led to 
fuel penalties, meaning that Euro 3 and 4 standards had an influence on the CO2 VA 
(EU2-A) which will be discussed in the next section. Other respondents also highlight 
trade-offs between CO2 and pollutant emissions (EU1-A, EU6-A, JP2-A). With regard 
to the latest round of standards, Euro 5 and 6, the same respondent highlights that 
the industry had a common pos ition of “95 to 98%” (EU2-A), which needs to be seen 
in the context of above statements regarding a rift between manufacturers.  
Three of the four respondents in automotive associations discussing pollutant 
emissions largely confirm responses from automotive firms. The tension between 
suppliers and OEMs is confirmed where suppliers report that the technology works 
while car firms are concerned that it is more complicated:  
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[they] say that it works in one car, but we need to make it work on 
100,000 cars. (AA1-B) 
The negative trade-off between pollutant emissions and fuel efficiency and therefore 
CO2 emissions is again highlighted (AA1-C, AA1-D). In this respect, one respondent 
observes a move away from fact-based decision-making: a move from cost-
effectiveness to latest-available-technology as a basis for regulation (AA1-D). This 
means that, while the Auto-Oil Programme 1 (AOP1) was the main input for Euro 1 
and 2 standards, Euro 3 and 4 were passed before the AOP2 was finalised, and for 
Euro 5 and 6 there was no clear linkage between the CAFE programme (Clean Air 
for Europe) and the standards, which indicates a rift between scientific and political 
reality (AA1-D)167.  
Likewise, the rift between German and French manufacturers in the Euro norms 
discussions is confirmed, particularly for Euro 5 and 6 on diesel particulate filters: 
without these, French manufacturers would not have been able to meet the norms; 
the legislation has a “massive impact in terms of costs” for these manufacturers, 
more than for producers of luxury cars – the example provided is EU4 versus EU7 
(AA1-E).  
Respondents from related industries also highlight the diesel issue as a rift between 
German and French car companies (Rel7, Rel8, Rel12), where French firms 
developed a particulate filter whilst German producers could have managed to meet 
the standards without one. Interestingly, diesel is highlighted as a European strategy, 
which led to a battle between diesel versus hybrid and therefore European 
manufacturers versus Japanese manufacturers (Rel12). The same respondent also 
emphasises disunity in the industry: 
During the Auto-Oil Programme, discussions for Euro 3, 4 and 5, it 
was really painful. ACEA said one thing, then another company said 
another thing behind doors. (Rel12) 
As in the discussion on companies‟ view on environmental regulations (RQ4), the car 
industry is seen as “crying wolf” – crying “too loud, too many times that it‟s not 
possible” (Rel8) when, in fact, two to three months after the Euro 5 and 6 standards 
had been passed, EU2 introduced a Euro 6 compliant engine well ahead of time 
(Rel7). The respondent therefore perceives the automotive industry as successful at 
a political level, whilst the suppliers are more successful at a technical level (Rel7). 
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 See e.g. Friedrich et al. 2000, Arp 1995, Wettestad 2006 and chapter 3 for more on the Auto-Oil 
Programmes (AOP1 and AOP2). 
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Similarly to the discussion on RQ4 the issue of timing and cost is acknowledged with 
regard to pollutant emissions: the “political direction of goals” is accepted by 
everybody, but speed and cost need to be taken into account as well (Rel14). 
The State side 
Commission respondents echo related industry responses in their perception of the 
car industry “crying wolf” on pollutant emissions, both in past and present discussions 
(Com11, Com4), where in the past the industry fought against the introduction of 
catalytic converters (Com11) and “had to be pushed” (Com9). Similarly, the 
dichotomy between suppliers and OEMs concerning the feasibility of technologies is 
confirmed (Com3, Com4), with the suppliers being known as successful in CPAs 
(Com3). For Euro 5 and 6, the industry presented a united front (Com3), with a 
“closed attitude” based on a lowest common denominator, not even wanting to 
discuss clean technologies (Com11).  
The rift between German and French manufacturers is observed in the Commission 
by both DGs involved in policy-making (Com10, Com4), with French manufacturers 
“struggling” to come up with the technology, particularly with regard to diesel for Euro 
3 and 4 (Com4), while for Euro 5 and 6 there were very different messages regarding 
NOx (Com10, Com5) and particulate traps (Com3). The difference in CPAs 
concerning French and German car firms is also related to their product range, which 
one respondent explains as follows: 
Well, one had the impression, you could be very cynical about this 
and say that those were the ones that produced at the bottom-end of 
the market, those are the ones that if you start putting a 150-200 Euro 
piece of kit on a car, the marginal additional cost is going to be quite 
significant, whereas those operating towards the higher end of the 
market are going to be less disadvantaged by having to put this piece 
of kit on a car. (Com4) 
This difference between manufacturers of luxury cars versus small cars is confirmed 
by another respondent (Com11) who also relates this to manufacturers who export to 
the US and find it easier to meet European standards than other manufacturers since 
standards in the US are more stringent (Com11). In this respect, one civil servant 
observes that companies are sometimes “in conflict with their own policies” – the 
diesel-focused European manufacturers oppose tightened limits in the EU but in the 
US they seem to maintain that they can meet the stricter diesel standards (Com2).  
In the European Parliament, this gap between the US and the EU concerning 
exhaust emissions is also noted in terms of very different standards (MEP8, MEP11), 
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which means that if companies want to sell European cars in the US they need to 
meet the more stringent standards there (MEP11). There are thus differences 
between firms that are strongly oriented towards the US and those that are not 
rooted there (MEP7). In general, a broad spectre of interests is noted (MEP7) with 
lobbying from the association followed by a breakdown and CPAs from individual 
companies – being “less well organised” is noted as not helpful to the industry in this 
respect (MEP9). The Euro 5 and 6 discussions are highlighted as a “good example” 
where companies broke out of the association leading to a division (MEP8), based on 
economic difficulties (MEP13). Even earlier than that, however, around 2000, the 
association had “suffered a blow” from the diesel debate, and so had the cooperation 
within the industry (MEP8). Concerning Euro 5 and 6, the contrast between suppliers‟ 
and OEMs‟ CPAs is again noted, as above (MEP8).  
More specifically, differences in CPAs are attributed to various factors. As above, a 
rift between German and French (also Italian) producers is observed, with the 
German manufacturers seemingly more proactive (MEP12), while manufacturers of 
smaller cars are also more hit by tightened standards than those of bigger cars in 
terms of absorbing higher cost as a percentage of price (MEP9). In this respect, 
producers of smaller cars try to achieve limit values with inner-engine measures 
while other manufacturers develop after-treatment, which leads to a difference in 
interests (MEP7). An interesting distinction is made by one former MEP who – whilst 
acknowledging differences between small and big car manufacturers – attributed 
differences in CPAs to differences in financial success:   
(…) on the one hand you have cutting edge manufacturers who are 
pushing ahead and being financially successful. And you have others 
who are struggling to meet the present standards and they are 
tending to pull things back. (…) you have to make the division 
between those car manufacturers who were relatively successful 
financially, and which were developing good, sound, progressive 
technology, and the others who were struggling to survive. (MEP9) 
One MEP puts the issue of sooty particles/particulate matter into perspective, stating 
that only 19% of these are caused by the automotive industry168 and therefore the 
industry should not always have to “take the blame” (MEP2). At the same time, the 
industry is observed to over-estimate or exaggerate costs, e.g. in saying that catalytic 
converters cost €1000 when in practice it is €100 (MEP10) – which re-iterates the 
theme of the industry “crying wolf” (see above). 
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 This figure is confirmed by data from the European Environment Agency (EEA 2010). 
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The Civil Society side 
The civil society respondents who discussed pollutant emissions largely confirm what 
is said above with respect to two themes. One is the theme of the car industry “crying 
wolf” and then introducing technology even before it is required (NGO1-B). In this 
respect the industry showed a unified voice in stressing that the AOP was 
“overachieving the target” and that the Euro 5 standards were “too tough” (NGO1-B). 
At the same time, different parts of the industry seem to contribute completely 
contradictory messages into the same political process: 
I think that is one of the problems the industry had actually when it 
was dealing with the authorities in the Auto-Oil context; it was being 
asked to speak with one voice when it really didn‟t have one voice. 
(NGO1-B) 
The other theme that is confirmed by another respondent is the difference between 
French and German producers with regard to pollutant emissions, where French 
producers were already producing particulate filters while German producers were 
more hesitant, leading to different positions in CPAs (NGO2-B, NGO3).  
One respondent laments the exception made for off-road vehicles in Euro 5, based 
on the position of one American company, which is a point that the responsible civil 
servant also made (Com11) and will be further discussed in section 8.4.2 on 
individual CPAs.  
Summary 
Differences in CPAs concerning pollutant emissions occurred across several lines of 
conflicts within the industry. Firstly, differences between French and German 
manufacturers, based on their technological interest and strengths led to distinct 
CPAs and were noted as a key theme by all societal triangle sides. Secondly, 
manufacturers of smaller cars versus producers of bigger and luxury cars were noted 
to exhibit distinct CPAs; this was observed by state and market side respondents. 
Thirdly, related to this, US versus non-US focused manufacturers showed differences 
in their willingness to accept stricter standards and therefore in their CPAs (based on 
the differences of standards between the US and the EU), according to state side 
respondents. Lastly, financially successful versus unsuccessful manufacturers were 
noted by state side respondents as another distinction in CPAs.  
Furthermore, stark differences of interest between car firms and component suppliers 
(especially catalytic converters) were noted as a theme across all types of market 
and state side respondents. Linked to the previous research question (RQ4) on how 
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companies view environmental regulations this key theme was noticeable with regard 
to pollutant emissions: the industry was viewed again as “crying wolf” by state and 
civil society respondents, and even by market side interviewees.  
8.3.2 Area 2: CO2 Emissions  
(…) nowadays CO2 has become the environment. (EU2-B)  
For the sector the top three priorities are CO2, CO2, CO2. (JP2-A) 
As these two quotes demonstrate, the climate change agenda and thus CO2 
emissions have become the number one environmental issue for many stakeholders 
(AA1-A, AA3, JP2-A). After the end of the data collection for this research (2007) a 
Commission proposal was negotiated between the European institutions; the 
directive was passed by the Parliament and Council in April 2009 which is a follow-up 
to the VA from the late 1990s (European Commission 2007, see also section 3.2.3). 
As highlighted in chapter 6 (6.4 Data Collection) the CO2 issue was politically heavily 
debated during the time of data collection and therefore highly sensitive:  
(…) that is a highly topical issue. It‟s not good at the moment, nobody 
will tell you anything. (…) Believe me, that‟s really not a good topic at 
this time. Everybody has very frayed nerves. (EU3-B)  
CO2, I can‟t say anything regarding CO2. (AA2) 
As a response, two more regulatory areas (pollutant emissions and ELVs) were 
included in this research, as explained in chapter 6.  
The Market side 
Firstly, automotive companies are discussed. Related to the previous section, 
several respondents point out the key theme of contradictory requirements regarding 
CO2 and pollutant emissions (EU1-A, EU2-A, EU6-A, JP2-A), as well as regarding 
CO2 and ELVs (EU2-A, EU6-A), which are discussed in the following section (8.3.3). 
As with pollutant emissions, a rift between German and French manufacturers is 
stated, where different emphases lead to differences in CPAs (EU4-A, US1-B, JP2-
A), and even to CPAs at the highest level by the German Chancellor Merkel for the 
German car industry (EU4-A). Such differences in CPAs depend on the structure, 
product range and mix of motorisation (e.g. diesel, hybrid, flexi fuel, bio ethanol) as 
one respondent points out (US1-A). In this respect, a difference between the 
manufacturers of small and large cars is highlighted again, where producers of 
bigger, heavier vehicles find it more difficult to meet CO2 requirements than 
producers of smaller cars (EU2-A, EU4-A, US1-A, JP2-A): 
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(…) you have problem spots. For example finding a common 
denominator between manufacturers of smaller vehicles and 
manufacturers that are rather in the premium or upper segment. This 
is now evident with CO2. (EU2-A) 
This difference in the model mix leads to differences in firms‟ abilities to reach 
targets, and therefore to differences in argumentation and in CPAs (US1-A). 
Companies that are being differentiated in this respect are EU7, for whom it is difficult 
to meet standards and EU3, EU4 and EU6, whose model range is very different from 
EU7 (EU4-A, US1-A). Related to this, the difference between premium, upper cars 
and smaller vehicles is underlined (EU2-A, see quote above). These differences 
make it difficult for the industry to reach a common position (EU4-A, US1-B). It is, 
however, stressed that, while individual manufacturers might have different starting 
positions (EU6-A) due to “technical cost discrepancies” and product ranges (EU5-B), 
the industry as a whole does have a unified position (EU4-A, EU5-B, EU6-A). 
Similarly, one respondent points out a development over time where the industry was 
“divided in the beginning”, and united later on (EU4-A). Whilst this consensus was 
with regard to preferring a VA over a legislative approach before the end of the VA 
(EU1-B), at a later point in time this united view was with regard to key industry 
issues such as lower penalties and a phase-in of standards (EU4-A, EU5-B). As with 
pollutant emissions, differences between the US and the EU are highlighted (EU2-B, 
EU4-A) – in this respect, standards are stricter in the EU, contrary to pollutant 
emissions which are more strictly regulated in the US (see above). 
Automotive associations stress CO2 emissions as the number one environmental 
issue, which is a “very serious” issue with a “negative impact” on the automotive 
industry (AA3). On CO2 “it is absolutely key and very important that ACEA speaks 
with one voice” (AA1-C) which is not only a local issue, but a global issue, as one 
respondent emphasises (AA1-D). In this respect, the same respondent also 
highlights that manufacturers with a global product range find it more difficult to 
comply with standards than manufacturers who concentrate on the European market 
(AA1-D). He also relates these differences in CPAs to the manufacturers of small 
cars for whom it is easier to meet stricter CO2 requirements and to the 
aforementioned rift between German and French manufacturers – for the latter it is 
easier to comply with more stringent CO2 requirements (AA1-D). As with 
respondents from companies, the trade-off between CO2 and pollutant emissions is 
emphasised (AA1-C, AA1-D):  
You can‟t have low CO2 without affecting pollutant emissions. (AA1-
C) 
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Responses from related industries also confirm this theme of trade-offs and 
contradictory requirements (Rel12), e.g. between CO2 and ELVs (Rel5). CO2 
emissions are emphasised as the key topic for the car industry (Rel6). Again, the car 
industry is observed to “cry wolf”; it is, however, acknowledged that for CO2, its cries 
are justified as it is a real concern, and therefore it is hard for the industry to be 
believed due to its damaged credibility from past issues (Rel8, Rel12). The CO2 
issue is highlighted as an area where there is no unanimity in the automotive industry 
leading to a lowest common denominator position taken by ACEA on the subject 
(Rel8, Rel11), and to individual companies lobbying against each other and ACEA 
(Rel7). This disunity shows itself in the rift between German and French 
manufacturers (Rel7, Rel8, Rel10, Rel11, Rel12), which confirms the above 
responses from the car industry. These differences in CPAs are due to the product 
range: German manufacturers produce high CO2-emitting vehicles (Rel7) with 
modern diesel technologies (Rel8) whereas the French produce smaller cars (Rel7, 
Rel12) with technological standards that are “not as high” (Rel8). The Italian 
manufacturer is grouped together with the French producers in this respect (Rel8, 
Rel10, Rel12). One respondent provides the following account of the rift between 
German and French manufacturers on the CO2 issue: 
ACEA has traditionally been dominated by the French perspective. 
The best example is the whole issue of CO2, the 140g/km target. 
When the issue began, the discussions went on for 3 years inside 
ACEA, the Germans had already committed within a Voluntary 
Agreement in the German market to reduce it by 25%, which is fairly 
easy for a manufacturer like Mercedes, e.g. 250g/km then 25%, but 
they would never reach 140. The French and the Italians, however, 
produce smaller cars and with diesel it's not that far to go. So the 
French and Italians will make it, ACEA will not. So the Germans 
proposed 25% and the French g/km. Who won? The French won! (…) 
Now the Commission announced 120g or 130g (plus additional 
measures). Who wins again? The French. (Rel12) 
These differences of interest are even defended through highest-level CPAs by the 
German Chancellor Merkel as three respondents claim (Rel10, Rel11, Rel12). Merkel 
had to disagree with the French position on uniform limits, thus standing up for the 
German car industry (Rel12). The CO2 issue is “uncomfortable” for the German 
automotive industry (Rel13) which has complained about it (Rel13) and which has 
had internal disputes over CO2 (Rel10). One respondent, however, puts the issue 
into perspective: while 12% of emissions are from the automotive industry, 90% of 
the discussion focuses on it (Rel14). 
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Unlike for pollutant emissions, there do not seem to be conflicts of interest between 
suppliers and OEMs in the context of CO2, which can be explained through the 
potential ability of related industries to help the car industry achieve lower CO2 
values in various ways and through various materials (Rel1, Rel2, Rel6, Rel8, Rel11).  
The State side – The EU 
One Commission respondent also puts the CO2 debate in perspective, stating that it 
is an international discussion (confirming AA1-D above), and that the EU is 
responsible for “only 14% of global CO2 emissions” (Com10). In this respect, 
differences in the CO2 regulatory system between the EU and the US are again 
pointed out (Com9, Com11). Within the EU – as for the market side and as for 
pollutant emissions – the rift and differences between German and French 
manufacturers are highlighted as a key theme. While one respondent urges the 
industry to avoid a German-French or German-French/Italian “warfare” on CO2 
(Com10), two respondents link these differences in CPAs to the product portfolio of 
German manufacturers with larger cars169 and of Latin manufacturers with rather 
smaller cars on average for whom it is easier to meet absolute targets (Com3, 
Com8): 
Here the members of the automobile association have very, very 
different interests, which are a result of their different positioning on 
the market (the bigger, the more CO2). The German producers have 
big fat vehicles on the market, whereas the French and Italian 
manufacturers have rather smaller ones (not exclusively, [EU6] is 
manufacturing [EU6-sub1s] in [A]), but on average they have much 
smaller vehicles there. There the interest of the German producers is 
contrary to the one of the French and Italian producers. What we 
received from the association was first of all a universal rejection 
without substance, that is damaging the association; if it is only 
saying no, then this position is not meant seriously, is not taken 
seriously. (Com3) 
Another respondent confirms this, anticipating differences in terms of lobbying based 
on firms‟ products in the market (Com2). Due to different market positioning and 
therefore very different interests (Com3, Com5), there is no unity within ACEA 
(Com3), making it difficult to get a “unified picture” from the industry on CO2 (Com5) 
and leading to the confrontational approach of ACEA (Com10). Echoing responses 
from related industries, CPAs at the highest level in relation to member state 
governments are observed (Com8) and the German automotive industry is 
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 One respondent also puts the Swedish manufacturers alongside the German producers in this 
respect (Com8). 
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highlighted as having problems with its communications on CO2 (Com10): the 
president of the German automotive association VDA resigned from his position in 
the midst of data collection, leaving unanswered questions regarding problems “in its 
positioning, in its presentation, in its communication” to highlight the industry‟s 
achievements in this area (Com10170).  
The German car industry is also highlighted among respondents from the European 
Parliament with respect to CO2. This industry is successful in the big car segment 
(MEP13), but made the following mistake, according to one interviewee: 
When the discussion came up here, that the voluntary agreement is 
not going to be met and that we [the policy-makers, SMW] will reply 
with a law, then the German industry stepped exactly into this evil 
trap because it put itself in the sulking corner and said, OK, if a 
regulation is coming, then you will have to be prepared that this will 
cost a couple of 10,000 jobs. And then you need to be careful, that 
you don‟t lead a discussion „economy against environment‟, 
„environment against economy‟. (MEP13) 
In the lead-up to the VA it became apparent that it was in the interest of the German 
industry that manufacturers of rather small cars also contribute to CO2 reductions 
(MEP7) which meant that there were “fierce debates how the burdens of reducing 
CO2” were to be allocated (MEP7). These debates (“massive internal fights”) about 
respective contributions were and are between producers of large-volume and small-
volume cars (MEP7) and therefore between German and French manufacturers 
(MEP6, MEP8). The latter traditionally depend upon the sale of compact cars, for 
which reaching an absolute target of 130g/km is more feasible. This means that a 
“German-French competition” is carried out on a political level (MEP13). CPAs are 
consequently different as interests in this respect are “diverging massively” which 
leads to an industry association that is paralysed, is working on a lowest common 
denominator basis, or is blocking any legislative initiative to address CO2 emissions 
(MEP8, MEP6, MEP10). 
Interestingly, one MEP does not perceive the differences between manufacturers of 
larger and of smaller cars in terms of their CPAs (MEP3). Echoing some of the 
market side responses with regard to contradictory requirements, one MEP points 
out that the whole life cycle of production and use needs to be addressed in terms of 
CO2 (MEP8). 
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 The president‟s resignation and failure to point out the industry‟s achievement is also confirmed by 
a market side respondent (EU2-A). 
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The Civil Society side 
Responses from the civil society side very much focus around the differences 
between German and Latin manufacturers and manufacturers of smaller versus 
larger cars as well, thereby triangulating key themes from market and state side 
responses. The German industry is again singled out and one respondent warns of a 
repetition of a perceived “German problem” in Brussels as with other directives (ELVs 
and Euro norms, NGO4). The German manufacturers produce cars that consume a 
lot of fuel and are therefore in “great conflict” with Southern European manufacturers 
of lighter, small vehicles that are close to the CO2 targets (NGO4). Another 
respondent calls this the “normal game” where, for example, the Latin manufacturers 
are pursuing their own interests on CO2 (NGO5). Similarly, in the lead up to the VA 
in the 1990s: 
(…) in the early „90s you didn‟t get anywhere on the CO2 and cars 
question anyway because each of the member states would be wary 
of a European wide approach to the problem which would potentially 
affect their industry, whether it be the Italians worrying about small 
cars being asked to do too much or the Germans worrying about big 
cars being asked to do too much. (NGO1-B) 
This again confirms that different positions in CPAs are due to different product 
portfolios, where EU2‟s larger cars are contrasted with EU4‟s smaller cars (NGO1-A).  
Summary 
Differences in CPAs concerning CO2 echo some of the differences found for the first 
area, pollutant emissions. Firstly, there have been massive differences of interests 
between German and French manufacturers for CO2, more so than for pollutant 
emissions. This is related to the second difference, the divergence of interests for 
manufacturers of smaller cars versus manufacturers of larger cars. Both of these 
differences were pointed out by respondents from all three triangle sides. While 
differences between the US and the EU were confirmed for pollutant emissions with 
regard to companies‟ product range on both markets and therefore for CPAs as well 
as stricter standards in the US than in the EU, this difference is reversed for CO2 
where the EU has a more stringent level of standards. In all this, the difficulties of 
finding unity within the association and therefore divergent CPAs based on product 
portfolios were observed. Furthermore, contradictory requirements between CO2 and 
Euro norms but also ELVs were mentioned, leading respondents to call for a more 
holistic and integrated approach to policy-making for the industry – a point that will be 
taken up by the recommendations in the final chapter.  
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8.3.3 Area 3: End-of-life Vehicles  
The ELV directive addresses the issue of scrap cars in two ways: through free take-
back of ELVs for consumers and through a ban on dangerous substances.  
The Market side 
Taking up the last point of the previous section, contradictory requirements between 
CO2 and ELV are highlighted by respondents from automotive companies (EU1-A, 
EU2-A, EU6-A, JP1-A) who also point out the ELV directive as highly political (EU2-
A, EU3-B):  
The ELV directive is very political. (EU3-A) 
One reason for the politicised nature of the directive is that the industry was not well 
organised and therefore “missed opportunities in influence on the right way of law in 
the future”, being ineffective in stating what the legislation would mean for them 
(US2-A). The industry was not well positioned and came into the discussion late 
(EU3-B), which is attributed by one respondent to the industry lobbyists having “left 
for their Christmas holiday already”, before a relevant Council meeting (EU2-A). They 
therefore had to pull the emergency brake on the legislation through lobbing (EU2-A) 
– “fire fighter lobbying” as one respondent puts it (EU3-B). The issue of contention 
comprised the retrospective introduction of free take-back duties (EU2-A) which was 
not an environmental topic, but constituted a financial problem and cost risk for the 
industry (EU3-B). Although this particularly affected the German car industry due to 
German accounting laws (accruals) (EU3-B) and which therefore took the lead (JP1-
A), even using CPAs at the highest level (EU3-B), it was a problem for the whole 
European car industry (EU3-B). Furthermore, the ELV debate was an “ideological 
and unobjective” (EU2-A) debate, e.g. where recycling targets provided by the EP 
seemed to be based on ideology, leading to conflicts between the industry and the 
Parliament, according to respondents (EU2-A, EU3-B). 
Although the industry‟s CPAs helped delay the start of the regulations (EU3-B) – 
which some consider as “wrong legislation” due to “misfits” (US2-A) – the way the 
industry lobbied had repercussions for the industry in that its image went down (EU3-
B), and it is “regularly accused” of this debate (EU2-A).  
While respondents from automotive associations focus on the first two regulatory 
areas, one interviewee does discuss the area of ELVs, which he views to be very 
critical for three reasons: the free take-back policy solely at the cost of vehicle 
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manufacturers, the material recovery rates (recycling targets) and the substances 
ban, which he describes as  
(…) ludicrous and (…) economically completely off the mark of 
sensible politics and environmentally they are achieving nothing. 
(AA2)  
He points out differences in position due to the German manufacturers‟ producing 
more valuable and larger cars. Furthermore, he emphasises that the German 
government takes European law very seriously, prioritising it over the interests of 
industry, unlike the French and Italian governments (AA2). 
Similar critical points are raised by respondents from related industries – the lead 
ban and recycling targets are criticised (Rel1) and the industry is “not happy” with this 
“badly written” directive (Rel3). While the goal and direction of the directive is 
accepted by everyone, there are outstanding questions of speed, costs and 
disadvantages (Rel14, Rel1). Tensions and differences in CPAs are pointed out by 
related industries on different levels. There are differences between related industries 
in terms of support for or opposition to reducing dangerous substances due to 
differences in being affected (Rel1). This tension within related industries extends to 
the definition of recycling (broad or narrow) (Rel6), which also amounts to differences 
between related industries and the automotive industry (Rel6, Rel9). These 
differences can also be seen regarding recycling targets and quotas (Rel2). At the 
same time, as with CO2, some related industries can support the car industry in 
achieving these targets (Rel1A). The highly political nature of the debate is confirmed 
(Rel8): this was a big topic for the automotive industry for two to three years, 
especially for the German car industry (Rel1) which is also emphasised as the 
dominant actor for ELVs (Rel5, Rel6, Rel9) while other manufacturers hardly played 
a role (Rel6, Rel9). There are also different interests within the automotive industry 
between premium class manufacturers and producers of middle and small cars 
(Rel1) or “cheap and cheerful” cars as one respondent puts it (Rel5): the high-end 
marques, such as EU1, EU2 or EU7 (Rel1), rarely have their products end up as 
scrap cars and are therefore less concerned about free take-back duties than 
producers of smaller car (Rel5). The concern of the German industry – which 
opposed take-back except for its high-end companies (Rel5) – led to CPAs at the 
highest level through the German Chancellor Schröder (Rel5) and to the German 
industry‟s confrontation with suppliers (Rel9). Respondent Rel5 also observes 
differences between member states and the type of cars people drive (“North versus 
South Europe”), thus possibly driving different CPAs, as well as a difference between 
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the association (“aggressive and dishonest”) and the manufacturers (“reasonable”) 
with regard to the ELV directive.  
Echoing automotive respondents, conflicting requirements between CO2 and ELV 
are again noted (Rel5, Rel14). 
The State side – The EU 
All Commission interviewees that discussed the ELV debate remark upon the CPAs 
conducted at the highest level through EU3‟s CEO and the German Chancellor 
Schröder (Com6, Com7, Com13) which aimed to “kill the project” (Com7). The 
German industry was very reluctant to support the legislation (Com6) and went to 
great lengths to obstruct the regulation (Com7), especially EU3 (Com7, Com13). The 
European association also resisted the legislation (Com7). Other firms seem to have 
been more cooperative but  
were always afraid of being called off by the association. (Com7) 
As examples of “very good contact”, the Scandinavian companies are emphasised, 
as well as EU6 (Com6). This situation led to contradictory messages between the 
association and individual manufacturers (Com6). Overall, the influence of the 
automotive industry in the ELV discussions showed how strong the industry is, 
according to the respondent who had worked for the Commission, the Parliament, 
and the Council (Com13). 
Among respondents from the European Parliament, one MEP, who was elected 
after the ELV debate, points out later problems with the implementation due to a 
“badly written directive” by the Commission, although the objective is broadly 
accepted (MEP3), thus echoing Rel3. CPAs on the highest level through EU3 and 
the German Chancellor Schröder are again confirmed (MEP4, MEP7) as is the late 
awakening of the industry (MEP4, MEP7) which made it difficult to lobby (MEP7). In 
this respect, one respondent notes that the automotive industry was still “in its 
infancy” during the debate with regard to the EP and it was therefore “one of the best 
learning processes for the industry” regarding the EP and CPAs (MEP4). There were 
“serious differences” between manufacturers based on the product portfolio (MEP4) 
and different weightings of particular interests, leading to different activities and some 
manufacturers “banging the drum about it” (MEP7). Brands such as EU7 and EU2 do 
not turn into scrap cars and may get exported instead, which meant that EU1 and 
EU3 were responsible for CPAs among German manufacturers (MEP4). Particularly 
EU3 faced a major cost risk of financing the disposal with retrospective free take-
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back policies, which would put them at a “considerable competitive disadvantage” 
due to having the greatest stock of vehicles on the roads compared to JP2 with very 
few (MEP7). Different recycling and recovery structures with fewer costs for 
manufacturers also led to differences in CPAs (MEP7). 
The German industry is therefore again highlighted as the most active in the debate, 
with other (European) manufacturers hardly active (MEP4, MEP7). The previously 
mentioned repercussions of the industry‟s CPAs are confirmed: for a long time a 
“stigma” stuck that the industry is “coming with a bulldozer” (MEP7) so that this 
respondent found CPAs “rather burdensome” in this case (MEP7). 
The Civil Society side 
The repercussions mentioned by state and market respondents are confirmed by civil 
society respondents where the industry‟s CPAs received media attention and the 
industry did not make a good name for itself: 
(…) it broke a lot of diplomatic crockery. (NGO3) 
CPAs by the industry are described as “aggressive” (NGO3) and, again, the German 
industry is singled out in the ELV debate, as being “extremely negative” in 
negotiations (NGO2-B). It was through the German Chancellor that “famous” CPAs 
occurred on the highest level, after political agreement had been reached in the 
Council (NGO3, NGO2-B, NGO4), to “prevent the worst” (NGO4). The car industry is 
referred to as a “very powerful lobby” which blocked plans for a long time (NGO3) 
and then “woke up very late”, trying to “pull out all available stops” (NGO4). In this 
respect the car industry was “isolated” and had no allies in other sectors, such as 
recyclers or plastics firms who also engaged in CPAs during the ELV debate 
(NGO3). 
Summary 
Unlike areas 1 and 2, differences in CPAs concerning the ELV debate did not occur 
across Germany and France or across the EU and the US, but seem to have been 
mainly within Europe and within Germany where high-end producers such EU2 and 
EU7 were not concerned about free take-back policies while producers of smaller 
cars, such as EU3, with the largest stock of vehicles on EU roads, faced a major cost 
threat. Its use of highest-level CPAs through EU3‟s CEO and the German Chancellor 
were remarked on by all sides of the societal triangle and were widely reported in the 
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media at the time171. Indeed, the German industry was seen as the most active while 
the other European producers were hardly observed, and neither were American and 
Japanese producers. Some CPAs of related industries were observed, more than for 
the other two areas, but at the same time the strength and power of the car industry‟s 
CPAs were highlighted which led to repercussions for the industry and was 
emphasised by all sides of the triangle, even car companies themselves. Appendix B 
illustrates the complexity of the ELV debate visually.  
8.3.4 Interim Conclusion 
Across the three investigated areas, several key themes emerged in the responses. 
Looking at all three areas in perspective, trade-offs and contradictory requirements 
were highlighted as a key theme, with CO2 in between Euro norms and ELVs – lower 
pollutant emissions lead to higher CO2 emissions, while lighter cars and therefore 
lower CO2 emissions lead to less recyclable cars. In terms of pollutant and CO2 
emissions, different standards were reported between the EU and the US with the 
EU having stricter norms on CO2 and the US more stringent regulations for pollutant 
emissions. Such differences affected individual companies‟ CPAs in these areas, 
distinguishing manufacturers heavily rooted in the EU from producers that have a 
strong foothold in the US in addition to the EU. This key theme in response to RQ5 
also affected the distinction between producers of smaller cars and producers of 
larger or higher-end marques as another key theme. While mass manufacturers of 
smaller cars were heavily affected by the Euro norms and the ELV directive, it is 
larger and luxury vehicle producers that are more affected by CO2 legislative 
measures.  
These product range-driven differences rendered all three regulatory areas highly 
political in the policy-making process as emphasised by all three societal triangle 
sides. This politicised nature led to CPAs on the highest level, particularly for CO2 
and ELV where German Chancellors advocated for the industry. While the German 
industry was particularly highlighted as being vocal and aggressive in the ELV 
debate, differences between the German manufacturers and the French 
manufacturers – both industries highly active in Brussels – were underlined for both 
CO2 and pollutant emissions, based on differing product ranges. It has therefore 
become clear through the discussion that corporate product portfolios have been a 
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driving force for individual CPAs and hence for tensions and differences between 
companies‟ CPAs in all three regulatory areas. 
The highly politicised nature of CPAs in the three areas also led to repercussions 
affecting the image and reputation of the industry for subsequent CPAs – it is still 
regularly criticised for its lobbying behaviour during the Euro norms and ELV 
debates. These repercussions relate to the findings of the previous chapter regarding 
reputation and social capital as important resources in CPAs, which seem to have 
been neglected in the three investigated areas. 
As could be seen from all three areas, there are differences in CPAs between 
manufacturers and between countries of origin of manufacturers. These will therefore 
be investigated in the second part of RQ5 (How do CPAs differ between MNEs from 
the Triad regions?), which will shed more light on these differences. 
8.4 RQ5: CPAs across Individual MNEs and Triad Regions  
As automotive CPAs provide a unique situation in that MNEs from all Triad Regions 
have representative offices in Brussels, the differences of CPAs between MNEs from 
the Triad regions are investigated in the second part of RQ5 (IVQs 6 & 7): 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – between MNEs from the Triad regions?  
This part of the chapter discusses each case company and their respective country 
of origin and Triad region, starting with the European companies (EU1 to EU6), 
followed by the American companies (US1 and US2) and the Japanese companies 
(JP1 to JP3). As with the previous discussions, this is done in a triangulating manner, 
investigating CPAs from the perspective of the market, the state and the civil society 
side. 
8.4.1 Europe: Six Cases – EU1 to EU6  
EU1 – The great event organiser 
Market side responses are discussed first for EU1 which set up its Brussels office in 
1990/1991, linked to the Treaty of Maastricht (EU1-A). The internal organisation of its 
CPAs is dual: association work reports to Corporate Planning while individual CPAs 
are channelled through Communication and Policy (see Table 7.2, EU1-A, EU3-B). 
Apart from Brussels, it has offices for CPAs at headquarters, in Berlin, Washington, 
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D.C., and Beijing (EU1-A). Compared to EU2, EU3 and other offices, EU1 is slimmer 
and relatively small concerning CPAs172 (EU1-A, EU1-B, EU3-A). As a consequence 
the company flies in experts from headquarters (EU3-A) where the head of the 
Brussels office is every Monday to coordinate CPAs (EU1-A, EU1-B).  
As a producer of high-range cars, EU1 finds it easier than e.g. EU6 to fit diesel 
particulate filters (EU1-A), and it is very different from e.g. EU5 on environmental 
issues (EU5-B). CPAs are therefore driven by product portfolios (EU1-A) and product 
specialism: as EU1 sells expensive, high-range cars, it can “sell technology” and be 
“more proactive” in CPAs (AA1-B). This also results in different interests for the ELV 
debate (Rel1). Furthermore, the company sells products world-wide which further 
influences CPAs (AA1-D). 
Despite the apparent ease with which it can meet environmental regulations, EU1 
opposed particulate matter limits and is perceived to see environmental regulations 
as cost factors rather than opportunities for innovation, preferring voluntary 
agreements (EU1-B).  
EU1 has very good regional links to its home federal state, and to the region‟s MEPs 
(EU1-B). EU1‟s emphasis on its regional nature could be a unique feature in CPAs, 
as one interviewee hypothesises (EU1-B). Regarding the EP,  
(…) the summer fete of EU1 is one of the events in Brussels that are 
pretty hot among Parliamentarians. (EU1-B) 
This is confirmed by a state side respondent in the EP who underlines the fete‟s 
ability for the firm to underpin networks and continuity of relationships (MEP7) which 
were established as major resources in the previous chapter. Similarly, the same 
MEP also notes EU1‟s “very continuous personnel policy” for CPAs (MEP7).  
EU1‟s product portfolio of premium cars is confirmed as making “life easier for EU1 
than for EU6” and driving differences in CPAs (Com9, Com11). The firm‟s global 
position with “very important business in the US” (where pollutant emissions 
standards are more stringent) consequently influences its CPAs (MEP3, Com11). It 
was therefore only “occasionally” seen during the Auto-Oil Programme discussions 
and subsequent Euro norms (Com4). For the ELV debate EU1 is noted as “active”, 
and “very good cooperation” was experienced (MEP4). One MEP observes that the 
                                              
172
 As opposed to EU2 and EU3, EU1 is also perceived as more of “a follower, politically” in Germany 
(EU3-B). 
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EU1 office in Brussels is “always interested in showing that they have nothing to 
hide” (MEP13). 
One former MEP recalls a conversation with the president of EU1: his firm‟s cars 
were not made to drive inside Berlin or its headquarters city (i.e. urban traffic) but 
made to drive from Berlin to its headquarters city (i.e. long-distance traffic), a city for 
which his company helped to design its public transport system173 (MEP9).  
EU1‟s strong political links to its home federal state and the regional party are 
confirmed by a civil society side respondent (NGO3). Furthermore, its ability to 
organise big events in its CPAs are noted again (NGO1-B); therefore EU1‟s 
recreational skills (see previous chapter) are confirmed by all triangle sides. EU1‟s 
rather negative attitude to environmental regulations (see EU1-B above) is confirmed 
by respondent NGO1-B who even calls the firm “the worst of the bunch” in terms of 
its “willingness to budge”, as it argues such regulations are impossible to follow and 
will put firms out of business (NGO1-B).  
EU2 – Brussels superstar and the industry‟s pope 
As already indicated above, EU2 has one of the larger representative offices in 
Brussels with financial abilities, as market side responses confirm (EU4-A, AA1-E). 
It opened its office in Brussels in 1989, and its External Affairs and Public Policy 
function has other offices in its headquarters, Washington, D.C., Berlin and Beijing 
(EU2-A), like EU1. The head of office describes the approach as proactive, the 
communication as “hierarchy-free”, and the office‟s strength as being multicultural in 
structure and having a good reputation (EU2-A). 
Unlike EU1, EU2 does not organise events in its CPAs – the head of office sees no 
point in having a “big cocktail party every year with circus performance” as people 
have known the EU2 office for a long time (EU2-A) which is recognised in Brussels, 
e.g. through surveys as the best office or its head of office as the “7th most important 
German in Brussels” (EU2-A). The role of the head is confirmed by other market side 
respondents: he is “an exception” and “great strength” which can simply not be 
replaced (AA1-A), “he‟s legendary here” (Rel12), and “he‟s the father of all of us, we 
call him the „pope‟” (Rel11), due to his long experience in CPAs in Brussels. The 
office is therefore politically influential (EU3-B). As he has been in Brussels for a long 
time, and has therefore built up many good contacts, he has the “possibility to 
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sometimes push certain positions” (EU2-A). People from the EP and the Commission 
come to him because of his long experience (EU2-A). When recruiting, he looks for 
people from the company as he has the network in Brussels which he can pass on 
(EU2-A). Although EU2‟s office is big, it is the contacts that matter, not only the size, 
another respondent emphasises (AA1-E).  
In terms of the three regulatory areas, EU2 itself acknowledges that as a 
manufacturer of bigger, heavier vehicles which cause more CO2, it is interested in 
not getting the same limit values as manufacturers of small vehicles (EU2-A). It is 
therefore very different from EU5 in CPAs on environmental issues (EU5-B). This 
product range-driven difference in interest is also the case for ELVs (Rel1) for which 
EU2‟s cars do not have a problem, thus influencing CPAs (Rel5). For pollutant 
emissions, EU2 introduced a Euro 6 compliant engine in 2007 for 2008 – 6 years 
ahead of the norms coming into force and “just a few months after ACEA had said it 
is impossible in the near future” (Rel7). This could be due to its strong position on the 
US market, and one interviewee indeed underlines that EU2‟s CPAs are influenced 
by its position of selling products world-wide (AA1-D).  
Two respondents note the role of the former Economic Minister in EU2‟s home 
federal state as EU2‟s main lobbyist in Germany (US1-A, US2-B) who was also 
acting head of the global External Affairs and Public Policy function before he left the 
company (EU2‟s corporate website, press release, 08.05.2005). The close political 
links to the governing party in said federal state are also noted by the only civil 
society respondent commenting on EU2 (NGO3).  
Respondents from the state side confirm the observations of the market side. As 
EU2 is at the premium end of the market with important business in the US (Com11, 
MEP3), it has fewer problems with European pollutant emissions standards (Com11), 
and one of the standards for one of the later Euro norms is indeed due to EU2‟s 
CPAs (Com11). Its product portfolio also means that it was “relatively little” engaged 
in CPAs for ELVs as their products “simply do not turn into scrap” (MEP4). EU2 is 
observed to look into environmental protection and cars thoroughly, using 
publications in its CPAs (MEP8).  
EU2 has had an office in Brussels “for a very long time” (Com8) and indeed, it made 
the first step to open up an individual corporate office in Brussels in addition to the 
association (MEP7), and therefore seems to be the company that is “most rooted” in 
its CPAs (MEP7) and among the “more visible ones” (Com11). As its head of office 
has been in his position for over 15 years, EU2 has a stable network (MEP7) and is 
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perceived to organise its work “continuously and very competently” (MEP7). Two 
further MEPs underline the sense of continuity they have experienced with EU2 
(MEP3, MEP6) – continuity was established as an important political resource in the 
previous chapter. The head of EU2‟s office is indeed “greatly appreciated”, a 
“respectable” person and a personality “here in Brussels”, due to whom the office 
“enjoys an extraordinary reputation” (MEP8). 
EU3 – Bulldozer or bigheaded market leader? 
As EU2, EU3 has one of the larger offices in Brussels, and is therefore present at 
every meeting as market side responses confirm (EU1-A, AA1-E). It enlarged its 
External Relations function and set up its Liaison Office to the EU in Brussels in 1998 
(EU3-B); it also has offices in headquarters and Berlin, with representatives in 
Warsaw and Madrid (EU3-B). It is the market leader in Germany and Europe (EU3-
B), and its size and production in many countries is strength as this gives the 
company access to different people, which is an advantage (AA1-E). In its work, the 
company does not spend money on big events, but rather engages in factual 
information activities and technical talks (EU3-B). 
EU3 was already observed to have close political links in the discussion on ELVs 
(8.3.3) and it is further established here that federal Chancellor Schröder played a 
role for EU3‟s CPAs to delay the directive which “upset people at the time” and led to 
EU3 being described as “difficult in meetings” (Rel5). The Chancellor is perceived to 
have “belonged to [EU3], practically” (Rel12). Whilst the company itself 
acknowledges such CPAs on the highest level through its CEO and the Chancellor 
(EU3-B), it puts this in the context of personal relations – when the Chancellor was 
still a federal state prime minister “he couldn‟t yet know that he would become federal 
Chancellor one day” (EU3-B). This could be seen as the use of social capital that had 
been established previously. As it was used late in the process, however, and led to 
a “type of lobbying” that the firm respondent does not advocate himself, the image of 
EU3 went down as a result of its lobbying during the ELV debate (EU3-B). 
Two further links to politics are noted by automotive respondents: the former head of 
EU3‟s Brussels office assumed a high-level position in the Council (Rel8, Rel12) and 
EU3‟s main lobbyist was formerly secretary of economic affairs in a German federal 
state (US1-A).  
This is confirmed by an MEP on the state side who portrays this figure as a 
“batsman” who, as a former secretary, cannot seem to accept that MEPs are in 
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charge of legislation (MEP6). Another MEP pointed this author to an article that 
refers to said lobbyist as being internally known as the “baseball bat” (Tagesschau 
2005, MEP8).  
Generally, EU3 is seen among the more visible companies in CPAs (Com11) which 
organises and sponsors events (MEP8). Yet, again, it is mentioned as engaging in 
“lots of lobbying” regarding ELVs (MEP4) where it went to “great lengths” to prevent 
regulation through its CEO‟s links with the federal Chancellor (Com13, MEP7), which 
is a “story generally known” (MEP4). Even the MEP from EU3‟s home federal state 
who worked closely with the company on ELV perceives EU3‟s approach to be 
confrontational and woodcutting/woodcarving-like with no provision of continuity for a 
long time (MEP7). He suggests that the late CPAs for ELVs were due to 
communication structures not working smoothly in the firm between various parts of 
the company, e.g. recycling, finances, and government relations (MEP7). At the 
same time, this respondent notes that EU3‟s particular economic interests need to be 
kept in mind as they have the greatest stock of scrap cars in the EU (MEP7). 
EU3‟s style of lobbying is criticised by all (current and former) MEPs with 
constituencies in the company‟s federal state (MEP6, MEP7, MEP8), thus confirming 
the company‟s approach even to sympathetic deputies: 
Well, the way [EU3] acted, I wouldn‟t call that a successful example of 
efficient lobbying. (MEP7) 
For other legislative areas there is a mixed picture for EU3: it seemed to be absent 
from the Auto-Oil process (Com4), but in later Euro norms discussions, it pushed 
ACEA (Com11) as well as the German association on emissions as it had “troubles 
to keep up with the development of particulate traps” (MEP13). 
The only civil society respondent commenting on EU3 confirms the “famous” 
highest-level CPAs of EU3‟s CEO through the German Chancellor and calls it a 
“gross/crass amalgamation of interest” that EU3‟s home federal state has a stake in 
the company (NGO3). These highest-level CPAs “broke a lot of diplomatic crockery” 
at the time (NGO3) – which is acknowledged by state and market respondents as 
well (see above).  
Summary of German manufacturers  
Whilst EU1 was noted as event organiser by all triangle sides, it was also noted for 
its smaller-sized CPAs function compared to EU2 and EU3 and therefore also as less 
active in CPAs. Its product portfolio, which drives its CPAs, meant that it is easier for 
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EU1 than other companies to meet environmental regulations to which it 
nevertheless carries a critical stance, also in CPAs.  
EU2 has a similar product portfolio as EU1, but differed in its visibility on CPAs. Its 
head of office was highlighted as being exemplary in his network and credibility that 
he had established over his long experience in Brussels. The various market and 
state side respondents confirmed his exceptional and positive role in EU2‟s CPAs. 
EU3, on the other hand, was noted in triangulation for its close links with the German 
Chancellor and therefore highest-level CPAs for the ELV directive. The type of CPAs 
used in this respect was seen as critical and not as a successful example of lobbying 
by respondents.  
EU4 – Tough negotiator resorting to politics? 
The European Relations function of EU4 has its CPAs structured around 
headquarters (in its home country capital) and around Brussels, with representatives 
in Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Slovakia (EU4-A) who mostly have a 
background in political institutions (EU4-A). As a producer of small cars (EU4-A, 
AA1-D), the additional costs in meeting environmental regulations is a difficulty and 
influences CPAs (EU4-A). Other market side respondents confirm cost as a driver 
for EU4 (EU5-B). Its product portfolio of a smaller range of cars, which is not offered 
in the US, drives its CPAs (AA1-D). It is one of the largest manufacturers of diesel 
engines for passenger cars, which impacts on its CPAs (AA1-D), and Euro 5 is 
highlighted as an issue for which EU4 was “keen” on protecting small diesels (AA1-
E). It is perceived as active (EU5-B) and EU4 says itself that having the best 
emissions figures for CO2 (lowest emissions), makes it easier for the company to be 
proactive in CPAs (EU4-A).  
The company intends to change its CPAs by sponsoring more events than in the past 
to increase its visibility, especially in Germany (EU4-A). This corresponds to what 
another respondent observes about the company‟s “more European” approach and 
heavy reliance on the French network in its CPAs (US2-A). 
The company describes itself as being “very tough” in negotiations: 
It‟s a question of mentality, yes, we are very, very tough. (EU4-A) 
This is confirmed by state side respondents, who link EU4‟s tough behaviour in 
CPAs to its president. During the Auto-Oil Programme the then president “upset 
everybody” by reacting in a “purely emotional way” to the technical facts presented 
by the Commission in a high-level meeting which ended up being very damaging to 
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the company as well as to the whole industry (Com4). Due to the company‟s struggle 
to “come up with the technology” with regard to diesel, the industry only acted on 
lowest common denominator basis (Com4). The current president of EU4 is also very 
powerful: 
When the president of [EU4] whistles, or if something doesn‟t suit 
him, then there are some that react nervously. (MEP8) 
Furthermore, EU4 is seen as “a bit inconsistent” as it does not attend every meeting 
arranged by the Commission (Com11). 
The only civil society side respondent to remark on EU4 also emphasises the role 
of the company‟s president during the Auto-Oil Programme:  
(…) he [the president] continually said that if catalytic converters were 
made mandatory the French car industry would be bankrupted. Two 
weeks after the directive was passed, not entered into force, two 
weeks after it was passed, [EU4] launched catalytic converter options 
on all of their models across the whole model range. (NGO1-B) 
The respondent therefore questions the credibility of EU4‟s CPAs. The company‟s 
use of “tough” negotiation techniques are thus confirmed by all sides of the societal 
triangle. 
EU5 – From national to global CPAs approach? 
On the market side, it is observed, that EU5 – like EU4 – has a smaller range of cars 
and does not offer its products in the US, which influences CPAs (AA1-D). Similarly, 
cost is a driver of EU5‟s CPAs (EU5-B). Its European Affairs/Public Affairs function 
was increased from a small team to a global function 18 months before the interview 
and most team members are recruited from within the company (EU5-B). The central 
team of 15 staff is based in Paris and Brussels, and the company has a global 
network of 40-45 people (EU5-B). Nevertheless, it has a smaller office in Brussels 
than the German car manufacturers and therefore works “a lot” with experts from 
headquarters (EU5-B). It is confirmed, that there is “a lot of interaction” between 
Paris and Brussels: one interviewee states that she is always between the two, 
almost every second day (EU5-A). 
The company presents itself as “very present, very active” in the association while 
also stating that “everybody is very, very active”, thus qualifying the first statement 
(EU5-B). Unlike EU6, it does not attend all the EP sessions in Strasbourg, only 
selectively (EU-B).  
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The related industry respondent commenting on EU5 speaks of a “very hard lobbyist 
from [EU5]” and EU5 as a company who had tried to show a related industry how to 
do their job regarding ELV recycling, which was not perceived positively (Rel5). 
EU5 mentions its cooperation with JP3 and the integration of JP3‟s perspective as  a 
unique approach in CPAs (EU5-B). The cooperation is, however, not on a day-to-day 
basis and rather on selective issues (EU5-A). The link with JP3 is mentioned by other 
respondents (AA1-D), but seems to be hardly noticeable in CPAs (AA1-E).  
This observation is confirmed by the state side respondent from a constituency with 
JP3 production facilities: he sees EU5 frequently, which has a “big representative 
office”, but the link with JP3 is not mentioned (MEP5). In terms of the regulatory 
areas of pollutant emissions, EU5 showed consistent participation during the Auto-Oil 
Programme as the legislation “would make a difference” to the company (Com4). For 
the Euro 5 discussions, the company is mentioned as “a bit inconsistent” which is not 
seen at every meeting, but nevertheless they are viewed as “fairly good participants” 
(Com11). Another Commission respondent sees EU5‟s production facility in Slovenia 
as explanation behind the intervention of the Slovenian government during Euro 5 
(Com3). Two MEPs also observe strong backing for EU5 by the political 
administration through the part-ownership of the state in EU5 (MEP7, MEP13), and 
the former CEO even came from a political family (MEP7). 
EU6 – In good shape but hiding? 
The Institutional Relations and Environment function of EU6 has its central office at 
headquarters, with other offices in Brussels and the home country capital, as well as 
an institutional relations office in another EU capital (EU6-A). It does a lot of CPAs 
work with the Parliament (EU6-A) which is confirmed by other market side 
respondents: EU6 is “much more present” in the Parliament, especially for the 
plenary sessions in Strasbourg which makes EU6 “very different” from the other 
manufacturers (EU5-B). This might have to do with the fact that MEPs from its home 
country hardly speak English so that the company itself has to lobby them rather than 
go through the association, which is a “problem” for the corporation (US1-B). 
Nevertheless, it is a strength and “good for the association” that EU6 has 
“enormously good” contacts in its home country (AA1-E). 
Its product portfolio is mentioned repeatedly: it produces smaller cars and is not a 
global player (AA1-D, Rel12) like the German manufacturers (Rel12). In offering a 
“down-market” range of vehicles where price is a key factor to selling, EU6 is more 
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careful with proposals of the Commission that have an impact on costs (AA1-B). For 
example the fitting of a diesel particulate filter is not as easy to tolerate for EU6 as for 
EU1 due to its product portfolio which influences its CPAs (EU1-A). For CO2 
emissions, EU6 is in a better position than EU7 for CPAs (US1-A); however, although 
it is “very well” positioned in this respect it acknowledges a need to take the whole 
sector into account (EU6-A). 
EU6 is “rather active” in the association (EU5-B). At the same time, the company 
itself notes that while it is interactive “when requested”, it is otherwise not proactive in 
every case, since it does “not want to push anyone to do something” (EU6-A). This 
influences its CPAs as follows: 
We do not want to be seen as being the most visible because it is not 
our interest to be for people saying „bravo‟. We have to provide our 
services to our company. (EU6-A) 
It acknowledges its weakness in having difficulties to read through “hundreds and 
hundreds of documents” which is “not really human” (EU6-A). 
It could be such weaknesses in CPAs that lead a state side respondent to observe 
CPAs by EU6, which might mean entering a grey area: this MEP was invited – in his 
first meeting with EU6 – to a “mega event” in EU6‟s headquarter city (MEP6). He did 
not accept the invitation but questions “what is ok and what isn‟t” in entering such a 
grey area and calls EU6‟s a “very different style” of lobbying from other companies 
(MEP6). 
With regard to the investigated areas of environmental regulations a mixed picture 
emerges for EU6‟s CPAs. During the Auto-Oil Programme EU6 showed some 
involvement as the legislation would “make a difference” to the company, similarly to 
EU4 and EU5 (Com11). For the Euro 5 discussions, the responsible civil servant did 
not have any contact details for the firm (unlike other firms) and observes “we see 
very little from [EU6]” (Com11). On the other hand, the responsible rapporteur for 
Euro 5 notes that he has seen EU6 “a few times” (MEP8). For the ELV discussions, 
one civil servant had “very good contact” with EU6, while the office of the responsible 
rapporteur in the EP “hardly saw” the firm during that time (MEP4)174.  
One MEP confirms the importance for EU6 to brief MEPs from its home country 
(MEP3) and another reinforces the significance of product portfolio for EU6‟s CPAs: it 
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has another segment of the market than EU1 for which life is therefore easier 
(Com9).  
Respondents from the civil society side confirm that EU6 does “very well” in terms 
of CO2 emissions (NGO1-A) and has a different interest to EU2 in this respect 
(NGO5). Nevertheless, one respondent emphasises that “EU6 doesn‟t do anything” 
and always refers to the association concerning this topic175 (NGO1-A). The third civil 
society respondent confirms the grey area that EU6 might operate in for its CPAs: 
before a vote on pollutant emissions, the company provided the deputies of one of 
the EP parties with its cars for a week to drive from Brussels to Strasbourg – a kind 
of CPAs which “almost goes in the direction of bribery” as the interviewee states 
(NGO3). 
Summary of Latin manufacturers 
The Latin manufacturers offer similar product ranges, and for all three their product 
portfolio was seen – in triangulation – as a major driver of CPAs. Nevertheless, they 
showed differences in their CPAs. EU4 is a visible player in Brussels, and its “tough” 
negotiation was confirmed by all sides of respondents, but was seen as particularly 
critical and negative by state and civil society respondents. While some respondents 
mentioned EU5‟s state ownership as an influence in its CPAs, this was not confirmed 
by its representatives. Its link with JP3 was widely mentioned but seemed not to be 
that visible in its CPAs which have evolved from a national (or regional) function to a 
global one. EU6 was seen as less visible than EU4 or EU5 although it is in a very 
good position regarding CO2 emissions, which was confirmed by all sides of the 
societal triangle. It seemed to have difficulties in coping with the amount of 
information from the association, which might have led to some questionable CPAs.  
Reflections on European manufacturers 
As already noted in the discussion of the three regulatory areas and during data 
collection and analysis, many respondents discussed firms in clusters of country of 
origin rather than companies individually (e.g. EU5-B, US2-A, AA1-C, Com4, MEP6). 
Within the European manufacturers, the two clusters observed were on one hand the 
German manufacturers, and on the other hand the French manufacturers or Latin 
manufacturers (including the Italian producer). While one respondent emphasises 
that there is not “THE German car industry” (MEP6), this was a minority opinion – the 
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only on second and persistent attempt secured an interview with EU6.  
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German manufacturers were often discussed as a group (e.g. EU4-A, Rel3, NGO4), 
both in positive and negative terms (e.g. Rel9, MEP7). Similarly, the Latin 
manufacturers were considered as a whole (e.g. AA1-C, Com3, Rel10). To illustrate 
this further, respondents from both EU4 and EU5 stressed the cooperation between 
the two companies in their CPAs (EU4-A, EU5-B) and EU6 often acts together with 
EU4 and EU5 (MEP8, MEP13).  
Differences in CPAs for the two clusters were particularly related to the areas of 
environmental regulations and – related to this – to technology and product portfolios.  
For both groups, strong relationships between firms and their respective 
governments were noted (AA1-C, Com3 Com10) – some car manufacturers are 
“national champions” and can be a source of national pride (US1-B, Rel12). 
Nevertheless, there seemed to be little or skewed knowledge or understanding of the 
other side – e.g. French companies saw the German government as supportive to 
German companies, but did not see the same support from their government (EU4-A, 
EU5-B, Rel11) and similarly a German automotive respondent saw this in opposite 
terms (AA2, see also EU3-B, EU4-A). This issue would be interesting to follow up in 
further research as culture was mentioned frequently as an influence on CPAs (e.g. 
EU1-B, EU2-A, EU3-B, JP1-A, AA1-D, Com1, MEP7, NGO1-B). 
The two Swedish car producers that were also mentioned by interviewees were both 
owned by American companies at the point of data collection176 but were observed to 
be more consensus-oriented and factual in their CPAs, with much weaker links to 
their government compared to other European manufacturers (AA1-D, MEP13, 
Rel12).  
8.4.2 USA: Two Cases – US1 and US2 
US1 – The active one or a finger in every pie? 
The Communications and Public Affairs function of US1 has offices in Germany, 
Brussels, and England, with representatives in Belgium and Spain177 (US1-B). The 
office in Brussels represents the complete portfolio of the company (US1-B), 
coordinating the individual brands (US1-A). This function is separate from Legal, 
Governmental and Environmental Affairs, which is a historically grown distinction – 
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 Both subsidiaries were sold to other firms in 2009/2010 (Automotive News).  
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 There is a separate team in Sweden for its subsidiary US1-sub2 (US1-B). 
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the two used to be one area (US1-A, EU3-B). The human resources employed in 
CPAs are mostly from the company (US1-A), only a minority is from politics (US1-B). 
US1 sees itself as proactive in CPAs, wanting to be a “portal of choice” for politicians 
and not to belong to a fraction that is reactive and negative (US1-B). It carries out 
CPAs through an active information policy and through events (US1-A), although the 
latter have had to be cut down due to the difficult economic situation the company is 
in (US1-B). Its company logo and image opens doors in CPAs, as one respondent 
views it (US1-A). 
Other market side respondents confirm that US1 is very active in the association 
(EU5-B), and that it is “typical culture” of the firm to come forward with many papers 
(EU2-A). One respondent observes that it might be “easier” for US1 to be proactive 
as they are less dependent on the European market (EU4-A). Being a globally active 
corporation is an advantage for its CPAs as it can learn from the experience from 
American colleagues (US1-A) – it is very good at using its internal network, like US2 
(US2-A). It is nevertheless relatively independent from its American parent company 
due to its different product portfolio (US1-B) which features a “European product 
range” so there is hardly a difference between US1 and the European manufacturers 
in terms of CPAs (AA1-D). It is “maybe a bit more neutral” in the association than the 
European producers (EU4-A). In its product range and CPAs, US1 is perceived to be 
“very German” (EU5-B, Rel6), and during the ELV discussions, its German subsidiary 
US1-sub1 dominated for US1 (Rel6). For the Euro norms it was perceived as 
proactive (EU4-A), although the company states that while it agrees with the 
objectives of environmental regulations, their timing is of importance for US1 as there 
are enormous costs involved to equip one of its smaller cars with particulate or NOx 
filters (US1-B). 
State side respondents confirm that US1 was proactive for Euro 5 for economic 
reasons: as it had financial difficulties it tried to get an exemption for its US1-sub3 
SUVs with which it “makes a lot of money” (MEP13, Com11). US1 was also involved 
in the Auto-Oil Programme (Com4), and during the negotiation of the CO2 VA it was 
the coordinator for ACEA in dealing with the Commission – it was the “first point of 
contact” and “the one firm that became really active” (Com8, see also Keay-Bright 
2000178). In general, US1‟s proactive and visible CPAs are also confirmed: it is “fairly 
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referred the author to a US1 colleague who unfortunately had to cancel a scheduled interview 
without re-scheduling. 
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visible, always in meetings” (Com11), “active” (MEP5) and “well-resourced” 
(MEP9179). Another MEP states to have experienced continuity with US1 (MEP6). 
While the market side observed US1‟s German connection, one MEP notes the 
British connection of the firm, which influences its CPAs (MEP7). US1‟s 
independence from its US parent is stressed by state side interviewees (Com11, 
Com4, MEP9). At the same, its “very important business” in the US is highlighted 
which means that the company has to keep a global picture in mind for CPAs 
(MEP3). 
From the civil society side, it is confirmed that US1 uses events in its CPAs and 
tries to use its image (NGO1-B, thus confirming US1-A). It tries to be progressive 
(NGO1-B) and is indeed perceived as proactive and concerned in relation to climate 
change (NGO1-A). It is seen as different from US2 in that it is “more European” than 
US2 (NGO1-B). 
US2 – the relaxed one/the more American one? 
US2 is indeed perceived to be more American as one market side respondent 
confirms, who remarks on the company‟s “very specific” cultural public affairs 
attitude, which is “very American” and therefore different from the other companies 
present in Brussels (EU5-B). The company itself states it might have a “more 
informal” style in CPAs as an American company, and that the idea of having a public 
policy function originates from the USA where it is more dominant and central than in 
Europe (US2-A). Generally, it is a growing function (US2-A). US2‟s Public Policy 
function is linked to the legal function and had a connection with communication in 
the past. This has grown historically and the function has offices at its American 
headquarters, in Washington, D.C., Brussels, Berlin and its regional headquarters as 
well as in countries with important production, such as England, Hungary, Poland, 
Sweden and Spain (US2-A). The office in Brussels (International Regulations 
Europe) was opened in the mid-1990s and the different brands coordinate the work 
(US2-B) – in using its internal network it is “one of the leaders” as it is better 
integrated and uses the network to share information (US2-A). Although it is 
perceived as American in its CPAs (EU5-B) and “not really European” (US2-A) it 
seems to be able to “neutralise the disadvantage of not being European” by doing a 
good job (US2-A). Nevertheless, a big difference is not noted as it has a European 
product range in Europe (AA1-D) which is very different from its US portfolio (US2-B). 
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Although EU5-B states that US2 is very active in the association, it also states that 
everybody is active in the association, thus leaving questions open regarding US2‟s 
CPAs. For one other respondent, US2 is perhaps “a bit more neutral” in the 
association (EU4-A) 
While one of the MEPs on the state side also notes US2 as active in CPAs (MEP5), 
the civil servant in the Commission dealing with Euro 5 and 6 calls US2 “surprisingly 
absent” for their size and “very quiet” (Com11).  
On the civil society side it is observed that US1 and US2 are different in that US1 is 
more European (NGO1-B). US2‟s PVC exit strategy to eliminate PVC from 
production in the wake of the ELV directive (incl. material bans) were initiated directly 
from its American parent, not by its European subsidiary (NGO3).  
Summary and Reflections on American manufacturers 
US1 and US2 differed in the extent to which respondents commented on the two 
companies – US1 received far more attention than US2 and was seen as more 
European than the perhaps more American US2. Furthermore, while US1 was also 
viewed as more active in general as well as proactive concerning environmental 
regulations by all societal triangle sides, US2 was perceived to be more mixed. 
Like the European companies, many respondents preferred to discuss the American 
companies together rather than individually. US1 and US2 are well organised at the 
Brussels level (MEP3) and their approach to CPAs was perceived as similar (US2-A) 
as they seem to be in a similar position “in between”, as mediators in the European 
association (US1-B). Nevertheless, there is “no special cooperation” between the two 
companies in CPAs (US1-B, US2-B), despite the same country of origin:  
I think the origin of the parent company doesn‟t play a role here in 
Europe. (US1-B) 
This might have to do with the very different product portfolios the companies offer in 
the US and in Europe, which was widely observed (US1-B, Rel8, Com2, Com9, 
Com11). The Americans producers are therefore “not American” in Brussels 
(MEP13) and there is no difference between European and American producers 
(Com2, Com3, AA1-C) as the latter lobby on the European basis and product range 
of their companies (AA1-C, AA1-D). US1 and US2 are fully integrated into ACEA 
(Com12), and viewed as European companies in their CPAs (MEP7) as they have 
been in Europe long enough (NGO5). Both firms are independent from their 
American parents (US1-B) and therefore American components of US1 and US2 do 
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not play a great role (NGO3). Nevertheless, occasionally US anti-trust requirements 
may influence their CPAs in Europe which one respondent notes180 (AA1-D). 
One respondent perceived US1 and US2 to be rather German in their CPAs (Rel6): 
The Americans are more German than real Americans. (Rel6) 
This was confirmed by another respondent who saw “no difference” between German 
and American producers in CPAs (AA2), while another also noted the use of the 
British connection of US1 and US2 in the EP (MEP4).  
8.4.3 Japan: Three Cases – JP1 to JP3 
JP1 – The sleeping tech-dog and silent environmental leader  
JP1 received fewest observations by interviewees from all societal triangle sides. 
Market side respondents observe that JP1 is “not a company that interacts” and 
“more technically driven” (AA1-D). It does not seem to “like” government relations 
and is very “independent minded” (Rel12) in its CPAs. They have “someone” in 
England dealing with government relations (Rel12, US1-B), but nobody in Brussels, 
although they are represented in the Japanese association JAMA there (US1-B). 
One interviewee who had worked for the Washington office of his company recalls 
his US experience of JP1 where the company is not a member of the association 
(Autoalliance), thus keeping itself aside from the rest of the industry (EU2-B). It is 
viewed as a green company and presents itself as a high-tech company which does 
not want to be seen as having an objection to tightening environmental regulations, 
but which wants to be part of the solution (EU2-B). 
The company itself confirms its different approach to CPAs. While its public relations 
function is located in the UK, it does have a regulatory and certification division in 
Belgium which is part of the regional head office in London, but the division reports 
directly to the global head office in Japan (JP1-A). This set-up of a specialised 
regulatory office and certification office in one is unique in the industry (JP1-A). It is 
mainly technical people with a technical background that work in the Belgian office, 
and the focus in CPAs is on technical problems that might occur. Only if there are 
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 Several interviewees drew attention to differences in regulation and in CPAs between Brussels and 
Washington, D.C., among them a respondent who had worked in EU2‟s CPAs office in the US 
before coming to Brussels (EU2-B, US1-A, Rel6, Rel7, Com9, Com11, MEP8). These differences in 
CPAs have also been treated by other authors, though the body of literature is still growing and 
would provide interesting ground for further research: Loewenberg (2001), Holtbrügge and Berg 
(2004), McGrath (2005), Richez (2005), and Mahoney (2007). 
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technical issues and concerns in a legislative proposal will the company contact 
policy-makers in order to listen to them and to understand a proposal (JP1-A). This 
was especially the case for the ELV debate where the company was involved on 
dangerous substances where the Commission re-confirmed the position of European 
manufacturers with JP1 as it was suspicious of their position. JP1 is responsible for 
some of the Annexe 2 exemptions on hazardous substances (JP1-A). Drawing on the 
ELV example, the company emphasises that it does not tend to use the public – 
unlike other manufacturers – but that the people dealing with the legislation in the 
Commission know JP1 (JP1-A). It is therefore recognised as a “worthtrusty and 
reliable” (sic) as well as a serious player in regulatory work which is a strength of the 
company (JP1-A). In this respect, it is stated that “if you want to work seriously” there 
is no major difference between non-European and European manufacturers (JP1-A). 
Nevertheless, the company is influenced “quite a lot” by the Japanese culture, also in 
its CPAs, and is a “serious player” in JAMA which relies “a lot” on JP1 (JP1-A). 
The company emphasises that it is “quite different” from other firms in its approach to 
CPAs – its internal rule is to follow the strictest legislative rule in the world and apply 
it to their global products (JP1-A). As a “very innovative company”, JP1 wants to be 
number one in environmental performance which it focuses on (JP1-A). One way of 
using this in its CPAs was the demonstration of the link between regulations and 
technologies by letting members of the EP and the Commission test-drive JP1‟s 
hybrids in Brussels (JP1-A).  
This environmental leadership of JP1 is confirmed on the state side: the company 
approached MEPs to promote hybrid cars and invited members to test drive a hybrid 
car (MEP11). The only Commission respondent to remark on JP1 confirms the 
company‟s more silent approach in that “it will occasionally pop up and say 
something” (Com11).  
On the civil society side, it is reinforced that JP1 does not like public 
affairs/government relations and therefore does not seem to devote resources to it – 
there is a team of two people in London for all European public affairs (NGO1-A). 
JP2 – Positive role model of environmental leadership or simply good PR? 
Unlike JP1, JP2 was very much commented on in interviews by all triangle sides and 
is the company most mentioned overall. JP2‟s External Affairs function is organised 
in two groups: government affairs and corporate affairs. Government affairs are dealt 
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with on two levels – the European level from its regional headquarter in Belgium181 
and the member states level through its sales companies (JP2-A) where it has some 
influence (AA1-E). Market side respondents emphasise that it is the only Japanese 
producer with their own office in Brussels and the “only really active one” (US1-B, 
Rel12); its office is among the bigger ones with stronger resources (EU1-A, EU2-A, 
EU4-A, EU5-B). It is seen as a “company that interacts” (unlike JP1, AA1-D) and as a 
fully eligible dialogue partner in Brussels that is very active and strong (AA1-E, EU3-
A, US1-B). It is a “major player” in CPAs and the biggest of the Japanese 
manufacturers in Europe (Rel12, EU2-B), but still belonged to JAMA at the time of 
the main stage of data collection (EU2-B). It tried to become a member of ACEA 
several times but was rejected (EU2-B, AA1-C, Rel12). It did eventually manage to 
become a member in 2007 (Just-Auto, 08.06.2007), and as it is “new to the 
association”, one respondent argued for the need to “wait and see how they manage” 
(EU5-B) – as a non-member of ACEA there was a difference in terms of less contact 
with lobbying colleagues (US1-B). It has become more confident in its CPAs which it 
operates similarly to European companies now (EU2-A) from which it nevertheless 
differs as it is successful and not in financial problems, unlike some of its European 
competitors (JP2-A) at the point of data collection. 
Although it is less dependent on the European market, which might influence CPAs 
(EU4-A), JP2 views itself as a European company as it has many Europeans working 
for them (JP2-A) and has considerable local autonomy in Europe – there is no direct 
reporting to the Japanese parent company (JP2-A). Nevertheless, it follows 
Japanese work practices “to a significant degree” (JP2-A) which it blends with its 
environment: 
They kind of mix the Japanese and the European way of working. 
(JP1-A)  
The company itself states to use a “softer lobbyist approach” than others and 
stresses the preference and importance of listening and adapting to requests of 
stakeholders, which is a (Japanese) process of exchanging views (JP2-A). Japanese 
JP2 engineers want certainty in terms of dates for legislation (JP2-B). JP2 have a 
very different product portfolio in Europe compared to the US and may therefore take 
a regional rather than a global view (Rel8).  
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 As the regional headquarter is close to Brussels, coordination routes are shorter (EU3-A). 
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Even if JP2 is “clearly a non-European company”, it has gained much credibility in 
raising its environmental profile with its hybrid cars (US2-A). It was early out and 
successful in promoting hybrid cars and showed the lead with it (Rel8, Rel10, Rel12). 
It is therefore seen to have done a  
(…) very good job in marketing itself as a green company. (EU2-B) 
This is also confirmed by the company itself: it takes the position on environmental 
issues very seriously, it has its “own environmental tough standards” and has 
adopted a position of environmental leadership (JP2-A), which is similar to JP1. 
Furthermore, it seeks to influence legislation “in such a way” that the company 
standards become regulatory ones (JP2-A) and states that “yes, we‟ve had an 
impact” (JP2-A). The person who started up JP2‟s government affairs in the late 
1990s also confirms that he “had the opportunity to be positive” in CPAs and the 
opportunity “to do things different”, which he liked about the company: if there was a 
challenge the attitude was “let‟s find a way to face it, not to kill it”, according to him 
(Rel12). 
Despite all the praise for its environmental credentials, JP2 is criticised by one of its 
Japanese competitors: JP2 sometimes seems to use the head of JAMA to talk to the 
Commission when it is actually a JP2-specific question, which the respondent “does 
not like” (JP1-A). To him, JP2 seemed “a little bit more aggressive” than JP1 (JP1-A). 
In Brussels, “JAMA equals JP2”, another respondent confirms (Rel12). 
State side respondents largely confirm the key themes of the market side for JP2. It 
is the biggest company with a large office and very active, proactive and very strong 
in its CPAs (Com2, MEP1, MEP5, MEP8, MEP10). The person who started JP2‟s 
government affairs offered strong support and the right information at the right time 
(MEP7). As a result of its approach of unobtrusive lobbying, the firm is perceived to 
be “much more agreeable” (MEP8). JP2‟s application for ACEA membership and 
subsequent rejection is again mentioned and pointed out as “difficult to understand” 
as the company employs many people in Europe and produces much (Com3).  
JP2‟s stance on environmental regulations receives heavy emphasis among both 
Commission and EP respondents. It is “very good on the technical side” (MEP3) and 
has “actually been fairly open” about technology, providing the most information 
(Com11). In terms of emissions, they seem to be  
(…) the most open about discussing clean technologies. (Com11)  
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JP2 took an early decision in terms of marketing to be at the forefront of policy-
making to benefit from new regulation (MEP1), realising the importance of 
environmental topics in the 21st century (MEP13). It is the only company where the 
name is advertised and associated with environment and sustainability (MEP13) and 
it used its head start in hybrids to declare its openness for future legislation (Com12). 
With regard to its hybrid, JP2 has shown the interaction between environmental 
performance and marketing as it has used the hybrid as a PR tool to promote 
environmentally friendly systems (MEP1). This has been a very successful PR job 
(MEP13, MEP5, Com11) and the hybrid car is portrayed as a “wonderful eco symbol” 
(MEP13). Nevertheless, it is pointed out that JP2 is still “not a great performer” as its 
hybrid was still sold less than its SUVs at the point of data collection (Com11, MEP5, 
MEP13). 
The key themes of JP2 as an active and strong player in Brussels based on its 
environmental stance are raised by civil society respondents as well. Its attempt to 
become an ACEA member is noted again (NGO1-A) and its European headquarter 
relocation close to Brussels is seen as part of its CPAs (NGO2-A). Although it was 
more difficult for the company to start in Brussels due to its Japanese culture (NGO5) 
and was still seen as Japanese (NGO1-A), it is now very present and big (NGO1-A). 
The company has realised what the policy-making community appreciates and 
wants, which is reflected in its corporate policy (NGO1-B). It can “play” on how good 
the image of its hybrid and modern technology development is (NGO4, NGO1-B), 
and therefore stands out as more positive regarding environmental regulations 
(NGO5) and even as the “most progressive” (NGO1-B). It takes a “very, very different 
approach” to CPAs in “stark contrast” to the European manufacturers, particularly the 
German ones: as ACEA is very negative and discouraging, JP2 can “look so good” 
and distance itself as a progressive outsider that welcomes the opportunity of 
progress and challenge (NGO1-B). It has indeed managed to distinguish itself as 
“THE green car firm” with its hybrid, which is “extremely successful” (NGO2-B). 
JP3 – EU5 takes care of it or who cares? 
JP3 seems to present a special case of CPAs as 44% of the company is owned by 
EU5 with cross share-holdings of 15%. Although JP3 has a bigger production in 
Europe, JP1 is the second well-known Japanese company in Europe next to JP2 
(JP1-A). At the point of data collection the Legal & External Affairs function of JP3 did 
not have an office in Brussels and was restructuring its public affairs (JP3-A, EU5-B). 
Other market side respondents confirm the link of JP3 with EU5 (EU5-A, EU5-B, 
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AA1-D, AA1-E, Rel12). While one respondent notes that JP3 “barely have an office 
here, it‟s under the wing of EU5” (Rel12), another one states that one “notices very 
little” that JP3 is connected to EU5. One EU5 employee recounts that the company 
tried to cooperate with JP3 at the beginning of their alliance, but states that, as a 
Japanese company, JP3 worked with Tokyo while EU5 worked with Paris, i.e. their 
respective headquarters. This, and different “working ethics” (Japanese versus 
French) meant that cooperation in CPAs was not on a day-to-day basis, but rather 
from time to time when needs arose (EU5-A). EU5 claims to take JP3 into account in 
its CPAs, and JP3 employees are regularly in Brussels to exchange information and 
positions (EU5-B). Nevertheless, lobbying is done separately (EU5-B). EU5 
furthermore confirms that JP3 did not have permanent representation or resources in 
Brussels at the point of data collection (EU5-B), but was planning to reopen its office 
in Brussels after 1.5-2 years of closure, which might change the cooperation (EU5-
B). During restructuring, JP3 had one person “between Paris and Brussels all the 
time” and one colleague working in London on technical issues (JP3-A). Interestingly, 
the interviewee who had worked in Washington, D.C., recalls that JP3 was a member 
of the American automotive Autoalliance until 3 years ago (at the point of data 
collection), and then dropped out as a member (EU2-B), which raises questions 
about JP3‟s global handling of CPAs. 
On the state side, only two MEPs commented on JP3 which “tends to be a bit lower 
key” because of its “strong relationship” with EU5 according to one of them (MEP3). 
The other MEP has a JP3 production plant in his constituency and despite being a 
shadow rapporteur for the biggest EP group for emissions regulations he had “no 
contact whatsoever” from JP3 in this matter. As local contact is an effective tool in 
CPAs (MEP5), this MEP recalls his frustration that JP3 were the only company not to 
contact him “at all”: all other companies have offices and contact him, but JP3 does 
not (MEP5). While he “sees EU5 a lot”, the JP3 connection is “never” mentioned 
(MEP5).  
On the civil society side, JP3‟s “strong identity” as Japanese is highlighted (NGO1-
B): despite being owned by EU5 to over 40%, it still has a Japanese work culture and 
mindset of trying to beat targets, the respondent found when speaking to people in 
the government affairs or engineering departments (NGO1-B). 
Summary and Reflections on Japanese manufacturers 
The two main players among Japanese car manufacturers are very clearly JP1 and 
JP2 while JP3 is less visible, also due to its link with EU5. For a long time, Japanese 
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manufacturers appeared more “discretely” in CPAs, they did not know “how to act 
here” and often used consultants in the beginning (EU2-A). A development in their 
interest representation has clearly been seen over time – during the Auto-Oil 
Programme in the 1990s there was hardly any representation from Japanese 
industry (Com4, MEP9). 
Japanese manufacturers have made great strides environmentally (MEP9, AA3); 
they promote how green their vehicles and they as companies are and the big 
Japanese companies have taken the lead in this respect (MEP5). Both JP1 and JP2 
are at the forefront of environmental regulations and portray themselves as 
environmental leaders: this was confirmed by respondents on all three societal 
triangle sides. In their environmental leadership and subsequent CPAs they show 
very different approaches, however, in that JP2 is very open, proactive and positive 
in its interactions with policy-makers, while JP1 takes a more reserved stance and 
only gets in touch with the institutions if there are actual technical concerns in 
legislative proposals.  
The Japanese association JAMA is indeed dominated by JP1 and JP2 (MEP3), while 
the other, smaller, Japanese producers are hardly or never seen (Com2, Com11, 
MEP10, NGO1-A). JP1 and JP2 both have operations in Belgium and brief MEPs 
regularly (MEP3). Both companies have been perceived positively in that “the guys 
from JP1 and JP2 were fine” (Rel5) and in that respondents were “glad to hear a 
different voice”, the example being the message of JP1 and JP2 on hybrids (MEP11). 
Although especially JP2 is well rooted in Europe and managed to become a member 
of ACEA after the data collection, all three companies are still rooted in Japanese 
ways of working: there is a distinct preference for legislation to be very clear, with no 
room for interpretation (JP1-A, JP2-B), and a high culture of internal consensus was 
pointed out for Japanese companies (EU2-A). Language as an issue is important for 
the Japanese producers (MEP1, AA1-C, AA3). Not only language but also culture is 
pointed out as an influence for the Japanese producers‟ CPAs (EU3-B, MEP8, AA1-
C). This is particularly the case for the association, JAMA, which is noted as being 
more observing and less involved or active (AA1-E, Rel7, Com1, Com12, MEP5), 
more reactive (AA1-C), and much less present in Brussels than ACEA (Com10, 
MEP5). It tends to follow ACEA‟s lead in CPAs (AA1-C, AA3, Rel7, Rel13). The 
consultancy, however, that works for JAMA in Brussels points out, that it is less a 
matter of culture rather than a strategic decision of JAMA to follow ACEA in Brussels 
(Rel13) and the association itself confirms this as a deliberate decision (AA3). 
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While Japanese producers were generally perceived to wait “systematically” for 
instructions from the headquarters (EU5-B), this constituted a further difference in 
CPAs between JP1 and JP2 reflected in the association – while JP2 seemed to be 
independent in its European operations, JP1 received instructions from 
headquarters. This is also the case for JAMA: decisions for Europe are taken in 
Tokyo (AA3, Rel12, Rel13), which is in stark contrast to European subsidiaries of 
American parent companies (see above). 
Like JP1 and JP2, JAMA is appreciated within the Commission on safety and 
environment (JP1-A), and the Commission itself is open to JAMA on environment 
issues (Com10). 
An interesting observation is offered by an ACEA employee: according to him, 
Japanese companies have more possibility to influence European regulatory 
requirements than European manufacturers have to influence Japanese legislation 
(AA1-D). Another interviewee pointed out differences between Brussels and Tokyo in 
this respect and these differences could be an interesting avenue for future research 
(Rel7, see also Kewley 2002). 
8.4.4 Interim Conclusion 
This part of the chapter discussed how the 11 individual case companies across the 
three different Triad regions approach and differ in their CPAs.  
The three German firms are very strong in Brussels in their CPAs and rather direct 
which was seen as both positive and negative by interviewees. While EU1 seems to 
be less visible, both EU2 and EU3 had larger offices and were very active, however 
with distinct perceptions: while EU2‟s head of office was praised by all three triangle 
sides, EU3‟s approach, especially regarding ELVs, received criticism from all sides. 
The three Latin manufacturers have a product portfolio distinct from the German 
producers, focusing on smaller cars, which is a major driver for their CPAs in which 
they co-operate. While EU4 was criticised for its tough CPAs through its president 
and EU6 for its questionable CPAs, EU5 was noted for its cooperation with JP3. 
The two American car producers are fully integrated in Europe and independent from 
their parent companies, and seem to be neutral mediators between the European 
firms, also with regard to their product portfolio. While US2 seems to be more 
American, laid back and silent (for its size), US1 is very proactive (also 
environmentally) and reliably provides position papers. 
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Among the three investigated Japanese companies, JP3 was noted for its link to EU5 
but otherwise non-existent CPAs. Both JP1 and JP2 were noted for their 
environmental leadership and distinctive Japanese approach as observing and 
diplomatic with a strong desire for clarity, but showed very different CPAs 
approaches: while JP1 is rather silent and only comments on legislation when there 
are technical reasons, JP2 is very positive and active in its communication with 
policy-makers. 
8.5 Revisiting RQ6 in Relation to Environmental Regulations and 
Individual MNEs 
Based on the discussion of the RBV in chapter 4, the previous chapter investigated 
political resources and competences generally used in CPAs. They included human 
resources and expertise, financial resources, relational resources, organisational 
resources, reputation with other non-market actors, public image, support of 
stakeholders, and recreational skills. In addition, continuity was emphasised as a 
political resource, which is part of human and relational resources and therefore 
social capital. This section reflects on the resources and competences that stand out 
after analysing the three regulatory areas and the individual case companies.  
Reputational resources 
Both the discussion of the regulatory areas and of the individual case companies 
underlined the relevance of reputation as an important resource used in CPAs. 
Credibility is a major resource and the industry has been regularly accused of “crying 
wolf” regarding environmental regulations, thereby damaging its reputation and 
credibility (e.g. Rel8, Com11). While EU3 and EU4 stand out as more negative 
examples in the ELV and Euro norms debate as a result of their CPAs, EU2 is noted 
by all three sides of the societal triangle for its positive reputation due to its head of 
office who presents a valuable resource for his company. This also concerns his 
network (“equal to none”, AA1-E) and continuity, through which EU2 has built up a 
large amount of social capital, which it uses in its CPAs: 
[He] is an exception; you can‟t simply replace him, that‟s for sure. 
(AA1-E) 
(…) he is a personality here in Brussels, he is respectable, he 
debates, but not with a sledgehammer, and that is also the reason 
why he enjoys such an extraordinary reputation. (MEP8) 
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JP1 and JP2 have gained a positive reputation for environmental leadership and 
particularly JP2 has built up a reputation of being proactive concerning environmental 
issues over a number of years – it has been noted and even praised by all societal 
triangle sides (e.g. EU3-A, Com11, MEP8, NGO2-B):  
It shouldn‟t just be the manufacturers shouting at policy-makers, they 
need to listen as well and take on board messages and take that back 
and do something with it. That is why I say [JP2] have been so good, 
they have realised what the policy-making community appreciates 
and wants and gone back and tried to do something about it in terms 
of their corporate policy, then come back with that to the policy-
makers and say, look this is what we are doing, this is what we have 
defined our goals and objectives as, this is how we are trying to do it 
and we want to enter a dialogue. (NGO1-B) 
Furthermore, also the industry association has a reputation, which suffers when the 
industry does not speak with one voice. If it lets itself be divided, as was the case for 
pollutant and CO2 emissions, the unity of companies as a collective resource cannot 
be used, which damages the association‟s credibility. 
Support of Other Stakeholders 
Dahan‟s (2005b) stakeholders include other companies within or outside the industry, 
employees, customers and suppliers, as well as local communities and public 
authorities. In this chapter, suppliers were found to be both supportive (CO2 
emissions) and non-supportive (Euro norms) of the car industry‟s CPAs.  
Although governments were not necessarily probed in the interviews, local and 
particularly national (member state) governments were repeatedly and strongly 
referred to by interviewees concerning the three regulatory areas and the triad 
regions (e.g. EU4-A, US1-A, AA2, Rel10, Com8, Com10, MEP13, NGO2-B): 
For example the CO2, at the start it was very difficult, because on 
German or French side when the Commission prepare its report on 
CO2, you know there were some declaration at the very high level, 
from Madame Merkel, from Mister Sarkozy. (EU4-A) 
It has become clear throughout the discussions that the support of their national 
governments (as opposed to local governments in Dahan 2005b) is an important 
resource for all European companies in their CPAs. The support of other 
stakeholders as a resource also includes regional MEPs, i.e. deputies with 
production locations in their constituencies.  
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Time 
Time was possibly a resource that was missing for car manufacturers during the ELV 
discussions as they did not recognise the impact of the legislation until very late in 
the process. Furthermore, although the objectives of environmental regulations are 
generally agreed upon by firms, they stress the importance of sufficient lead times  
(e.g. US1-B, Rel9, MEP7). Whereas time was the term used by interviewees, in this 
respect it could also be seen as the amount of available capacity, a scarce resource.  
Technological Resources  
Referring back to the RBV on a general level, technological resources are assets 
within a company that are used to implement certain strategies (Grant 1991, Barney 
1991). In this chapter‟s discussion it could be clearly seen that product portfolios are 
driving forces for differences in CPAs (e.g. EU1-A, JP2-A, AA1-E, Rel7, Com11, 
MEP7, NGO4): 
[US1] could be proactive, was proactive for Euro 4, Euro 5, in that 
case we had problems with our small diesels, for example. On CO2 
we were in a position to be proactive. (EU4-A) 
There are serious differences, it already starts with the brands or with 
the products, especially with this directive and that is surely true for 
other legislative proposals in Europe as well. With ELVs it was the 
case that an [EU7] and an [EU3] simply will not turn into scrap. 
(MEP4) 
Some are more in favour of legislation on follow up than others. They 
don't all think the same. One reason is the product portfolio, which 
puts them in different positions in terms of average CO2 emissions. 
(NGO1-A) 
If technological resources are seen as the driver for product mix and market 
positioning, these technological resources drive the content of CPAs as established 
for all three environmental areas investigated. 
Furthermore, insufficient or insufficiently developed technical or technological 
resources as in the case of the Latin manufacturers drove their resistance against 
stricter standards for pollutant emissions (e.g. EU4-A, Com4, NGO2-B). Their 
recourse to the cost argument could be seen as an attempt to hide technological 
difficulties as technologies relate to confidential business information. In contrast, it 
was pointed out that the German car industry is technology-driven in its CPAs (EU1-
A, EU5-B, Rel8).  
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Summary 
The chapter strengthened the support of stakeholders as a political resource in the 
form of national governments. This had neither been brought up in the literature – 
Dahan (2005b) only refers to local authorities – nor in the previous, more general 
chapter and thus constitutes a different kind of stakeholder support182. 
In terms of reputational resources this chapter demonstrated both their negative 
impact (see the repercussions of EU3‟s and EU4‟s CPAs) and their positive impact 
(e.g. EU2 and JP2). Furthermore, environmental leadership as demonstrated by JP2 
and also JP1 is a valuable and rare reputational resource, which takes time to build 
up and is therefore hard to imitate. 
Finally, as product ranges drive CPAs it has become clear that firm-specific 
technological resources translate into political resources and significant drivers for 
CPAs and therefore differences in CPAs. 
8.6 Conclusion 
So, it‟s true, yes we try to have a common position on big policies but 
we have also individuality on supporting different kinds of policies. 
(EU6-A) 
In this chapter, the specific findings of the triangulated interviews were examined 
using the societal triangle, according to the two remaining research questions (RQs 4 
and 5), while RQ6 was revisited (IVQs 5-9). 
The first part of this chapter discussed the following research question: 
 RQ4: How do enterprises view environmental regulations? 
It looked at the way automotive companies regard environmental regulations and 
how other stakeholders of the societal triangle consider car companies‟ stance in this 
area. This discussion resulted in divergent views – car manufacturers perceived 
environmental regulations as both opportunities and costs whereas other 
stakeholders from related industries, the state and civil society side saw car firms as 
only focusing on the cost aspect of these policies and therefore viewing 
environmental regulations negatively. This raised the question whether car producers 
gave socially desirable responses, as did the previous chapter. Whilst the need for 
balance and avoidance of contradicting requirements was acknowledged in general, 
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Japanese companies were pointed out as seeing more opportunities for innovation 
from environmental regulations than American and European car companies who 
were perceived to view environmental legislation more negatively.  
The discussion on views on environmental regulations set the scene for the first part 
of RQ5: 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations? 
One key theme that emerged here were differences between French and German 
manufacturers based on their product portfolios, thus leading to tensions and 
differences in CPAs. This also related to different market emphases and regulations 
between US- and EU-focused manufacturers as well as the key difference between 
producers of larger cars and manufacturers of smaller cars where different product 
ranges drive differences in CPAs. Differences in CPAs between the car industry and 
related industries could also be observed in the answers. Furthermore, contradictory 
requirements between the three areas, highest-level CPAs, the politicised nature of 
the policy-making process as well as repercussions came up as key themes among 
responses for the three regulatory areas.  
In this discussion it became clear that there were differences in CPAs between 
individual manufacturers and their countries of origin, which were discussed in the 
second part of the chapter, based on the case companies, thus addressing the 
second part of RQ5: 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – between MNEs from the Triad regions?  
Within the six European cases the main difference that was observed concerned 
German versus Latin manufacturers where both sides experienced highest-level 
CPAs in the regulatory areas in using national governments for CPAs. The major 
driver for CPAs, as could clearly be seen between the German and Latin 
manufacturers, was the distinct product portfolios of the two clusters with an 
emphasis on larger, more upmarket cars and on smaller, more fuel efficient cars at 
the lower end of the market respectively.  
The two American cases seemed to come between the Latin and German 
manufacturers with regard to product portfolios, but they were also perceived as 
German due to their heavy presence in the country and a similar product range. In 
their CPAs, US1 and US2 were perceived as Europeans, and, like the rest of their 
operations, they are independent from their American parent companies. This was 
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perceived differently for the three Japanese cases, which were still regarded as 
distinctly Japanese and not European, despite an increased manufacturing and 
lobbying presence in Europe. The Japanese companies were seen as 
environmentally proactive, and particularly JP1 and JP2 as strong in this respect, 
albeit with very different approaches to CPAs.  
The issue of culture was mentioned as a potential differentiating factor for CPAs, 
especially for the Japanese companies. Culture also plays a role in Europe, as the 
Latin manufacturers have traditionally specialised in smaller cars and the German 
producers in larger and heavier vehicles. However, as this could also be due to the 
strength of the German economy and Germany‟s engineering tradition leading to a 
bigger market for up-market cars, the issue of culture (and institutions) would be an 
interesting avenue for further research (see also Barron 2010). One respondent 
stated he could not attach differences to countries within Europe, but did so with 
regard to the Triad regions (MEP6). Regarding culture and national identity of 
manufacturers, it is worth quoting an interesting perspective on this: 
Each manufacturer had a national identity, which played through to 
the member states representation very strongly. That is no longer the 
situation in terms of the industry being a global industry now, a true 
global industry. But there is still this identification of parts of the 
industry as being of a certain nationality, which I find really bizarre. 
When [JP2] makes any cars in Europe it is seen as Japanese or 
[US1] is seen as English in Britain even if it is American, these types 
of national ideas, [EU3] is German even if they are made in Eastern 
Europe. It is these concepts in people‟s minds that, ownership of the 
brand is still very much identified with different countries but not 
necessarily legitimately. (NGO1-B) 
While firms from one region or country shared certain similarities in their approach, it 
is interesting to note that, in all regions, there seemed to be two diverse approaches 
of CPAs by firms within one country, thus EU2 differs from EU3 in its approach, 
visibility and perception, EU4 from EU5, US1 from US2, and JP1 from JP2. 
As a result of RQ4 and RQ5, RQ6 was revisited: 
 RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in their 
CPAs?  
In addition to the political resources and competences investigated in the more 
general findings of the previous chapter, this chapter raised some more specific 
political resources and competences, firms use in their CPAs. The support of other 
stakeholders through national governments was strongly emphasised for the three 
regulatory areas as well as for the individual companies, especially the European 
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ones. While time could be seen as a missing resource for the car industry in the ELV 
discussions, reputational resources and therefore social capital were reinforced both 
as a positive political resource (in the case of EU2, JP1 and JP2) and as a negative 
resource which can lead to repercussions (in the case of EU3 and EU4). As a major 
driver of CPAs, product portfolios and firm-specific technologies were identified in this 
chapter, and therefore technical and technological resources are translated into 
political resources used in CPAs. 
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9 Findings and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has investigated CPAs of automotive MNEs for three areas of 
environmental regulations in the EU, using the RBV as theoretical framework. This 
chapter gives a summary of the thesis and its findings, implications and limitations, 
makes suggestions for further research and gives recommendations to the three 
constituents of this research – the societal triangle of state, market and civil society. 
Chapter 2 introduced the relevant areas of literature – MNE-Host Government 
Relations from International Business, CPAs from Strategic Management, and 
Lobbying/Interest Representation from Political Science (including social capital), all 
of which stressed the importance of multi- and interdisciplinary research into 
business-government relations. One important commonality that was found among 
these three strands of literature is that individual CPAs – as opposed to lobbying only 
collectively through industry associations – are only possible if there are sufficient 
resources available to firms. Hence, the research lent itself to the use of the RBV as 
an underlying foundation. Chapter 3 introduced the specific context of the study by 
discussing environmental regulations in general and with particular application to the 
EU and the automotive industry in three regulatory areas – pollutant emissions, CO2 
emissions and ELVs. 
Chapter 4 set out the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. Using the RBV 
served two purposes: in the first place, to see what kind of resources and 
competences companies use in their CPAs and secondly, to see whether different 
resources and competences lead to different CPAs based on the fundamental 
resource-based assumption that different resource endowments lead to different 
market strategies. As the RBV has been used in the strategy literature as the 
dominant explanation for firm differences, this was the appropriate framework 
(Hoopes et al. 2003: 897) to examine variations in CPAs. By applying it to CPAs and 
taking the EU as setting, this research furthermore explored the RBV in a new 
context.  
The following research questions emerged from chapters 2 to 4 and were 
synthesised in chapter 5: 
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 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs? 
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? 
 RQ4: How do corporations view environmental regulations? 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations, and between MNEs from the Triad regions? 
 RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in 
CPAs? 
Chapter 6 discussed the choice of case study research as suitable methodology and 
specifically highlighted the importance of triangulating interview sources from state, 
market and civil society for investigating such a sensitive topic as CPAs. Considering 
the contentious nature of the issue, the resulting response rate above 50% (71 
interviews from 130 to 140 potential interviewees) was judged as being very high. 
The findings of the study, based on interviews, were discussed in chapters 7 and 8, 
analysing them across and within the regulatory areas and the case companies. 
This last chapter evaluates the results of the investigation based on chapter 7 and 8, 
revisits the research questions, and looks at research implications and limitations, 
whilst also acknowledging the changing industry environment, before making 
recommendations for further research and to the constituent stakeholders. Whereas 
chapter 7 discussed the general findings across the cases in terms of motivation, 
organisation and approach, the relationship between individual companies and the 
association, as well as of resources and competences (RQs 1-3 & 6), chapter 8 
discussed the specific findings of the three environmental areas and the individual 
case companies from the Triad regions (RQs 4 & 5) and, on this basis, revisited 
RQ6. These findings are now summarised in the following. 
9.2 Revisiting the Research Questions: The Findings  
 RQ1: Why do firms engage in CPAs? 
Based on the definition of CPA as “any deliberate firm action intended to influence 
governmental policy or process” (Getz 1997: 32f) including aspects of communication 
and continuity, the thesis investigated why firms engage in CPAs as a starting point.  
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Five key themes emerged from the analysis. The two main motivators were, firstly, 
the business interest, i.e. the legislative impact on operations, which makes 
companies desire to influence legislation according to their interest. Secondly, it was 
information and communication – the wish to inform policy-makers about the industry 
and its needs as well as the wish to be informed about legislative developments. 
Other reasons to engage in CPAs included predictability and fairness (to create a 
level playing field), defensive (to avoid, weaken or postpone legislation) and positive 
motivators (to contribute to the best solution). In terms of the literature, the findings 
confirm the strategic saliency of legislative issues and favourable legislation as 
reasons for CPAs (Yoffie 1987, Baysinger 1984, Salorio et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
these results showed that governmental policies are an endogenous factor for 
companies, which they are trying to integrate into their general strategy. It became 
clear in the course of the discussion that governmental policies are not external 
givens for corporate strategies. This has implications for the RBV, which traditionally 
takes governmental factors as exogenous (see below). 
 RQ2: How do companies organise and approach CPAs? 
Although the findings of RQ1 would suggest the integration of corporate political and 
corporate competitive strategies, in practice this is not the case – corporate as well 
as other respondents pointed out the communicational distance between the 
representative offices in Brussels and the headquarters, which needs to be 
acknowledged and bridged. A possible explanation was the development and 
addition of CPAs as a relatively new and growing function to businesses, which also 
leads to major differences in how CPAs are called and organised within corporate 
hierarchies.  
The approach to CPAs cannot be generalised or classified as either conflictual or 
cooperative as proposed by some authors (e.g. Luo 2001). It was stressed by all 
three triangle sides that it was dependent on the topics, the individual firms and the 
association, and on the time scale (of both policy processes and automotive CPAs in 
general). Whilst automotive respondents tended to describe their approach as 
cooperative in general, and that the broad, ideal aim is to be proactive and 
cooperative in their CPAs, the findings also showed that the reality of reactive and 
confrontational approaches was acknowledged by respondents of all three societal 
triangle sides in general, but especially by related industry, state and civil society and 
in particular for the specific instances of environmental regulations.  
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 RQ3: What is the relationship between individual firm activities and industry 
association activities in interest representation? 
Three key themes emerged from this discussion: cooperation and complementarities 
between individual firms and the association lead to a unified voice – this was 
emphasised by automotive respondents. Difficulties and challenges for the 
association through lowest common denominator positions, lead to firms pursuing 
individual CPAs due to different interests, technologies and product portfolios, which 
was highlighted by related industries and state side respondents. Within the key 
theme of communication channels it was observed that the association mainly talks 
to the Commission while companies talk to MEPs, although there are exceptions. 
While the automotive industry is generally characterised by cooperation in form of 
joint ventures and strategic alliances, CPAs happen either at the association level or 
the individual firm level – ad hoc lobbying coalitions between selected individual 
companies were rarely observed. 
 RQ4: How do corporations view environmental regulations? 
Although related industries, the state side and civil society perceived car companies 
to view environmental regulations negatively and as cost factors, automotive firms 
seemed to recognise these as both costs and opportunities for innovation183, and 
acknowledged contradictory requirements in environmental legislation along with 
association respondents, for which a balance and compromise needs to be found. 
Civil society respondents perceived an element of “green PR” from the automotive 
industry, which raises the question of social desirability for industry responses. It 
emerged from both the market and the state side that timing is an issue where 
environmental regulations might be a cost in the short term but can be an opportunity 
for innovation in the long term. Japanese companies were pointed out by all three 
sides as firms that – more than their European and American counterparts – see 
opportunities for innovation and environmental leadership in such legislation. 
 RQ5: How and why do CPAs differ – across different areas of environmental 
regulations, and between MNEs from the Triad regions? 
In the discussion of the three areas of environmental regulations it could clearly be 
seen that CPAs differ between individual car manufacturers. Key themes among 
these differences were the rift between French/Latin and German manufacturers and 
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different product ranges. A different market presence of manufacturers and different 
regulations between the EU and the US also play a part here. Other key themes that 
emerged in the first part of RQ5 include contradictory requirements between the 
three legislative areas, and the highly politicised nature of the policy-making process, 
which involved CPAs on the highest level, and repercussions for the industry as a 
consequence of the nature of their CPAs. 
As car companies from all Triad regions not only produce vehicles in the EU but are 
also politically active through CPAs in Brussels, the automotive industry provided a 
unique setting to compare MNEs from these regions. Within the six European case 
companies, large differences were observed between German and Latin 
manufacturers, although both clusters experienced the support of their respective 
national governments. The major differentiating factor between the two groups was 
their distinct product portfolios, which led to very different positions in CPAs. 
Although the support of member state governments was not necessarily available to 
American and Japanese manufacturers, they also received the support of MEPs with 
production locations in their constituencies.  
It became very clear from the interviews that both American subsidiaries in Europe 
are fully integrated in Europe and independent from their American parent 
companies, also in their CPAs, although US2 was perceived as somewhat “more 
American” than US1 which seemed more proactive in its CPAs, also with regard to 
environmental regulations.  
The Japanese subsidiaries in Europe are different from the American subsidiaries in 
that they are still regarded as Japanese, also in their CPAs in the desire for clarity. 
For Japanese companies and especially for their association, JAMA, the links to 
headquarters in Japan are very close. While JP3 seemed to disappear behind its 
alliance partner EU5, both JP1 and JP2 were very strong with regard to 
environmental leadership. Particularly JP2 stood out as proactive and positive in this 
respect; unlike the other subsidiaries it was also perceived as more European, and 
had managed to become a member of ACEA.  
 RQ6: What kind of (political) resources and competences do firms use in 
CPAs? 
Using the RBV as a theoretical foundation, the research investigated what kind of 
(political) resources and competences are used by firms in CPAs, based on Dahan‟s 
typology. Expertise and relational resources with a strong reputational element were 
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stressed by market side respondents – political resources therefore encompass 
social capital since contacts and relationships are vital to CPAs. Although state side 
respondents pointed to the difficulties of outside observations, they highlighted the 
same resources as main resources. More than other respondents, civil society 
respondents observed recreational skills as resources used by firms in CPAs, but 
also stated expertise and relational resources as important resources for CPAs. 
Amongst other resources, public image was less important and, similarly, financial 
resources, recreational skills and support from other stakeholders. Organisational 
resources were seen as given since the companies and associations interviewed are 
all represented in Brussels through offices there. Being connected, knowing people 
(and thus knowing whom to talk to when it matters) creates social capital (Althaus 
2005), and thus relational resources can provide real value for companies‟ CPAs. On 
the basis of the findings in chapter 8, the support of other stakeholders in the form of 
national governments received re-enforcement as a political resource. In addition to 
reputational resources and time, technological resources based on product portfolios 
emerged as a strong resource that drives CPAs.  
The main resources emphasised in both chapters are all connected to human 
resources. These develop expertise and contacts through learning processes, which 
then leads to reputation, trust and continuity. Such social capital enables beneficial 
relations with policy-makers who will take corporate suggestions into legislation, 
which in turn leads to corporate success. Chapter 8 added technological resources 
as the second main resource used in CPAs. As was clearly seen in the discussion of 
the three regulatory areas, market positioning on the basis of product portfolios and 
technological resources drives political positioning. Human resources could therefore 
be seen as the form of CPAs and technological resources as the content of CPAs, 
which together are the driving forces in CPAs and thus the main factors for 
differences in CPAs.  
9.3 Research Implications 
9.3.1 Revisiting the Literature 
In the IB literature – the first perspective discussed – MNE-host government relations 
often focus on developing or emerging markets and seem to take government 
relations in industrialised home and host countries for granted. In the context of the 
thesis, the EU is home and host country for MNEs in the automotive industry and, 
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thus, the literature could be applied in a context hitherto insufficiently acknowledged. 
As previous work in IB may have suffered from an economic bias (e.g. Boddewyn 
1988), the thesis has contributed to the area by questioning governmental policies as 
external givens – here they have been shown to be endogenous rather than 
exogenous factors – and by focusing on political (EU) as well as environmental 
issues. The joint investigation of environmental issues and MNEs in the automotive 
industry is a valuable input to International Business research184.  
Significantly, two important resource-based findings of the thesis confirm the building 
blocks of MNE-host government relations as suggested by Luo (2001) who argues 
that resource complementarity, political accommodation, organisational credibility 
and personal relations make up MNE-host government relations. Organisational 
credibility is seen in the relational resources of trust, reputation and continuity, while 
personal relations are embodied in the relational resources of human resources, 
networks and contacts. These relationships, as a form of social capital, are firm-
specific assets that are not transferable (Luo 2004b, Chisholm and Nielsen 2009). 
Furthermore, these findings confirm that non-market factors not only include political 
risks, but also political opportunities (Boddewyn 1988), which JP1 and JP2 perceive 
in relation to environmental leadership in their CPAs. 
As the research investigated MNEs from the Triad regions, it was possible to transfer 
the Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) typology of MNEs from the market area to a non-
market field as Baron (1995) suggested. From the findings it could be seen that 
Japanese MNEs also tend to aim for global integration in their CPAs, and on an 
industry level through their association JAMA, while US and European firms are very 
similar in their approach. Whilst a multi-domestic approach could have been 
expected from European firms and from the independent European branches of 
American firms, it seems that in their complex structures of brands and subsidiaries, 
US and EU MNEs are developing transnational approaches where knowledge, 
information, and people flow interdependently between subsidiaries, and between 
subsidiaries and headquarters.  
The second theoretical perspective, the CPA literature from Strategic Management, 
has a strong US focus and the thesis has contributed to generalising its application in 
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a non-US, international context (see e.g. Wan and Hillman 2005). The findings also 
challenge traditional CPA perspectives of approaches being either confrontational or 
cooperative – the results of RQ2 show that approaches cannot necessarily be 
generalised. The approach depends on various factors, most importantly the 
individual regulations in question, including their timing and stage, and the role of the 
industry association and individual companies. 
The strategic salience of legislative issues as motivation for firms to engage in CPAs, 
as underlined by this strand of literature (e.g. Salorio et al. 2005) was confirmed by 
the findings. Reputation was substantiated as a vital political resource (see Yoffie 
1987, Dahan 2005a, b), which a firm gains by being a reliable source of information 
(Schuler et al. 2002). Furthermore, establishing credibility as a crucial resource is 
also consistent with earlier studies (Hillman and Wan 2005). 
This third perspective, the Political Science literature on lobbying and interest 
representation, underlined the complex entity of the EU. The thesis has contributed 
to this strand of literature by focusing on individual CPAs instead of association 
activities as well as by taking a company perspective through the RBV. In this 
respect the research substantiates Van Schendelen‟s (2002) resources of expertise 
and networks; he considers a good image as a requirement for successful lobbying, 
which this thesis adds to the resources that are leveraged in lobbying. The thesis 
also confirms that while financial resources are important they are not key 
determinants of lobbying success, as John (2002) points out.  
Eising (2007) indicates that national differences in interest intermediation and 
representation might have been levelled out by 50 years of European integration and 
might be less pronounced than is generally supposed. Although many interviewees 
did attribute the level or degree and kind of interest representation to national 
differences, this research also showed that product ranges have a significant impact 
on the form and especially the content of CPAs. However, the form of CPAs might be 
more influenced by national differences than the content as the form lies in the 
human resources carrying out these activities. 
The research has reinforced the importance of trust-based relationships between 
interest groups (in this case automotive companies) and EU officials (e.g. Coen 
2007). These relationships also create (positive) reputational resources in the form of 
social capital that help firms gain access to decision-makers (Coen 2007, 1997b), 
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which is again confirmed by the findings from the interviews185. Coen (2007) calls this 
whole process a “credibility game“ – credibility has repeatedly been pointed out as an 
important resource. 
In light of the above, this thesis has provided greater insight into the relationship 
between business and politics, and therefore practical recommendations may be 
made (see below). By integrating three strands of relevant literature, this research 
was able to fill research gaps identified in all three perspectives, namely the need for 
interdisciplinary research, the importance of investigating environmental regulations, 
looking at the supranational context of the EU, investigating the nature of business-
government relations as either confrontational or cooperative as well as considering 
the country-of-origin effect of MNEs engaged in CPAs (see Table 2.5 in synthesis 
section 2.2, p. 41). 
9.3.2 Revisiting the Theory 
As discussed above, the findings strongly indicate that governmental policies are not 
given factors for companies, but are indeed integrated into their strategy as factors 
that can be influenced. This challenges the traditional perspective of the RBV that 
government or regulation is an exogenous environmental characteristic (see Dahan 
2005b as well as Amit and Schoemaker 1993, Frynas et al. 2006). As an adjustment 
and contribution to the theory, governmental policies should therefore be regarded as 
endogenous factors that may be influenced by CPAs, certainly in industries such as 
vehicle production where manufacturers are so powerful. 
This study has contributed to the RBV by examining political resources and 
capabilities, which needed to be factored into strategy and IB research and looked at 
from an international perspective, with less orientation towards the USA (Boddewyn 
and Brewer 1994, Frynas et al. 2006). The thesis used Dahan‟s (2005a) 
conceptualisation of political resources to empirically validate his typology of 
expertise, financial resource, relational resource, organisational resource, reputation, 
public image, support of stakeholders, and recreational skills. These are discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
Expertise of human resources was confirmed as an important resource in terms of 
technical as well as institutional expertise.  
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Financial resources are only of indirect nature in financing other political resources; 
they are not used directly as in the US through campaign contributions. Economic 
resources, as Attarça (2002, 2005) discusses, are important in the case of the 
automotive industry – its size and market power were pointed out as political clout 
possessed by the industry which is used as a political resource (e.g. threat of 
relocation and job losses), particularly concerning environmental regulations. 
Relational resources were found to be an essential resource which form a basis for 
gaining access to policy-makers (through social capital) and for being able to 
influence them. External as well as internal networks play a role in this respect. 
Interviewees identified continuity of personnel as a resource which does not feature 
in Dahan‟s typology but which should be added as a sub-category to relational 
resources. Networks and contacts, and therefore social capital, in turn influence the 
reputation that automotive companies have in their CPAs.  
Reputation and political acumen, which Russo and Fouts (1997) identify as neglected 
intangible assets in RBV development, have been shown to be of prime importance, 
thus confirming Moon and Lado (2000). This is especially the case for the Japanese 
companies JP1 and JP2 who have been able to build positively on their reputation as 
environmental leaders when interacting with the European institutions. Conversely, 
the negative reputation of EU3 after the ELV directive was a detrimental political 
resource for EU3‟s CPAs with implications and repercussions for the industry as a 
whole. Reputation also affects public image, which is, however, of less importance in 
CPAs. 
In terms of organisational resources and how CPAs are structured, all companies 
interviewed used internal resources in the form of their in-house units in Brussels. 
These units and their organisation within the corporation were all structured 
differently – a situation that was pointed out by interviewees as possibly due to the 
more recent development, especially for European companies, of CPAs in general 
and in the EU. Like financial resources, organisational resources seem to be a 
foundational resource, necessary in order to be able to engage in CPAs in the first 
place, but not a differentiating resource such as reputation or networks.  
While the support of stakeholders did not play a role in the general analysis in 
chapter 7, it came out strongly in the discussion within the three regulatory areas and 
the Triad regions in the form of national governments supporting firms in their 
member state. Therefore this resource is indeed part of the typology of political 
resources as suggested by Dahan (2005a), although he only mentions local public 
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authorities, not national governments. In this respect, Sethi and Elango (1999) 
propose incorporating country-of-origin effects to expand the RBV of the firm where 
resources could be differentiated into internal (within-firm) resources and external 
(country-of-origin based) resources. As country-of-origin effects were investigated in 
this research with regard to differences between MNEs‟ CPAs, future research could 
link these two perspectives further. 
Recreational skills are commonly used in practice but had not been acknowledged 
previously in the literature, according to Dahan (2005a). These are indeed used by 
companies to set up events to create contacts but were not found to be of great 
significance apart from one company, EU1. 
In summary, this thesis has largely confirmed Dahan‟s typology and added some 
sub-categories to his classification. In this, the thesis therefore contributes to the 
development of the RBV with regard to political resources and competences. In 
addition, the thesis identified technological resources as important drivers of CPAs 
(content) and thus also as political resources which must be taken into consideration.  
The thesis developed the following graphic as a starting point in chapter 4, based on 
the discussion and development of the RBV in the context of MNEs and CPAs: 
Figure 9.1: Resource-Based Determinants of MNE-Host Government Bargaining Power Relationship 
(Figure 4.3, based on Figure 4.2, Moon and Lado 2000: 101) 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of the findings, this graphic can also be taken as a concluding point with 
the addition of a feedback arrow from the industry and country context to firm-specific 
resources based on the findings: 
Figure 9.2: Resource-Based Determinants of MNE-Host Government Bargaining Power Relationship 
(Figure 4.3, amended on basis of findings) 
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As elaborated in the previous chapters, automotive companies engage in individual 
CPAs (bold arrow) as well as in industry association activities (upper left and right 
arrow) which can be seen in the industry context. Furthermore, their country context 
does play a role in their CPAs (central arrow and upper right arrow) and for their firm-
specific resources (upper left arrow). While Moon and Lado (2000) only show the two 
central arrows (see Figure 4.2), the thesis contributes to the RBV by highlighting the 
flow of firm-specific resources into the industry context (association activities) and 
vice versa, and the influence of the country context on CPAs. The most important 
firm-specific resources used in CPAs were found to be resources related to human 
resources (expertise, networks, reputation – form of CPAs) and technological 
resources (product portfolios – content of CPAs) which are thus differentiating factors 
between MNEs. Technological resources relate to technological know-how, which 
Moon and Lado (2000) identify as firm-specific resources used in MNE-host 
government relationships.  
The importance of human resources as found in this thesis is consistent with Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (2002) on building competitive advantage through people – they are 
crucial in corporate strategy. Furthermore, as human resources are intangible 
resources, the findings confirm that the most influential resources in the RBV (which 
does not per se distinguish between tangibles and intangibles) are intangible 
resources (see also Kristandl and Bontis 2007), or as Barney (1991) puts it, human 
and organisation-specific resources. 
While human resources could possibly be imitated or hired away, a firm‟s reputation 
and long-term relations with decision-makers cannot easily be duplicated or 
substituted (Keim 2001b, Moon and Lado 2000). Even though human resources 
rarely move companies in Brussels, the one time it happened it caused huge uproar, 
when an ACEA employee left the association to start JP2‟s public affairs office in 
Brussels (Spell 2000, Rel12). 
This brings the discussion to the characteristics that resources need to possess in 
order to lead to (sustainable) competitive advantage or, in the case of this thesis, 
political advantage. While Dahan (2005a) suggests a classification of political 
resources, he only applies the VRIN framework (Barney 1991) to the outcome of 
CPAs and not to political resources themselves. Therefore, this thesis applies the 
VRIN framework to political resources and, in that, contributes to the development of 
the RBV in a political environment. Firstly, in order to lead to competitive or political 
advantage, resources need to be immobile and heterogeneous. Secondly, resources 
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need to exhibit value, rareness, inimitability, and non-substitutability as 
characteristics in order to lead to competitive or political advantage – can the VRIN 
framework (Barney 1991) be applied to the political resources as reflected in the 
thesis? The following paragraphs attempt to answer this. 
Are political resources immobile? As noted above, human resources are mobile in 
CPAs, but it is rarely the case that they move and when they do, this has serious 
consequences. Most other political resources are tied to the company: organisational 
resources, reputation, public image, support of stakeholders and recreational skills. 
As human resources are tied to the company, so are relational resources and 
expertise. Dierickx and Cool (1989), too, point out the immobile nature of reputation, 
which was confirmed by the thesis. Furthermore, technological resources as drivers 
of CPAs are also “sticky” resources (Teece et al. 1997) as they are deeply rooted in 
companies and therefore organisation-specific (Barney 1991).  
Are political resources heterogeneous? The main resource consists of human 
resources and their related resources (expertise, reputation, relational resources) 
and human resources are by nature heterogeneous. Other resources that are 
heterogeneous and tied to the company include public image and organisational 
resources, possibly recreational resources. Financial resources are the least 
heterogeneous resources. Furthermore, the technological resources that were 
pointed out as main drivers of CPAs besides human resources are inherently 
heterogeneous and organisation-specific as they are linked to the diverse product 
portfolios of car companies. The support of stakeholders in the form of national 
governments as a political resource is only heterogeneous across country borders ; 
within a member state it might be shared among companies and therefore be 
homogenous to some extent. 
Are political resources valuable? All of the political resources and competences 
discussed provide value of some kind to automotive firms. This is especially the case 
for relational resources: relationships with legislators – once established – are 
valuable when information and expertise are exchanged in mutual “give and take” 
relationships. In addition, the technological resources, upon which companies build 
their competitive success in the market place through their distinctive product 
portfolio, are very valuable in constituting vital information when talking to policy-
makers. 
Are political resources rare or limited? Whilst not all political resources are rare or 
limited (e.g. financial and organisational resources are available to all companies if 
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the general economic situation of a company is left aside), resources such as the 
support of stakeholders and relational resources may be limited (cf. Frynas et al. 
2006). For example, the time for a politician or a civil servant to engage in networking 
is limited (and rare) and if companies have built up credibility and social capital 
through their representatives as trusted dialogue partners, they will be a preferred 
source of information when meetings are arranged. Time as a resource for 
companies is also limited. Furthermore, human resources that have sufficient 
expertise about both the industry and the institutional environment may be in limited 
supply. The technological resources that drive CPAs through product portfolios are 
limited in supply, too. 
Are political resources inimitable? While expertise, organisational resources, financial 
resources and recreational skills may be imitated, this may not be the case for 
resources such as relational resources, reputation and public image as well as the 
support of other stakeholders. While the first group of resources may be imitated in 
the short-term (with the possible exception of expertise), this may not be possible for 
the second group of resources. Barney (1991) previously pointed out that human and 
organisation-specific resources are the most difficult to imitate. CPAs happen on an 
inter-personal level and if the “chemistry is right” (as a number of interviewees 
pointed out) with policy-makers in the EU institutions, this may be difficult to imitate 
for competitors. Unique historical conditions and socially complex resources such as 
relational resources and reputation (i.e. social capital) thus complicate imitation.  
Are political resources non-substitutable? As with the characteristic of inimitability, 
resources such as financial, organisational and recreational resources are 
substitutable in the short-term, while other resources such as reputation and public 
image are certainly non-substitutable, even in the long run. Relational resources and 
the support of other stakeholders may be substituted but this might take time. This 
asset stock accumulation (Dierickx and Cool 1989) applies to the continuity that 
human resources provide in CPAs who cannot be substituted instantly. Company 
representatives that have been working in CPAs for several years cannot easily be 
replaced or substituted by a new assignment. As was indicated by several 
interviewees, in the first year or two, one cannot be efficient. Once a network has 
been established over a period of time, this can be stable and durable, thus providing 
continuity. The head of the EU2 office in Brussels had been in the position for almost 
two decades and had established a network that was unequalled as interviewees 
from all societal triangle sides emphasised. 
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Even though possibilities for CPAs are initially the same for every company, the way 
a firm carefully builds up its political resources makes sure that the work leads to 
sustainable advantage in terms of the political resources of expertise, contacts, 
reputation and credibility, in other words, social capital. This process, above all, takes 
time and is thus not easily imitated. This is where firms can gain advantages in their 
CPAs by providing valuable expertise through credible, trustworthy human resources 
(form) who in turn build on the technological resources (content) that drive CPAs, and 
are supported by other resources such as stakeholder support or recreational skills.  
In this context, the question whether the RBV is an appropriate framework to 
investigate firm differences in a political environment as opposed to a market 
environment needs to be asked. The RBV can be applied to the political environment 
to a certain extent, as – unlike in the market environment – firms join together in 
industry associations and lobby for the general interests of their sector. They use 
certain resources jointly, e.g. the support of stakeholders and of the industry 
association. In a competitive market environment this is often not possible for anti-
trust reasons. This research has now shown that individual CPAs are indispensible 
for companies as environmental regulations directly affect their product portfolios and 
vice versa and, therefore, the RBV can be applied in this context. Future research 
could, however, specifically concentrate on the characteristics of collective resources 
that are jointly used by individual companies and on the characteristics of firm-
specific resources that are pooled together.  
9.3.3 Revisiting the Methodology 
Regarding the methodological choice of regulatory areas it can be stated that, 
although the research initially started with a focus on CO2 emissions, it became clear 
during the first interview stage that CO2 emissions were a topic that automotive 
companies (and associations) were very reluctant to discuss. Furthermore, as a VA, 
this kind of regulation is not a typical example of environmental regulations and, 
therefore, extending the research to pollutant emissions and ELVs gave the study 
more breadth and strengthened its arguments for environmental regulations in 
general. In addition, by looking at these three areas this research constitutes the first 
time these have been studied in context.  
The policy community for environmental regulations and automotive industry in 
Brussels is tightly knit and the number of people involved comprises a limited circle, 
as was noted by interviewees (e.g. Rel3, MEP7, Com11). In such a context, 
Findings and Conclusions 231 
 
qualitative methods are better suited – quantitative methods could not have been 
easily applied to this area, especially since respondents all came from different 
backgrounds (societal triangle) that would have been problematic for such 
comparisons. Using triangulation based on the societal triangle (market, state and 
civil society) contributed depth and credibility to the chosen approach. 
Saturation in sampling was achieved with 71 interviews and the coverage of the 
whole population of 11 case companies politically active in Brussels. Moreover, as 
the regulatory areas of environmental legislation were dispersed over a period of 
several years a qualitative case study approach, also in retrospection, seems more 
appropriate than any alternatives. The approach was especially suited for the 
sensitive as well as controversial nature of the topic as illustrated in chapter 6.  
9.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
One of the limitations of the study is related to the preceding discussion on 
methodology. The case studies all applied to a single industry where producers and 
states are so powerful. The three regulatory areas enabled the comparison of CPAs 
within one industry over time. However, the generalisability beyond one industry is 
somewhat limited and further research could and should therefore extend to other 
industries as political behaviour and resources may differ among industries and issue 
areas (see e.g. Brewer 1992, Boddewyn and Brewer 1994, Frynas et al. 2006, 
Héritier and Eckert 2009). The VA over energy use of electronic and electric goods 
and the so-called WEEE directive (Waste of Electric and Electronic Equipment) 
would enable comparisons of this industry with the CO2 VA and ELV directive of the 
automotive industry. 
Climate change as a policy issue shares some of the characteristics of vehicle 
manufacturing, with strong countervailing state and producer influences, and further 
research could and should look at the processes and actors in the development of 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (see e.g. Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008, 2010, 
Wettestad 2005). As there was strong industrial representation for these cases, it 
would provide a valuable research opportunity to investigate similarities and 
differences (see e.g. Markussen and Svendsen 2005). 
Staying within the same sector, the research could be extended to the other two 
major political locations where interest representation takes place. The location of 
Brussels could be compared to the locations of Washington, D.C., where most major 
car companies have offices or use lobbyists, and Tokyo, where ACEA opened an 
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office in 1995 (ACEA 2008). Loewenberg (2001) points out stark differences between 
the US and the EU with respect to lobbying which was also highlighted by the 
respondent who had experienced both (EU2-B, see also Mahoney 2007). As an 
increasingly important and emerging political location, Beijing could be an interesting 
place to investigate interest representation – ACEA opened offices there in 2004 
(ACEA 2008). The increasing importance of Beijing and thus China in the political 
automotive landscape is illustrated by the fact that the new head of the EU2 office in 
Brussels spent three years in Beijing as the General Manager North-East Asia 
Government affairs (Public Affairs News 2009). The industry‟s changing competitive 
landscape through Chinese firms is illustrated by Ford‟s sale of Volvo to Geely in 
2010 as well as through SAIC‟s (Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation) 
purchase of Rover designs and its subsidiary NAC‟s (Nanjing Automotive 
Corporation) acquisition of MG Rover assets (source: Just Auto). 
A related possibility for further research in the same area is the investigation of 
automotive subsidiaries in EU member states or globally in terms of integration or 
dissimilarities (see e.g. Blumentritt and Nigh 2002, Wan and Hillman 2006).  
Research could also include other instances of regulation for the automotive industry, 
particularly safety, distribution, intellectual property rights (e.g. design protection) and 
technical regulations (e.g. type approval). This would enable the investigation of 
whether environmental regulations are exceptional regulatory areas.  
This research was limited in that it only investigated in-house activities – it would 
therefore be of interest to examine to what extent and for what reasons automotive 
companies use political consultants – a research area that Bouwen (2002) and 
Greenwood (2007) identify as being under-researched. 
A potential risk and limitation of interview research is response bias and poor recall of 
interviewees; therefore, care had to be taken to triangulate sources from the societal 
triangle in order to secure a robust base for the findings, especially as some of the 
regulatory areas dated back to the 1990s and even 1980s (pollutant emissions pre-
Euro norms). The distribution of the respondents and the number of interviews 
undertaken served to circumvent response bias and poor memory and underline the 
strength of the research with respect to triangulation from automotive and related 
industries, Commission and EP, and NGOs.  
Since many actors (companies and associations from different industries, civil society 
organisations, other state side stakeholders such as national governments) have an 
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input into legislation it is difficult to define concise political advantages for individual 
companies (see e.g. US2-B, Public Affairs Manager 2005, ECPA Annual Conference 
2007). Transferring the concept of SCA to a political environment can therefore be 
problematic and potentially limits the use of the RBV and thus provides opportunity to 
develop tools to measure and quantify success in CPAs in future research. 
Furthermore, as it was only to a limited extent possible to trace approaches to CPAs 
to MNEs‟ countries of origin, it could be beneficial in the future to draw upon the 
national business systems literature in order to understand how different cultures and 
business climates play a role in CPAs (see also Barron 2010). Future investigations 
could possibly draw upon Morgan, Kristensen and Whitley (2001), Morgan, Whitley 
and Moen (2005), and Whitley (1991, 1992). In this respect, The Council of Ministers, 
which was excluded from the data collection for various reasons (see 2.1.4) and 
could have modified findings, may be included in further research to investigate the 
linkages between European and national CPAs of automotive companies. 
The integration of market and non-market strategy factors (Baron 1995 and 
Boddewyn 2003) could only briefly be discussed in chapter 7 and this could be an 
important and worthwhile avenue for future research as there seem to be practical 
and theoretical limitations in this respect (see Capron and Chatain 2008), especially 
since several interviewees commented on the lack of communication or integration 
between people involved in CPAs in Brussels and corporate headquarters (US2-B, 
EU3-B, AA1-A, AA1-E, MEP6, NGO1-A).  
In this respect, one respondent actively encouraged future comparative research on 
how CPAs are organised in automotive MNEs as there seem to be stark differences 
in the internal organisation of the function (EU3-B, see RQ3). 
As environmental regulations and corporate perspectives on them can also be 
related to corporate social or environmental responsibility, further research could look 
at the differences and similarities of corporate communication in terms of CSR and 
CPAs – are companies giving out contradictory messages to customers and policy-
makers or are they sending out consistent communications?186 Pedler (2002a) points 
out that, increasingly, public affairs managers cover CSR issues in addition to 
                                              
186
 It is known to the author that such work has started – a doctoral researcher at the ICCSR 
(International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility) at the Nottingham University Business 
School is working on similar questions. McGee (1998) also places corporate strategies and 
environmental regulations in the context of CSR. 
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lobbying and government affairs, and therefore this link is an important direction for 
further research.  
A further important limitation with regard to the focal industry is that its nature has 
changed since the beginning of the research and especially since the end of data 
collection (Just-Auto 2010a), with regard to several respects. The importance of 
environmentally friendly cars has increased, and is more and more recognised by the 
industry (Just-Auto 2010b). The global financial crisis has affected the automotive 
industry in various ways, among them the end of various scrappage schemes (e.g. 
Automotive World, 16.03.2010), that were intended to aid the industry in its recovery, 
which may leave the sector particularly vulnerable.  
The global financial crisis also led to changes in ownership and alliance structures 
within the industry. Both GM and Chrysler filed for bankruptcy and required a bail-out 
by the federal US government in 2009 (FT 2011b), thus demonstrating the 
vulnerability of the sector. With the offering of GM shares in the stock market in 2010 
and Chrysler‟s listing in 2011, the two companies seem to have achieved a 
turnaround. Both companies have carried out changes in their brand and alliance 
structure: GM has sold off its Saab brand while Chrysler has teamed up with Fiat, 
which could potentially lead to a full merger, after its separation from Chrysler and 
acquisition by Cerberus. Fiat in turn is in the process of separating its industrial 
business from its automotive and engine business (FT 2011c), while Ford has sold 
several of its marques to emerging market companies (FT 2011d).  
Changes in the industry have also occurred in Brussels as main location of CPAs 
regarding EU environmental regulations for the automotive industry. The growing 
importance of Asian companies and the Asian context is reflected in several 
changes. As mentioned above, the new head of the EU2 office in Brussels spent 
three years in the company‟s Beijing government affairs office. Since the end of data 
collection, JP2 has been accepted as an ACEA member. This is a major shift for 
CPAs in Brussels considering the stir JP2 caused when it employed a former ACEA 
employee to start its European government affairs in the 1990s (Spell 2000, Rel12). 
This leaves the question open whether this has had or will have an effect on ACEA 
and its member companies in their CPAs due to JP2‟s different approach, particularly 
regarding environmental issues, discussed in the previous chapter. JP3 re-opened its 
representational offices after closing it for a couple of years. Furthermore, while 
neither the Korean association KAMA nor any of its members had any 
representational offices for the duration of this research, Hyundai has since opened 
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offices in Brussels. This change in the political landscape reflects and complements 
changes in the competitive environment, as mentioned above, through the 
emergence of Chinese, Indian and Korean manufacturers investing in established 
markets and/or European- and American-owned brands. This goes in parallel with 
the massive growth of emerging markets, which have become even more crucial to 
the car industry during the global financial crisis as established car markets, such as 
Europe and Japan, are only expected to deliver moderate growth following the 
recession (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011).  
9.5 Recommendations and Concluding Remarks 
In light of these discussions, certain recommendations and concluding remarks can 
be made. While suggestions for further academic research have been proposed, the 
findings are also relevant for practitioners on the three constituent sides of this 
research: on the basis of the analysis and the interviews with stakeholders (IVQs 10 
and 11), the following recommendations are put forward. 
The Civil Society side 
This side constitutes the smallest stakeholder within the societal triangle. While some 
respondents were critical of the messages sent out by NGOs (EU3-A, AA1-C) as 
they tend to oppose the industry (Rel2, see also FT 2010), civil society is encouraged 
to be more positive towards the industry (US1-B) in acknowledging the complex 
reality of car production and the impact this has on environmental progress (US1-B, 
AA1-B). 
For one respondent NGOs were not as strong as expected in Brussels as they 
seemed to work more on a member state level (AA1-A). This may be translated into 
a recommendation for both environmental and consumer organisations to step up 
their efforts at the EU level which, in general, are recognised and valued (EU2-A, 
NGO1-A). Furthermore, such NGOs have an important place to play in enhanced 
cooperation between industry, governments (European Commission), customers and 
users (AA3, NGO6). As civil society provides an important counterpart to industry 
and companies in CPAs, the work already undertaken by various organisations in 
Brussels, should arguably continue in this way to provide a critical and 
environmentally positive voice in policy-making for the car industry. 
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The State side 
Recommendations for the state side revolve around one key theme, that of 
integration. Firstly, the approach to policy-making should be holistic and integrated 
within the car industry, which has several aspects to it, as discussed in the following. 
As was repeatedly pointed out in chapter 8, there are contradictory requirements 
between different regulations (e.g. JP1-A, Rel10, Rel12). It is important not to deal 
with one regulation in isolation from any other (AA1-C) but to balance requirements 
(EU1-A, EU2-A, EU3-B, EU6-A, US1-A, JP1-A, JP2-A, AA1-C, AA1-B): 
Technically to win on every front, that is the Holy Grail, to get 
progress on all fronts. (JP2-A) 
In order to avoid contradictory requirements, timing needs to be considered (US1-B, 
Rel10) and a perspective of the whole life cycle needs to be taken (MEP8). This is 
with regard to production, but also with regard to the life cycle of legislation which 
should include impact assessments of costs and legislative measures (AA1-C) and 
monitoring after their implementation (AA1-D, see also Lenschow and Sprungk 
2010). The principle of cost-effectiveness should arguably guide a fact-based and 
objective approach to policy-making rather than a political approach (AA1-B, AA1-D, 
US1-B, EU2-A) where objectives rather than means are set (EU3-B). Rational cost-
benefit analysis would integrate the three objectives of environment, economy and 
society instead of playing them against each other (MEP13), e.g. jobs versus 
environmental protection. 
In order to avoid contradictory requirements, clarity of legislation is paramount (AA1-
D), which is particularly advocated by Japanese companies (JP1-A, JP2-B). Clarity is 
also advocated by this civil society respondent: 
The car industry understands only one language and that is clear 
legislation. (NGO3) 
An integrated approach for the industry in policy-making might also include better 
cooperation and integration between the Directorates Generals of the Commission 
who are responsible for automotive legislation, e.g. DG Industry and DG 
Environment, which have not always worked together in the best interest of the 
industry (Rel3, Rel4). Several market side respondents were concerned about the 
level of expertise in the Commission, especially a lack of engineers (AA1-B, AA1-D), 
and subsequent poorly written legislation (US2-A, AA1-B, AA1-D, Rel3). 
Furthermore, contract researchers who “move around” were also mentioned (AA1-D), 
which means that there is not much continuity of Commission personnel in 
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automotive legislation (US1-B). This translates into a recommendation for more 
engineers in addition to existing legal and economic experts in the Commission, and 
for more continuity of personnel working on automotive policy-making within the 
Commission.  
For improved policy-making in cooperation between policy-makers, the Commission 
could furthermore provide layman‟s summaries so that MEPs do not have to rely on 
lobbyists to explain legislation to them (MEP11). 
Secondly, the approach could integrate other industries who may contribute to 
environmental progress, too (US1-A, US1-B, AA1-B). Although the automotive 
industry is an easy target (US1-B, Rel14), one industry alone cannot address all 
environmental issues, which is why an integrated approach may be needed (AA3, 
Rel5), where also less visible sectors are included (US2-A). 
Thirdly, an integrated approach to policy-making should arguably not only include the 
market side, it should also include civil society in terms of consumers. Consumers do 
not like to be regulated in general (EU5-B, NGO1-B), but policy-makers should not be 
afraid to do so (AA1-A, NGO1-B). This could avoid costs being borne only by industry 
(AA1-A, Rel5).  
The Market side 
While most recommendations are and were made with regard to the automotive 
industry, some recommendations may be made with regard to the CPAs of related 
industries on the basis of interviews. They seem to have a careful approach to CPAs 
as they cannot be seen to contradict their customers in the car industry (Com11) and 
therefore tend to be “kowtowed” in their communication (NGO1-B). In the long-run 
they could benefit from an environmentally proactive strategy such as JP2‟s (NGO1-
A) and there is hence an opportunity to speak up for these industries‟ interest instead 
of being subservient to the car industry. Furthermore, as related industries can 
support the car industry in achieving more environmentally friendly vehicles, this 
message could be emphasised in their CPAs.  
The car industry can learn from other industries, e.g. the oil industry, to be more 
effective, positive and adaptive in its CPAs, based less on emotions and more on 
facts (Com3, Com7, MEP9, EU2-A, Rel4, Rel9). 
Concerning the political resources and competences that automotive MNEs use in 
CPAs, there needs to be a careful balance and mix of resources in terms of the form 
and content of CPAs. Content (technology, product range, firm-specific resources 
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leading to SCA) is not communicable without form (human resources, reputation, 
credibility, continuity, i.e. social capital) and form without content is hollow. This 
means that personnel should be carefully chosen to foster relations with policy-
makers, to provide continuity and credibility. Furthermore, if human resources have 
the relevant expertise on legislation and on technology they will be able to 
communicate effectively the needs of the firms driven by their technology and 
product range. The size of the industry is also a strength that can be used as a 
resource in its CPAs (Rel4, Rel6, Com8), which should, however, be used sensibly 
(Rel1, Rel2, Rel11, Rel14). 
Special emphasis was given to credibility as a resource, which is a resource the 
automotive industry is recommended to pay more attention to, especially considering 
its history of “crying wolf” and of being too pushy (Rel8, Rel9, Com4, MEP5, MEP7). 
There should probably be a greater willingness of the car industry to compromise 
(Rel6, MEP8) with respect to other stakeholders, be it related industries, policy-
makers or NGOs. Credibility could also be improved by providing continuity of 
personnel (US1-B) and by adapting to the culture in Brussels in order to be more 
effective (Com3). 
Another area where recommendations may be made, which is related to credibility, 
concerns the communication of the industry (Com1, Com10). The car industry is 
heterogeneous and often struggles to cooperate and find a joint pro-active strategy 
(NGO4, EU6-A). The ability to communicate is crucial in CPAs and, arguably, the 
industry association should therefore speak with one voice in this respect (Rel6, 
Com10, NGO1-B). Furthermore, only one voice should be heard from each company 
– the bigger a firm becomes, the more individual divisions may have specific 
interests, which might negatively impact CPAs (MEP7). It is therefore of significant 
importance to improve communications between the representative offices in 
Brussels and headquarters: the importance of the CPA function needs to be 
promoted so that the “top people” recognise the importance of the political framework 
and the possibilities of influencing it as it is not an external factor but an endogenous 
factor which can be factored into strategy (MEP9, MEP7, AA1-A, AA1-E, US2-B). 
This means that social capital should be present in both its forms: in bonding form 
through improved communication within companies and within the industry, and in 
bridging form through improved communication with policy-makers by providing a 
joint industry voice on the basis of their strong network, i.e. bonding social capital.  
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Finally, in the area of environmental regulations and how these are viewed, the 
examples of JP1 and JP2 have shown that there are indeed opportunities for 
environmental leadership in regulations and that a positive outlook on environmental 
regulations can lead to better relations with policy-makers and can open ears, e.g. 
JP1 and the materials ban in the ELV directive. US1‟s proactive approach was also 
noted. EU2‟s positive relations and its credible and continuity-based approach were 
rewarded during the legislation on pollutant emissions where one standard was 
based on the company‟s suggestion. A proactive, transparent and regular (i.e. 
continuous) engagement of industry with government is also recommended by 
McKinsey (2010). The car industry‟s “biggest weakness” is that it is always hiding 
instead of being open with regard to environmental legislation (Rel12). Thus, 
environmental regulations may be taken as an opportunity to be less defensive and 
more proactive in improving the integration of the environmental aspect in their CPAs 
(Com1) with a positive attitude (Com12) as the industry is not only part of the 
problem but also part of the solution (Rel11). While the cost of technology is used by 
the industry as a factor against legislation, this is only in the short term, while in the 
long term there are opportunities on a wider scale and therefore the industry may 
integrate the long-term view of environmental legislation in order to become less 
reactive or defensive and more proactive in their CPAs, anticipating developments 
and developing concepts (EU1-B, Rel7, Rel12, Com5, Com8, MEP3, MEP6, MEP7, 
MEP13, NGO1-B, NGO5).  
From all the tensions and repercussions the car industry and its companies has 
experienced in the discussed regulatory areas, important lessons can therefore be 
learned in how to apply a proactive and cooperative approach to CPAs. This is 
especially the case for environmental regulations which MNEs (not only) in the 
automotive industry may view more favourably as challenges and opportunities in 
order to improve their relations and interest representation with political institutions  
and therefore their reputation and credibility (i.e. social capital), and, as a strong 
industry, to contribute positively to the protection of the natural environment and thus 
to sustainable development. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sources of Interviews and Documentation 
Sources of Interviews 
On the basis of the considerations in chapter 6 the following organisations were 
specifically identified and contacted for interviews:  
From the government side 
 the Commission‟s Directorates General (DG) for environment (various units, 
e.g. Clean Air and Transport) and for industry (Automotive unit): present and 
former civil servants; 
 the Parliament‟s environmental committee: present and former members, 
other involved committees according to legislation (e.g. industry, research, 
energy). 
From the market side:  
 Automotive companies with liaison/government affairs office in Brussels: all 
members of ACEA (European Automobile Manufacturers' Association); 
members of JAMA (Japan Automobile Manufacturers' Association). Current 
and former employees working in government affairs, public affairs, European 
affairs, regulatory affairs, public policy (terminology varies). Companies 
without an office in Brussels but with links to JAMA.  
 European automotive industry association ACEA. Staff responsible for 
investigated policy areas (pollutant emissions, CO2, recycling). Japanese 
automobile industry association JAMA (office in Brussels), Korean industry 
association KAMA (no office in Brussels). National automotive industry 
associations (e.g. SMMT in the UK, VDA in Germany), staff responsible for 
environmental issues.  
 Related industries (associations and companies) as other stakeholders: 
Supplier industries: European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA), 
European Association of Metals (Eurometaux), PlasticsEurope, and European 
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Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER); component and tyre 
manufacturers. Petroleum industry: European Petroleum Industry Association 
(EUROPIA), The oil companies‟ European association for environment, health 
and safety in refining and distribution (CONCAWE). Recycling industries: the 
European Group of Automotive Recycling Associations (EGARA), European 
Ferrous Recovery and Recycling Federation (EFR).   
From the civil society side:  
 Environmental NGOs: European Environmental Bureau (EEB), Friends of the 
Earth Europe (FOE), Greenpeace, European Federation for Transport and 
Environment (T&E), World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF – European Policy 
Unit).  
 Unions: European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), European Metalworkers‟ 
Federation (EMF)187. 
 Consumer organisations: Fédération Internationale de l‟Automobile (FIA). 
Policy officers in relevant areas. 
These organisations were the contacted primary sources for interview partners for 
this research.  
Documentation Sources 
The most important documentation sources are the same organisations that were 
chosen for interviews. These documents are termed secondary sources here in order 
to distinguish interviews as primary sources although in principle these could be 
considered as primary sources as well as they are from directly concerned 
stakeholders.  
The secondary sources consist of the following:  
 Government side (Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers): 
communications, reports, legislative proposals, press releases, contributions 
to stakeholder consultation process, minutes of meetings (e.g. working 
groups), reports (parliament committees), adopted legislation, green papers, 
white papers, policy papers, speeches, staff working papers, web pages. 
                                              
187
 Despite repeated efforts to contact trade unions for inclusion in the data collection, these attempts 
were never answered. 
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 Market side (companies and associations): annual reports, industry reports, 
environmental or CSR or sustainability reports (terminology varies), press 
releases, position papers and comments, newsletters, web pages. 
 Civil society (NGOs): reports, press releases, newsletters, workshop 
proceedings, position papers (including comments and letters to members of 
parliament), web pages. 
Further secondary sources come from organisations or stakeholders not directly 
involved with the legislative process and include other international, European or 
national governmental or non-governmental institutions (e.g. in member states). 
These can again be in various forms, for instance contract research (e.g. for the 
European Commission or member state governments), formal studies, reports and 
evaluations of the regulatory areas, conference proceedings, mass media sources, 
academic publications and analysis of the policy areas.  
Among the further secondary sources, the following organisations were identified: 
TNO Science and Industry, Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), 
World Resources Institute (WRI), International Energy Agency (IEA), European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
Environment and Energy, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), FIA Foundation for 
the Automobile and Society, Centre for Automotive Industry Research (CAIR, 
Cardiff). 
Mass Media sources with relevant coverage on the EU, environmental policies and 
automotive issues include the following: European Voice, Financial Times, ENDS 
Europe Daily, Just-Auto, Automotive Environment Weekly, Automotive World, 
EurActiv, eceee newsletter (The European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy). 
Furthermore, German and British broadsheet newspapers were consulted.  
The majority of these sources are available online. Some of the mass media sources 
have restricted access (paid services) and thus the means to retrieve these sources 
for the thesis was through free trials, if necessary also repeatedly. 
While semi-structured interviews and the majority of secondary sources were of 
qualitative nature, some of the consulted documents also included quantitative data, 
for instance included in reports.  
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Appendix B: Mapping of companies‟ motivational factors for CPAs 
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Appendix C: Photograph of ELV files in EP 
The assistant of the MEP who was the responsible ELV rapporteur worked directly 
with the industry during the debate and allowed the author to photograph the files for 
the directive – the files on the top shelf displayed below were the remaining ones 
after two office moves and clearances, thereby demonstrating the scale and 
complexity of the discussions (Altauto-RL = ELV directive).  
 
 
